China-India Brief #162

Guest Column

Towards a New Indian Thinking on China 

By Rahul Tripathi    

Photo by BMN Network from Flickr.

During a departmental trip to Sikkim and the Nathu-La Pass on the India-China China border in 2006, I got a first-hand experience of what it means to be with Indian soldiers face to face with their Chinese counterparts. Of course, the context was very different then, as the historic mountain pass had just been opened up for border trade, allowing scope for reconnecting history and commerce between the two rising economic giants. This was before the 2008 financial crisis as well, and India was trying to creatively redefine its borders with its regional neighbours, with ‘connectivity’ as the new mantra of good neighbourliness.

The mood of the Indian soldiers at the border was quite a sombre one by contrast. The Chinese soldiers were relaxed, jovial, and shook hands with our Indian students, while the Indian soldiers were stern, did not budge from their positions, and dissuaded the students from getting close to the Chinese and exchanging gifts. Perhaps the Indian troops were overcautious, possibly due to memories of the 1962 war. India’s hope was that economic diplomacy would at some stage drive home the point that military confrontations were an anachronism in an era of globalization; but at the border the Indian troops looked less optimistic.

A decade and a half down the line, in the midst of a global pandemic, and given the developments along the India-China border since May 2020, the promise of economic diplomacy, cooperation, and peace seem far away. Even as a post-Galwan de-escalation appears to be taking form, there a need to revisit Indian thinking on China, with an eye on the past, present and future. The Indian debate on the current border confrontation suggests that after decades of trying to theorize China’s strategy, often using texts and contexts from Western writers, it is time for fresh ideas and approaches. While Indian scholarship on China has grown over the years, very few of these works have been based on a close and critical reading of Chinese texts, experts say.

The result has been that India’s political leadership has been caught off guard in responding to China after decades of cultivating the Chinese political leadership and encouraging economic entanglement. Not surprisingly, there is now a growing view that with the greater assertiveness in India’s defence posture in recent years, the diplomatic messaging too, ought to have been more tough-minded. Some Indian analysts are arguing that India overemphasized the logic of economic interdependence as a way of preventing confrontation. This is a strategic slogan that applies more to the West in their dealings with Beijing: Western countries after all do not share a disputed border with China. The fact that China resolved its border issues with Russia as far back as 1991 and that it has signed agreements with several other countries in Asia is of little solace to India. The dynamics of these other border quarrels have been entirely different. During the Doklam military confrontation in 2017, India deftly managed the crisis, using its potential boycott of the 2017 BRICS summit as a means to bring about a mutual stand-down. There is seemingly no such leverage in Delhi’s hands this time.

It is quite obvious that the 2020 build-up along the China-India border and complete de-escalation will be more protracted. India has been ramping up its infrastructure in and around the Line of Actual Control at a much faster pace since the early 2000s, giving its military a greater ability to supply its posts on the frontlines. One view in India is that it is this which has provoked the Chinese. In any case, while the Indian military is entrusted with border security, the real work of dealing with China must be done on the domestic-diplomatic front, which is going to be much more complicated than the ‘boycott China’ lobby in India suggests.

What might be some key elements of India’s domestic-diplomatic strategy ahead? First, a full-scale war is unlikely and would be problematic for India. This is what the most seasoned Indian military leaders argue. Fortunately, there are very few voices talking about a full-fledged confrontation with China. Secondly, amidst the many and sometimes apparently contradictory official statements, India needs an urgent domestic consensus. Assigning blame to one political party or other over territorial issues does not help achieve a consensus. Instead, devising a strategy of how to validate territorial claims with China is what matters. Third, India needs to create an army of Sinologists who have their eyes and ears glued to China, to develop a deep understanding of its history and to go beyond predominant Western understandings. This is clearly a long-term endeavour: China specialists are not produced overnight. Finally, the Indian diplomatic approach to China needs to show greater nuance, some signs of which are now becoming visible.

It is the combination of these elements that will help India to engage China more effectively. The old terms of engagement no longer seem terribly relevant. After all, 2020 is not the same as 2006.

Rahul Tripathi teaches Political Science at Goa University.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

India to push China for maps to clarify claim lines, actual control
The Times of India, July 13

India plans to push the Chinese side for an exchange of maps in the western sector after the process of disengagement and de-escalation is complete and Indian troops go back to their old patrolling posts.

India asks court to stymie potential challenge to Chinese app ban
Reuters, July 11

India’s government has petitioned a state court to stop any of the Chinese companies whose 59 apps it recently banned from obtaining an injunction to block the order, according to two sources and the legal filing.

Chinese envoy calls for de-escalation of China-India tensions to restore ties to right track
Global Times, July 11

China's Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, said on Friday (July 10) that friendship and cooperation between China and India need to be emphasized in order to defuse suspicion over sensitive issues such as last month's border clash and bring bilateral relations back on the right track for a sound and steady development.

