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Guest Column

The race for space-based solar power and the space economy is already underway between rivals China and India. Despite having much in common—as rising powers with nuclear weapons and large populations alongside a shared ambition of multipolarity—India and China regard each other with suspicion, both terrestrially and in space. Nowhere is this more obvious than in their competition over space-based solar power (SBSP).

SBSP involves collecting solar energy in space using solar-powered satellites and transmitting it wirelessly to Earth via microwaves or lasers. Once on the ground, a rectenna (a ground antenna) converts the electromagnetic energy into electricity and delivers it to the power grid for energy consumers.

The primary advantage of SBSP lies in its ability to collect energy consistently, irrespective of the weather or time of day. This makes it a reliable and efficient source of clean energy for satellites, remote communities, and disaster-stricken areas worldwide. The competition between China and India in this field highlights their quest for technological dominance and its potential to transform energy infrastructure on a global scale.

Growing Energy Demands

The concept of collecting solar power in space is not new. While Nikola Tesla developed the idea of wireless electricity transmission at the end of the nineteenth century and Konstantin Tsiolkovsky proposed beaming energy from space to Earth, science-fiction author Isaac Asimov popularised the idea in 1941 in his novel “Reason.” In 1968, aerospace engineer Peter Glaser published the first technical article on SBSP. Although the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the United States (US) confirmed its technical feasibility in the 1970s, the technology remained economically prohibitive.

However, growing pressure to meet climate goals and national space plans has sparked renewed interest in SBSP, including from countries like China and India. The pursuit of this technology has gained momentum in recent years, driven by the need to achieve net-zero emissions and fulfill environmental commitments on a global scale, as well as achieve space ambitions.

China

In recent decades, China has increasingly emerged as a key player in SBSP. In 2008, it listed SBSP as a key research program. In March 2016, Lieutenant General Zhang Yulin, a national lawmaker and deputy chief of the armament development department of the Central Military Commission, stated that China would make use of the space between the earth and the moon for solar power and other industrial development purposes. Linking SBSP to China’s national goals, Zhang declared, “The earth-moon space will be strategically important for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

In February 2019, construction of a RMB 200 million (USD 28.4 million) testing base commenced at Bishan District in Chongqing, Sichuan. A representative of the China Academy for Space Technology (CAST) stated that China would be the “first country in the world to build a space solar power station with practical value.”

Indeed, in June 2022, China formally announced it would build the first-ever solar power plant in space by 2028, which would be used to convert sunlight in outer space into an electrical supply to drive satellites in orbit or transmit power back to Earth.

India

India, an emerging space power, has made significant advancements in satellite technology and space exploration, having been interested in SBSP since the 1980s and has classified it as a renewable energy source.

Although the concept of SBSP has been discussed in various Indian scientific and policy forums, highlighting its potential benefits and challenges, it remains in the conceptual phase and has not yet been realised in the country.

In 2010, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the US National Space Society established a joint forum to enhance cooperation in harnessing solar energy through space-based solar collectors. This initiative, also known as the Kalam-National Space Society (NSS) Energy Initiative, is made up of individuals from India and the US with space-related expertise.

In 2018, the ISRO announced it bought the technology for space solar cells from the US for domestic mass production. These cells are necessary to power satellites in space and ensure they are functional. At the same time, this space and technology push fits in with Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ‘Make in India’ domestic policy.

The Militarisation of Space

More important perhaps, is the increasing militarisation of space in the competition for military dominance. In the case of China, it is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), rather than a civilian entity, that is responsible for space planning, directing organisations, and managing the taikonauts. Its 2019 defence white paper—China's National Defence in the New Era—also emphasised a growing role for the PLA Air Force in space, while the country’s 2021 white paper on space—China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective—highlighted President Xi Jinping’s ambition of making China a space power.

Some defence analysts have noted China’s rapidly expanding space-related military capabilities and the fact that it possesses the technology, hardware, and knowledge to coordinate a war from space. Beijing has already designated outer space as a military domain and built a military-run space station in Argentina's Patagonia region.

India, for its part, has become increasingly interested and also worried by the prospect of the militarisation of space. Although New Delhi has previously been publicly reticent on this issue, it has repeatedly raised its defence allocations for space-related military capabilities (such as space-based intelligence) over the last few years.

At present, New Delhi views space as critical for national security, including satellite communication, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and early warning systems, in India's broader defence strategy.

In March 2019, India conducted an Anti-Satellite Test (ASAT), referred to as ‘Mission Shakti,’ where it successfully destroyed one of its own satellites in low-earth orbit using a ground-launched missile. This test showcased India's accelerated development of its military space capacity, as well as capability to target and destroy satellites, which may be considered another step towards space militarisation.

To develop a globally competitive space warfare capability, the Indian government established the Defence Space Agency and the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO). In July 2019, all military members participated in India’s first combined space warfare exercise, reflecting India's commitment to developing dedicated space capabilities within its defence framework.

