Intro: Hello. Welcome to the Foreseeable Podcast. I am Zubaidah Nazeer, the host of today's episode. Today we put the spotlight on the United Nations as it turns 80 years old in 2025. Current global crises, such as geopolitical conflicts, climate change, and humanitarian disasters are profoundly testing the UN's existing mechanisms and its capacity to respond effectively.
Are these unprecedented challenges pushing the organisation to a pivotal moment of decision regarding its future trajectory and continued legitimacy? Today we sit down with Professor Francesco Mancini to discuss the UN's ability to adapt, reform and successfully address these crises, which will ultimately define its relevance and determine its path forward in global governance.
Professor Francesco Mancini is Vice Dean and Associate Professor in Practice at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He works in global governance, United Nations, conflict analysis and resolution. Before joining LKYSPP, Francesco was Senior Director of Research at the International Peace Institute in New York, an independent international think tank devoted to the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts.
He also headed a program called “Coping with Crisis, Conflict and Change”, a program that worked to assist decision makers in the United Nations among other multilateral organisations. Welcome to the podcast, Professor. Happy to have you here.
Let me dive into our first discussion. As it turns 80, the United Nations faces a test of its existing mechanisms and effective response. How profoundly are the current array of global crises testing the UN's mission and effectiveness?
For context, the charter was signed on June 26th [in 1945.] And, but it was actually formalised in October [1945.]
Francesco: Well, thank you for having me. Yeah, indeed. The UN is turning 80 and I think it shows, but listen, before talking about the challenges of ageing, let's say a word about the remarkable history of the United Nations. The charter was signed in June 1945, in San Francisco; the location that was deemed acceptable because it was equally distant between London and Moscow which was not the case for New York.
Zubaidah: That was quite deliberate.
Francesco: And 50 countries signed the charter. World War II had not ended yet. So my point is that it was an extraordinary moment in human history that brought together countries with a very ambitious agenda. We can claim a world peace agenda. The charter eventually came into force in October, and so the 24th of October is when we celebrate UN day.
But we have to recognise that the world today is, you know, 80 years forward. It's a very different place. And I also want to argue that maybe it's not such a happy place right now. So a number of crises, from war, to climate in between, many others are putting this organisation to test. And I would argue that the UN had been built for a different era.
One in which global power was more centralised and there was also a strong commitment to international cooperation. And the UN went through many different crises, of course. But if you really look at when the UN was the most active was toward the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s when the Cold War ended and the US was the only superpower.
So somehow it was kind of easier to make decisions.
Zubaidah: In a unipolar world?
Francesco: In sort of a unipolar world. Today is a very different environment and is very fragmented, with a lot of geopolitical rivalries. And that's why you see the organisation paralysed, particularly on those very hot topics like the war in Ukraine or in Gaza.
And of course now with the Israel-Iran War. Now I don't want to sound too negative in the sense that of course the UN is not just the Security Council. The UN also works on many other issues with many different agencies. The World Food Program, UNICEF, UN Refugees. They all deliver right on a daily basis targeting weak countries, vulnerable people, mobilising solidarity, and so on and so forth.
Of course these agencies now are also under stress because this agency received a lot of cuts from the United States, and these are agencies that actually have historically relied a lot on US money which maybe we can say later, but maybe was a bit of a mistake and unwise to do that. So yes, a series of challenges but you know, things are still happening.
It needs more co-operation; it's not that the system has completely fallen off the cliff.
Zubaidah: You know, now the world is more complex. You can argue that the world order has shifted and the forces that were there at the time in 1945 that wanted this to happen, things are shifting. Everybody's a bit more populist to a certain extent.
Some state actors are a bit selfish, So. Perhaps the second question then, what are the most significant and existential challenges currently confronting the United Nations and how do these differ from past crises that the organisation has navigated?
Francesco: Yeah, so let's go a little deeper on this issue of crisis.
A lot of experts are calling what is happening right now, sort of a poly crisis environment where there are multiple crises happening at the same time, which are feeding off each other. And I would identify three of them. Political, financial and legitimacy. Now, political is probably the deepest one and also the one that is most different, more different from the past.
