Grant Period : Feb 2022 - Feb 2026
Faculty : THAKUR, Ashutosh Dinesh
In many organizations, members need to be assigned to certain positions, whether these are civil servants to states, legislators to committees, or executives to roles. Who gets what position crucially affects the performance of the organization, the efficacy of its operations, the synergies/conflicts generated, and the resulting satisfaction/aspiration of its members. I use tools from market design and matching theory to i) empirically evaluate, ii) theoretically understand, and iii) practically improve the design of these assignment procedures.
I explore new applications of matching theory in public administration, e.g., allocating Indian civil servants to states and assigning US Senators to legislative committees. My empirical analysis leverages the institutional knowledge of the underlying matching mechanisms along with new preference data of US Senators and Indian Civil servants to evaluate the efficacy of the procedures and their impact on outcomes (e.g., American legislative policymaking and party discipline, and India’s state capacity and development outcomes).
Theoretically, my projects shed light on institutional stability and organizational culture: why organizations endogenously change their assignment procedures over time, which coalitions lobby for change, and when are they successful. Lastly, my work delivers practical design improvements for Indian civil service allocation procedures and other two-sided market platforms.