Share

China-India Brief #176

January 30, 2021 - February 11, 2021

China-India Brief #176BRIEF #176

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
January 30, 2021 - February 11, 2021


Announcement

China-India Brief’s Top 5 articles for 2020

By Byron Chong    


Xi and Modi_1200x800Image credit: Prime Minister's Office of India

At the China-India Brief, we aim to provide a platform for constructive analysis and debate on the security, political, and economic relationship between Asia’s two biggest powers. In 2020, we were privileged to publish articles from a diverse range of contributors from all around the world.

The following are the Top 5 most read articles of 2020, based on view count.

To all our readers and contributors, we would like to extend our sincere gratitude and appreciation for your continued support.

1. The End of India’s Strategic Autonomy? by Itty Abraham

“For the second time in a half-century, India’s glowing self-regard would come up against the harsh reality of Chinese military force in the Himalayas and found to be wanting. Self-inflicted or not, the situation demands a major reconsideration of where India stands in the world.”


2. Managing China: Does India need allies? by Ian Hall

“Where India arguably needs to work more closely with others and enhance interoperability is at sea, and it is already doing that with its Quad partners and others, with agreements in place to facilitate secure communications and provide necessary logistical support.”


3. India and the Quad: Future Directions and International Relations Theory by Zhang Baohui

“The Quad is essentially a form of alignment. It is a coordinated network of strategic partnerships, not an alliance. Rather than seeking ‘militarization’ of the mechanism, India’s future relations with the Quad and the nature of the Quad itself will continue to reflect the soft balancing dynamics of twenty-first century international relations.”


4. Will India balance China in East Asia? by Hugh White

“Few questions matter more to Asia’s future than the long-term trajectory of India-China relations. And few questions are more deeply shrouded in myth and wishful thinking—especially in America and among America’s closest allies in East Asia.”


5. India-China relations post-Galwan by C. Uday Bhaskar

“From India’s point of view, if China’s current orientation is maintained, the much-touted harmonious Asian century could transmute into a sullen and contested Chinese century. The post Galwan stand-off with India could well be a critical litmus test for determining the strategic texture of Asia.”

 


Byron Chong is a Research Associate at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, and is the editor for the China-India Brief.


Guest Column

Biden and the Indo-Pacific: Beijing and New Delhi anticipate shifts in US policy

Prospective shifts in US policy towards the Indo-Pacific hold broad implications for India, China, and their intermittent skirmishes in the Himalayas


By Kashish Parpiani   


CIB176_1Image credit: wikimedia commons

Ahead of the 2020 US presidential election, Joe Biden often invoked Donald Trump’s nomenclature of the Indo-Pacific, to underscore his restorationist foreign policy agenda. However, Biden subsequently steered clear from the oft-repeated assessment that there was little divergence between his proposition and Trump’s record in the Indo-Pacific. Notably, Biden altered the Trump administration’s normative aim of the US cultivating a “free and open” Indo-Pacific to “maintaining" a “secure and prosperous” Indo-Pacific. Thereafter, with its nominations for national security cabinet posts, the Biden campaign even returned to using the term ‘Asia Pacific’.

Amidst consternation around Biden’s commitment to the region, reports emerged of former State Department official Kurt Campbell being nominated as the Biden administration’s “Indo-Pacific coordinator”. However, by then, questions over Biden’s Indo-Pacific policy had expanded to doubts over his China policy. In his acceptance speech, Biden’s nominee for US Secretary of Defence had curiously skipped any mention of the strategic competition between China and the US.

Beijing under Biden’s restorationist agenda?

Trump rightfully broke from the post-Cold War US policy of balancing cooperation and competition with China. His new approach encompassed a sustained agenda of confrontation across multiple domains like trade, telecommunications, and maritime posture. In building on the preceding Barack Obama administration’s Pivot/Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific policy, the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy achieved a constructive record on development assistance, multilateral projects for regional infrastructure, and traditional partnerships.

Biden’s distancing from the Indo-Pacific construct seems to be aimed at cultivating some political elbowroom on exploring a conciliatory approach towards China. While a degree of de-escalationmainly on the rhetoric levelis warranted in view of Biden inheriting “a massive trust deficit” in US-China ties, it remains a matter of concern if that would come at the cost of America’s role in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, under Obama, the prioritisation of a “stable and constructive relationship with China”, contributed to Washington’s ambivalence towards Beijing reneging on its commitment to not militarise the South China Sea. In a sign of that folly recurring, Biden officials have come around to recognizing China as a “serious strategic competitor”, but with the caveat of the need to “work with China when it’s in our [US] interests do so on issues such as climate change”. It remains unclear how the new administration will actually handle China in strategic-military terms.

