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Guest Column

In a recent high-level diplomatic engagement during the 23rd Meeting of the Special Representatives (SRs) of India and China, India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval visited China and met Mr Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dialogue signals a cautious but noteworthy effort to normalise relations between the two Asian giants. Amid unresolved tensions, particularly the border stand-off along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), both nations appear to be inching toward pragmatic cooperation in critical areas, such as the sharing of transboundary river data.

Around half of the world's population depends on 310 transboundary lake and river basins that span across 151 nations. Many of these basins are shared by India and China, the region’s two largest riparians, and their neighbours. However, nearly 60 percent of these shared water resources lack agreements or frameworks for collaborative management. India and China share three major transboundary basins: the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM), the Indus, and the Irrawaddy. The exchange of water data and information is widely recognised as a cornerstone of cooperation. This principle is embedded in the evolution of water treaties, which focused on allocation between riparian states.

Currently, two key international conventions guide transboundary water management: the 1992 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, and the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWCC). Both conventions emphasise the importance of gathering, exchanging, and sharing water resource information. Article 9 of the UNWCC mandates the regular exchange of data on watercourse conditions, including hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological, and ecological aspects. Similarly, Article 13 of the UNECE Convention allows riparian states to request unavailable data from neighboring states, with compliance potentially subject to reasonable charges for data collection and processing. Transboundary water cooperation is monitored globally under the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6.5.2, which emphasises the efficient management of shared water resources.

India and China are involved in a limited number of bilateral water agreements. Despite sharing significant transboundary basins, agreements that directly involve the two nations are scarce. Existing agreements prioritise procedural rules, focusing on information-sharing and technical cooperation, including emergency notifications. Key agreements include the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra River, under which China provides hydrological data to India twice daily during the flood season (June 1 to October 15). This agreement, renewed every five years, has been extended to expand the data-sharing period, most notably in 2013. The MoU expired in June 2023 and is currently undergoing renegotiations. Another agreement, the 2005 MoU on the Langqen Zangbo/Sutlej River, facilitated hydrological data sharing but expired in 2020, and renewal discussions are ongoing. Under the 2014 Implementation Plan, India has to pay an annual fee of CNY 850,000 for hydrological data. Additionally, the Expert Level Mechanism, which was established in 2006, serves as a platform to discuss data sharing, emergency measures, and related issues. While these agreements reflect incremental progress, they lack the comprehensive scope required to address all of the key elements of transboundary water governance.

Despite the potential for a general framework agreement, there are several factors that have hindered comprehensive water governance. Geopolitical and national interests, along with regional politics and conflicting national priorities, have complicated treaty negotiations, often stalling efforts. Furthermore, India and China have primarily relied on non-binding arrangements, such as MoUs and joint declarations, to manage shared waters.

The absence of binding legal frameworks means that current agreements must rely on mutual goodwill rather than enforceable mechanisms. Hydropower development conflicts also present significant challenges. China’s current proposed Medog Hydropower Dam near the Indian border has raised concerns over water flow control, potential dry-season shortages, sudden flood risks, sediment disruption affecting agriculture, and biodiversity loss in downstream regions of India and Bangladesh. Geopolitical concerns include China’s unilateral control over the Brahmaputra, lack of a water-sharing treaty, and the risk of weaponising water in disputes. The dam’s location in a seismically active region also raises fears of dam failure, threatening downstream populations. India has since proposed countermeasures, such as the development of a hydropower project in Arunachal Pradesh, to mitigate potential risks.

China has positioned hydropower as a key element of its strategy to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060, as outlined in its 14th Five-Year Plan. Significant projects are planned along the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River, including seven mainstream dams and eighteen dams on tributaries. In contrast, India’s hydropower development has faced domestic opposition, financial constraints, and technical challenges. This has limited its capacity to match China’s ambitions and scale of development.

The revival of dialogue on transboundary water management reflects a shared recognition of the need to insulate water diplomacy from broader geopolitical disputes. Functional cooperation in this area has broader implications for other transnational challenges, such as climate change and regional trade. Transparent and timely data-sharing mechanisms can prevent disasters, enhance regional stability, and foster trust between the two nations.

Meaningful progress in transboundary water governance requires sustained efforts and mutual trust. To achieve this, both nations must institutionalise mechanisms to ensure accountability, transparency, and continuity. They should prioritise the development of a binding legal framework to address the equitable and reasonable use of the shared resource, early notifications, and environmental impact assessments. At the same time, both India and China should leverage existing platforms like the Expert Level Mechanism to expand dialogue and foster collaboration for the sustainable use of water resources. The visit by NSA Doval and the willingness of Chinese officials to engage in discussions represent a shared understanding on the importance of water governance and a crucial opportunity to strengthen cooperation between both Asian giants. It is now up to both governments to translate this dialogue into tangible outcomes that would benefit their citizens and the region at large. Water knows no boundaries—and neither should efforts for peace and cooperation.

Neeraj Singh Manhas is the Special Advisor for South Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. He is also a subject matter expert on Water Security in South Asia, India-China Hydropolitics, Climate Security and Transboundary Rivers, at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), Ministry of Defence, Government of India. He has published his writings for renowned institutions such as the Institute for Security & Development Policy, (ISDP) in Sweden, the Pacific Forum in Hawaii, the Lowy Institute in Australia, the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. He tweets on X (formerly Twitter) @The_China_Chap.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

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