The year 2020 has been a time of disruptions and many great changes, both welcome and unwelcome. The COVID-19 pandemic, de-globalisation, protectionism, a growing disdain of science — all these have undermined the world order of the last seven decades. In light of this, do we attempt a resuscitation of the old world order, or is it time to move on to a new system?
As part of the LKYSPP's 16th anniversary celebrations, four faculty members of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy came together to discuss the issue of world order. Professor Kanti Bajpai, Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation and Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies served double-duty in also moderating the discussion.
The role of the United States in the changing world order
Clockwise from top left: Professor Kanti Bajpai, Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation and Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies; Professor Khong Yuen Foong, Vice Dean (Research and Development) and Li Ka Shing Professor in Political Science; Professor Danny Quah, Dean at the LKYSPP and Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics; Assistant Professor and Programme Chair (Master in International Affairs) Selina Ho
Professor Khong Yuen Foong, Vice Dean (Research and Development) and Li Ka Shing Professor in Political Science, jumpstarted the discussion by addressing the role of the United States in the changing world order. For him, a Biden presidency would look towards resuscitating the old world order, otherwise known as the liberal international order. This would involve moving away from "Trumpian unilateralism" to a more "traditional multilateral approach".
But the Biden administration's efforts to return to the liberal world order will face challenges. For one, growing illiberalism in America is undermining the functioning of a liberal democracy, which is premised on the voluntary transfer of power and the ability to discern truth from falsehoods. Furthermore, the strength of Trump's base has shattered the consensus about America's role in upholding the liberal international order.
As a result, it will be hard to have a coherent foreign policy and to sustain it over time. Allies and friends of the US are likely to hedge against the US, and be more cautious or circumspect.
"Trump may be gone, but Trumpism has not," said Professor Khong. "It will be sticking around, hobbling the Biden administration's domestic and foreign policy agendas."
Citing the late Samuel Huntington's point about the US needing an external other or enemy in order to know who it is and what it stands for, Prof Khong foresees that the US-China rivalry will continue to intensify. As of now, China is the lead candidate for America's external other, given that China is closing in on the US in comprehensive power terms and the US is fearful that China will replace the US as the predominant power.
China's relations with Southeast Asia in the wake of COVID-19
While China faced a political falling out with the US and Europe, the COVID-19 pandemic did not significantly impact China's relations with Southeast Asia (SEA).
According to Assistant Professor and Programme Chair (Master in International Affairs) Selina Ho, governments in SEA showed solidarity in fighting the virus with China instead of pointing fingers, and China reciprocated with aid. The political fallout is thus much less severe in SEA than in the US or Europe.
The pandemic did however exacerbate longer-term trends. For one, the pandemic further eroded SEA's trust in China. In an example cited by Assistant Professor Ho, Southeast Asian countries believe that China's recent aggressive actions in the South China Sea are aimed at making use of the COVID-19 crisis to advance its claims and exert dominance. Moreover, the pandemic, along with the US-China trade war, highlighted the dangers of being over-reliant on China, and thus accelerated the trend towards diversification from China-centric supply chains.
Additionally, Southeast Asian countries have been increasingly concerned about China's expanding power in the region, and its influence over the domestic politics and foreign policies of SEA nations. These concerns are different from the West's, which are primarily ideological and over human rights issues.
Southeast Asia's approach is pragmatic. We are in a region where China dominates but domination does not mean exclusivity and that smaller countries have no agency. Southeast Asian countries have continued to pursue multilateralism, such as initiating and forming the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), that helps protect their national interests.
"We will not wait for great powers to act," said Assistant Professor Ho. "Instead, we will go ahead without the leadership of great powers to ensure a rules-based economic integration."
The obsolescence of the old world order
From an economist's point of view, Professor Danny Quah, Dean at the LKYSPP and Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics, had a pessimistic outlook on the continued survival of the old world order.
For decades, the world enjoyed an open, rules-based multilateral order that delivered a level playing field and inclusiveness for all. Under that system, global inequality fell, and rich and poor nations converged. Under the Trump presidency, however, the US turned itself worked against the ideals of that system.
