China-India Brief #165

Guest Column

Managing China: Does India need allies? 

By Ian Hall    

Image credit: The U.S. Army/Flickr

The question of whether New Delhi should seek allies is not an idle one. Clearly, China poses a set of serious, multifaceted security challenges to India that it cannot at present manage without friends and partners. Among other things, it needs them to supply arms, share defence technology and intelligence, coordinate minilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives, influence international and regional institutions, and invest in an economy that is not growing as fast as it should and must. So why does New Delhi still rule out turning at least some of its closest partnerships into formal alliances?

The traditional answer to that question was supplied by Jawaharlal Nehru and blended ideological objections with strategic acuity. He argued that alliances were a part of an obsolete and illegitimate system of power politics in which India should play no part. At the same time, Nehru judged that allying India to any major power would divert scarce resources from economic development, constrain its ability to speak freely on global issues, and drag it into conflicts in which it had little interest and could make little difference.

Since Nehru, of course, the ideological dimension of this argument for “nonalignment” has largely dissipated. Lip service may sometimes be paid to it, but New Delhi has long since reconciled itself to playing power politics and has muscled up to do so, investing in its military and using force when it deems necessary. The desire for what earlier governments called “strategic autonomy” has however persisted, along with staunch resistance to the idea of entering into alliances.

There is little sign that this stance will change anytime soon, even under Narendra Modi, a prime minister otherwise keen to sweep away as much as he can of Nehru’s legacy, and even as pressure from China grows. Speaking at a conference in July 2020, as the standoff in Ladakh rolled on, Modi’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) Subrahmanyam Jaishankar categorically ruled out allying with any other state: “we were never part of an alliance system” in the past, he said, “and we will never be.” And he went further, arguing that the United States should “go beyond” alliances and embrace different approaches to managing security challenges in a multipolar order.

Those remarks might strike some outsiders as odd, given India’s predicament and given the role that Jaishankar himself has played in strengthening its strategic partnership with the US, as EAM and earlier as Foreign Secretary. Many analysts argue that the gap that has opened up between China and India in terms of national wealth and military power ought to drive New Delhi to explore all options, including formal alliances, to balance against an increasingly ambitious and assertive Beijing.

If we take a step back from India’s immediate predicament, however, it is possible that Jaishankar has a point. Alliances remain a feature of contemporary international relations, but there is some evidence that they are falling out of favor as an instrument for handling threats. Hardly any new treaties embedding security guarantees have been concluded in decades. Most of the alliances we have today were formed in the 1940s and 50s, including multilateral arrangements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilateral arrangements like the US has with Australia or Japan. Of course, NATO has since expanded and a handful of deals were struck amidst the rubble of the Soviet Union—including one to form the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) during the early 1990s—but new formal alliances have been few and far between.

It is tempting to argue that the reason why states appear not to ally with one another anymore is because state-based threats have declined. There is evidence to support that hypothesis. But other factors may be at play and it is worth looking again at the functions of formal alliances to explore them.

Conventionally, alliances are formed by two or more states either to collaborate in aggrandizement—to conquer another state or states for mutual gain—or to work together in various ways to deter and, if necessary, defend against a potential threat they collectively perceive. Over the last century, the first kind of alliance has mostly disappeared, while the second has lingered on, because they provide benefits like shared intelligence, burden-sharing, and access to capabilities that might otherwise be beyond their reach.

All alliances are, however, grounded in mistrust—and not just of the state or states the allies see as a threat. NATO was not just designed to keep the “Russians out,” as its first secretary-general Lord Ismay famously put it, it was also intended to keep the “Americans in, and the Germans down.” It was meant to ensure that the US could not dodge the defense of western Europe and that Germany’s postwar rearmament was transparent and controlled. Both the ANZUS treaty and US security agreements with Japan were designed to reassure Australia and New Zealand—and others—that Washington would scrutinize and manage Tokyo’s capacity to make war as it rebuilt its economy.

