The growing tide of criticisms lifted against Confucius Institutes (CIs) and the waves of closures in the United States and Europe somewhat present a puzzle. Why is a cultural and educational institution triggering such strong reactions from foreign governments and communities? And, more importantly, what does the backlash over the CIs tells us about China's soft power policy?
Established in 2004, CIs are non-profit institutions aimed at promoting the global learning of the Chinese language and culture. Until 2020, CIs were managed by the Confucius Institutes Headquarters or Hanban (汉办). Last year, to rebrand its image and reduce political sensitivity, a new non-governmental organisation, the Chinese International Education Foundation, was initiated by Chinese universities and companies to operate the CIs. According to the CI website, there are 540 CIs established across the globe.
"Flagship" of China's global soft power campaign
The CIs are not merely language studying centres and cultural exchange programmes.
Instead, they can be viewed as the centrepiece of Beijing's soft power campaign to ease the country's transition to attain great power status by enhancing its global appeal among wider audiences.
Soft power, as defined by political scientist Joseph Nye, "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" and "co-opts rather than coerces them". According to Nye, soft power can be derived from three resources, namely culture, political values, and foreign policies.
In the case of the CIs, they carry out public diplomacy to facilitate people-to-people engagement through cultural platforms and promote mutual understanding and trust.
However, the journey of China's "flagship" soft power policy has not always been smooth sailing. Almost mirroring its rapid global expansion are the voluminous controversies and backlashes surrounding the CI project, particularly in Western countries.
Some common criticisms mounted against CIs are that there have been a lack of competent Chinese teachers and quality teaching resources.
But practical problems, though injurious, are not fatal to the CIs' reputation. Instead, resistance against the presence of CIs on university campuses is strongest over political and ideological concerns.
In recent years, CIs have come under increasing fire and intensifying scrutiny for concerns over excessive political influence, censorship, and academic integrity. Last August, the United States Government designated the CI as a "foreign mission". Later, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly articulated his wish to see the closure of all American CIs by the end of 2020.
Last year, Sweden became the first European country to close all its CIs – including all Confucius Institute Classrooms (CCs).
As things stand, the tide seems to be turning against the CIs.
However, in recent years, scholars and experts, such as Professor Edward A. McCord from George Washington University, have pointed out that criticisms and accusations towards the CIs lack substantial evidence.
And a 2018 Hoover Institution report shows no solid proof of CIs' violating academic freedom or engaging in illicit political activities.
What, then, accounts for the backlash against CIs?
There is more than meets the eye
In my opinion, negative perceptions and reactions towardsCIs reflect broader credibility problems that are much more grounded in political and international issues.
While CIs serve as a useful instrument to mobilise and project China's cultural resources, China's political actions and foreign policy will firmly bear on the credibility and attractiveness of CIs and its other soft power projects.
Unfortunately, in recent years, Beijing's track record in the latter two fronts has been far from flattering.
According to past studies conducted by the Pew Research Center, there is a strong correlation between people living in societies with high democratic and freedom scores and their negative perceptions of China.
Indeed, news of human rights abuses against the Uighur minorities in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Beijing's repressive actions towards the protests in Hong Kong have repulsed China's global audience, particularly those living in democratic societies.
Meanwhile, China's maritime actions in the South China Sea continue to alarm its neighbours, while its "wolf warrior" diplomacy backfires and draws severe criticisms.
In turn, the combination of increasing authoritarian governance at home and growing muscular posture abroad generates not soft power but what Paul Michael Brannagan and Richard Giulianotti refer to as "soft disempowerment", which results in China's loss of credibility and attractiveness.
Even as China builds more CIs globally, its domestic policies and international actions will create a disjuncture between an image of China that CIs seek to portray and that the people see and experience in real life.
Thus, how can Beijing expect the CIs to successfully promote a narrative of China rising peacefully and harmoniously when its domestic and international actions are anything but?
Even the average Chinese folk dislikes someone who "says one thing but does quite another" (说一套做一套 shuoyitao zuoyitao).
Eventually, this perception gap will perpetuate a deep sense of hypocrisy and mistrust in CIs and retard any progress made on the cultural and educational fronts.
China needs to rework its soft power strategy
The above assessment carries two important implications for China's global soft power moving forward.
First, China should not treat soft power like building infrastructure, which tends to focus on numbers and scale.Instead, China needs to pay more attention to creating a reservoir of mutual trust and understanding.
To do so, Beijing needs to not only promote the Chinese culture globally, but also make adjustments to its political actions and recalibrate its foreign policy to improve the country's overall credibility and attractiveness.
Nevertheless, it would be naïve and impractical to suggest that China needs to make a complete transition to democracy or strike a conciliatory tone on issues of strategic import to stay credible and attractive.
To be courteous and polite does not mean one has to sacrifice or compromise on dignity and respect.
No one should find fault in China seeking to pursue and safeguard its national interests at home and abroad. But its leaders should recognise the importance of adhering to international laws and norms. And there should be no inherent conflict between the two.
Second, China should recognise that the backlash over CIs shows that the time is not (yet) ripe for the country to enthusiastically push for a global soft power campaign.
So, rather than ramping up its soft power campaign, it is wiser to consolidate its cultural presence overseas whilst devoting more time to building political credibility and improving international reputation.
Soft power is a marathon race, not a sprint
No doubt it will take quite some time for China to be politically credible and internationally acceptable again.
But being a new- and latecomer to the soft power game in the 21st century, China needs to be patient and strategic in making its moves.
In the late 1980s, Deng Xiaoping exhorted China's new generation of leaders to adopt the taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦) strategy, or to "bide our time and build up our capabilities" to guide China's economic development and rapid ascendancy.
More than thirty years later, Deng's taoguang yanghui strategy remains relevant to moderate and guide China's soft power ambitions today.
The making of soft power is not a 400-m sprint but a long marathon. And while all marathon winners have outstanding stamina and inexhaustible energy, not all winners rush to occupy the pole position at the start of the race.
(Photo: UI International Programme, Calligraphy workshops at the Confucius Institute at the University of Iowa)