Listen, the UN has gone through a lot of political crises; just remember that just five years after 1945, the UN was already stuck because of the Korean War and the beginning of the Cold War, basically. And the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council. So then again, the mid sixties, mid seventies, with the entrance into the UN of a lot of decolonised countries and they started to create this north-south split. So there are many moments, right through the history of the United Nations, where things were very hard, very difficult to make a decision. So the political angle is not so new. Where I think is particularly new of this political challenge now is that the United States has a very different attitude toward the UN. The United States always had a very bipolar, I would call it relationship with the UN sometime in, favours them against it, but right now has shifted dramatically. I think that is what is unique right now. Now on to the other two crises, the legitimacy and the financial. On the financial side UN has been on the verge of bankruptcy and insolvency many, many times over.
So this is not something very new. On the legitimacy as well. You know, the UN has been criticised in many contexts. They've been criticised in the context of the Vietnam War, has been criticised in the genocide in Rwanda, this Srebrenica massacre at the time of of the, of the war in the Balkans.
Of course, more recently with the war in Iraq in 2003 so many situations in which the UN didn't manage to prevent disasters to stop wars. And the UN has been criticised many times. Again, I want to say that what is very unique right now is that the attitude of the United States to multilateralism has dramatically shifted.
The US is not trying to reshape it. It is basically saying, “I'm disengaging what I think is annoyance, is an annoyance for me, or I just don't care when I think it is not relevant for me.” And that is something completely new. They're also treating the financial challenges but fundamentally it is a political challenge.
Zubaidah: I mean, one state actor can actually influence so much? Isn't this a very outdated model? That is a very rhetorical question, surely?
Francesco: Yeah. I mean, you could argue that financially, maybe it's not the wisest thing to do for a certain agency to have more than half of their budget, depending on one country.
But you know, these things are also decided collectively. So for example, the United States contributes 22 per cent of the budget of the United Nation, 27 per cent of peacekeeping. And this is all money that the new US budget that has been presented by the Trump administration does not include any amount.
And I also want to remind you that these are mandatory contributions, not voluntary. So that's also become very problematic to add also to that, US has not been paying fully their contribution to the UN over many years. So there's an estimate that the US owes $2.8 billion to the United Nations.
So obviously you have a huge challenge there. On one hand, there is the fact that yes, diversifying this base will be very important, but we also have to recognise that we don't see many countries jumping in right now offering to cover this cost because the politics of financing these institutions is also something that has been very complicated.
So there's a new landscape, for the UN and of course for the Secretary General who at this point has basically taken an approach of cutting. So it's basically said, we need to cut 20 per cent of the budget. I don't care how you do it. Basically just do it. And some agencies, like the World Food Program, will have to cut, you know, up to 7,000 people if this is the direction that they're going.
Zubaidah: Is this doomsday for the UN?
Francesco: I think this is a very critical moment. I would hesitate to say that this is the end of the UN. I don't think that the UN works only when all interest aligns. Actually, I would argue that national interests are both the engine and the brake of the organisation. What I mean by that is that on one hand, the United Nation was built precisely to provide a platform where countries with divergent priorities and objectives can negotiate. So it would be absurd to say, oh, we should have a UN only when we all agree.
No, the UN is exactly the space to discuss these diversities. You know, the security council is what everybody thinks about.
Because that's where obviously these interests are, are very entrenched and, and very difficult to solve.
Zubaidah: That is the seed of implementation.
Francesco: Yeah. When it comes to peace and security, that is the place where the United Nation takes decisions. But most importantly, that is the place where five countries have a veto power.
And these five countries, China, Russia, United States, France, and UK can block any decision if they want. So that's what is also creating a crisis of legitimacy because a lot of people say: Hey, wait a minute, this is a setting that is coming out of 1945. As we said at the beginning, the world has changed. Why do these countries, you know, have this veto power?
