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China-India Brief #169

October 22, 2020 - October 30, 2020

China-India Brief #169BRIEF #169

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
October 22, 2020 - October 30, 2020


Guest Column

The End of India’s Strategic Autonomy?

By Itty Abraham    


CIB169_1Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Thebrowniris 

The gap between India’s self-image and international reality has never been so extreme. Caught between a long-proclaimed desire for strategic autonomy in foreign affairs and the growing realization that it may not have the means to afford such freedom, India finds itself at a critical juncture as it decides what its future will be. The widening cleft between today’s perceptions and tomorrow’s outcomes is the product of its own actions and missteps joined with profound changes on the external front, built on a dubious foundation of civilizational greatness that has become a self-perpetuating conceit. The essence of the situation boils down to this: given likely trajectories of prevailing geopolitical forces, does India have any choice but to join the US as a strategic ally? 

Looking back, it could be said that the decision to join ranks with the US was a foregone conclusion ever since the G.W. Bush administration’s rewriting of US nuclear policy to accept India as a legitimate nuclear weapons state in 2005. Perhaps so, but it must be remembered that many observers argued precisely the opposite at the time. In fact, what has become a significant change in India’s international personality was built on gradually, beginning with annual joint military activities and a series of defence cooperation agreements, and consolidated symbolically by the announcement of a new geopolitical category in 2013—the Indo-Pacific. Compensating for material inaction with symbolic messaging, the Indo-Pacific was an announcement by the US that international terrorism was no longer its main concern and that China had risen to the level of an existential threat to US hegemony in what had once been called the Asia-Pacific. Indian observers celebrated, as the ‘Indo-’  of Indo-Pacific was taken to be an explicit reference to the country, not the ocean, an American affirmation of India as a leading Asian power. 

Even as India and the US were coming together in a cautious but growingly intimate embrace, China under Xi wasn’t waiting for the world to recognise its importance. The omni-directional Belt and Road Initiative, expansion into Europe and Africa, creation of new international development banks, competition for leadership positions in the multilateral system, massive investments in new technologies, wolf warrior- and debt-diplomacy, multiplication of military spending and aggression towards its maritime neighbors were all-too visible signs that the time of ‘keeping a low profile’ and ‘biding one’s time’ was effectively over. What is important to note is that these and other Chinese actions largely preceded the profound uncertainties in international order generated by the Trump administration, uncertainties that were massively compounded by the global disruptions of the Covid pandemic. These actions and events exposed existing faultlines and weaknesses and accelerated vectors of changes already underway. 

China, Trump, and Covid: India was faced with simultaneous and intersecting crises of a complexity not encountered since the end of the Cold War. It responded by deepening its relations with the US, while taking advantage of global inattention to take actions that effectively rewrote its domestic political contract, notably in Kashmir. The latter action, born of a rigid ideology and a massive election victory, reinforced by misreading international tea leaves, would turn out to be a blunder. For the second time in a half-century, India’s glowing self-regard would come up against the harsh reality of Chinese military force in the Himalayas and found to be wanting. Self-inflicted or not, the situation demands a major reconsideration of where India stands in the world. This is the context in which the question must be asked: does India have any choice but to move even closer to the US—to protect itself from China, on the one hand, and to restore its deeply dented self-image, on the other? 

The outcome of the US presidential election may not be as much of a concern for India as it is for the American public and the rest of the world. Whether Trump or Biden comes into office in January 2021, India is now a necessary partner in future US efforts to contain China. In the past, India has always spoken out against joining an explicitly anti-China alliance, whether to maintain strategic autonomy or at least keep its options open, and to not alienate the PRC. After the mountainous assault and banning of TikTok, that moment may now be over, even if emerging alliances such as the Quad choose to cloak their intentions in diplomatic euphemisms such as ensuring the freedom of navigation in international waters. India has much to gain materially from an alliance with the US: trade, immigration and defence are immediate beneficiaries, and as the global war against terror dials down, the constant irritation of US ties with Pakistan will be correspondingly loosened. 

At least two important implications flow from this coming re-orientation. The ongoing dismantling of India’s liberal institutions may now continue unabated. To the extent that external pressure and shaming made a difference in slowing the tendency toward illiberalism at home, closer ties between the US and India will offer protection to New Delhi. After all, if there’s one constant in US foreign policy going back to the origins of the Cold War, it is that Washington will not let a decline of democracy get in the way of strong bilateral relations. 