Sensing an opportunity, Beijing has made the case for US-China ties also warranting Biden’s restorative touch, by calling for the return to a “sensible approach” and address “expanding converging interests by cooperation.” However, as the world grappled with the coronavirus pandemic and the US underwent a turbulent election cycle, Beijing concurrently also sought to gain the initiative in the region. Under China’s wolf-warrior diplomacy, this encompassed: pushing the envelope on its ties with Honk Kong and Australia; altering the military posture vis-à-vis Taiwan, India, and Japan; and, announcing administrative jurisdictions over the contested Paracels Islands, Macclesfied Bank, and the Spratly Islands.

Hence, while pushing for a return to the Obama precedent on managing bilateral ties, Beijing has set the stage to also test Biden’s resolve on continuing America’s role in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi banks on US continuity

A key component of Trump’s constructive record in the Indo-Pacific was his administration actively pursuing relations with nascent partners. With India, despite occasional friction with Washington over issues like trade, immigration, and its ties with Iran and Russia, the Trump administration continued the post-Cold War US policy of de-hyphenating India and Pakistan, strengthening counter-terrorism cooperation, and institutionalising US-India force interoperability.

Particularly in the defence domain, Trump expanded US support for India’s capacity-building. Under America’s Indo-Pacific calculus, New Delhi’s emergence as a security provider in the Indian Ocean region is imperative, to prevent Beijing from expanding its influence to the critical subregion and permitting the US Navy to focus its assets in the Western Pacific. Towards that aim, US-India defence trade under Trump developed a focus on India’s maritime surveillance capability. Wherein, the Trump administration yielded to Indian requests for particular platforms (e.g. MH-60 Romeo Seahawk maritime helicopters), adopted a policy to ‘front-load’ clearances (e.g. for ancillary equipment for India’s fleet of P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft), and ended the Obama-era freeze on India’s acquisition of US-made Unmanned Aerial Systems (e.g. clearing the sale of Sea Guardian maritime drones).

While this has been a welcome development from the standpoint of lending a policy structure to defence trade, it now also renders that crucial domain to be inextricably linked with the US’ Indo-Pacific policy. As a result, any shift in the US’ commitment to the region could also impact India’s role in the Indian Ocean. This correlation gains credence in view of the centrality of US platforms in New Delhi’s efforts. Case in point being India’s fleet of US-made P-8 aircraft which constitutes the backbone of the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean RegionIndia’s flagship effort to position itself as an international hub for maritime domain awareness in the region.

Hence, even as broad US policy continuity on India is assured owing to a durable precedent of American bipartisanship on US-India ties and strong US business interest in India’s market potentialities, Biden’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific will also be an integral factor.

Implications for India-China border tensions

Over the past nine months, India and China have intermittently engaged in clashes along their border. At its height, the standoff even claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers. While the two sides continue to engage in military dialogue, the recently inaugurated US administration would definitely figure in Indian and Chinese calculations. Apart from testing Biden’s mettle on supporting India, Beijing would seek to gauge his appetite for a power-sharing mechanism in South Asia and the region at-large. Back in 2009, Obama’s visit to China led to a joint statement, which was widely seen as the US “acquiescing” to Chinese interests. The statement recognised “each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” as a matter of “respecting each other’s core interests” and the same being “extremely important to ensure steady progress in US-China relations.”

With Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi construing the ongoing India-China border tensions as a consequence of their boundary not being demarcated, Beijing could seek to test the applicability of this contested sovereignty claim under the terms of the 2009 joint statement. Beijing could argue for the continued relevance of the understanding owing to Biden’s time as US vice president around that time.

During the election, the Biden campaign’s ‘Agenda For The Indian American Community’ underscored their candidate’s commitment to work with India to “support a rules-based and stable Indo-Pacific region in which no country, including China, is able to threaten its neighbors with impunity.” With the Biden administration now in place, India would seek to test whether that commitment goes beyond mere rhetoric. Biden’s response will be carefully observed, especially since the Trump administration’s support for India had manifested in real terms. For instance, late last year, India invoked the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), to source 11,000 sets of Extended Cold Weather Clothing System from the US Army’s holdings. The systems were then dispatched to Indian troops as part of the build-up along the India-China border.