And so some people say, oh, some other countries might want the veto power. Or of course others say, well, nobody should have a veto power. So this is an unfortunate debate that has been going on for many, many years. And frankly, I don't think that we're going to solve it. Where I think we should think about is more in terms of aligning interest, where is possible.
And again, historically this has been possible during the massive disagreements, the tension of the Cold War. We had, you know, the famous non-proliferation treaty. We had the outer space treaty. We had many arms treaties between the US and Soviet Union. So what I'm saying is there are opportunities right to find moments where interest aligns.
And that's the work, that's why we have the United Nations.
Zubaidah: I like the point that you reminded us about how the UN does not just exist just because a bunch of people agree. It has to exist because it is a space where you can come together and have a sort of thrashing out of something to get to a consensus.
Moving along to the UN and Southeast Asia So the question is, how do you think Southeast Asia views the UN's track record, particularly concerning the engagement in regional conflicts? Do these exigencies suggest the UN is at a crossroads in this region?
Francesco: Listen, I think that the Southeast Asia view of the United Nations is mixed. On one hand there is strong support for international law, global norms and the importance of peace, stability and development. On the other hand, there is also strong emphasis on sovereignty.
And an overall sort of pragmatic approach, right, of dealing with big powers, for example, being US, China, or anyone, anybody else. And because of this dichotomy, the UN track record in the region is uneven, agencies like UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, have played a critical role in health, in education, in disaster reduction, and sustainable development in many countries in the region, like in Cambodia, in Myanmar, in Laos, and the UN also collaborate closely with ASEAN.
For example, if you remember the post-tsunami, recovery right in Indonesia and in Thailand, as well as in the pandemic response and in climate resilience. I would say that there is a broad support for the SDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals in Southeast Asia. But when it comes to conflict and humanitarian crises, the picture is more complicated.
The UN engagement in Myanmar, for example, doesn't have a successful track record. The UN Secretary General had a special envoy for Myanmar since 1995. Alvaro de Soto from Peru was like the first one. But the impact right has been very, very limited. Regional actors often prefer an ASEAN led approach to conflict resolution which limits the UN leverage.
In fact, the principle of non interference, a cornerstone of diplomacy, has often clashed with the UN's emphasis on universal human rights and monetary intervention. So this tension puts the UN at something of a crossroad, as you mentioned before in Southeast Asia. On one hand the region's governments value the technical assistance and the development support that the UN can provide.
But on the other hand many are wary, right of, of what they perceive as sort of external political pressure, or at least let's say, attempt to infringe on that national sovereignty space. But I would argue that there is a diminishing role overall of the UN in the region, particularly in the development area because most of the countries in the region are moving up to the middle income level which means the aid money becomes less important, less relevant, less donors. So I think also in that art of development the UN's role is fading a little bit.
Zubaidah: This question actually takes on a little bit more about the UN at the crossroads. In what ways might a UN at a crossroads impact its collaboration with regional organisations like ASEAN in Southeast Asia, and what are the implications for regional peace and security?
Francesco: I think there is a need for a recalibration of the relationship. For years ASEAN and the UN have had a somewhat cautious relationship or partnership; the UN pushes for strong human rights and humanitarian principles, ASEAN emphasis on non-interference and consensus. If the UN wants to remain relevant in Southeast Asia particularly because of the diminishing role of development, it may need to shift from a sort of prescriptive role to a more collaborative mode of engagement, supporting ASEAN-led initiatives, while funding ways to uphold its own norms. I would say there is also a broader geopolitical angle. China and the US and maybe also India and other countries compete over influence in this region. I think this makes life harder for ASEAN countries and there is no real desire to have others shaping peace and security norms in this region.
So, in the broader context where I think there is no mystery that there is a global erosion of the respect of global norms, ASEAN remains quite committed to that. So I think the UN is actually a welcome point of reference when it comes to international law. But I repeat it needs to rethink the way to engage in the region if it wants to continue to have traction and any influence.
Zubaidah: I truly appreciate that point that you have fleshed out about the two differing principles, if you like, from the UN being prescriptive on an emphasis on human rights versus the ASEAN non-interference method where you are persuading the buy-in rather than just telling you that this is, and then you have to subscribe to that.
