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Guest Column

The 2025 Pahalgam attack that claimed twenty-six lives and wounded seventeen individuals in Indian-controlled Kashmir had rapidly escalated tensions between India and Pakistan, whose relations have been fraught for decades. In response, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration undertook several actions, including promptly expelling some Pakistani diplomats and suspending the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan’s retaliatory countermeasures included the suspension of the 1972 Simla Agreement and bilateral trade with India, as also closing its flight space to air traffic from India. The Pahalgam attack drove a renewed armed conflict along the disputed border and has since seen the United States (US) and China calling on both India and Pakistan to defuse the situation and avoid further escalation to maintain regional peace.

Against the tense backdrop, China, in response to media inquiries during a regular press conference, called on both parties to exercise restraint and expressed support for a Sino-Russian-led investigation—an initiative backed by Pakistan to help defuse the situation. Despite supporting Pakistan’s call for a neutral probe into the Pahalgam attack, China’s spokesperson's response did not explicitly side with either party but instead appealed for joint cooperation and harmony, one that is consistent with China’s diplomacy. However, this came just one day after China Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed China’s support for Pakistan, characterising the relationship as an “all-weather strategic” partnership and referring to Pakistan as an “ironclad friend” during a phone call initiated by his Pakistani counterpart Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Wang’s official response echoed the spokesperson's narrative, albeit with a subtle yet clear affirmation of China’s support to Pakistan—an expression that carries profound implications for China-India relations.

China’s strong bilateral All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership with Pakistan is deeply rooted in strategic cooperation across areas such as economic, security, and infrastructure domains—most prominently through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Between 2005 and 2024, through the CPEC, Pakistan received $68 billion in investment from China, and separately, between 2019 and 2023, 82 percent of Pakistan’s military assets were from China. China’s relationship with Pakistan is not just extended to its influence in South Asia but also to counterbalance India. At a meeting on May 5, 2025 with Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong, used the same rhetoric as Wang, signalling China’s clear and continued support for Pakistan.

These actions reflect the fact that Pakistan is not merely a strategic ally, but also an integral part of China’s broader diplomatic calculus. With stronger relations with Pakistan, China keeps India’s regional dominance in check, especially as India’s ties with the US continue to strengthen. India has been a key beneficiary of US efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese goods and manufacturing, as major US corporations aim to relocate their manufacturing and assembly operations to India. This trend only deepens the rivalry between China and India. The well-known Indian newspaper, The Economic Times, claims that China’s support for Pakistan is only rhetorical with no tangible matching actions. However, such a perspective underestimates China’s resolve and assumes that it will sit idly on the sidelines—an assumption that could be detrimental to India’s strategic decision-making by promoting a misguided view.

China and India’s relations are more rivalrous than amicable in nature, underpinned by thorny issues such as territorial disputes, military skirmishes, and economic competition. This was starkly illustrated in 2020, when the Sino-Indian border dispute escalated into armed clashes and a massive military build-up along the frontier, reflecting the precariousness of their bilateral ties. Although tensions have de-escalated since 2022 and relations appear friendlier, it would be prudent to recognise that such tranquillity is only temporary—vulnerable to future catalysts such as the India-US Trade Agreement, which may be seen as an attempt to appease the US for relief from Liberation Day Tariffs, or renewed tensions in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. These global developments, especially in light of the perilous economic outlook, could further deepen the already complex China-India relations, amplifying existing tensions. India’s perception of China’s support for Pakistan is especially important, given the deep-rooted strategic mistrust between both countries. This mistrust was evident during the negotiation process to de-escalate the 2020 Sino-Indian border conflict, as both sides simultaneously advanced the modernisation of military infrastructure in the disputed border regions.

Without a doubt, China is using Pakistan as a strategic proxy to destabilise and curb India’s rise. However, it is clear that India is not only concerned about China’s influence in Pakistan, given that China could potentially seek to marginalise and alienate India diplomatically and strategically through the BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where it continues to exert significant dominance. This is further compounded by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s renewed push to enhance China’s soft power, articulated through a ten-year vision to transform China into a cultural powerhouse by 2035. According to the Global Soft Power Index 2025, China ranks second, right behind the US in overall soft power, reflecting China’s expanding influence.

Wang and Jiang’s repeated emphasis on China-Pakistan relations as “ironclad brothers” reflects a deeper commitment. Even if China’s valuation of Pakistan has declined, as suggested by The Economic Times, it would make little sense for China to renege on its commitments absent exigent circumstances. Reneging on such promises would profoundly damage China’s credibility, undermining its influence achieved through deterrence and soft power. The effect would extend to all of China’s trading partners, especially those involved in the BRI, who are likewise described as  “ironclad brothers.” This is a risk that Xi is unlikely to take, as it contradicts China’s strategic objective of strengthening its global standing and reputation.

China’s possible inaction will also send a signal that prompts India and potential adversaries to reassess the weight of China’s influence. China’s strategic leverage is contingent on its credibility; unfulfilled promises undermine its effectiveness and erode its international standing. It contradicts Xi’s goal of elevating China’s global standing and challenging US dominance. While uncertainty exists about whether China will intervene with direct military engagement if the Indo-Pakistani conflict escalates, it is unlikely to refrain from assisting through logistical supply and diplomatic actions, which would further strain China-India relations.

 

Wei Shen Gay is a Master in Public Policy candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

 

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit:Wikimedia Commons/Official_website_of_President_of_Russia

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