China-India Brief #161

Guest Column

Will India balance China in East Asia? 

By Hugh White    

Image from U.S. Navy

Within just a few decades, China and India will both have economies larger than America’s, and their power and influence will grow accordingly. That means their relationship will become the most important in the world. In Asia especially, how they interact will largely determine the nature of the international order and prospects for peace and prosperity. And already, the nature and tone of their relationship has become a vital element in the fast-changing regional strategic order. Few questions matter more to Asia’s future than the long-term trajectory of India-China relations. And few questions are more deeply shrouded in myth and wishful thinking—especially in America and among America’s closest allies in East Asia. 

Clearly, these two giants will be strategic rivals. But how, why, and where will their rivalry play out? The assumption in Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra is that India and China will be bitter strategic rivals across the entire Indo-Pacific region. That leads them to expect that India will wholeheartedly support their efforts to resist China’s growing power and influence in East Asia. This flows naturally from the Indo-Pacific concept to which these countries are so deeply committed. The Indo-Pacific concept presupposes that the South Asia-Indian Ocean region and the East Asia-Western Pacific region are inextricably tied together in a single strategic system, and that India and China, as the two strongest powers in that system, will inevitably compete for strategic position across its entire span.  

But that is far from inevitable. How and where India and China compete strategically will depend on choices that will be made in Delhi and Beijing in the years and decades ahead, and it is unlikely that they will choose to compete in the way America and its allies hope. That is because both countries will almost certainly give priority to securing their pre-eminence in their own backyards, just as America has always done in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, India’s primary aim will most probably be to preserve and enhance its position as the leading power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and China’s will be to become the leading power in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

Of course, both countries have ambitions to extend their sway beyond their core regions, but they will be unlikely to do so in ways that will jeopardize their primacy close to home. That means they would each have to consider whether the gains of challenging the other in the other’s backyard would justify the costs and risks involved. Those costs and risks would be very high, as each of them will be powerful states with massive resources and each will enjoy vital home-ground advantages in their core region. This is especially true in the maritime sphere, where long-term trends are making it harder and harder for any country to project power by sea against the land-based defences of a capable adversary.  Thus, India and China would both find it hard to project significant power into the maritime approaches of the other. The costs and risks of trying to do so would outweigh any potential benefits to either of them. 

All this means that it is far from likely that India and China will seek to challenge one another across the entire Indo-Pacific region. It is much more likely that India will focus on its own core region in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and tacitly concede primacy in East Asia and the Western Pacific to China, and vice-versa.  If so, the old US-led order in Asia-Pacific will not be replaced by a single new Indo-Pacific strategic order, but by two distinct regions or systems—one dominated by India and the other dominated by China. The two countries will still compete, but their contest will focus on the boundary between their adjoining spheres of influence, rather than on the existence of those spheres themselves—much as we see them jostling one another along their common land border without ever seriously threatening each other’s sovereign territories. That means countries that are squarely within East Asia, like Japan, cannot rely on India to resist China’s ambitions to exercise hegemony over them. But it also means that countries on or near the natural boundary between Chinese and Indian spheres—like Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Australia—will have scope to play the two regional giants off against one another to preserve a measure of freedom of maneuver from both.

It might be argued that China is already intruding into India’s core region, with its provocative presence in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Djibouti, and that India must inevitably be drawn into China’s backyard in response. But China’s moves into the Indian Ocean have occurred while India has been relatively weak—too weak to exclude China and too weak to mount a corresponding challenge in the Western Pacific. As India’s power grows, it will become strong enough to exclude China from the Indian Ocean, but not strong enough to challenge Chinese dominance in the Western Pacific. That means each will become more inclined to tacitly accept and respect the other’s sphere of influence.

It might also be argued that India has no need to confront China alone. Many people believe that it will ally with America, Japan, and Australia—in the ‘Quad’—and others to resist China’s ambitions in East Asia. But that kind of alliance will only work if these countries’ interests and objectives align over the longer term, and it is far from clear that they will. Why should Delhi court conflict with Beijing by opposing China in East Asia simply to please Washington or Tokyo? And how sure can Delhi be that Washington or Tokyo—or Canberra—would risk their relationship with China to stand with India?

In the decades to come, India’s growing power will be exercised to serve India’s interests, not anyone else’s. And its interests will not be defined by vague notions of democracy or the rules-based order. They will be defined by India’s natural ambition to maximize its power and influence over the countries and regions closest to it in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and that objective will likely best be served by respecting China’s parallel ambitions in East Asia and the Western Pacific. And that means East Asian countries cannot rely on India to shield them from China’s power, and America cannot expect India to help protect America’s strategic position in the Western Pacific.

Hugh White is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

‘Mutual consensus to disengage’ reached during top-level India-China military talks
Hindustan Times, June 23

A “mutual consensus to disengage” from “all friction areas” along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC) was reached during a marathon meeting between senior Indian and Chinese commanders at Moldo on the Chinese side of the LAC on Monday (June 22), two senior officials said on Tuesday (June 23).

