Intro: Southeast Asia now finds itself at the heart of a growing storm. As the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China intensifies, ASEAN nations are navigating a delicate balance between two competing powers.
Today, we speak with Professor Khong Yuen Fong about his work, examining how ASEAN is managing this rivalry and what the shifting global order means for the region's future.
Zubaidah: Welcome, Professor. Thank you for being here.
Prof Khong: Thank you very much for having me, Zubaidah. I'm really delighted to be here.
Zubaidah: Can you begin by telling us more about this project, Anatomy of Choice?
Prof Khong: Yes, I'll be very happy to. This is a project that Dean Joseph Liow and I recently completed. It took us five years, and we titled it the Anatomy of Choice, Southeast Asia Between the Superpowers.
It's a project in which we attempt to investigate how the 10 Southeast Asian countries (except Timor Leste) are navigating their relations with China and the US in the context of the two superpowers applying pressure on countries in the region to align with them.
Our project was supported by a Singapore Social Science Council research grant. And that grant allowed us to recruit some of the best young scholars working on the international relations of Southeast Asia to investigate the issue with us, and also allowed us to build what we call the Alignment Index.
The project actually asks four questions. First, what is it about the US-China competition that incentivises them to pressure others to align with them?
Secondly, how are the Southeast Asian countries aligning themselves then and now?
Third, what explains their alignment postures?
And finally, what are the implications for the region and beyond?
Zubaidah: And Professor, this is just a quick follow-up. This is actually the first of its kind of index.
Prof Khong: On the Index, I would say so. Yes, you have had impressionistic accounts of where the various countries are, but I believe our Alignment Index is the first one to try to come up with rigorous measures to get a better idea of where each of the countries are.
Zubaidah: And how long did that take you, this whole project?
Prof Khong: The whole project took us about four and a half years.
Zubaidah: Wow, congratulations on launching it.
Prof Khong: Thank you.
Zubaidah: So why do you say Southeast Asia is caught in the middle of this US-China rivalry?
Prof Khong: We see the rivalry as a struggle for the predominant position in Asia. And if you look at Asia, you'll find that Japan, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, in a sense, are already committed or aligned with the US. The one region which remains sort of unaligned to some extent is Southeast Asia.
So, if either China or US want to be the predominant power in the region, it is very important that they be able to become the leader of the Southeast Asia group. In a sense, Southeast Asia remains the last swing region, right? And both the US and China see influence over Southeast Asia as very important to their plans.
For example, if you have Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia on your side, your prerogatives in the South, in the Straits of Malacca will be much easier to realise. But the ASEAN countries do not want to take sides as far as possible, but the pressures on them are increasing as the but the pressures on them are increasing as the intensity of the rivalry heightens.
Zubaidah: So Professor, I know that you and Professor Liow, our current Dean actually came up with an article here in this prestigious magazine, ‘Southeast Asia Is Starting To Choose’. Fascinating, and this is also, of course, building off this Index that you're talking about. What is the key takeaway of this index, the project, if you will?
Prof Khong: Thank you for the question. The key takeaway of the project is that Southeast Asia is starting to choose, and the direction of travel is away from the US and toward China.
So, Professor Liow and I summarised this finding in the article that you mentioned, and we have also recently launched an Alignment Index website at the School, in which we provide the data supporting our key takeaway and the arguments we make in the article, and which we welcome the global public to check out. And the users of the website can actually change the parameters that we use to come to our conclusions. To see how things go when they change those parameters.
Zubaidah: It's great because right now that Index is now live on our Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy website as well.
Prof Khong: Yes, we are very excited about that, and we hope that people will go to it. Check it out, and if there are strengths and weaknesses, tell us about it. We know that it is not the last word on the issue, but we look forward to getting feedback.
Zubaidah: So Professor, in this article inside here, Prof Liow and you noted that the region is gradually drifting towards China. What drives that shift?
