If you are experiencing a sense that the world has entered an unstable and troubled era you are not alone.
A recent study found 90 per cent of those interviewed felt there were “growing number of crises” and they are having a greater impact on people’s lives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres says “We are facing a global crisis” and Singapore’s Prime Minister warned that the country’s next chapter “opens in a more troubled and turbulent world.”
In such a time, it may help to turn to the lessons of the past to understand the present, says Khong Yuen Foong, Li Ka Shing Professor in Political Science at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. But he echoed historians Ernest May and Richard Neustadt, saying you should never settle on the first historical precedent that comes to mind, as it requires much more careful consideration.
Which is exactly what Ayşe Zarakol, Professor of International Relations at the University of Cambridge explored in her lecture, Is the Disorder of Our Times Unprecedented? Lessons of History part of the S.T. Lee Distinguished Lecture series and chaired by Professor Khong.
Professor Zarakol makes the case that the 21st century is tumultuous. It opened with the 9/11 attacks, which quickly led to US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, Brexit, the COVID pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and many more destabilising events—not to mention climate change. While she admits the view in Asia is different from that in the West, she says there is a general consensus this is a time of global disorder, and she wanted to study whether it was her subjective feelings or something measurable going on.
Two prevailing, but flawed, views
Professor Zarakol identifies two dominant views on what’s going on. The first argues we are living through truly unprecedented times, a state of “polycrisis.” This view, popularised by economic historian Adam Tooze, suggests that political, climatic, technological, and financial crises are all converging and amplifying each other in a way never seen before. In this case, history offers little guidance because we have never faced such a unique confluence of challenges.
The second camp, more common in international relations circles, insists that this is a replay of the 20th century—a familiar story of power transition. China is rising while the U.S is declining, setting the stage for a new Cold War. Those sharing this view predict a rebalancing that will eventually settle into a tense equilibrium. It’s a comforting notion that we are merely heading into a geopolitical scenario we already know how to navigate.
Great power competition is back
Professor Zarakol doesn’t dismiss the reality of great power competition. However, she argues that the easy comparison to the 20th century is misleading. She posits that the 21st century is fundamentally different in four key ways:
- A global rejection of 20th century institutions: There is a widespread loss of faith in the ideologies and international arrangements that seemed settled in the last century. This trend began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and has spread to the West, with populations increasingly rejecting liberalism and liberal democracy. Trust in governmental institutions is at a global low.
- Strongman politics: While the 20th century had its share of autocrats, the modern trend of strongman politics is different. Today’s leaders often rule countries as their personal domains, unconstrained by the ideological frameworks that bound their predecessors. This shift makes international relations less predictable, as foreign policy becomes a matter of personal whim rather than long-term strategy.
- The rise of the Global South: There are now many more countries—from Asia, Africa, and South America—with the resources, confidence, and agency to shape global politics. While a positive development in many respects, more actors inherently makes the system less predictable and harder to model.
- Radical structural pressures: Challenges like climate change, financial volatility, and transformative technologies like AI are creating a background of intense structural pressure. The speed and scale of these changes are central drivers of global volatility, directly impacting politics and society in unpredictable ways.
A better parallel: The 17th century
Given these unique 21st-century conditions, Professor Zarakol proposes a more illuminating historical analogy: the “general crisis of the 17th century.” Drawing from her research for her book Before the West, she describes the 16th century as highly globalised and connected, centred on powerful Asian empires. This was followed by a near-century of disorder in the 17th century.
The 17th century was a period of:
- Financial crises, such as the Spanish price revolution brought on by an influx of cheap silver from the Americas;
- Widespread rebellion and civil war, from the English Civil War to the Time of Troubles in Russia, to China’s Ming-Qing Transition;
- A loss of faith in institutions, especially the church in Europe;
- The rise of new powers—in this case, Europe was rising; and
- Climate change, the Little Ice Age, which led to crop failures, famines, and massive demographic decline.
This was a long, uncertain period out of which new winners—and the modern nation-state system—eventually emerged.
Lessons from a century of upheaval
So, what lessons can we draw from this 400-year-old crisis? Professor Zarakol offers several crucial takeaways:
Prepare for a long haul: The 20th-century analogy suggests disorder will be brief, followed by a clear new order. The 17th-century model warns that fragmentation and uncertainty can last for decades. We must be open-minded and prepare for scenarios where no new, stable order quickly emerges.
Beware the danger of nostalgia: The empires that struggled most were those desperately trying to recapture a lost golden age. Europe, having less to lose, was more open to innovation and new solutions, which gave it a decisive advantage. In our time, those who can let go of their attachment to the 20th-century status quo will be better positioned to adapt.
Disadvantages can become advantages: In long periods of disorder, old weaknesses can transform into strengths. Forced to cope with their previously peripheral and risky position, European actors developed mechanisms like joint-stock companies and maritime insurance—innovations that later became crucial advantages. We must be open to fresh thinking and new models for organising politics and managing risk.
For example, for a small, agile state like Singapore, this long downturn might not be solely a threat. Zarakol suggested that while large nations may struggle, periods of fragmentation can create space for new political experiments. The very model of a successful city-state, she implied, could become increasingly attractive and resilient in a world where the old assumptions are breaking down.
Ultimately, Professor Zarakol’s work is a masterclass in heeding Professor Khong’s warning against settling on the first historical parallel. She prefers the term "insights" to "lessons," clarifying that her goal is not to predict the future, but to use the past to break our collective addiction to 20th-century templates. By understanding the deeper patterns of a pre-modern crisis, we can better prepare for a future that demands openness, innovation, and a willingness to let go of what is being lost to see the opportunities that lie ahead.