The costs of adjustment to new economic and military partners will not be friction-free: China-India trade (including Hong Kong) now exceeds 100 billion dollars. Coming economic adjustments will mask the greatest cost of all which is emotional, namely, the putting to rest of the long-standing belief that India can be a Great Power by virtue of its own standing and achievements. How that ideological legerdemain will be pulled off is a far more difficult question to answer than acknowledging and accepting the practical concerns that drive India closer to the US, every succeeding day.


Itty Abraham is Professor and Head of the Department of Southeast Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore.


Guest Column

The Taiwan–India ‘Milk Tea Alliance’ 

By Jassie Hsi Cheng    


CIB169_2Image credit: Twitter/Digital Diplomacy Lab

“TAIWAN Happy National Day October 10,” read the posters congratulating Taiwan on its 109th National Day. They were put up near the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on the 10th by India’s ruling BJP spokesperson, Tajinder Pal Singh Bagga. Even though they were soon taken down, images of the signs had already gone viral on Twitter and in the press. They were joined by a meme tweeted by Indian netizens in support of Taiwan. Titled “Milk Tea Alliance,” … the meme showed Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi toasting each other with bubble tea and Indian spiced tea.

This represented a huge humiliation for Beijing, as the Chinese Embassy in Delhi had specifically issued a diktat to the Indian media a few days before Taiwan’s Double Tenth Day, … asking them not to violate its “one China” policy. As expected, this diktat sparked a backlash on social media and had a so-called Streisand effect … Tsai thanked the Indian people for their blessings and support, and on the day the posters went up, Taiwan’s envoy to the U.S., Hsiao Bi-khim, tweeted, “Wow! What a #MilkTeaAlliance.”

This is an except from an article originally published in The Diplomat on October 20, 2020 and is reprinted with permission. See the full article here.


Jassie H. Cheng is a Research Associate at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Previously, she was a press researcher responsible for public relations activities and communications at the Taipei Representative Office in the U.K.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

China draws up a peace plan on Ladakh. India sees right through it
Hindustan Times, October 30

Army finds PLA’s condition that India should only patrol till Finger 3 of Pangong Tso unacceptable as it means that Finger 4 will become part of occupied Aksai Chin.

India takes its tussle with China to the high seas
Financial Times, October 28

New Delhi quietly dispatched a frontline warship on an unusual voyage to the South China Sea.

India in dialogue with China to end six month old military standoff: Rajnath Singh
Livemint, October 28

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said India was in dialogue with China to end a six month old military standoff and commended the Indian army for standing firm against any possible attempts at intrusion by the Chinese forces in the mean time.

Against China, India needs to be militarily better prepared, says RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat
Hindustan Times, October 25

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat said India needs to be more powerful than China in terms of military preparedness, adding the world is aware of that country’s expansionist designs.

India-China standoff: ITBP to set up 47 new outposts for better vigil
DNA India, October 25

Amid rising tensions with China along the Line of Actual Control, the government has ordered setting up of 47 Border Outposts (BoPs). The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) will set up and man these Border Outposts.

India-China border standoff: Ensuring comprehensive disengagement is 'immediate task'
The Economic Times, October 22

"The immediate task is to ensure a comprehensive disengagement of troops in all the friction areas,” said the spokesperson in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Anurag Srivastava.

News Reports

China and India in the Region

US counters China in Sri Lanka and Maldives by driving a wedge
Nikkei Asia, October 30

Pompeo announces opening of Male embassy and calls Communist Party a 'predator'.

Communication channels on China-India border issues unimpeded, Indo-Pacific strategy outdated Cold War mentality: Chinese FM
Global Times, October 28

The Indo-Pacific strategy proposed by the US advocated an outdated Cold War mentality, promoted bloc confrontation and upheld the dominant position and hegemonic system of the US, Wang Wenbin said, urging some US politicians to stop hyping up the so-called China threat and sowing discord between countries in the region.

With a message for Pakistan and China, India & US conclude 2+2 talks, vow to deepen ties
The Print, October 27

The biggest takeaway from the talks was the signing of BECA, a key defence pact that will enable India to avail of US expertise on geospatial intelligence.

China’s hand seen in Myanmar’s insurgent group targeting India-backed Kaladan project
Hindustan Times, October 26

The Arakan Army, an insurgent group whose activities have severely affected the India-backed Kaladan multi-modal transport project in Myanmar, has benefited from the clandestine transfer and smuggling of Chinese-made weaponry, people familiar with developments said on Monday (October 26).