Prof Khong: We and our authors focus on four main factors responsible for the shift
The first factor is domestic politics, thought of in terms of regime legitimacy and regime security. That is, the countries in Southeast Asia try to legitimise their rule by aligning with the powers that support their political system and that ensures their longevity of political survival.
Second, perceptions of economic opportunities. In this particular one, China has replaced the US as the number one trading partner of most of the countries in Southeast Asia. And in that sense, many of the countries are looking to China as the potential future provider of their so-called lunch. Although one must admit, US investments remain very strong in Southeast Asia.
And the third factor we looked at was the US's staying power. The perception says whether the US will remain military and economic power in the region or whether the US is thinking of retrenching. That affects the alignment postures of the countries.
Finally, geography. I mean, if you are a neighbour of China who sits on top of you, then there'll be the natural gravitational economic and security pull.
So those were the four main factors we discovered or we looked at.
Zubaidah: I remember you emphasising on this gravitational pull because you said so as well. You've been saying this previously in the Festival of Ideas last year and it's been something that you've been sharing, right? I also note that traditionally, people think that China is where Southeast Asia looks towards trade and economics and the US people look towards the Southeast Asian nations, look towards security. So it's interesting how the article covers how that could shift.
Prof Khong: Yes, a lot of countries in Southeast Asia still have strong military partnerships with the US. Think of their allies like Thailand and the Philippines and Singapore has a very strong strategic cooperation with the US in that sense. But it is also the case that the economic pull has become from China's direction, has become stronger over the last 10 to 15 years.
In Singapore, we use the term 'Trade is strategy'. Which means that trade becomes an important element of political military strategy too. So that's where the two factors, trade and security merge.
Zubaidah: So my next thing here is how has US policy, whether or not it's under Trump, maybe you can clarify, contributed to Southeast Asia's alignment moves?
Prof Khong: I should first note that the data underlying our analysis ends in 2024. Which means that they do not incorporate the actions and policies of Trump 2.0. I'll come back to that point later.
But if you look at the period before that, let's say after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US. For the next 10 to 15 years, the US was distracted or focusing on the Middle East. And what that meant was that as China was rising during this period, the US did not keep its eye on the ball. And coupled with US’s disillusionment with free trade, think Trump 1.0 and even Biden after succeeding Trump, the Southeast Asian countries had to anticipate where their future lunch is coming from, given the trade war, Trump 2.1. But I think it would be premature to write off the US because it still remains a very important economic partner for most of the Southeast Asian countries.
Secondly, the US interest in democracy promotion meant that the non-democratic states of Southeast Asia were subjected to criticisms and sanctions. Think Cambodia, think Myanmar, Thailand, even with the coups. And what happened then was that these states moved away from the US and therefore, inched closer to China. Because China is agnostic about political complexion. It deals with everybody. Different from the US in that sense.
And when it came to security, President Barack Obama's pivot to Asia was promising. But then again, he was distracted by Iraq and Syria. So overall, I think the US remains a key military security partner of many in Southeast Asia, but its reliability and long term commitment to the region is being increasingly questioned.
Zubaidah: Some Southeast Asian countries are so-called hedges. What does that mean in practice?
Prof Khong: The hedgers are the countries that have positioned themselves in such a way that they are not obviously aligned with either of the superpowers. In a sense, they are straddling the two powers and they have put themselves in a position of what we call equal strategic distance from the two superpowers.
And the examples in our work of the hedgers are Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam. Many of them still engage economically, very strongly with China, while maintaining security and defence ties with the US. Our Anatomy of Choice Index, shows that even though the hedgers are in neither camp, they, like the rest of Southeast Asia, have inched a bit in China's direction over the last 10 to 15 years.
Zubaidah: And this is even though they are gravitational pull with the exclusion of Vietnam because these are the countries that are more southern, isn't it?
Prof Khong: Excellent point on your part, because in a sense, maritime Southeast Asia countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, because they are further away from China, they have more room for manoeuvre, you might say, in terms of their positioning.
