"Countering China" is a buzz phrase in international politics. A recurring question is whether India can help the US, its strategic partner in the Quad, to contain China's aggressiveness and economic clout, especially after its catastrophic, economically enervating wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, economics and strategy are linked. Given that India's economy and defence spending are trailing behind China's, how realistic is talk of India maintaining the strategic equilibrium in Asia? China's economy is $16 trillion, India's less than $3 trillion. Indeed, China's navy has expanded its presence in India's Indian Ocean neighbourhood because neither India's naval power, nor its defence budget, match those of China.
While India wants to be a leading global economic power and the world teacher, the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations have hailed India's emergence as a regional and global power. Biden's State Department even sees it as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific.
India's strategic importance
Like 19th century imperial Britain, the 21st century US sees India's geographical location at the centre of a security route extending from the Suez Canal to the Pacific to be of strategic import. Additionally, since the early Cold War, America has perceived India as a potential counterpoise to communist China but India has yet to fulfil that promise, largely because it has lagged behind China economically.
India's economic decline over the last few yearshas impacted its influence in Asia even before smoke and mirrors failed to obscure its illusion of great power and to prevent the end of its vaccine diplomacy, pushing South Asian and African countries to turn to China and Russia for Covid-19 vaccines. In part this was because – as IMF statistics show - the GDP per capita of three of India's smaller, strategically located neighbours – Bangladesh, [$1,998]
Bhutan [$3,358] and Sri Lanka [$3,678.]
is higher than that of India,[$1965] which is viewed by New Delhi and Washington as a regional and global power. And only two ASEAN countries – Cambodia and Myanmar - have a lower per capita income than India.
Add to that the facts that the GDP per capita of many Sub-Saharan African countries is higher than India's and that India's armed forces need modernising - and it is easy to see why India's role in Asia could be reassessed by its friends.
At variance with ASEAN and Quad
In any case, India's strategic priorities are at variance with those of ASEAN states and its partners in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. India focuses on its land disputes with Pakistan and China. For ASEAN and the US, Japan and Australia, the maintenance of maritime and territorial security in the Pacific are the top priorities.
Meanwhile, China has wooed India's neighbours - and ASEAN countries -with arms supplies and investment. All of them have joined its Belt and Road Initiative. In South Asia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have welcomed Chinese investment to upgrade and build roads, railways and ports. However, acceptance of Chinese material and finance has not dissuaded these two countries from standing their ground when confronted with Chinese intimidation.
Yet resistance to China's overbearing behaviour does not encourage a tilt to India because of its arrogant attitude towards its smaller neighbours. For instance, Dhaka has been deeply offended by New Delhi's labelling of Muslim migrants from Bangladesh as "termites" and the allegation that Bangladeshis come to India because of their country's poverty – an absurd claim given that Bangladesh is surging ahead of India economically. Annoyed at Indian talk of allowing Chinese submarines and a warship to dock at Colombo port in 2014, Sri Lanka riposted that between 2009 and 2020, more than 525 warships visited Sri Lanka. India topped the list with 110 ships. About 40 Chinese ships visited Sri Lankan ports.
Aware of their smaller size and limited resources compared to those of China and India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh do not claim or aspire to be leading South Asian powers. But their geopolitical horizons, economic and diplomatic ambitions extend beyond an India-dominated region.They seek to leverage their strategic location in the Indian Ocean to secure geopolitical and economic advantages from competing powers including the US, China and India.
Meanwhile, India is strengthening its strategic ties with ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea and Australia. Since 1996 it has been a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which focuses on security dialogue. But these security relationships do not make India an Indo-Pacific power capable of countering China.
When it comes to trading ties, ASEAN has replaced the European Union as China's top trading partner. In 2020, ASEAN-China trade amounted to $731.9 billion. Even if trade between India and ASEAN touches $300 billion by 2025 it will be less than half of the value of current ASEAN-China trade.
India's no-show in any Asian regional economic grouping rules out its chances of influencing the fastest-growing Asian countries that will leave a mark on the world economy. These groupings include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which has been on ASEAN's agenda since 2012, the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The RCEP will be one of the top regional and economic priorities of its member countries. None of them will change this priority to negotiate a trade deal with a protectionist India. And when they do review trade agreements with New Delhi they will surely be influenced by their "new" interests as members of the RCEP. The chances are that India will have to modify its own demands if it wants revised trade agreements with Asia's economic wunderkinder in the RCEP.
Generally, India's absence from these Asian partnerships highlights its economic weakness, protectionism and resultant inability to display many credentials as a strong Asian power.
Since economic and military power are intertwined, can India realistically be perceived as a counterpoise to rising China in Asia or the Indo-Pacific? New Delhi, Washington, Tokyo and Canberra must answer that tough question if their Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is to play a meaningful role in making Asia a safer place.
In the long run, India's status and role in Asia will not hinge on America's presence in the Indo-Pacific. Increased investments in education and infrastructure, and more equitable economic development, are necessary to strengthen India's military sinews and to polish its credentials as a key driver of the global economy — and an increasingly central contributor to Asian security.
(Photo credit: Vishal Bhutani)