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Guest Column

Transboundary water diplomacy succeeds through flexible soft rules, sustained cooperation spirit, robust institutional capacity, and well-managed external support, as demonstrated by the Mekong River Commission's experience. The Mekong model offers valuable lessons for other contested river basins, provided they avoid reactive approaches and resist narrative distortions that compromise cooperative solutions.

Mismanagement of transboundary rivers would impact 153 countries sharing their common resources. This is over three billion people or 40 percent of the earth’s population. In our region, mismanagement of the Mekong River would not only directly impact six riparian countries and seventy million people, but also the whole region. This is due to the Mekong’s increasing importance for the rest of ASEAN’s food, energy, tourism, transport, and environment.

Like other large international rivers, the Mekong faces daunting challenges—balancing development and environment, responding to climate vulnerability, and managing geopolitical contestation. Yet, there is a growing recognition that Mekong transboundary management has gotten something right. As my colleagues and I have shown in “Water diplomacy and conflict management in the Mekong” and River Basin Organizations in Water Diplomacy, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) demonstrates that water diplomacy does work in the Mekong. Despite lacking enforcement power, the MRC has diffused crises (e.g. Vietnam-Cambodia over the impact of the Yali Falls dam, Vietnam-Laos over the construction of the Xayaburi dam, and Cambodia-Laos over the development of the Don Sahong dam), managed interstate water tensions (Thailand-Laos over the proposed Sanakham dam, China-Mekong countries on drought impact), and contributed to more sustainable design and management of major clashing infrastructure projects. Through the MRC mechanisms, even major powers have found something that they can get along with in the management of the Mekong geopolitical hotspot. Stakeholders of various stripes recognise that MRC’s processes give them data, information, knowledge, and opportunities to raise their voices openly that they otherwise would not have. 

While the Mekong’s challenges persist, its model of cooperative transboundary water governance has therefore drawn increasing attention from other contested major international river basins such as the Amazon, Aral Sea, the Ganges, the Nile, and Senegal. In these rivers, one often finds inadequate river monitoring, sporadic data sharing, no prior consultation of projects, no inclusive stakeholder platforms, and general mistrust. As one leader of a major basin told the author: “we just don’t like each other very much.”

But what should and should not be learned from the Mekong’s experience? Let’s start with the former: soft rules, a cooperative spirit, a strong secretariat, and supportive network of partners.

What Should Be Learned

First, build and use “soft” rules.

The Mekong Agreement of 1995 which establishes the MRC – along with its five water use Procedures (data sharing, water monitoring, maintenance of flows and quality, notification and consultation on projects, etc.), basin strategies, and technical guidelines—provides a “soft rules” regime: clear obligations with flexible and cooperative implementation. These take years to develop, negotiate, and agree by states—and thus have legitimacy. But unlike hard law, this approach does not seek to penalize but provides a framework for regional cooperation.

A telling contrast lies with the previous Mekong Committee era (1957-1994), when a 1975 rule allowed any country to veto another’s mainstream project—an idea that eventually proved unworkable. Similarly, early attempts to impose legalistic transboundary environmental impact assessment (TbEIA) rules in the Mekong modelled on Europe’s water frameworks stalled for eighteen years. It was only when the MRC made the TbEIA voluntary, with the state proposing the project retaining final say, that consensus was achieved.

Soft rules may not work immediately or all the time. But the key is that, if properly designed, implemented and followed up, they can still generate cooperation: meaningful data sharing, independent review, consultation with neighbours and broad stakeholders, betterment of the proposed project than originally designed, and impact monitoring during operation.

Second, nurture a cooperative spirit.

In a world where one superpower leads by might, transactions and deals, a cooperative spirit based on mutual understating, compromise, generosity and win-win outcomes are more important than ever. Central to Mekong cooperation is the intangible but important “Mekong Spirit”—the ethos that, even amid disagreement, countries should engage in dialogue, find mutual understanding and compromise, and certainly not walk away when the going gets tough. The “one Mekong, one Spirit” need to be nurtured, as it has managed tensions and sustained relations in a Southeast Asian region fraught with extraordinary diversity and past conflicts.

During tense episodes in Mekong water contestations—Vietnam’s request for ten year delay over Xayaburi, Cambodia’s challenge to bring Laos’ Don Sahong project to an international court, and Thailand’s ongoing objection to Sanakham project on its border with Laos—countries continued to engage and found compromise. Xayaburi was redesigned while a major study was launched to reconsider future dams, Don Sahong went ahead, but with joint monitoring, Sanakham’s consultation process was delayed by four years but remained on track. The Mekong spirit of cooperation continues in spite of the recent border clashes between two Mekong states, as exemplified by Cambodian and Thai representatives working together on a joint Cambodia-Thai project on flood management in the border area.