India redraws its rules to engage China on border
Livemint, June 22

Commanders can now decide on response to provocation. The new tactical approach may include staggered movement of patrols in key areas of the line of actual control.

India moves jets, copters to China-facing forward bases
The Times of India, June 20

The fresh build-up includes the new Apache attack helicopters, which are “tank killers” with their Hellfire air-to-ground missiles and rockets, and Chinook heavy-lift choppers, capable of transporting howitzers to forward high-altitude areas.

Modi accused of surrendering to China after denying border incursion
South China Morning Post, June 20

The hashtag #ModiSurrendersToChina is trending after Narendra Modi said no Indian territory was lost during last week’s border clashes with China. Modi said the Indian army can take steps to resolve tensions, but Beijing said Indian troops provoked the skirmish, and that China claimed the Galwan valley.

10 Soldiers Including 4 Officers Released By Chinese Army After Talks
NDTV, June 19

The release of the men, including two Majors, came about after three days of negotiations in the Galwan Valley headed by a Major General of the Army.

Chinese FM urges closer China-India communication to maintain border peace
Xinhua, June 17

Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi suggested on Wednesday (June 17) that China and India strengthen communication and coordination on properly addressing the border situation and jointly maintain the peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

India urgently seeks Russian missile defense system after China clash
Livemint, June 23

India defense minister Rajnath Singh plans to seek the advanced delivery of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile defense system—currently due in Dec 2021—and the purchase of Russian-made jet fighters Su-30Mki and MiG-29.

China-India border situation ‘very tough’, US talking to India and China to help them out: Donald Trump
Financial Express, June 21

Trump's comments came in the backdrop of the violent face-off between the Indian and Chinese armies in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh on June 15 in which 20 Indian military personnel were killed, significantly escalating the already volatile situation in the region.

Amid stand-off with China, India faces new low in bilateral ties with Nepal
South China Morning Post, June 20

Kathmandu has approved a controversial new map marking as its territory land currently administered by India. Experts say China’s influence in Nepal has boosted its assertiveness in a dispute going back two centuries.

Australia hints at Chinese cyberattack; Japan, Vietnam too riled by Beijing
The Times of India, June 20

Australian PM Scott Morrison said his government and some private sector entities in the country had been under a sustained cyberattack by a state actor—a hint at China.

China, Pak possess more nuclear weapons than India: Defence think-tank SIPRI
Hindustan Times, June 15

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s Yearbook 2020 pegs the number of nuclear warheads in the Chinese arsenal at 320, while the nuclear forces of Pakistan and India are estimated to have 160 and 150 weapons, respectively.

Galwan stand-off: India takes another shot at free trade deal with US
Business Standard, June 20

As India distances itself from China following the clash in Ladakh between soldiers of the two countries, the Centre is keen to have another go at negotiating the India-US free trade agreement.

India working to restrict Chinese goods, investments since before Galwan, Covid: Officials
The Print, June 19

Modi govt has been working on a multi-pronged strategy since walking out of RCEP last year. The LAC incident has only pushed the process, says top official.

Chinese firms to lose India business in Railways, telecom
The Indian Express, June 18

A Chinese engineering major is set to lose a significant contract with the Indian Railways, and the Department of Telecommunications has conveyed to state-owned BSNL not to use Chinese-made equipment in its upgradation, top sources in both sectors said on Thursday (June 18).

Boycott Chinese products chorus grows following Ladakh LAC stand-off
India TV, June 17

Strong protest against the Chinese goods and products is building up in the country amid the rising tensions at the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. The news of 20 Indian soldiers killed by the PLA in Galwan Valley has given rise to the call of Boycott Chinese Products/Goods.

India-China trade crashes 7% amid cold vibes - steepest fall in 7 years; monthly deficit at 10-year low
Business Today, June 11

Import substitution of electronics going into TVs, refrigerators, ACs, washing machines and mobile phones caused a $1.5 billion fall in imports from China in FY20.

India not ready to take up RCEP’s ‘flexible’ offer
The Hindu Business Line, June 10

India is not ready to respond any time soon to the offer made to rejoin the RCEP free trade negotiations on much easier terms than before, especially as its industry and farmers are struggling to cope with the Covid-19 crisis, according to officials.

India's May crude oil imports post biggest decline since at least 2005
Reuters, June 20

India’s crude oil imports in May fell 22.6% from a year earlier, it’s biggest drop since at least 2005, as fuel demand and refinery production was hurt by a country-wide lockdown to curb the spread of coronavirus.

India-China Himalayan standoff deadly for cashmere herds
The Hindu, June 19

The months-long military standoff between the Asian giants is hurting local communities due to the loss of tens of thousands of Himalayan goat kids died because they couldn’t reach traditional winter grazing lands, officials and residents said.