In Galwan, both sides agree: Troops step back 1.8 km, 30 soldiers each in tents
The Indian Express, July 7

According to a senior Army officer, the Chinese military camp at PP14 in Galwan Valley, reconstructed at the site of the June 15 clashes, has been completely dismantled and all tents have been uprooted. Troops and material have been taken back in vehicles.

Eye on China: India to get Rs 38,900-cr defence upgrade amid border dispute
Business Standard, July 3

India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation in Ladakh, where Indian soldiers are facing off against Chinese intruders, by approving the purchase of weapons and equipment worth Rs 38,900 crore.

India uses Hong Kong to land diplomatic punch on China
The Times of India, July 2

At the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, India’s representative said that given the large Indian community that makes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China its home, India has been keeping “a close watch on recent developments”.

Chinese Defense Ministry blames India for border clash: it 'unilaterally' violates consensus
CGTN, June 24

China's Defense Ministry said a recent border clash between China and India was “completely caused by the Indian side's violation of consensus and unilateral provocation,” and called on efforts to jointly safeguard border stability.

India to challenge China’s foray in South America; To explore defence export opportunities
Financial Express, July 12

In a challenge to China’s forays in South America, India is exploring the sale of various military platforms to the region.

Defying US, China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership
The New York Times, July 11

The investment and security pact would vastly extend China’s influence in the Middle East, throwing Iran an economic lifeline and creating new flash points with the United States.

Russia and US jostle for arms sales to India after tensions with China over border
South China Morning Post, July 11

The Indian government last week rushed to approve a proposal to acquire 33 new Russian warplanes for US$2.4 billion and upgrade 59 more, in addition to an earlier US$5.43 billion deal for S-400 air defence missile systems, after the deadly skirmish with Chinese troops last month on their disputed border.

China's anti-India move at UN Security Council blocked by US, Germany
Livemint, July 2

China introduced the statement on June 30 but Germany stepped in to put a delay in issuing the statement at the last moment.

India-Japan naval exercises: a message for China?
South China Morning Post, June 29

Joint exercises by the Indian and Japanese navies in the Indian Ocean at the weekend suggest the two countries are drawing closer to face what they perceive as a common threat from China, analysts say.

US shifting military to India, Southeast Asia to counter Chinese Army: Pompeo
Livemint, June 26

The threats from China to India and countries in Southeast Asia and the challenges in the South China Sea are going to dictate the allocation of defence resources.

Chinese foreign minister calls on China, Russia, India to work together
Xinhua, June 24

Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Tuesday held a video conference with Russian and Indian foreign ministers, calling on the three countries to send positive signals to the rest of the world by jointly combating COVID-19, promoting economic development and safeguarding international justice.

India cuts China imports by half in a year; needs measured approach to further lower dependence: SBI
Financial Express, July 8

While anti-China sentiments gain prevalence in the country, India has already cut its import dependence on China by half in the last financial year.

India’s trade deficit with China dips to $48.66 billion in FY20
The Hindu, July 3

India’s trade deficit with China fell to $48.66 billion in 2019-20 on account of the decline in imports from the neighbouring country, according to government data.

Beijing warns of India's additional scrutiny of Chinese goods, ready to take countermeasures
CGTN, July 3

China said on Friday that artificial blocks to bilateral cooperation would harm India's interests and that the two countries should work together to uphold peace in their border region.

India blocks Chinese highway deals as military talks enter third round
Nikkei Asian Review, July 2

The Road Transport, Highways and MSME Minister, Gadkari said that for road construction, his ministry will not grant permissions to joint ventures that have Chinese partners.

S'pore, other countries reaffirm commitment to sign RCEP this year
The Straits Times, June 24

Singapore and other stakeholders have reiterated their commitment to sign the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) mega trade deal this year, despite the turmoil stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic.

India Looking To Strengthen Domestic Solar Manufacturing, Reduce Dependence On China
Clean Technica, July 12

The Indian government is looking to reduce dependence on Chinese imports, including solar cells and modules. India is considering multiple efforts to discourage developers to import Chinese equipment and encourage investors to develop domestic manufacturing facilities.

China’s Era of Mega-Dams Is Ending as Solar and Wind Power Rise
Bloomberg Quint, July 8

It’s the beginning of the end for the era of mega-dam building in China.

India plans to thwart Chinese firms from participating in Ladakh solar project
Livemint, July 7

India is exploring ways of denying Chinese firms from participating in the marquee 7.5 gigawatt (GW) solar power development contract in Ladakh that also involves setting up a 900-km strategic power transmission link to help supply electricity across the country, said two people aware of the development.