Let's now talk about UN reform. What needs to be done to remain relevant and what are the main roadblocks?
Francesco: And this is the question, and, and I listen, I could answer this question in a very traditional way and maybe also a little bit boring because a lot had been said and written on UN reform. Actually I worked on it for many years when I was based in New York. So I could say that the UN needs both structural reforms as well as functional improvements. I could say that we need a security council reform because as I mentioned before, it reflects the power balance of 1945.
What about India, Brazil, South Africa and Korea, or what about Pakistan, Argentina, Nigeria and Japan. And what about the Arab world, or what about Indonesia and so on? I can also say that it requires a funding reform; the UN relies heavily on voluntary contribution, especially from a few major donors. And these make it very vulnerable to political pressure and financial changes like we're seeing right now.
And of course I can say that the UN bureaucracy is too rigid. It's too large, it's not transparent enough, it's organised in silos. That means of course, that there is a need for streamlining bureaucracy, reducing duplications across agencies and adopting a more modern approach, technological approach in data communication and crisis response.
So I agree on all that, but I would like to instead answer that, you know, the reality is that the UN is like it is because its member states wanted to be like that. So allow me to take a different angle and let's recognise that the UN has the capacity to adapt, but deep reform is much harder. Over the decades, the UN had many waves of reform.
The idea, for example, peacekeeping, as you probably know, doesn't even exist in the UN charter.
Francesco: It was invented by the Second Secretary General Doug Hammarskjöld in 1956, and then eventually in Congo. So it's something that the UN can create new tools and I can go on, on the list of new agencies, new programs, new positions that are being created. Even the security council has been enlarged. Originally 11 members, now it is actually 15 in 1963. So the real challenge is that we're not going to be able to redefine who sits in what council and what committees in a definitive way, because you see the world is too fluid.
And so instead of fighting over if Brazil versus Argentina, or India versus Pakistan should be the member of the Security Council. The UN should move sort of away from this conversation around membership into a more flexible and more adaptable approach to decision making. What I'm thinking about is that we should focus more on issues and then you have rotating membership.
So you can imagine a system that is based on regions or sub regions and countries rotate every other two, three years. And this is an idea that comes from something called agile governance. So the way in which tech companies organise around innovation projects rather than around hierarchies and pre-determined structures.
Now of course, this is easier said than done, and it seems to me clear that going forward, the UN needs to do some thinking about what it means to shrink back. And they need to do it in a way that UN member states decide on the priorities. And here the opinions are many, you know, someone say that they should go back to focus on the core, which is peace and security, preventing war, this is an argument that has been made by Thant Myint-U, an historian and a UN expert very recently in The Economist or to focus on humanitarian aid and drop other issues. The reality, this is my argument, is that member states will not choose because each country has a pet project or a core interest somewhere.
Each country wants different things, which is the reason why the UN is different things. Richard Gowan is another UN expert who's based at the International Crisis Group in New York and has argued very well that the agreement that the current UN Secretary General Guterres has reached in 2024, the pact for the future. It's a document in which basically member states promise to work on everything.
It's a sort of a laundry list of all the topics. Why? Again, because every country has a priority and so everybody wants to put their own priority there. So of course I know there's many countries, Singapore included, who are big supporters of UN reform, which are helping, they're convening diplomatic chats, right about ways forward in different areas.
But there is no sustained sort of strategic thinking within the UN. A way of, okay, what, where do we should go and what should we focus on? So a different approach again, is to go back to a more flexible approach, and let me make just one example, there is something called the MPIA, which is the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration.
Francesco: It's an agreement within the World Trade Organisation, The WTO in Geneva. Now, you might remember that the United States had decided a few years back that the appellate body of the World Trade Organisation was no longer something that suited their own interest. And so the United States has prevented electing judges to these appellate bodies, which is in charge of solving trade disputes right between the WTO members.
So in this way, the body did not work. Now in 2020, 16 WTO members got together and created a new dispute resolution mechanism, and it is within the WTO, it's not outside of it, and now it has 55 members. The European Union is a member. So if you count each individual European Union, you have 55 members.
