When Dr. Michael Green delivered the S.T. Lee Distinguished Lecture “America and Asia: Has Trump Changed History Forever?” at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy on 3 March 2026, the atmosphere was charged with a sense of profound geopolitical resonance.
Just days earlier, the United States and Israel had launched strikes on Iran, derailing fragile diplomatic efforts focused on Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran responded with attacks on Israel, US interests and allied countries across the region. The episode underscored a growing sense of instability in global politics and renewed debate over whether the second presidency of Donald Trump represents a turning point in the international order.
Dr. Green is well positioned to weigh in on the question. He is Chief Executive Officer of the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and previously served as Director for Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Dr. Green’s central message was that those claiming history is forever altered are getting ahead of themselves, and that observers often mistake turbulence for permanent change.
To illustrate how easily even the most seasoned observers can misread the moment, Dr. Green reached back to the 19th century recounting an episode involving US statesman John Quincy Adams. Upon hearing early reports that Napoleon Bonaparte had triumphed at the Battle of Waterloo, Adams—then ambassador to England—warned Washington that the global balance of power had been transformed. Within days, the news proved false.
Even experienced strategists, Dr. Green suggested, can be blinded by the ‘fog’ of breaking events.
Zeitgeist vs structural change
Dr. Green said that analysts should be careful not to confuse the zeitgeist—the mood of the moment—with deeper structural change.
Much of the commentary surrounding Trump attempts to identify a coherent “Trump doctrine.” But Dr. Green was sceptical that such a doctrine exists.
Strategy, he noted, requires clear ends, ways and means. Under Trump, however, policy often appears to focus primarily on tools rather than objectives.
Tariffs offer a clear example. The administration has justified them as a way to reshore manufacturing, generate government revenue and gain negotiating leverage over trading partners. Yet these goals can conflict with one another. If tariffs successfully open markets, revenue declines. If they generate substantial revenue, they may not be reshoring production.
In this sense, tariffs function less as part of a coherent economic strategy than as instruments of leverage.
A similar ambiguity surrounds the recent military action against Iran. Despite the gravity of the decision, there had been no comprehensive presidential speech outlining clear strategic objectives.
Without clearly defined ends, Dr. Green argued, policy becomes untethered and expansive, allowing governments to act “everywhere all at once.” Trump’s political strategy often resembles what advisers once described as “flooding the zone”: a tactic of launching multiple initiatives simultaneously in order to overwhelm opponents.
However, Dr. Green cautioned that such methods will eventually succumb to the political gravity of institutional and economic realities.
The structural shift: economic security
While Dr. Green cautioned against overstating Trump’s long-term impact, he identified several deeper structural changes reshaping the international system.
Among the most important is the growing emphasis on economic security.
For decades, globalisation was driven by the pursuit of efficiency and open markets. Today, governments are increasingly focused on resilience: securing supply chains, protecting strategic technologies and reducing vulnerabilities in critical industries.
This shift has multiple causes. China’s industrial policies and manufacturing overcapacity have triggered repeated “China shocks” across global markets. Domestic political support for trade liberalisation has weakened in many advanced economies. Strategic competition between major powers has also intensified.
As a result, the emerging international system may look very different from the globalisation model of the late 20th century.
Rather than relying solely on universal institutions, countries are increasingly building coalitions of trusted partners to secure critical supply chains and technological ecosystems. Initiatives such as the Quad—involving the United States, Japan, Australia and India—illustrate this trend.
In this context, economic policy and national security are becoming increasingly intertwined.
The limits of disruption
Dr. Green also emphasised that the American political system contains mechanisms that may temper some of the administration’s more disruptive policies.
The United States Constitution distributes authority across multiple branches of government. Courts, Congress and federal agencies all play roles in shaping policy outcomes.
Political norms and public opinion also matter. Polling data suggests that several of the administration’s policies lack majority support among the American public. The Republican coalition itself is not always unified on issues such as tariffs or foreign policy priorities.
Electoral dynamics may also impose constraints. Midterm elections historically punish the incumbent president’s party, and a second-term president inevitably enters a “lame duck” phase as the end of the administration approaches.
Taken together, these factors suggest that while disruption may be real, it is not necessarily permanent.
US competitive advantage in the security domain in Asia
If Trump were fundamentally transforming the international order, one might expect US allies to begin distancing themselves from Washington.
Yet Dr. Green argued that the opposite appears to be happening in much of Asia.
Public support for alliances with the United States remains high in countries such as Japan, Australia and South Korea. Security cooperation among regional partners has intensified, and military interoperability with the United States remains central to defence planning, he said.
Even countries pursuing more independent diplomatic strategies—including India and Indonesia—continue to deepen security ties with Washington.
Rather than hedging away from the United States, many Asian partners appear to be preparing for uncertainty while still relying on American military power.
Europe faces more complicated political dynamics, but the overall pattern suggests that US alliances remain resilient.
Shaping the next order
Dr. Green highlighted Japan as a particularly instructive example of how allies are adapting to this evolving environment.
Rather than resisting change, Japan has focused on strengthening its own capabilities while remaining closely integrated with the United States. Tokyo has expanded defence spending, deepened regional partnerships and developed a comprehensive economic security strategy.
Japan’s approach, Dr. Green suggested, reflects a broader lesson for US allies: the goal is not to abandon Washington, but to shape how the United States approaches a changing international order.
By making itself indispensable to American strategy, Japan increases its ability to influence the direction of that order.
Asian Perceptions of American Leadership
Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Centre of Asia and Globalisation Chin-Hao Huang, who chaired the lecture, said US global influence cannot simply rely on US military might. “By abandoning free trade and promoting protectionism, rejecting multilateralism, and rewriting the rules-based international order, Asia actually has more questions now than ever before regarding US credibility.”
This was evident during the Q&A. Professor Chan Heng Chee, Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large, was surprised at Dr. Green’s optimism, asking if the scene in Asia is truly the same as it was before Trump 2.0. Perhaps more tellingly, Professor Chan captured a shifting emotional landscape with a poignant observation, “America, you were the good guys. Now you're one of the guys.” This sentiment suggests that even if structural alliances hold, the moral authority that once underpinned American leadership may be evaporating.
Lutfey Siddiqi, Adjunct Professor at the National University of Singapore, who recently spent 18 months with the interim government of Bangladesh, leading the tariff negotiations with the Trump administration, said, “The world has moved on…. never again will the rest of the world want to be held hostage to this sort of situation.” He also pointed out how the hollowing out and weakening of international multilateral platforms hurts countries like Bangladesh which are not in the “big leagues” like the US.
Again, Dr. Green maintained that these reactions are more noise than signal. Yet scholars of international order have long argued that legitimacy and perception are critical foundations of global systems. If attitudes toward American leadership are shifting, the question remains whether today’s change in zeitgeist may eventually harden into a deeper structural change.