India seeks to curb Chinese power equipment imports amid tensions
Reuters, July 3

Indian companies will need government permission to import power supply equipment and components from China, an order by the power ministry said, amid rising military tensions between the two countries.

India rolls the dice on Hong Kong
Observer Research Foundation, July 10

By Harsh V. Pant, Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation

New Delhi chose the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva to react to China where it argued last week that India has been keeping “a close watch on recent developments” in Hong Kong given the presence of a large Indian community there.

India-China conflict: A move from the Himalayas to the high seas?
The Interpreter, July 10

By David Brewster, Senior Research Fellow at National Security College, Australian National University

A risky naval blockade in the Indian Ocean is touted by some as a way to pressure China’s vital energy routes.

Why a Trade War With China Is a Bad Idea for India
Foreign Policy, June 29

By James Crabtree, Associate Professor in Practice at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Relations between the United States and China have sunk to such lows in recent years that it is now easy enough to imagine the two nations eventually going to war. Yet this month’s deadly Himalayan skirmishes suggest China is far likelier to usher in a new era of military conflict with its neighbor India.

The Galwan Killings Are the Nail in the Coffin for China and India’s Relationship
Foreign Policy, June 26

By Jeff M. Smith, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation

For the last two months, China and India have been embroiled in a series of standoffs along their disputed Himalayan border that has become the worst crisis in Sino-Indian relations in over 50 years.

On China trade sanctions: India can serve its national security much better by rapidly expanding its economy
The Times of India, June 25

By Arvind Panagariya, Professor of Economics at Columbia University.

With its GDP at $14 trillion, China now feels economically secure and militarily powerful enough to pursue its long-standing geopolitical ambitions that include the acquisition of territories with strategic value.

Driving India into US arms is a risk China is willing to take
South China Morning Post, June 24

By Shashi Tharoor, third-term Member of the Indian Parliament and former Chairman of Parliament’s External Affairs Committee

Beijing knows that with each passing year its relative economic, military and geopolitical strength is growing vis-à-vis India. New Delhi knows that the clash in the Himalayas is a test of its resolve; giving in to Chinese tactics would invite more ‘salami-slicing’ by the PLA.

Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War
Brookings Institution Press (2020)

By Tanvi Madan, Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program, and Director of The India Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC

In this Asian century, scholars, officials and journalists are increasingly focused on the fate of the rivalry between China and India. They see the U.S. relationships with the two Asian giants as now intertwined, after having followed separate paths during the Cold War.

In Fateful Triangle, Tanvi Madan argues that China’s influence on the U.S.-India relationship is neither a recent nor a momentary phenomenon. Drawing on documents from India and the United States, she shows that American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China significantly shaped U.S.-India relations in three crucial decades, from 1949 to 1979. Fateful Triangle updates our understanding of the diplomatic history of U.S.-India relations, highlighting China’s central role in it, reassesses the origins and practice of Indian foreign policy and nonalignment, and provides historical context for the interactions between the three countries.

Madan’s assessment of this formative period in the triangular relationship is of more than historic interest. A key question today is whether the United States and India can, or should develop ever-closer ties as a way of countering China’s desire to be the dominant power in the broader Asian region. Fateful Triangle argues that history shows such a partnership is neither inevitable nor impossible. A desire to offset China brought the two countries closer together in the past, and could do so again. A look to history, however, also shows that shared perceptions of an external threat from China are necessary, but insufficient, to bring India and the United States into a close and sustained alignment: that requires agreement on the nature and urgency of the threat, as well as how to approach the threat strategically, economically, and ideologically.

With its long view, Fateful Triangle offers insights for both present and future policymakers as they tackle a fateful, and evolving, triangle that has regional and global implications.

Thirteen Months in China: A Subaltern Indian and the Colonial World
Oxford University Press (2017)

Edited by Anand A. Yang, Kamal Sheel, Ranjana Sheel, Prasenjit Duara, and Tansen Sen

This book is an annotated English translation of Gadadhar Singh's Cīn Me Terah Mās (1902), a stunning account, in Hindi, of his experiences in China as a soldier in the International Expedition-a multinational force of eight nations organized in the summer of 1900 to march on the capital city of Beijing, lift the siege of the Foreign Legations there, and defeat the insurgent Boxers and the Qing Empire that supported the movement. Written shortly after his return from Beijing, Singh details many aspects of China and its people he encountered in person over the course of thirteen months. Part travelogue, part history, his story of China offers an eyewitness account of the tumultuous events of the Boxer Uprising and its aftermath along with a remarkable close-up view of Chinese society, culture, politics, religion, art, and architecture, and other 'knowable and suitable subjects', from the perspective of an Indian subaltern.

This volume was reviewed on H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online by Emily Whewell from the Max Planck Institute.