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Guest Column

ASEAN should strengthen regional food security through diversified import networks, collaborative reserves, and climate-adaptive agriculture to address current trade uncertainties and supply chain vulnerabilities affecting Southeast Asia's population.

Global food systems have faced increasing strain in recent years, with crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts exposing vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Southeast Asia, home to more than 670 million people, is particularly vulnerable due to its reliance on imports of staples like wheat, soybeans, and maize. These disruptions have left ASEAN countries exposed to the shocks of fluctuating global markets, supplies, and (geo)political tensions. With regional vulnerabilities compounded by climate change and the US-China trade tensions, the need for a comprehensive food security strategy has never been more urgent.

ASEAN’s food security challenges are varied. ASEAN’s current production levels are highly unsustainable and remain insufficient to meet its own demands. Indonesia imports all of its wheat, leaving it vulnerable to global price and supply fluctuations and shipping delays. Singapore and Timor-Leste, which import around 90 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of their food, are similarly exposed to any disruptions in trade. Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, a vital rice-producing region, faces saltwater intrusion from rising sea levels, while Thailand struggles with erratic monsoon seasons. These vulnerabilities highlight the urgent need for a diversified and resilient food security strategy which can be tailored to local contexts.

Economic Consequences and Vulnerabilities

The resurgence of US protectionist policies poses dual risks and opportunities for ASEAN, as the US is the bloc's second largest export market and a top food import source (e.g., soybeans, wheat). New measures risk key domino effects: surplus American/Canadian crops flooding ASEAN markets, undercutting farmers; redirected trade flows inflating prices via bottlenecks; and currency volatility raising import costs in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN exporters like palm oil producers may gain US market share amid rising domestic prices, but overreliance risks production cuts for smallholders and surplus “dumping” in non-US markets. Meanwhile, Beijing’s tariffs on US goods could redirect American farmers to alternative markets like ASEAN, heightening competition with locals.

ASEAN’s Responses to Food Insecurity Concerns

ASEAN has implemented various regional initiatives to enhance food security. Key efforts include the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve under the ASEAN Food Security Reserve and the ASEAN Food Security Information System. Yet more can be done.

Strategic Responses for Regional Resilience

Building on existing efforts like the ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea, and Japan) Emergency Rice Reserve, ASEAN must promote a multifaceted regional food reserve system, diversifying staples beyond rice to include wheat, soybeans, and maize. This buffer would mitigate global market volatility, supply chain disruptions, and external shocks while ensuring stable access to critical imports during crises.

To complement local production (boosted by artificial intelligence, agricultural technologies, and biotechnologies), ASEAN should deepen partnerships with agricultural powerhouses like Australia and New Zealand—key exporters of grains and oilseeds (the backbone of food security) —to build alternative supply chains and strengthen regional reserves. These reserves should be regularly monitored, reviewed, and adjusted when necessary to reflect shifting needs. Strengthening regional ties reduces reliance on distant suppliers, insulating Southeast Asia from global instability.

Furthermore, encouraging stronger intra-ASEAN trade and efforts could further help shield the bloc from geopolitical and climate shocks and also supply chain volatility, providing a buffer against external shocks. To this end, the region’s bigger food producers, like Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, could lead the way. With intra-ASEAN trade under 30 percent, there is significant potential to increase this.

At the same time, coordinated investments in regional supply chains and early warning systems for climate risks, food chokepoints, and price volatility would enable more proactive responses to (sudden) disruptions as well as adaptation to any long-term changes.

Diversifying suppliers is critical for ASEAN to reduce overreliance on specific regions for agricultural imports like grains and fertilizers. The urgency of this strategy was starkly highlighted by the outbreak of the war between agricultural powerhouses Ukraine and Russia that together accounted for 25 to 30 percent of global wheat and 15 percent of corn exports. The Russia-Ukraine war exposed Southeast Asia's food vulnerability, particularly in Laos, which sourced 98 percent of its wheat from these countries. The conflict triggered food shortage fears, price inflation, and fierce competition as ASEAN nations scrambled to secure limited alternative supplies, pitting them against buyers from East Asia and the Middle East. ASEAN can draw lessons from Singapore, which hedges risk by sourcing food from over 170 countries. Such strategies highlight the power of proactive diversification to buffer against geopolitical shocks.

The Path Forward

ASEAN’s food security is increasingly at risk due to external shocks, climate change, and geopolitical tensions. However, by adopting a more integrated and diversified approach, the region can build resilience and protect its citizens from future crises. Boosting local production, regional cooperation and concomitant investment in climate adaptation technologies combined with stronger trade networks, including inter-ASEAN trade, are key to ensuring food security. In a world of overlapping crises, ASEAN must act now. Only a united strategic vision can provide the stability and resilience needed to secure the region’s food future.

Ms Genevieve Donnellon-May is a geopolitical and global strategy adviser interested in regional resource governance (land, energy, water) and environmental conflict in Asia. Currently, she is the Asia-Pacific analyst at The Red Line, a researcher at the Oxford Global Society, and a fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit: istock/hadynyah

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