From left to right: Ambassador Heng Chee Chan, Ambassador-at-Large & Professor, Lee Kuan Yew Centre for Innovative Cities;
Mr Yi Shyan Lee, Former Senior Minister of State & Chairman, Business China;
Asst Prof Selina Ho, Co-Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy;
Prof Danny Quah, Dean and Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
The world needs to find areas where the United States and China can find “inadvertent cooperation” to avoid conflict, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP) Dean and Li Ka Shing Professor of Economics
Danny Quah said in his opening remarks at this session, which started off the school’s Festival of Ideas 2024.
Professor Quah said that the period from 1980 to 2010 was of "inadvertent constructive engagement”, an era marked by an expectation of geopolitical convergence and economic interdependence, much like political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the End of History popularised in the 1992 book of the same name.
After 2010, this shifted towards rivalry due to ideological divergence and economic insecurities — a period that is referred to by economists as the ‘China shock’.
He argued that there were ways to rekindle cooperation in areas of common interest in what he called “inadvertent cooperation” and outlined how small states could play a role in the process.
"It takes two to tango,” he said. “There's no sound of one hand clapping. We've got to try and understand both sides of this engagement.”
The different sides of the US-China rivalry were examined in detail by all the participants.
Ambassador Heng Chee Chan, Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large and a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew Centre for Innovative Cities, said people should not underestimate China's resurgence, despite the current downturn.
“When China’s growth picks up again, we’ll find ourselves back to Hong Kong and back to China because the world, Europe, and the United States do not want to miss out on a piece of the action,” she said.
Despite the contention between the two superpowers, she believes small and medium-sized states could carve out meaningful roles in global affairs.
A Third Space Amid Superpower Rivalry
Ambassador Chan highlighted the significance of smaller nations like India and Indonesia, which she described as entering a "third space"—an emerging zone of influence that doesn't neatly align with either side of the US-China rivalry. She said this space could “blunt the rivalry between two sides,” reflecting a growing trend where nations pursue independent foreign policies that balance relationships with competing superpowers.
This was a common theme among several other sessions at the Festival of Ideas 2024 where the role of smaller states in geopolitics, conflict and peacemaking was examined.
ASEAN’s Role and the China Shock
Former Senior Minister of State and Chairman of Business China, Mr Yi Shyan Lee, added a regional lens to the conversation, focusing on the evolving relationship between China and ASEAN. He highlighted the deepening economic ties between China and Southeast Asia.
He said that ASEAN had recently become China's largest trading partner, a trend likely to continue due to the health of the relationship between ASEAN nations and China. “ASEAN enjoys better tariffs than the rest of the world,” Mr Lee said.
He said Singapore and ASEAN should remain neutral and open to all powers if they wanted to be positioned as a potential mediator and beneficiary in the superpower rivalry. “Provided ASEAN remains neutral, friendly to all parties, and acceptable to all parties, we can continue to benefit from China’s rise.”
Domestic Drivers of China’s Foreign Policy
Co-Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation and Assistant Professor at LKYSPP, Selina Ho, delved into the internal dynamics driving China's global strategy. “We really need to understand this rivalry by looking within China itself.”
She said that many misunderstandings between the US and China stem from a lack of comprehension of each other’s domestic priorities.
Professor Ho broke down China's goals into three major "remakes": the economy, society, and the Chinese Communist Party itself. For China, the legitimacy and survival of the Communist Party were paramount, she emphasised.
Remaking the Communist Party through anti-corruption campaigns and ideological enforcement ensures that the Party retains its central role in Chinese governance, Professor Ho said.
“China does not like a free-wheeling economy that’s completely driven by market forces. They recognise the need for market forces, but they don’t want it to be completely driven by them,” she noted.
This ambition is reflected in the government’s emphasis on self-reliance and control over private firms, with policies aiming to create a stable and equitable economic environment under the banner of “common prosperity”.
China’s societal goals are equally transformative, she said, with initiatives like the social credit system designed to assert control and preserve ideological purity. “The Xi government saw a society deteriorating, not ideologically pure enough.”
China’s Desired World Order
Professor Ho said China doesn’t necessarily seek global dominance but rather “a world order that’s commensurate with its size,” where China’s political authority is recognised as legitimate. “What China wants, in my opinion, is parity with the United States.”
She noted that China’s desire for parity with the US could lead to an era of heightened competition, but not necessarily conflict. She was cautiously optimistic that the global order wouldn’t devolve into a new Cold War. Instead, she saw a world where “alliances and partnerships… are fluid,” with many countries maintaining deep economic ties with China, creating an environment where rigid blocs are less likely to form.
Professor Quah rounded out the session arguing that measuring the rivalry solely through economic metrics like GDP and military strength overlook the relationship's nuances.
He outlined three strategies the world, and in particular small states, could engage with to improve the relationship between the two great powers.
He suggested leveraging mutual interests where collaboration occurs naturally, especially on global challenges like climate change was one. Calling it “inadvertent cooperation,” he said it echoed the “inadvertent constructive engagement” the US and China practised between 1980 and 2010.
He further proposed that smaller countries can play a role in easing tensions by promoting dialogue and preventing gridlock. Stating that multilateralism as we know it is over, he proposed a “pathfinder multilateralism” where cooperation is focused on specific issues. Something that would be crucial for trade-dependent nations like Singapore.
He emphasised that taking sides would be unproductive since both nations act in their legitimate interests.
"Each country, each great power is just trying to do the best that they can."
This article is produced as part of a series in conjunction with
Festival of Ideas 2024.