Third, build a strong secretariat.

A river basin organisation without strong technical and diplomatic capacity is a hollow shell. The MRC Secretariat (MRCS) has shown how a technically robust executive body with diplomatically skilled leaders can support and facilitate cooperation. A strong secretariat takes time to develop, with investment in staff, technical capacity, and impartiality. Both member states and their development partners must be credited for spending large amounts of money to building up a well-established MRC secretariat.

The MRCS' work during major disputes offers compelling examples. During the Xayaburi Dam controversy, while Laos locked horns with Vietnam and Cambodia, MRCS carried out rigorous assessments, facilitated dialogues between the countries, and offered practical design modifications—many of which Laos accepted and implemented at half a billion dollars of additional investment cost. The project became one of the most advanced dams in the world. In relations with China, the MRCS led joint studies and institutional cooperation with Chinese water-related agencies. These proved critical in securing China's agreement in data sharing, dam releases to alleviate drought, and dam management to alleviate floods.

The secretariat provided states with tools to increase understanding and reduce tensions, potentially, paving the way for future cooperation. The lesson: a strong secretariat does not tell states what to do; it offers the best possible solutions based on science and facilitates cooperation through public and quiet diplomacy.   

Fourth, leverage but manage external partners.

External actors (donors, technical partners) can be useful but should not dominate. Early in the MRC’s history, some donors were often overbearing, pushing their own agendas. This approach backfired during Xayaburi, when donor opposition “failed” to stop the project.

Over time, however, as Mekong countries became less poor and the MRC matured—with countries contributing more financially, and riparian MRCS CEO demonstrating stronger leadership—donors stepped back and began supporting priorities and approaches set by the MRC. They helped fund joint monitoring regimes, supported quiet diplomacy on  controversial projects instead of publicly shaming the countries, and provided technical and diplomatic support to the MRCS’ brokering agreements on dam data sharing and regional guidelines. Development partners work effectively when they trust the leadership and ownership of the institution in place, put resources where needed, and put their “logos at the back.”

What Should Not Be Learned

While the world’s contested rivers can reflect on the above four good lessons of the Mekong, there are two particularly bad lessons of Mekong water governance that the rest of the world could probably do without: reactive planning and biased narrative.

Don’t just follow reactive planning.

The first weakness of Mekong governance has been its tendency to react to already planned national projects rather than proactively shape basin-wide development. The MRC has often focused on assessing impacts and mitigating harms after projects are already designed—necessary but not sufficient.

This approach limits the MRC’s ability to reconsider potentially damaging projects or create joint projects with greater basin benefits. It also risks sparking tensions, as countries that have not participated in planning the projects would certainly feel uncertain about them. The Mekong Committee’s indicative basin plans of the 1970s-1980s, despite their flaws, had a more proactive vision: basin-wide planning for shared benefit. That spirit needs revival if the region is to move from damage control to future-building.

Don’t let biased media and NGOs dictate the narrative.

While civil society and media can play important roles in raising awareness, transparency and accountability, their interventions are sometimes irresponsible and not fact-based. In the Mekong, certain actors have been overly alarmist or selectively using “evidence,” fuelling mistrust rather than cooperation.

Examples include exaggerated claims about dam displacement impacts, oversimplified explanations for complex hydrological events like droughts and unsubstantiated allegations about military uses of water infrastructure projects. One-sided narratives inflame tensions and undermine the diplomacy and cooperation needed for transboundary governance. Fair and balance reporting must prevail over sensationalism and provocative headlines.

Conclusion

The Mekong River is the beating heart of ASEAN and a symbol of Southeast Asia’s interdependence, complexity, and potential. Its water diplomacy model—anchored in soft rules, cooperative spirit, a strong secretariat, and well-managed partnerships—is not only to be built further but also offers lessons for the world’s other complex rivers. But the Mekong experience is not a blueprint to be copied wholesale. Diplomacy must be grounded in regional context, responsive to state interests, reflective of basin vision, and alert to the risks of reaction and distortion. If studied carefully, the Mekong can inspire good actions for other global rivers—and that’s ultimately good news for the world.   

 

Anoulak Kittikhoun is Senior Visiting Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore and former CEO of the Mekong River Commission. He is the co-author of River Basin Organizations in Water Diplomacy and a number of articles on the Mekong.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Basile Morin

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