Hence, in the near-term, even as the Biden administration is expected to remain occupied with a host of issues at home, any shift in US policy towards the Indo-Pacific is certain to hold broad implications for India, China, and their intermittent skirmishes in the Himalayas.


Kashish Parpiani is Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai.


Guest Column

Sino-Indian Frontier Dilemma: A Potential Stalemate? 


By Nazia Hussain    


CIB176_2Image credit: flickr/BMN Network

After nine months and nine rounds of Corps Commander-level talks, the ground situation in the Sino-Indian frontier region remains locked in a stalemate with neither side willing to vacate positions gained from strategic advances made last year, or reach any consensus on pulling back troops—currently at 100,000 personnel—along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours hit a historic low with the deadly border clashes in May 2020 in the Galwan Valley—an area between Indian-controlled Ladakh and Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin. At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed while Beijing has declined to confirm casualties on its side. The two countries accused each other of incursions into the disputed territory and contended that shots had been fired by the other side along the border for the first time in 45 years.

Ensuing rounds of high-level military talks proved inconclusive due to disagreements over the conditions of disengagement. While India has been advocating disengagement and de-escalation along all points of friction in eastern Ladakh, China insists the Indian army first pull back troops deployed on strategic heights on the south bank of the Pangong Tso—a glacier lake that stretches from Tibet to Ladakh. Ahead of the ninth round of military talks, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said that India will not reduce troops along the friction points “unless China reduces the deployment of troops on its side”.

The latest round of military talks between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took place last month which stretched into a 16-hour marathon culminating in a joint statement that the talks had been “positive and constructive” with both sides agreeing to hold the 10th round at an early date to “jointly advance de-escalation.” The statement, however, failed to produce any tangible results. This does not come as a surprise seeing the hardening of positions on both sides—earlier this year, Indian Army Chief M. M. Naravane stated that India was “ready for the long haul” and its troops were prepared to hold their ground in eastern Ladakh “for as long as it takes”. Meanwhile, the PLA has moved back at least 10,000 soldiers from depth areas to rear positions, likely owing to extreme weather conditions, but no changes have been reported on its frontline deployments.

The Boundary Question

While high-level military talks are important to keep the channels of communication open, future episodes of skirmishes along the LAC will likely continue so long as the boundary question remains unresolved. According to Indian government reports, there had been 1,025 instances of Chinese troops “transgressing” into Indian territory between 2016 and 2018. Even as the ninth round of talks were to be held between the two militaries, reports emerged of a fresh scuffle on January 20 between Chinese and Indian troops along the disputed border at Naku La which connects the Indian state of Sikkim with Tibet. Although the Indian Army downplayed the incident as a “minor face-off” and the PLA claimed there was no record of this incident in their front line patrol logs, failure to clarify the LAC will perennially cast a shadow on bilateral relations. An early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries. As such, Beijing and New Delhi would do well to renew boundary talks aimed at delimitation of the border. The last round of border talks were held in December 2019.

New Points of Contention

As the boundary question hangs over bilateral relations between the two countries, new points of contention have only added layers to the already complex relationship. Reports about the construction of a new Chinese village of more than a hundred homes between August 2019 and November 2020 along the border with India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradeshwhich China considers a part of southern Tibethave raised new potential flashpoints. The eastern sector of the disputed LAC has a higher density of inhabitants and an escalation of tensions in this area would prove deadly as compared to current hostilities in the relatively sparsely-populated western sector.

Water issues also threaten to become another geopolitical flashpoint in Sino-Indian relations. Beijing’s announcement of plans to build a mega dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo river, otherwise known as the Brahmaputra in India, is worrying for New Delhi. The trans-boundary river originates from Tibet and flows into Arunachal Pradesh, passing through the plains of Assam into Bangladesh before merging with the Bay of Bengal. Damming the river could potentially lead to water scarcity or trigger flash floods in India as a lower riparian state. While most experts agree that the volume of water in the Brahmaputra as it flows through Arunachal Pradesh and beyond comes from catchments on the Indian side, the perception that China could seriously affect the water flow remains.

