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Guest Column

Singapore should pay more attention and think about its options and preparations for a Taiwan contingency better, or risk finding its vulnerabilities more exposed.

Taiwan is both near and distant to many Singaporeans. It is a popular holiday destination and source of popular culture. Many ethnic Chinese Singaporeans are familiar with Mandarin as well as Hokkien and Hakka, languages commonly used in Taiwan. But Singaporeans are uneasy about Taiwan’s vibrant and competitive democratic politics, often caricaturing its politics in terms of physical fights in the Legislative Yuan from the 1990s while characterising its active civil society as chaotic and dangerous.

There is also confusion over Taiwan’s status. Singaporeans see Taiwan variously as a continuation of the Republic of China established in 1912, part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and a separate entity. The Singapore government formally recognises the PRC and maintains its own “one China” policy that is distinct from the United States (US) and other countries. Singapore’s “one China” policy sees Taiwan as part of China and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, but appears somewhat ambiguous about the definition of China. Within that context, Singapore maintains substantive private and unofficial ties with Taiwan.

These mixed views highlight an inattention that stems from the privilege of having not to worry about what happens to Taiwan and its people. Cross-Strait instability is undesirable, but relevant only insofar as it may disrupt commercial activity for Singapore. Repeated but unrealised PRC threats about using force against Taiwan seem largely academic and readily brushed off, or else speculated upon like some sort of spectator sport.

At worst, a powerful PRC will rapidly defeat Taiwan, after which everything will quickly return to normal, and Singapore will remain unscathed. Such beliefs, however, betray a limited appreciation for the risks and potential implications that may result from a cross-Strait conflict. Like it or not, Singapore may find it difficult, if not impossible, to escape indirect involvement should a major military contingency over Taiwan unfold.

Indeed, cross-Strait tensions have visibly grown with reports of PRC impatience, stepped-up PLA activity, mounting Taiwanese resolve, as well as greater US and international support for Taiwan. The Taiwanese public is increasingly confident and unapologetic about their distinct democratic identity, which they see as separating them from the PRC’s authoritarianism.

Such developments likely sparked apprehensions in Beijing about their ability to control Taiwan in the future. This has resulted in more strident demands on Taiwan to accept PRC terms for accommodation accompanied by increased coercion, disinformation, cyberattacks, and attempts at political interference. Beijing has also started to become less acceptant of agreeing to disagree with the US over Taiwan’s status, partly by blurring the differences between its own “one China” principle, the US “one China” policy, and the “one China” policies of other states.

A Taiwan conflict however, may well reshape the Asian order from which Singapore has benefitted for decades. The rules-based international order undergirded by Washington’s alliance network, military prominence, commitment to institutions, and relative restraint helped regional states, including the PRC, find peace and prosperity. But American unwillingness or inability to support Taiwan in the face of Beijing-initiated violence could cause the system to unravel in Asia. Whether Beijing is capable of or interested in maintaining a comparable framework is unknown.

Regardless, an unsuccessful or overly costly PRC attempt to take Taiwan militarily could spell the end of Chinese Communist Party rule, or at least that of its sitting leadership, and usher in a period of domestic instability. This would deprive Singapore and the world of a key economic partner.

Spill overs from any Taiwan conflict are also likely to be strongly felt in Singapore. The US may seek military transit access from points west and south, logistic support, supplies, and other assistance, as it did during the Vietnam War. Since Singapore formalised its role as a logistic hub for the US military through a 1990 Memorandum of Understanding and a 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, a refusal could invite economic and political isolation from Washington.

Beijing may engage in concerted economic coercion, cyber, disinformation, and political influence campaigns to strategically delay Singapore’s decision on whether to assist Washington or disrupt efforts to do so. Beijing could also employ sabotage or kinetic action on US assets in Singapore and the facilities serving them. Close neighbours like Indonesia and Malaysia, facing contestation over access to their airspace and waters, might be made to pressure Singapore. The consequences of these developments could prove far-reaching.

Taken together, contestations in Singapore and its neighbourhood involving the mobilisation of ethno-nationalism could tear existing social fissures and destabilise these communities and leave them reeling even after the conflict ends. Not properly handling relations could cause Singapore to lose the trust of its largest trading partner (China) as well as its largest single investor and a critical regional security provider (the United States). Critically weakened, both Washington and Beijing could end up leaving the region open to greater uncertainty as others try to fill the vacuum.

Studied attempts to “not take sides” may work in calmer times but seems like inadequate protection against the strategic fallout from a high stakes US-PRC confrontation over Taiwan. The effects of a major Taiwan Strait crisis are unlikely to pass Singapore by. Given the difficulty of mitigation, Singaporeans should think ahead about their strategic options and preparations to undertake, or risk finding its vulnerabilities more exposed.

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Chong Ja Ian is Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS) and researches regional security issues in East Asia. He tweets at @ChongJaIan.

Image credit: Unsplash/Lisanto 李奕良

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