Various Indian officials, including those from the DRDO and ISRO, have made statements indicating that India is actively exploring military applications in space, noting also the need for counter-space capabilities to protect national security interests. More recently, following the publication of the country’s 2023 national space policy by ISRO, there are now calls for India’s Defence Space Agency to follow the US and issue its own military space doctrine.

The Sino-Indian competition for space bases further adds to the militarisation. While China had planned to build a base on the moon by 2035, this has been brought forward to 2027. India has similarly expressed an interest in building a moon base within this decade. Aside from rival lunar base plans, competition between the two countries to build bases on distant planets (such as Mars), however futuristic, is also likely.

Implications and Challenges

SBSP has the potential to open up new areas of research and innovation, and its development seems inevitable, despite past cost barriers. As an inexhaustible source of clean energy, it can be the solution to our planet’s rising energy demands, potentially ushering in a new energy age. Areas like deep space exploration and lunar operations could also benefit from utilising SBSP as an energy source.

Its resilience makes it valuable as a backup energy source during power shortages or attacks on (sub)national energy infrastructure. However, China and India face significant challenges regarding costs, the low efficiency of wireless power transmissions, and mitigating potential environmental impacts. Nonetheless, private sector interest and technological advancements are expected to drive down costs.

The pursuit of SBSP aligns with global geopolitics and geoeconomics in the space sector as well as the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry, with the two countries seeking to achieve scientific and economic hegemony in space. China currently appears to be racing well ahead of India. Already a contender in the global clean energy race and harbouring ambitious space plans, China may well become a leading, if not the leading space power, especially if the country develops SBSP before India and indeed the rest of the world.

China's advancements in SBSP could also bolster its Belt and Road Initiative, with Beijing offering this form of energy to other countries alongside existing opportunities for greater economic development and connectivity. As the International Space Station is set to be decommissioned by 2030, this may give China an upper hand, as its Tiangong Space Station becomes the sole orbiting station.

Amid an increasingly complex and fractured geopolitical environment, continued Sino-Indian competition alongside concerns over the militarisation of space and space-based weapons threaten to add another layer of conflict.

However, their shared interests in space exploration and energy could offer opportunities for cooperation as well. Given that the global space economy market is expected to be worth more than USD 540 billion by 2026, strengthening research capabilities in space mining, manufacturing, and other previously niche sectors, will become an increasingly lucrative and worthwhile endeavour. This could open the way for joint research collaborations between China and India. If such collaborations do produce mutually beneficial outcomes, both countries would be incentivised to ensure the partnership remains in place by prioritising cooperation over conflict or competition in other areas of their relationship, thereby bringing greater stability to bilateral ties.

Addressing Concerns

To reduce Chinese influence in space-related technologies and ‘catch up’ to China in outer space, New Delhi has sought to strengthen existing measures. These include enhancing space surveillance and tracking capabilities to monitor objects in space (such as satellites and Chinese space assets) and plans to establish its own space station—the ISRO Space Station (ISS).

Also, in line with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s push for self-reliance, India has been expanding the use of its regional navigation satellite system—Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC). Operational since 2018, the system allows the Indian government to enhance the country’s strategic autonomy and national security by reducing reliance on foreign systems, including the US Global Positioning System (GPS). Its development has also been a source of national pride, seen as a challenge to China’s BeiDou system. Arguing that NavIC provides more accurate domestic navigation and that its use would benefit the Indian economy, Modi’s administration and space officials have been pushing for smartphone giants (such as Samsung, Xiaomi, and Apple) to produce new smartphones compatible with NavIC.

Additionally, India has sought collaborations with other countries to strengthen space cooperation. It has actively engaged in ‘space diplomacy,’ signing space-related formal cooperation arrangements with numerous countries as well as with international multilateral bodies such as the European Commission and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). These agreements focus on promoting cooperation in research, satellite technology, space exploration, and space-based services.

Participation in international forums and organisations related to space (such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) further aim to shape discussions on space governance and security and may be used by New Delhi to decrease China’s influence regarding outer space. Doing so also reinforces India’s position and rising influence in the global space arena.

Looking Ahead

As both China and India seek to compete for influence and advance their strategic interests, the growing significance of space-based energy could expand the existing geopolitical competition to the realm of geospace.

To counter China's assertiveness and expand its influence, India may seek greater space cooperation with the other Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) members (Australia, Japan, and the US) and engage with Global South countries and organisations like the African Union. By doing so, India aims to not only enhance its presence on Earth and in outer space but also potentially offset China's space activities. This approach aligns with India's wariness of China's rise and its assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a geopolitical and global strategy adviser interested in regional resource conflict and environmental governance in Asia. She is a researcher at Oxford Global Society, the Asia-Pacific analyst for The Red Line podcast, a 2023 Pacific Forum Young Leader, and a 2023 Yenching Global Symposium delegate. She tweets at @GenevieveDonn.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit: iStock/loveguli

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