Moreover, although the two countries have a hydrological data sharing agreement in place, India remains apprehensive that China may stop sharing data of water flow levels from its dams as it did during the Doklam stand-off in 2017. The data is crucial to warn downstream areas in the event of floods. Though data sharing resumed in 2018, New Delhi is concerned of a repeat.

Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific

Apart from contentious bilateral issues, the geopolitics of the day also have a hand in charting the future trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. The current border hostilities may simmer down eventually, but both countries remain wary of the other’s intentions. Beijing is concerned about New Delhi’s increasingly close ties with Washington and contents of the recently declassified 2018 document on America’s Indo-Pacific strategy confirm these concerns. The document noted the US’s intention to provide “support to India through diplomatic, military, and intelligence channels—to help address continental challenges such as the border dispute with China and access to water, including the Brahmaputra and other rivers facing diversion by China.”

Moreover, China regards India’s role in the Indo-Pacific and the Quad—which Beijing perceives is a China-containment strategy—as geo-strategic posturing. India, on the other hand, remains worried about Chinese influence, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), over South Asian nations traditionally thought to be in India’s sphere of influence.

Despite the current geopolitical climate wherein New Delhi may want to seek support of like-minded countries, India is unlikely to abandon its traditional foreign policy of non-alignment which allows it a broader strategic playing field. India still prefers to avoid taking a confrontational stand, especially when it remains active in multilateral arrangements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the BRICS grouping. Under the circumstances, Sino-Indian relations may very well remain locked in a stalemate with both sides unwilling to give concessions but also reluctant to escalate tensions owing to their own strategic calculations.


Nazia Hussain is a Senior Analyst with the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Her research interests include multilateral security cooperation in ASEAN; Indian Ocean security; sub-regional cooperation in South Asia; and Sino-Indian relations. Nazia holds a Masters in Asian Studies from RSIS.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

China, India armies disengage, ‘breakthrough in returning to peace’
Global Times, February 10

Frontline troops of the Chinese and Indian armies stationed at the southern and northern banks of the Pangong Tso began simultaneous, scheduled disengagement on Wednesday (February 10), according to Wu Qian, a spokesperson at China’s Ministry of National Defense.

India, China agree to continue engagement on UNSC agenda amid LAC standoff
Livemint, February 9

The Indian delegation briefed the Chinese side on India’s priorities during its UNSC tenure, a statement said.

Chinese envoy: More people-to-people exchanges can inject positive energy in Sino-Indian ties
CGTN, February 9

China and India must look to enhance people-to-people exchanges in the future to infuse positive energy into bilateral ties, the Chinese envoy to New Delhi said in a video message on Monday (February 8).

India has transgressed LAC more often than China: V.K. Singh
The Hindu, February 7

“Let me assure you, if China has transgressed 10 times, we must have done it at least 50 times,” said the Union Minister and former army chief.

India’s Military Sees Small Budget Rise Despite China Standoff
Bloomberg Quint, February 2

India increased its defense spending by about 1%, throwing the timing of its military modernization program into doubt while it faces a protracted standoff with China along their disputed Himalayan border.

China says border issue with India will not be linked with bilateral ties
Livemint, January 31

The border issue between China and India shall not be linked with bilateral relations, said Zhao Lijian, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson.


News Reports

China and India in the Region

Biden calls India's Modi, seeks to strengthen regional security through “Quad” grouping
Reuters, February 9

Biden spoke to Modi on Monday (February 8) night in his first call since taking office last month and noted that India-U.S. ties were held together by a shared commitment to democratic values.

Russia, China, and Iran to hold joint naval drills in Indian Ocean soon - RIA
Today Online, February 8

Russia plans to hold joint naval drills with Iran and China in the Indian Ocean later this month, the RIA news agency cited Moscow's ambassador to Tehran as saying on Monday (February 8).

US, Japan, Australia, India plan summit amid China's growing clout, says Sankei newspaper
The Straits Times, February 7

Australia, Japan, the United States and India plan to hold a summit to strengthen ties amid China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region, the Sankei newspaper reported, citing unidentified government officials.

