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Guest Column

On September 5, 2023, ASEAN leaders reviewed the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC)—a policy framework focused on dialogue, de-escalation of violence, and humanitarian assistance in an effort to address the humanitarian and political crisis in Myanmar after the coup in February 2021. Although the 5PC had been issued more than two years prior, little progress had been achieved. The military-led State Administration Council (SAC) continued to utilise violent and repressive tactics against civilian protestors. And the bloody civil war waged by the junta against the multiple armed groups that opposed it, including the National Unity Government (NUG), the numerous Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), and the various People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) that emerged post-coup, showed no signs of ceasing.

Faced with such a state of affairs, the meeting saw ASEAN leaders publicly acknowledge Myanmar’s limited progress in the implementation of the 5PC and move to deny Myanmar the ASEAN chair for 2026—a position rotated alphabetically among members, and one of the most significant decisions taken by the regional bloc since the crisis. Interestingly, the ASEAN official statement also called for enhanced cooperation “between ASEAN with neighbouring countries of Myanmar” to address the crisis.

This recognition of the role of critical neighbours, like India and China, in supporting ASEAN’s 5PC is well-timed, especially given that the intractability of the Myanmar crisis threatens to dent ASEAN’s credibility. The response of regional states like India, Thailand, and China have been ambiguous, engaging the military despite rhetorical statements on the need to stem violence and restore democracy; while Western responses have been far more explicit, focusing on sanctioning military officials, condemning human rights abuses, offering humanitarian aid, and calling on ASEAN to put further pressure on the junta-led regime in Myanmar to return to democracy. Indeed, there has been much discussion on ASEAN’s cooperation with the Western states and multilateral agencies to support Myanmar. However, I argue that ASEAN could strategically ‘resource’ itself by harnessing the comparative strengths of regional states like India and China, bringing in their untapped leverage, influence, and capacity to deliver on the 5PC.

In particular, this ‘strategic resourcing’ approach by ASEAN could help deliver on two domains of the 5PC: i) institute humanitarian corridors from Indian and Chinese borderlands to deliver aid; ii) and take advantage of India and China’s economic, political, and normative leverages with the various local factions to foster dialogue and bring a quick end to the violence, as well as open the way for a viable long-term solution acceptable to all parties.

Strategic Resourcing: Humanitarian Assistance, De-escalation and Inclusive Dialogue

The ‘strategic resourcing’ approach to support humanitarian assistance delivery through India and China, would help alleviate the pressures along the Thai-Myanmar borderlands—the primary route for aid delivery channels into Myanmar. Instituting multiple aid corridors would also ensure that assistance is delivered to hard-to-reach ethnic areas, enabling ASEAN to not have to solely rely on the SAC’s aid channels, as well as mitigate the core critique about ASEAN’s aid being state-centric and promoting the legitimacy of the military.

In terms of delivering on such a policy, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) which is already leading in delivering humanitarian assistance could include India and China on three issues: i) initiating a pooled fund to address the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar with contributions from all regional partners; ii) convening a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with India and China to allow for the usage of their border towns for establishing humanitarian corridors to deliver aid in the borderlands but also within Myanmar; iii) forging a coalition of partners that include the United Nations (UN), local civil society partners within Myanmar, as well as non-state actors working on relief in India and China to review, assess and deliver on humanitarian assistance.

As it stands, India and China’s bilateral humanitarian assistance and their support to other international organisations to address the crisis in Myanmar have largely been limited and not well-institutionalised. Throwing their support behind an ASEAN-led regional initiative might be a more efficient use of their resources and more effective at addressing their own security concerns. For example, managing refugee flows from Myanmar could be achieved more systematically, mitigating pressures on cross-border communities, and lowering the likelihood of non-traditional security threats like the spread of diseases and pandemics.