China right to be concerned about Quad alliance’s bright future, analysts say
South China Morning Post, October 24

After unpromising beginning, US, Japan, India and Australia grouping is finding renewed common ground against Beijing.

News Reports

Trade and Economy

Chinese promise market opening amid technology push
Yahoo Finance, October 30

China will promote “technological self-reliance” under the ruling Communist Party’s latest five-year plan but will open further to trade, officials said Friday (October 30).

India can still be $5 trillion economy, says PM Modi
Business Today, October 29

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has said he's optimistic about achieving the $5 trillion dollar economy target by 2024, despite coronavirus pandemic ravaging the Indian economy.

Sustained Chinese demand pushes up iron ore, steel prices in India
The Times of India, October 28

Steel prices are riding high on export demand, with China playing an important role.

India, China Get Richer As Virus Hits US Wealth: Credit Suisse
NDTV, October 23

Only China and India saw gains in household wealth in the first half of the year, growing by 4.4% and 1.6%, respectively.

India will slip to seventh largest economy in 2021, shows IMF data
Business Standard, October 23

China is not just firm at the No. 2 spot, but is nearing the US fast.

News Reports

Energy and Environment

US pitches cheaper solar technology to India amid high dependence on China
Livemint, October 29

The US wants India to explore manufacturing a cheaper alternative to silicon solar cells, U.S. Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette said on Wednesday (October 28), amid high dependence on Chinese technology.

Xi's carbon neutrality vow to reshape China's five-year plan
Reuters, October 26

Policymakers are under pressure to include radical climate targets in the new 2021-2025 “five-year plan”, with the COVID-hit economy weighing on their decisions. 

At India Energy Forum, PM Modi says India’s energy future bright and secure
Hindustan Times, October 26

Promoting India’s capability to be a global force multiplier, PM Modi said, “A self-reliant India will also be a force multiplier for the world economy. Energy security is at the core of our efforts.”

Analyses

How the US and India became brothers in arms
Asia Times, October 28

By Jagannath Panda, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the East Asia Centre at MP-IDSA, New Delhi

India and US have overcome historically rocky relations to forge a key defense pact aimed primarily at China.

Incentives to advance India-US partnership are stronger than ever before
The Indian Express, October 27

By C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

The 2+2 dialogue comes in the backdrop of a structural shift in great power politics and turbulence in the global economic order.

India can play a constructive role in evolving a multipolar and just world order
The Indian Express, October 26

By D. Raja, General Secretary, CPI

India pursuing an independent foreign policy is not only essential for the country or the South Asian region, it can have a bearing on deprived populations of the world.

India is caught between the need for good China relations and rising public anger
South China Morning Post, October 26

By Mohamed Zeeshan, editor-in-chief of Freedom Gazette

Indian officials have used cautious rhetoric in the hope of easing tensions with China and keeping up Delhi’s foreign policy balancing act between East and West.

India aims at maximum interests with BECA
Global Times, October 25

By Zhang Jiadong, Director of South Asian Studies Center at Fudan University and Professor of American Studies Center

In the long run, in a multipolar world, US-Indian relations will continue to develop, but will also transform. It's difficult for Washington to form alliance with New Delhi like it has with Tokyo.

How Russia emerged as key mediator in the China–India dispute
East Asia Forum, October 23

By Artyom Lukin, Associate Professor and Deputy Director of Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok

Russia has become the de facto intermediary in the dispute, despite never publicly offering. Moscow’s discreet diplomacy may have helped de-escalate the most violent China–India clash since the 1960s.

Books and Journals

IndiasChinaChallengeIndia’s China Challenge: A journey through China’s rise and what it means for India
HarperCollins, September 2020

By Ananth Krishnnan, Beijing correspondent for The Hindu

This book is Krishnan’s attempt at unpacking India’s China challenge, which is four-fold: the political challenge of dealing with a one-party state that is looking to increasingly shape global institutions; the military challenge of managing an unresolved border; the economic challenge of both learning from China’s remarkable and unique growth story and building a closer relationship; and the conceptual challenge of changing how we think about and engage with our most important neighbour. India’s China Challenge tells the story of a complex political relationship, and how China – and its leading opinion-makers – view India. It looks at the economic dimensions and cultural connect, and the internal political and social transformations in China that continue to shape both the country’s future and its relations with India.


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ABRAHAM, Itty

ABRAHAM, Itty

CHENG Hsi, Jassie
Research Associate