India approves 100,000 Covishield doses for China ally Cambodia
The Times of India, February 5

The move has taken India’s vaccine diplomacy deep into Southeast Asia

To counter China, India willing to share military hardware with Indian Ocean Region allies
Livemint, February 4

“India is ready to supply various types of missile systems, light combat aircraft, helicopters, multi-purpose light transport aircraft, warship and patrol vessels, artillery gun systems, tanks, radars, military vehicles, electronic warfare systems and other weapons systems to IOR countries,” according to Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

Foreign firms look to reduce reliance on China, poll shows
South China Morning Post, February 7

Strategy known as ‘China Plus One’ sees companies boosting operations in Vietnam, India and elsewhere.

India suspends anti-dumping duty on some steel products from China
Reuters, February 1

India said on Monday (February 1) it will temporarily withdraw duties on some steel products imposed to stop dumping mainly from China, after a spike in domestic prices hit job-creating small and mid-sized manufacturing companies.

In annual budget, India vows to boost spending to revive economy
Al Jazeera, February 1

India to double healthcare spending, increase cap on foreign investment in insurance to boost the industry.

China still ‘largest source of critical items’ for India
The Hindu, January 31

“The trade deficit is not in dollars, it is in overdependence,” said Sanjay Chadha, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

 

News Reports

Energy and Environment

India to overtake EU as world's third largest energy consumer by 2030: IEA
Business Standard, February 9

IEA forecast India accounting for the biggest share of energy demand growth over the next two decades.

Nearly 5 Deaths Per Minute In India Due To Fossil Fuels Burning: Report
NDTV, February 9

In 2018, more than 8.7 million people around the globe died from fossil fuel pollution, the report estimates.

Rescuers search for about 170 missing after India glacier disaster, many believed trapped in tunnel
Channel News Asia, February 8

Rescuers searched for more than 170 people missing in the Indian Himalayas on Monday (Feburary 8), including some trapped in a tunnel, after part of a glacier broke away, sending a torrent of water, rock and dust down a mountain valley.

Govt inspectors accuse China's energy agency of negligence in environmental protection
The Straits Times, January 30

A Chinese central government inspection team has accused the country's energy administration of negligence in environmental protection, failing to control new coal power capacity in key polluted areas.


Analyses

India should prioritise a denial strategy in the Indian Ocean
The Interpreter, February 9

By Arzan Tarapore, Research Scholar on South Asia, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University; and Senior Nonresident Fellow, National Bureau of Asian Research

The stand-off with China in the Himalayas has raised a broader debate about India’s strategic outlook.

Are Indian politicians serious about ousting Chinese vendors, apps?
Global Times, February 8

By Dai Yonghong, Director, Institute of Bay of Bengal Studies, Shenzhen University

Chinese smartphone vendors in 2020 grew their market share in India despite the headwinds caused by New Delhi from border clashes to economic conflicts.

China does not like the coup in Myanmar
East Asia Forum, February 6

By Enze Han, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong

Since the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, there have been reports and allegations that China approves of or is able to spin the military takeover to its advantage. This is unlikely to be true.

Why Tensions Between China and India Won't Boil Over
The National Interest, February 2

By Rafiq Dossani, Director, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy; Senior Economist, RAND Corporation; and Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School

Leadership on both sides could help by focusing on the long-term gains in a spirit of give-and-take.

China’s vision of hegemony: the view from India
The Strategist, February 1

By Vijay Gokhale, former Indian foreign secretary and ambassador to China

The balance of power in the Indian Ocean is undergoing a significant change as countries from outside the region begin to establish a permanent presence there.

 

Books and Journals

Making India Great_156x243Making India Great: The Promise of a Reluctant Global Power
HarperCollins, January 2021


By Aparna Pande, Director, Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. 

India will be the world’s most populous country by 2024 and its third largest economy by 2028. But the size of our population and a sense of historical greatness alone are insufficient to guarantee we will fulfil our ambition to become a global power. Our approach to realize this vision needs more than just planning for economic growth. It requires a shift in attitudes.

In Making India Great, Aparna Pande examines the challenges we face in the areas of social, economic, military and foreign policy and strategy. She points to the dichotomy that lies at the heart of the nation: our belief in becoming a global power and the reluctance to implement policies and take actions that would help us achieve that goal.

The New India holds all the promise of greatness many of its citizens dream of. Can it become a reality? The book delves into this question.


 lky-cag-logo

Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Have any feedback or comment? Email us decb64_Y2FnQG51cy5lZHUuc2c=_decb64
Subscribe

PARPIANI, Kashish

PARPIANI, Kashish

HUSSAIN, Nazia

HUSSAIN, Nazia