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Guest Column

On balance, for the Philippines, Donald Trump performed better than expected during his first presidency, which suggests that the Philippines will probably be fine under another Trump presidency.

The first Trump administration offered security guarantees on the South China Sea the Philippines sought but never received under President Barack Obama. Trump officials declared that armed attacks in the South China Sea, including those by paramilitary forces like the Chinese maritime militia, fall under the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty. They also abandoned the US’ previous stance of neutrality on the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, siding with the Philippines’ maritime claims as affirmed by the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration award (though remaining neutral on territorial issues). These policy shifts translated into more US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea during Trump’s four years than Obama’s eight. Moreover, for the first time, the US had imposed economic and visa sanctions against Chinese companies and individuals involved in land reclamation and militarisation in the South China Sea. Beyond the South China Sea, the US assisted the Philippines in retaking Marawi City from Muslim militants in 2017 and in rehabilitating it.

In the economic domain, US allies have succeeded in reviving the Trans-Pacific Partnership after Trump withdrew the US from the deal. The revived agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), shows that US allies can step up when the US backs down.

Yet, risks remain for the Philippines. Trump could be lured by China to reduce US military presence and assistance by offering a deal he could not refuse, such as if Beijing makes major economic concessions. If this does happen, Manila must rely on its own bourgeoning maritime capabilities or increase joint patrols with like-minded countries in the South China Sea.

Trump will also likely abandon the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and retreat from regional and global cooperation on non-traditional issues, especially climate change. If the US withdraws from IPEF, the Philippines could double its efforts to join the CPTPP as an economic hedge. At the least, Manila must position itself to benefit from another potential round of US-China trade conflict, as it had missed out on the gains from friendshoring during Trump’s first term. For now, the Philippines can rely on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), its recent free trade deal with South Korea, and existing economic agreements with Japan and the European Union.

On non-traditional issues, a US retreat would open space for other powers, even ASEAN, to demonstrate leadership. True multipolarity could emerge from this opportunity.

Lastly, it is not the intention of this piece to advocate for a more revisionist agenda towards the A second Trump administration will probably continue or even intensify US assistance to the Philippines. If not, the Philippines and its partners in the region are more prepared now to support themselves and each other.

Edcel John A. Ibarra is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

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