In sum, formal treaty alliances are as much about raising confidence in one’s allies’ commitment to act when needed, as they are about signaling resolve to putative adversaries or improving capabilities. In that light, Jaishankar’s recent remarks arguably make more sense. What is remarkable about the Indo-Pacific today is the high level of agreement on key challenges between most of the major players. There is near-consensus across the Indo-Pacific (and beyond) that Beijing’s assertiveness threatens to destabilize regional order and could even trigger armed conflict. Over the past decade, differences of opinion about how to manage this problem have narrowed, thanks partly to more intense dialogue between “like-minded” states in forums like the Quad. And even with Donald J. Trump in the White House, New Delhi (and others) can be reasonably confident that if China did act recklessly, many or all of those states would respond. There is relatively low risk that most of the major players, at least, would “defect” in a crisis. There is, in other words, enough trust and transparency among India’s friends and partners to obviate the need for a treaty-based alliance.

Beyond that issue, there is also the question of what putative allies might do collaboratively to strengthen their postures and enhance their capabilities. India has no need for large deployments of foreign troops on its territory, as Europe or Japan did after 1945 or South Korea after 1953. Informed analysts observe that it has sufficient forces to at least hold the line in the Himalayas. Where India arguably needs to work more closely with others and enhance interoperability is at sea, and it is already doing that with its Quad partners and others, with agreements in place to facilitate secure communications and provide necessary logistical support. And, in the end, where it must put in the most effort is in modernizing its own forces, as well as building diplomatic capacity.

Ian Hall is a Professor of International Relations and the Deputy Director (Research) of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University, Queensland, Australia.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

Military option on table if talks fail: Rawat on China
Hindustan Times, August 24

India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat has explicitly stated that a military option to deal with transgressions by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Ladakh is on the table, but will be exercised only if talks between the two armies and the diplomatic option are unfruitful.

Amid India-China tensions, Indian Ambassador calls for mutual understanding on basic principles
Yahoo News, August 24

Indian Ambassador to China Vikram Misri delivered the keynote address of the second China-India roundtable, in which he outlined India's position on recent developments in bilateral relations and called for promoting mutual understanding on the basis of basic principles.

India rejects China's suggestion of ‘equidistant disengagement’ from Finger area in Ladakh
The Times of India, August 23

The Indian side is clear that the Chinese should disengage completely from the Finger area and move back to the original location.

India Slaps New Curbs on Visas, Schools to Stem China Influence
Bloomberg Quint, August 22

India is stepping up its curbs on Chinese activity in the country, adding extra scrutiny for visas and reviewing Beijing’s links with local universities, as relations between the two nations continue to nose-dive.

China-India border dispute: advanced fighter jets sent to nearby airbases
South China Morning Post, August 19  

Two J-20s were seen at Hotan airbase in China’s Xinjiang region, while India has deployed five new Rafales to Ladakh, according to media reports.

India answer to China-backed Thai Canal plan is a huge military upgrade in islands
Hindustan Times, August 24

China will be one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Thai Canal project, aka Kra Canal, that will give Beijing an alternative route to the congested Malacca Strait.

‘Inalienable part of India’: MEA rejects reference to Kashmir in China-Pakistan joint statement
The Indian Express, August 22

India has consistently protested against the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, saying it passes through the “territory of India that has been illegally occupied by Pakistan”.

US arms sales in Indo-Pacific pick up as China tensions build
Nikkei Asian Review, August 21

The U.S. wants India to steer clear of Su-35 fighters and other Russian hardware that would prove “problematic” down the road in terms of interoperability.

CPEC of Great Importance to China-Pakistan Ties: Xi Jinping tells Pakistan Prez Arif Alvi
The Wire, August 21

Xi said that the Pakistani president attaches great importance to and supports the China-Pakistan relationship and construction of the CPEC.

Vietnam Briefs India On Escalating Tension Arising Out of Chinese Military Presence in South China Sea
News 18, August 22

Vietnam has briefed India about the escalating tension in the South China Sea in the wake of China significantly ramping up its military presence by deploying a large number of ships and fighter jets in the resource-rich region notwithstanding the calls for restraint by several countries.

China’s Covid success spurs 78% rise in imports from India, cuts trade deficit
The Print, August 21

India’s exports to China and Malaysia surged by more than 70 per cent in June, even as those to the US and the UK contracted in the same period, rating agency Crisil said in a report Friday (August 21).

RCEP enters final phase, to be signed without India: Ministry
The Jakarta Post, August 18

The participating countries will keep the door open for India in case it decides to rejoin the trade deal in the future.

India, Japan, Australia keen to boost supply chain security by reducing reliance on China
South China Morning Post, August 21

The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative will look to secure supply chains and reduce dependence on China in the wake of the disruptions caused by the coronavirus.