Secondly, India and China as key investors, diplomatic partners, and critical neighbours bring an innate sense of leverage among all parties of the political settlement. The first political step in an ASEAN framework is seen to be addressing or stemming the violence. While this is undoubtedly important, it is merely a temporary band-aid for the crisis. Achieving a more permanent solution will require not only fostering dialogue between all sides including the different EAOs and PDFs, but also ensuring that the dialogue achieves the compromises and commitments to key demands, including democracy, federalism, civilian supremacy, and reform of the security sector. An ASEAN-led dialogue process with ASEAN’s Special Envoy(s) as the primary facilitator, and with India and China along with other regional states as key guarantors, will create a broad international momentum that incentivises parties to agree to dialogue.

It needs to be noted that dialogue remains an unpopular option among key domestic parties. From my interviews with EAO representatives, for an ASEAN-led dialogue process to be seen as credible and accepted, it would have to set out certain preconditions, such as an immediate end to violence against civilians, recognition of the NUG, pressure on the junta to restore democracy and outline future steps for non-engagement in politics, the release of political prisoners, and accountability. The process will also need to be broad-based, involving not only the NUG and the SAC, but also the EAOs as well as bodies like the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). In this regard, regional partners, like India in particular, will be able to assist with technical support, and sharing experiences and best practices to facilitate agendas of democracy, and civilian supremacy.

Adding to ASEAN’s Heft

ASEAN’s partnership with India and China on the 5PC also adds capacity and credibility, while addressing the cost and complexity of the issue. Cooperation with India and China enhances ASEAN’s capacity at a time when there is a growing realisation that ASEAN alone does not have enough leverage with the new military government to ensure it abides by the 5PC. As Angshuman Choudhury notes, “with other influential regional powers added to the mix, the junta might comply quicker.” Indeed, a coordinated stance with India and China would strengthen ASEAN’s capacity to create sustained pressure on the SAC to comply, correct course, and not hedge its bets by courting different international actors.

Similarly, in a fragmented context like Myanmar, with competing claims of legitimacy and governance by multiple actors, India and China’s support in leveraging different domestic groups for dialogue would enhance the credibility of the process. India and China’s support in getting various parties to the table would ensure that the dialogue is broad-based and enhance the legitimacy of the dialogue process.

China commands huge, albeit not unlimited, leverage on a range of EAOs across Northern Myanmar that rely on Beijing formally and informally for food, medicine and arms. Moreover, it had already demonstrated its ability to persuade these groups to come to the dialogue table, such as during the 2017 Union Peace Conference.

Similarly, India with its democratic institutions, mechanisms for minority accommodation, and a deeply rooted practice of civilian supremacy over the armed forces can provide support through technical assistance and experience sharing based on its domestic model, which many EAOs are keen to learn.

While cooperation with India and China on Myanmar will incur costs for ASEAN—financial, diplomatic, and institutional—in the short term, it will also ensure greater cost-sharing in the longer term. With two Envoys nominated and humanitarian assistance underway, ASEAN has already incurred costs but has yet to has to see concrete results. With India and China in the equation, despite the added costs, it is likely to have more promising prospects.

Lastly, getting India and China’s cooperation on Myanmar will likely involve a highly complex process of discussions and negotiations, further hindered by the vested interests these two countries have with maintaining friendly relations with the military junta. However, successfully bringing India and China on board would address some of the complexities that have impeded an effective international response towards Myanmar, including, the pre-occupation of Western states with multiple other crises, including the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the intra-ASEAN divide. On the latter, while having China on board creates incentives for ASEAN countries leaning towards it to collaborate, invoking a partnership with India might be seen by the rest as a more balanced way to engage China, creating greater momentum for the 5PC.

Monalisa Adhikari, PhD, is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Stirling.

This article is based on the author's paper, “Framing ASEAN’s Cooperation with India and China over Myanmar Post-coup: A Strategic Resourcing Framework,” published in the journal, Contemporary Southeast Asia. The paper can be accessed here.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/MgHla

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