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Guest Column

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as Quad, is a strategic dialogue between the United States (US), Japan, Australia, and India. It gained media attention after its reestablishment in 2017. In May 2022, leaders of these four countries met and released a joint statement which reaffirmed their resolve to “uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion”. In particular, the statement singled out “challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas”.

Although the Quad does not openly criticize China, Beijing views the grouping as an ‘anti-China’ alliance. For example, immediately after the release of the joint statement, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded by urging “relevant countries” not to establish a “small circle” or to “instigate a confrontation” [between China and others]. Another spokesperson from the MFA stated that any frameworks for regional cooperation should not “target a third country.” It is, therefore, safe to say that China does not hold the Quad in a favorable light.

One might then wonder whether recent developments regarding the Quad have a negative impact on Sino-Indian relations. Despite China’s public stance that the Quad is a tool of containment, Chinese analysts believe that it is ill-suited for this purpose. Evidence for this can be drawn from writings and interviews with former Chinese diplomats, as well as Chinese policy analysts who have close ties to the Chinese government.

In 2018, Wu Zhenglong, a retired Chinese ambassador, doubted the utility of the Quad, arguing that “India is still pursuing a hedging strategy and will not seek a formal alliance with the United States”. Ma Jiali, a senior India specialist from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a government think tank under China’s Ministry of State Security, noted in 2020 that despite the existence of the Quad, there remained areas of disagreement and friction between India and the US, including over trade, Indian weapons purchases from Russia, and US-Pakistan relations. When interviewed in 2021 on the recent military standoff between China and India along the border, one Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) analyst dismissed the Quad as nothing new, reasoning that the Biden administration has limits to its India policy, while India is also cautious about certain aspects of US policies.

These views are shared by Chinese analysts from various other government think tanks as well as senior Chinese scholars. In short, the Quad has not changed China’s view that the US and India will not establish a formal alliance, a development which would potentially increase the risks of a military escalation involving the United States in Sino-Indian border disputes. As such, although China’s official stance toward the Quad is negative, the Quad in practice, does not seem to be a significant detriment to Sino-Indian relations. From China’s perspective, there are still obstacles that both India and the US have to overcome before establishing a formal alliance.

In fact, Sino-Indian relations seem to be on the mend in 2022. In March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India. This visit marked the first high-level Chinese official visit to India following the Sino-Indian border clash in 2020. Lin Minwang, a former Chinese diplomat in India, believed that Wang Yi’s visit was a sign that China wanted to improve Sino-Indian relations and reduce bilateral tensions. Lin noted that India’s muted response on the Russian invasion of Ukraine suggested mutual interests and the possibility of an improved relationship between India and China. Moreover, the aforementioned MFA responses on the Quad focused on the US. The MFA never once singled out India when making remarks on the Quad. As such, the Quad does not seem to have a major impact on Sino-Indian relations.

Overall, the Quad is a useful mechanism for India to engage the Asia-Pacific region. It is important to note that the Quad is not fixated on China. As its recent joint statement indicates, it is aimed at resolving many issues, including non-traditional security ones such as the global pandemic and climate change, both of which China has an interest in. Moving forward, it is possible for Quad members to engage China on these non-traditional security related issues to reduce tension and further collaborate. Moreover, as my previous research suggests, if the media exposure, that is, international media reports, of the Quad can be reduced, China’s response might be more subdued. Oftentimes, when the Quad’s activities garner huge media attention, Beijing is driven to respond in an assertive manner in order to appear tough in front of other countries in the region. This could easily trigger a vicious cycle of action and reaction between China and the Quad. Reducing and downplaying media attention would help to avoid this.

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Ketian Vivian Zhang, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of International Security in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. She studies rising powers, coercion, economic statecraft, and maritime disputes in international relations and social movements in comparative politics, with a regional focus on China and East Asia.

Image credit: Pxhere

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