China’s Loss May Be India’s Gain in Shifting Supply Chains
Bloomberg, August 17

Companies like Foxconn and Samsung are among those showing interest to invest in India.

Indian solar projects hit as Chinese solar gear prices rise for the first time since 2017
The Economic Times, August 23

Prices of Chinese solar modules have increased for the first time since 2017, making Indian developers apprehensive about returns on their projects because they import about 85% of the equipment from China.

China’s Draft Pact for Everest Height Announcement With Nepal Raises Eyebrows in India
The Wire, August 21

At the heart of New Delhi's worries is a clause in the agreement that calls for Beijing and Kathmandu to jointly collaborate on “surveying, mapping and geo-information management”.

Heavy rain, late typhoon season in China raises climate concerns
The Straits Times, August 19

Typhoon Hagupit barrelled into China's eastern Zhejiang province and Shanghai earlier this month, bringing heavy rain, which was a relief for a region sweltering in summer heat.

India to set up solar manufacturing zones; impose 15-20% duty to discourage imports from China
Business Today, August 17

Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, in consultation with Shipping Ministry, has zeroed in on 6-7 land parcels across major ports to set up production units for local manufacturing of solar equipment.

Today, India’s strategic autonomy is about coping with Beijing’s challenge to its territorial integrity, sovereignty
The Indian Express, August 25

By C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies

In the 1990s, the quest for strategic autonomy from the US drove India into a political coalition with Russia and China that sought to limit the dangers of the unipolar moment. Today, the logic of strategic autonomy from China nudges India to look for strong security partnerships.

India's narrowing trade deficit with China is unsustainable
Global Times, August 24

By Dai Yonghong, Director, Institute of Global Governance and Area Studies, Shenzhen University

In recent months, India has seen its trade deficit with China fall and then bounce back, demonstrating that any manufactured reduction in the trade deficit based on protectionism simply isn't sustainable, despite being the result Indian authorities are longing for.

India should ignore Putin's offer to broker accord with China
Nikkei Asian Review, August 23

By Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator (R-FL), Acting Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Co-Chair of the Congressional Executive Commission on China and a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Those considering relying on the Kremlin should realize that they will have no long-term stable partner in Russia while Putin remains in power.

India misinterprets China-Pakistan strategic dialogue
Global Times, August 23

By Zhao Gancheng, Research Fellow, Shanghai Institute for International Studies

Against the backdrop of China-India border tensions, and days after the first anniversary of India's revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status, India may see the dialogue between China and Pakistan as a strategic alliance targeting India.

India must inflict costs on China
Hindustan Times, August 20

By Brahma Chellaney, Geostrategist

The only way China will roll back its aggression is if India begins exacting mounting costs that make its territorial gains unbeneficial to hold.

Inclusive growth essential for poverty alleviation in BRICS states
China Daily, August 20

By Wan Guanghua, Former Director and Head of Poverty and Inequality Group at the Asian Development Bank, currently Distinguished Professor and Director of the Institute of World Economy, Fudan University

All BRICS countries have made progress in poverty alleviation work, even though their progress has been uneven due to their different growth rates and the levels of inequality in their societies.

India’s China fears give new impetus to US defence ties, arms sales
South China Morning Post, August 17

By Rupakjyoti Borah, Associate Professor, Sharda University, India

Closer ties are a win-win as the US needs more jobs in an election year while India needs a new weapons source amid Russian neutrality in Sino-Indian clashes. Heightened defence cooperation is a bright spot in a US-India relationship that has hit rocky ground elsewhere amid differences over trade and tariffs.

A retreat from global trade will hurt India’s geopolitical stature
Livemint, August 16

By Nitin Pai, Co-founder and Director, The Takshashila Institution

Self-reliance is achieved through robust economic expansion and not by shutting the world out and losing foreign support.

At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 19

By Toby Dalton, Co-director and Senior Fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment; and Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.

In the aftermath of the June 2020 border clash, senior retired Indian diplomats argued that the conflict marks the “end of a chapter in relations”2 and that “the entire architecture [of border and military agreements between China and India] has collapsed,”3 with “very serious repercussions.”4 If ties between the two powerful neighbors are indeed entering a more sharply competitive era, a crucial question arises: will nuclear weapons play a more prominent role as each country seeks to shape each other’s behavior?.