So it's voluntary. If a country considers it useful, it can join. Singapore is a member, for example. So I can see this as examples of a more flexible, agile issue-based approach to collaboration. Not ideal, but I think it is the only way possible right now.
Zubaidah: But can I just add something to that? You know, people might just wonder, does it have the same level of legitimacy given to it?
Francesco: For the countries that participate, it would.
Zubaidah: And, and the kind of influence it would have on the decisions or the outcomes it makes.
Francesco: No, of course, as that's why I said it's not ideal in the sense that in a perfect world, you would like all countries to be together.
But there are plenty of mechanisms out there that are not fully inclusive. Countries decide to sign agreements because they're interested in it and then they respect it. My point is, I think it's much more valuable right now to have bodies with a limited membership, but a membership that is committed to it. Rather than having a universal membership, where everybody does what they want.
Zubaidah: So something that is more, well, you could say a bit, it could be smaller, but it's a bit more nimble and it can act a little faster.
Francesco: Absolutely. And you can imagine a situation in which you have seats in these different bodies or agencies, whatever you think about. These seats are not for a country, but for a representative of a certain region.
So you could have a Southeast Asia seat, and you know, for a couple of years, Indonesia, and then Thailand comes in, and then Malaysia comes in right then Singapore. So, and this is a way to create a more fluid approach because I believe it is very, very hard right now to decide who is representing whom in a situation where geopolitics is very fluid.
Zubaidah: Very fluid. That means it could be a representative for a bloc for that means they can gather a united voice on a position.
Francesco: Correct.
Zubaidah: For example, it could be an ASEAN rep or a member.
Francesco: Absolutely.
Zubaidah: Something like that. Yeah.
Francesco: And this is an idea that has also been used in the reform of the security council.
But with the idea that you have a representative for their region, what I'm saying is you're not gonna have a fixed representative for their region, but you have them as the non-permanent member of the security council.
Zubaidah: That's right. Yeah. We've got two more questions and these are also as interesting. Can the UN survive till age hundred? What potential future trajectories or pathways do you foresee for the organisation and what are the implications of each for global governance?
Francesco: Well, listen, it's impossible to predict the future, but yes.
Zubaidah: We're crystal balling in some sense.
Francesco: Yes, it's very hard, but you know, yes, of course the UN can survive for longer. The question is how relevant is it going to be? And I think that the reference that I made to agile governance in multilateralism, it's a way that tries to address this dynamic equilibrium that exists today. There is no way to cast in stone rules, new roles and new responsibility in a definitive way in an age of fluidity.
So basically I'm suggesting coming up with a multilateral governance system that is more adaptable that kind of automatically shifts. There are some issues that, you know, matter more to some countries and less to others.
Francesco: Let me add another layer of complexity, which is in some areas you can also imagine opening up to business and people organisations.
This of course comes with some risk because it can enhance the gap between rich and poor countries because of course, rich countries have more capacity and more money in the corporate, the nonprofit sector. But it is undeniable that, I mean, you cannot have a conversation on AI regulation today without involving tech, corporates and, and users.
Zubaidah: But that has also gone to the UN discussion, hasn't it?
Absolutely. Yes. Absolutely. But you, you, so you can think of this example that already exists in the system to be utilised for many more other issues in which the flexibility is in two ways. There is flexibility in the state membership, but there is also flexibility in non-state stakeholders.
Zubaidah: And the last one, let's conclude on the UN Secretary General. 31st December, 2026 will be the last day in office of the current Secretary General Antonio Guterres.
Who is going to replace him? How is the race for UN Secretary Generals shaping up?
Francesco: Well, listen, I would say that the race to replace the UN Secretary General has unofficially started already.
It will probably conclude sometime in the fall next year with an election within the General Assembly, at least if this reflects what happened in the past.
Now the most notable thing is that the Secretary General is elected by the UN General Assembly on recommendation from the UN Security Council.
