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Guest Column

China and India represent a unique case within the Global South. Together, they are the largest emitters, contributing more than one-third of the total global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (China contributes about 26 percent and India about 7 percent, making them the world’s largest and third-largest emitters, respectively). At the same time, both countries have become increasingly vulnerable to adverse impacts of climate change with recurrent extreme weather events such as flash floods, heat waves, and coastal erosion.

Internationally, both nations have set climate targets, yet these goals lack the ambition to prevent the most severe consequences of climate change. India and China are among the wealthiest developing countries, with significant geopolitical influence over their peers. This positions them as contenders to lead the Global South not only in climate mitigation efforts but also resilience building and adaptation. Furthermore, both countries face growing expectations from the Global North as well as low-income countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), to take on more responsibility for climate action. They are also expected to differentiate themselves from the rest of the developing country bloc due to their ability to mobilise international finance (both public and private) and their comparatively higher capacity to implement climate solutions with fewer challenges than low-income countries.

In this context, while climate cooperation has historically remained limited due to geopolitical challenges, the recent warming in bilateral ties, with greater stability at the border, opens up new opportunities for these Asian giants to work together in advancing climate action as well as cementing their position as global leaders. This piece explores the challenges and opportunities for collaboration that could strengthen trust and bilateral relations in the long run.

Climate Cooperation, Geopolitical warming, and the Climate Imperative

Sino-Indian relations have been remained tensed due to territorial disputes along their shared border. The 2020 border standoff in Galwan Valley, the worst since the 1962 war, had significantly impacted any progress made in building bilateral ties over the years. Security concerns—both territorial and economic – have hindered meaningful cooperation.

Bilateral engagements on climate, though limited, date back to the 1990s. Major agreements on climate cooperation were reached between 2009 and 2010, with notable progress made in 2015 ahead of the Paris Agreement. In their 2015 joint statement, both countries emphasised that their partnership was “mutually beneficial,” and pledged to enhance dialogue on domestic climate policies as well as multilateral negotiations. They had also committed to collaborate on practical cooperation in areas such as clean energy technologies, energy efficiency, low-carbon urbanisation, and climate adaptation. However, post-Paris, engagement on climate cooperation waned following the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the continued political and boundary issues.

Interestingly, there has been some consistency and continuity on the multilateral front. Both countries have engaged within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by coordinating through the BASIC countries group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) as well as more recent Global South-oriented platforms such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As recently as 2024, through the BASIC group, they had jointly called for “unilateral trade-restrictive measures” in the COP29 agenda, reflecting a shared stance on addressing climate-related trade imbalances. Last year, through the BRICS platform, China supported India’s bid to host COP33 in 2028. More notably, during COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, India and China effectively coordinated to ensure that the final decision text avoided binding commitments to a coal phaseout, instead adopting much weaker language on coal phasedown.

Nevertheless, recent developments on total disengagement at the border have created space for greater dialogue between the two countries. At the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for the first time after five years—a strategic step towards realigning their bilateral ties. In a post on X, Modi stated that India-China relations were “important for the people of our countries and for regional and global peace and stability.” While most of the positive spillovers are expected in the commercial space, there is also a renewed opportunity for both countries to pursue efforts towards mutual beneficially cooperation in the climate domain. The urgency of climate action and shared vulnerabilities provide strong incentives for such collaboration. Hansen and Kaack have also highlighted that “cooperation or non-cooperation between the two countries on climate would have significant repercussions for the global community.”

Low Hanging Fruit: Climate Cooperation can strengthen bilateral ties

While the de-escalation of border tensions is an important step forward, it should also not be understood as a complete reset of ties and a restoration of trust between the two countries. However, it is important to utilise this momentum and seize the opportunity to work towards the greater good of the global community.

Given this renewed opportunity, both countries should leverage climate cooperation to achieve a dual purpose: supporting each other in fulfilling their climate ambitions—including energy transition and adaptation efforts – while also strengthening their bilateral ties. Revisiting the 2015 Joint Statement offers a valuable starting point, focusing on areas such as clean energy technologies, energy conservation, energy efficiency, and sustainable transportation, including electric vehicles. This cooperation could also further expand in emerging areas such as green hydrogen development and greening the logistics industry. Addressing air pollution is another critical area where India can learn and benefit from China’s experience. The policies implemented in Beijing to curb air pollution could serve as a guide for India to address similar challenges in its major cities such as Delhi and Mumbai.

Another promising area for cooperation is the protection of the Himalayan region, which is experiencing adverse climate change impacts in the form of receding glaciers, desertification, and glacial lack outburst floods (GLOF). However, this is easier said and done, as it raises significant security concerns related to both territorial and water disputes. For instance, India has expressed concern following China’s recent approval of a mega dam (touted to be the world’s largest dam) on the Tibetan Plateau’s Yarlung Zangbo which takes the name Brahmaputra as it enters India. While China has insisted that the dam will not negatively impact downstream riparians (India and Bangladesh), it might do more to alleviate concerns for the two downstream countries by working together using data and research from neutral, independent bodies such as the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).

There is also potential for climate issues to be incorporated into high-level diplomatic engagements. For instance, the issue of transboundary rivers and the sharing hydrological information was discussed during the recent meeting of Special Representatives of India and China, NSA Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in December 2024. A promising starting point for cooperation would be to strengthen existing channels such as the Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) to facilitate the exchange of hydrological data—which will facilitate responses to climate related adverse events.

China’s economic might bring significant climate financing to the table, while India’s strength lies in its capacity for low-cost and innovative climate solutions. Collaboration in these areas could lay the foundation for exploring triangular cooperation models to support other global south countries in their energy transition efforts. So far, both countries have had different approaches to South-South cooperation. While China has engaged on a bilateral front with other developing countries through financing critical large-scale infrastructure and development projects, India has focused on cooperation through capacity building and supporting small-scale resilience projects. This includes initiatives such as the UN Fund and other minilateral alliances such as the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI). By bringing their respective strengths to the table, both countries could not only yield mutual benefits but also foster positive outcomes for the entire Global South community.

Way Forward

With around a third of the global population, India and China have a vested interest in protecting their citizens from the varying impacts of climate change, while also aiding other developing countries build a shared future. Joining forces on climate efforts—domestically and internationally—could be a mutually beneficial pathway that would also help their developing country allies. This could be achieved by collaborating on existing platforms such as China’s Global Development Initiative, and India’s ISA and CDRI.

It is clear that both India and China stand to benefit by becoming partners rather than rivals in their pursuit of leadership in the Global South. In the short term, the return of a Trump administration in the United States could provide another window for the two countries to strengthen their development partnership and pursue shared interests. Despite the Indian government’s efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese-made solar equipment, China remains India’s largest trading partner. The Economic Survey of India has also highlighted last year that India could benefit from integrating into Chinese supply chain, especially in clean energy and sustainable transportation sectors.

In the long term, the two countries can utilise existing multilateral platforms including BRICS and G20 to address pressing issues facing the Global South including food and water security, climate finance for energy transition, adaptation, and resilience building.

Meera Gopal is a Senior Program Officer (Climate) at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) and focuses on climate diplomacy and cooperation in Asia, particularly South Asia. Her social media platforms include-LinkedIn, X, and Bluesky.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit:wikicommons/Prime Minister’s Office

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