With this drift away from the old order, the COVID-19 pandemic did not constitute an unexpected turning point in the international system. Instead, it was merely that "instant in time" when it became clear to a majority of the world that the US was no longer capable of leading the world order.
"Something is profoundly wrong with what used to be the leader of the world," said Professor Quah.
Professor Quah, therefore, believes it is time to rewire and make a new international system, where "performance legitimacy is the organising principle". The world needs "infrastructure, clear rules of the game, finance and a clear vision on the green economy", and the US no longer needs to be the sole provider.
With regards to performance legitimacy, it is determined by material and normative performance. "You are only considered legitimate when you can deliver the public goods materially, and when you can be seen as a model that others can follow," said Assistant Professor Ho.
The number one power must possess the will and capacity to build an inclusive international system. According to Professor Quah, with all the challenges that the US is facing, it will take monumental willpower for America to return to its former position.
But so too, for China, much is to be done before that nation can be considered a legitimate world leader. While China is able to provide material goods and resources to the countries of SEA, it has yet to show that it can provide normative leadership. There remains a low level of trust in the international community on China.
The possibility of an alternate, multipolar world order
In light of this, Professor Bajpai highlighted the possibility of moving away from a singular world order, and towards a world made up of regional orders and spheres of influence. "Why should one imagine that one order would do it all?" he asked.
Professor Quah agreed that it is a fallacy to think that a global hegemon would necessary be able to provide order. Many think it's impossible to have order without a hegemon; it doesn't follow, however, that if you do have a hegemon you automatically have order. It might be better to divide the world into geographies, within which subsystems of the world order can be established, provided competing great powers can tolerate that. He even suggested that our global public goods can be divided into issue domains, each with their own provider.
"I would be quite in favour of fragmenting issue domains and geographies into coalitions of the capable that could actually provide variants of order," he concluded.
Assistant Professor Ho, however, raised some concerns about a multipolar world order. According to her, a truly multipolar world order could result in a collective action problem, in which countries will have difficulty ensuring that everyone is doing their part. Furthermore, a multipolar order could potentially bring about downstream problems, including instability.
"Realists believe that the most stable order is a bipolar one, and a multipolar world is extremely unstable," she cautioned.
Middle powers and their impact on global relations
During the COVID-19 pandemic, and with the rise of China and the retreat of the US, many middle powers came together. Historically, Professor Quah observed, middle powers form groupings where they are like-minded in certain issue domains, and as a result become a conglomerate great power.
Their position as middle powers has allowed them to become good connectors and communicators between great powers and smaller states, observed Professor Bajpai. They are also able to keep great powers in check, step in when they fail to provide, and render aid to smaller states.
Moreover, middle powers are often very good at niche areas and issues, giving them competitive advantage in issue-based problem solving. Singapore, for example, is an authority on maritime and regulatory issues, while the Scandinavian countries are ahead of the pack in environmental concerns.
The EU and ASEAN present two very different models of a coalition of middle powers. Where the EU practices supranationalism and hands over decision making to non-elected bodies, ASEAN retains a greater sensitivity on national sovereignty.
These differences, Professor Quah suggested, can help us think about alternative modes for plurilateral organisations rather than global multilateral ones. With this, we can come up with innovative and creative solutions for collective choice problems.
What does it all mean for Singapore?
In the face of the continued power struggle between the US and China, as well as the upcoming Biden presidency, what does this all mean for Singapore? According to Assistant Professor Ho, the country has many advantages that will help.
For one, it has a greater chance at diversification than other SEA economies, it is less reliant on China economically, and it benefits greatly from having an open economy.
Secondly, Singapore has a transparent, well-functioning government, which contributes to high state-capacity. Thirdly, it has proven over time to be nimble when it comes to diplomacy and has shown the ability to navigate the great power terrain between the US and China and engage in partnerships with both of them.
In regard to the changing leadership in the US, Professor Khong is optimistic about Singapore's future dealings with the US even though it has historically been more comfortable dealing with Republican administrators.
"The transition to the Biden administration will be welcomed by many in Singapore," said Professor Khong. The return to multilateralism will tamp down the trade war, divert greater attention to ASEAN once again, and bodes well for all of us.
Photo credit: Robert Locke
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