Francesco: So it's a two step process. What does it mean? It means that any potential Secretary General has to clear the Security Council with nine votes, including all five permanent members.
Zubaidah: Without vetoes, yeah?
Francesco: Precisely right, who could potentially veto. So the Secretary General candidate must first survive the vetting of the five and of the security council and then go into the general assembly. Generally historically, once in the general assembly, the Secretary General is voted by acclamation.
That's not an easy thing to do right now. According to UN convention, the job should rotate between different regions, and this time around it happens to be Latin Americans turn. Or as they say in the UN, Latin America and the Caribbeans.
Francesco: So I'm going to name some names, but before doing that, experts have raised this question in the past: whether the UN Secretary General is a secretary or is a general? There is actually a great book by the NUS professor and NUS College Dean and Vice Provost Simon Chesterman, which I think was written in 2006 or 2007 on this topic, so I would argue that at this particular historic moment, we actually need a secretary.
And less so a general; but what do I mean by that? I mean that we need a Secretary General who understands the UN system very well and can overcome internal blocs to reform and change, who knows how to manage a bureaucracy, and how to bring the UN organisation to the 21st century when it comes to leadership and management.
There is really not much space for a general right now, for a head of global diplomacy that goes around the world fixing the world’s problems, I think that this will be extremely hard, no matter how good the person is.
So I will lean toward an excellent and tough manager who can fix the main internal challenges of the UN.
Now, with that said, some names. Listen, for quite a while there was a presumptive front runner, Mia Mottley, the Prime Minister of Barbados, who's a bit of a star at the UN, because she gives very powerful speeches about climate change. But personally I think that her chances have significantly reduced with Trump in the White House.
Other candidates are starting to jump in and I think that the unofficial front runner at this very moment - and this might change tomorrow - is Rafael Grossi. Now Rafael Grossi is the Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency based in Vienna. He's from Argentina, and he might find the support of the Trump administration for his work on nuclear non-proliferation in Iran. There are a couple of other candidates I would mention: Michelle Bachelet, the former president of Chile, who by the way, has been talked about to become S.G. for at least 15 years. And I will also add Rebecca Grynspan, who's the Secretary General of UNCTAD, which is the UN Trade and Development based in Geneva.
She's from Costa Rica, but I think their chances are quite limited right now. Of course new names can come up at the last minute. The last time around I was actually in New York, I remember quite well that there was a big push that the person who ought to replace Ban Ki Moon should be a woman.
Because there has never been a female Secretary General. I think that this is much less an issue with member states right now, but it's still an issue with civil society organisations. And for some member states, that's a very important issue. But I would argue that less so for the Trump administration, improbably also less for China and Russia.
So I think it's something that we still have to watch but, you know, candidates are starting to take their positions.
Zubaidah: It'll be interesting to see where we are with this closer to December, 2026. Next, oh wait, you said by fall, which point in time?
Francesco: Yes. I would say some point in the fall, 2026.
Zubaidah: We should get you and then, then, and check out these names. Happy to come back and to discuss and see who made it, and then who are the new ones in the ring. Anything else you wanna pitch in on the UN at this point?
Francesco: No, that's, I think it was an interesting conversation, so thank you very much for having me.
I just wanted to say that obviously the UN is quite an easy target for criticism, because it's a very imperfect organisation. But I also want to remind everybody what an extraordinary idea it is, the fact that 193 countries around the world actually have a representative there that sits there and discusses problems.
That doesn't necessarily mean they're gonna solve them, but the very idea that there is a space, not just a thing, but actually space for countries and leaders of the countries to meet and discuss and. And very often also to make decisions. I think it's a remarkable achievement and I think we should make every effort we can to preserve it.
Zubaidah: Thank you Prof, for this really enriching conversation. We sometimes forget too easily that to have 193 member countries in the UN, a body that has lasted 80 years now, is no mean feat. Happy 80th anniversary United Nations.
I am Zubaidah Nazeer, and thank you for listening. And if you are interested in listening to more of these conversations. Please continue to tune into us, to Foreseeable podcast wherever you get your podcasts.