Zubaidah: So with all this shifting, I wonder, can ASEAN maintain unity as its members drift in different directions?
Prof Khong: ASEAN, the organisation, that's what you're asking about? As you hint in your question, it will be tough for ASEAN as a whole, as a collective entity, to maintain unity on this issue of their strategic alignments. ASEAN does not have a collective position on where it is. It aspires to be non-aligned.
But as our Index and argument suggests, some have already chosen and others are still calibrating. On the economic front, however, we might see greater ASEAN unity and purpose. Think the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), think ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is the world's largest trading bloc.
And recently, at the 47th ASEAN summit in KL, they were trying to argue about the reinvigoration of the RCEP, precisely because of all the trade wars that are happening around us. And that suggests that there's still some room for ASEAN to come together and exert leadership on regional economic matters. From digital economy rules to the rules-based multilateral trading system and sustainability issues.
One important thing to note, I think, is that although we have tried to show how countries are moving in terms of their alignments, I should say that the alignments are not fixed in stone. Actually, they can be quite fluid depending on what the two superpowers may do currently and in the near future, and also on what the individual ASEAN countries' assessments of their interests are.
Zubaidah: So, what are the implications of the project's findings for the future of the region?
Prof Khong: As I suggested earlier, our findings are based on data to late 2024, meaning that they do not include the actions and policies of Trump 2.0.
Now, the Trump 2.0 administration, by upending the assumptions underlying much of Southeast Asia's path to economic growth and prosperity, and by inflicting punishing tariffs on many of the countries in the region, that makes the US come across as less benign, less reliable, and somewhat revisionist of the rules that it made. And in that, China is capitalising on this and portraying itself as the more reliable actor on free trade, on multilateralism, and on rules-based economic order.
So one thing to watch out for in my view is whether Trump's 2.0 foreign policy, which actually relies primarily on tariffs, and add to that US domestic political upheaval, whether all these factors are likely to reinforce Southeast Asia's direction of travel away from the US in China's direction.
Zubaidah: Just following up on this, I wanted to ask you about the recent ASEAN summit, right? How will the Index be useful in looking at what's going on in the summit? And what happens at the summit?
Prof Khong: Two things, I would say. First of all, if you were the United States or you were a US policymaker and you look at the Index, I think you would say that Trump did the right thing in going to KL for the 47th ASEAN summit, because the ASEAN countries, it is very, very important that the key powers show face. That shows that you are engaged with the region. And so I think Trump did the right thing.
But on the other hand, I think Trump would have also noted that all the countries in Southeast Asia are extremely worried about the tariffs that he's imposing on them. And so in that sense, if they're aware of the Index and if they want to sort of reverse the direction of travel, then they might have to be nice to Southeast Asia.
Now, you can decide whether the agreements that Trump made in KL recently fit that description or not. And on the part of the ASEAN countries, you can see that what happened at the summit and at the East Asian summit and at the ASEAN Plus Three, all these meetings that were happening together recently. You can see that they are looking for alternative ways of ensuring that a multilateral trading system continues to exist. And this is especially true in the way that the key countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand are talking up the RCEP.
Given what I've said, I think here's a parting thought for people to think about. And it is this:
Could Southeast Asia be the canary in the mine? That is what we are seeing happening here in terms of the alignment movements we discovered. Could there be a harbinger of things to come in the Global South, especially for countries in Africa and Latin America?
Zubaidah: That's much to think about, and I want to thank you for your insights. It's been very interesting today, having you.
Prof Khong: Thank you very much for having me. It has been an honour and a privilege to be chatting with you on these issues. Thank you.
Zubaidah: As Professor Khong reminds us, Southeast Asia's pragmatism has long been its strength. But as the United States and China competition deepens, the choice of non-alignment is becoming harder to sustain.
Thank you so much for watching.
Stay tuned for the next episode of Policy Unpacked.