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Guest Column

Japan-India strategic cooperation is on the rise. Given the strategic uncertainty caused by the intensifying US-China rivalry, it seems natural for Japan and India—two countries that share similar strategic perspectives—to align more closely with each other to manage their evolving security and economic environment. However, Japan-India bilateral relations are more nuanced and have been carefully constructed as an ‘alignment for a strategic alternative.’

For Japan, India is a strategically important state in the Indo-Pacific region to realise its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision. The FOIP aims to maintain and enhance the existing international order that has been largely constructed by advanced democracies in the post-Cold War era, particularly the United States (US). India is a democratic state, and it already has significant influence as a regional hegemon in South Asia. And with their history of amicable relations, Japan sees India as an indispensable partner in upholding the existing international order and regional strategic balance. Moreover, given the relative decline of American global influence, consolidating its alignment with India is a means for Japan to expand its strategic horizon beyond the US-Japan alliance.

For India, consistent engagement with Japan expands its policy options and enhances its strategic autonomy. Japan has economic resources to provide official development assistance (ODA) and has eased restrictions on the export of military equipment and technology that would help India develop its own defence capabilities. More importantly, China’s increasing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, as well as its recurring border tensions with India have been key factors in New Delhi strengthening its strategic alignment with Tokyo. Obviously, by aligning itself with others, India runs the risk of diluting its own strategic autonomy. However, India can avoid being entrapped in others’ disputes and conflicts if it pursues a modest pace of engagement with its partners while keeping itself at a certain distance. This can be observed in the Japan-India relationship. Driven by different but mutual interests to expand their strategic options, both countries have cautiously but steadily strengthened their bilateral ties.

This bilateral trend can be traced back to the early 2000s, when Japan took the initiative to (re)engage with India. Despite Japan’s lingering security concerns about India’s nuclear test in 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori made an official visit to India in 2000 to facilitate bilateral cooperation and nurture a “Global Partnership in the 21st Century.” Mori foresaw the importance of India’s future role in the global economy, information technology development, and the reform of the UN Security Council to raise Japan’s profile in the international community. This vision also resonated with his successor, Prime Minister Jun-ichiro Koizumi, who institutionalised regular high-level exchanges between the Japanese and Indian foreign ministers.

Japan-India relations took on a different shape in the mid-2000s, going beyond traditional diplomatic and economic cooperation, to include regional political-security issues such as counterterrorism and nuclear non-proliferation as well as the promotion of democracy. This was clearly illustrated by the bilateral statement in 2005, the “Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership,” which also led Japan and India to upgrade their relations to a “Strategic and Global Partnership” status in 2006. In this context, it was Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that took the Japan-India relationship to the next level. In 2007, he made an official trip to India and delivered his “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech at the Indian parliament which laid the foundation for the Quad and FOIP concept. Abe envisioned both Japan and India playing an active strategic role in shaping international order by promoting democratic coalitions with other like-minded states, particularly the US and Australia. Japan and India would go on to establish the Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue in 2007, the Vice-Minister/Foreign Secretary Level Dialogue and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2010, and the Vice Minister and Defence Secretary-level Defence Policy Dialogue as well as the Maritime Affairs Dialogue in 2013.

Further, the Japan-India partnership was upgraded to the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” in 2014, which enabled both states to conclude a series of defence-related agreements, including the “Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information” and “the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology” in 2015 as well as the “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement” in 2021. In 2019, the first Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting was held, and the US-India joint military exercise, Malabar, formally included Japan as a member from 2014 onwards. The channels of communications are now constantly strengthened, and the bilateral agreements enable both Japan and India to prepare for furthering economic and defence cooperation.

In addition, Japan and India are cooperating in several multilateral frameworks. Both are members of the Quad, the Australia-India-Japan-United States consulting groups, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). To be sure, India was hesitant to be part of groupings that could be seen as a counter to China. In 2008, when Prime Minister Abe attempted to build the Quad as a strategic democratic coalition in a broader Asia, India initially showed its reluctance because China raised concerns about the strategic intention of such a grouping. However, after witnessing China’s increasing assertiveness in the maritime domain and land disputes in the Ladakh region, India became more willing to cooperate with those states. Both Japan and India have thrown their support behind the FOIP that aims to maintain the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Even when Japanese and Indian security interests are not congruent, their joint diplomatic statements are carefully crafted to avoid damaging their cautiously-nurtured strategic relationship. The most recent example of this is their responses toward the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Japan has taken a firm position to castigate Russia’s action, imposing economic sanctions, and closely aligning itself with the United States and its European partners. Japan considers Russia’s action as a clear violation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which affects the very foundation of the existing international order. On the other hand, while India has advocated for an immediate ceasefire and dialogue in the conflict, it has avoided explicitly condemning Moscow given its long-term strategic partnership with Russia. Despite Japan’s efforts to get Delhi to change its stance, India has stood firm.

At the same time, Japan is gradually consolidating its strategic relations with like-minded states, particularly the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Admittedly, their national interests also diverge from Japan’s. Yet, their strategic posture is more akin to Tokyo’s, including their views on the existing international order, liberal values, and the Russian invasion. In this sense, it is no surprise that Japan has concluded the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Australia and the United Kingdom to facilitate military cooperation, which Japan and India are still negotiating. These strategic differences indicate that the bilateral dialogues and defence/economic agreements between Japan and India may not be automatically activated, even in times of regional conflict.

The US-centered minilateral and multilateral frameworks, such as the Quad and IPEF, also highlighted limitations in Japan-India ties. The Quad was not able to form a strong stance against Russia because of India’s hesitation. Also, India opted out of one of the four statements, Pillar-I Trade, that the IPEF Ministerial Meeting issued in September 2022. Although there are many areas of cooperation that Japan and India have engaged and explored bilaterally and multilaterally, their diverging political stance will set a limit on strategic cooperation.

Given this, it is highly unlikely that Japan and India would form a close alignment or alliance with each other in the short-term unless other significant external shocks, such as wars and major conflicts, occur. Moreover, even if they become much more closely aligned, their defence commitment to each other’s regions, East Asia and South Asia, would likely be limited today because of a lack of power projection capabilities. For now, both seem content with a gradual enhancement of alignment to expand their own strategic alternatives in the long-term.

The enhancement of Japan-India strategic cooperation is progressing despite their differences in national interests and strategic orientation. Most recently, this has been illustrated by the Japan-India air force exercise, Veer Guardian, in January 2023 which saw India flying several of its air assets, including four Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters to Japanese bases for the first time. The Japan-India strategic partnership should therefore be assessed from a long-term perspective, and the significance of Japan-India bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region should be neither underestimated or overestimated.

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Kei Koga is an Associate Professor at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU). He is also a Non-resident Fellow at The National Bureau of Asia Research (NBR), the United States, and a member of RIPS Research Committee, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Japan.

Image credit: Prime Minister's Office of Japan

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