Oil retreats as China coronavirus outbreak darkens outlook for demand
Hindustan Times, June 17

Oil dropped in Asia as fears of a resurgence of coronavirus in China cast fresh doubt on the demand outlook, and a report pointed to a further swelling in US crude stockpiles.

India 2nd biggest driver of global energy consumption in 2019: BP Statistical Review
Financial Express, June 17

India was second biggest growth driver of primary energy consumption in the world, behind China, in 2019 even though it witnessed fall in demand in oil and coal, according to BP Statistical Review released on Wednesday (June 17).

India Looks To Double Oil Refining Capacity By 2030
Oilprice.com, June 16

The world’s third-largest crude oil importer, India, plans to double its refining capacity by 2030 from the current 5 million barrels per day (bpd), Oil Minister Dharmendra Pradhan said at a webinar on Tuesday (June 16).

Worsening China-India clash would be bad move for both economies
Nikkei Asian Review, June 22

By William Pesek, Tokyo-based journalist

China and India should redouble efforts to counter the severe disruptions facing their economies this year. The first priority is avoiding military conflict.

China, India should keep cooperation as a priority
China Daily, June 22

By Ma Bo, Research Fellow, Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University

The Sino-Indian border military confrontations have drawn the world's attention. Many in the West would hope India would “stand up” against China's “aggression”.

Violence on the Chinese-Indian border: Why now, and what next?
CGTN, June 21

By Josef Gregory Mahoney, Professor of Politics, East China Normal University

The recent violence on the border is a gross tragedy that is being exploited by those willing to risk further dangers; and both sides must accept responsibility.

India Failed to Read the Chinese Tea Leaves in Time, Its Options Now Are Limited
The Wire, June 21

By General Ashok K. Mehta, part of the monitoring team of Defence Planning Staff in MOD of the year-long PLA intrusion at Sumdorong chu in 1987/88

Great uncertainty surrounds Prime Minister Modi’s promise of a befitting reply but his response will probably be economic and diplomatic and not military.

China and India: how many soldiers must die before they get a border?
South China Morning Post, June 20

By Debasish Roy Chowdhury, Jefferson Fellow

The Galwan Valley incident shows that soldiers continue to be used as cannon fodder to make up for a decades-old political failure. The two countries’ refusal to draw a line on the ground gives the lie to their grand declarations of peace.

How rising tensions on the India-China border are dashing hopes of an ‘Asian century’
South China Morning Post, June 19

By Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, Director of the Society for Policy Studies (SPS), New Delhi

With China standing its ground, India determined to prevent a repeat of its 1962 humiliation and tensions rising in the region, the stakes are high for both President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

China and India’s deadly Himalayan clash is a big test for Modi. And a big concern for the world
The Conversation, June 17

By Ian Hall, Deputy Director (Research) at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University

Although standoffs and even fistfights between Chinese and Indian troops have been relatively common in recent years, there have been no deaths on the disputed border for decades. In this case, it appears disengagement processes have failed, and at a moment when relations between China and India - both nuclear armed states - are already tense.

India should curb ‘boycott China’ voices after border clash
The Global Times, June 17

By Liu Xiaoxue, Associate Research Fellow, National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Rational voices in India have repeatedly pointed out that it is unrealistic and self-destructive for Asia's third-largest economy to launch frictions with the largest economy in the region.

China and India can aim for amity amidst border impasse
Global Times, June 15

By Zhang Yunling, academy member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Shandong University

The differences in the two countries' strategies and interests seem to have become a gap blocking the development of bilateral relations. As a rising country, India's strategic pursuit and established goal is to be a global power.

When Nehru Looked East: Origins of India-US Suspicion and India-China Rivalry
Oxford University Press (2020)

By Francine R. Frankel, Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Founding Director of the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI), University of Pennsylvania

Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs from 1947 to 1964, set the framework of foreign policy which has remained India's reference point until the present. One of the most significant leaders of the twentieth century, Nehru came to power in the early years of the Cold War, determined to assert independent India's influence and interests in Asia and beyond. Drawing on the Nehru Papers, Francine Frankel's When Nehru Looked East reinterprets the doctrine of non-alignment with which Nehru is most closely identified to reveal its strategic purpose.

Analyzing India-US and India-China relations during this period, Frankel explains how these parties came to distrust each other. From the outset, Nehru's vision of India's destiny as a great power collided with that of the US as leader and protector of the free world. He considered the US a rival in South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East and carried out an active diplomacy to dissuade newly independent nations from joining US-led anti-communist mutual security alliances and instead follow India's example of non-alignment. He did not see a threat from the Soviet Union and believed, despite the dispute with China over the northern border, that India's approach would bring India and China together as advocates of Asianism to counter American penetration in the region. This historic miscalculation, manifested in the 1962 China-India War, overthrew the pillars of Nehru's foreign policy.

Frankel provides the most authoritative account yet of the origins of India-US suspicions and India-China rivalries. Outlasting the Cold War, Nehru's worldview lived on in the mindset of successor generations, making it difficult for the US and India to form a strategic partnership and establish a natural balance in Asia.