Grant Period : Nov 2022 - Oct 2025
Faculty : WU, Alfred Muluan
The proposed project, to the best of our knowledge, is a first attempt to explore the role of intermediate governments in grant transferring process using a detailed analysis of local fiscal data and field interviews. This study will elucidate the debate on fiscal federalism and grant politics in China.
Previously more academic attention has been paid to the politics of grant making and grant distribution by recipients. Nevertheless, the politics of grant transferring will reflect local political agendas and the relations between different layers of government. Filling in the gap in the literature will substantially enhance the understanding of fiscal federalism and intergovernmental relations in China and beyond, which could have good implications for the real world.
The project could be scaled up to MOE AcRF Tier 2 after the implementation of the current proposal, given its practical and theoretical implications. We will include Indonesia as a comparative case because China and Indonesia share some similarities and differences in terms of central-local relations. More specifically, both are the most populous countries in the world (Hofman, Zhao & Ishihara, 2007) but adopt a unitary system (Lewis &Smoke, 2017). At the level of decentralization, particularly on the expenditure side, both countries rank very high among all developing countries (Shah, Qibthiyyah, & Dita, 2012; World Bank, 2002). As a centralized system of revenue generation, subnational governments in both China and Indonesia rely heavily on central transfers and subnational governments have been required to implement substantial expenditure programs (Gong & Wu, 2012; Shah, Qibthiyyah, & Dita, 2012). The World Bank has paid a close attention to intergovernmental management in China and Indonesia on the practical level.
As scholars, if we could deepen the nuanced understanding of decentralization and grant politics in two contexts, it would expand the existing literature in the developing context substantially. Students of intergovernmental relations have long been interested in the effectiveness of intergovernmental funds (the amount of transfers was about 5 percent of GDP in industrialized economies, Bahl &Wallace, 2004). Nevertheless, scholars have paid less attention to whether central (or federal) grants will reach the recipients.
There are two lines of argument with regard to the grant-transferring process. Intermediate governments offer a helping hand; therefore they top up central grants to recipient governments using their own resources. Grassroots governments, the main provider of public goods, will have good capacity to provide public services. On the other hand, some argue that intermediate governments have a grabbing hand. Central grants have been retained by intermediate governments while leaving grassroots governments short of fiscal resources and handling increasing public demands. This study attempts to investigate what the role played by provincial governments or prefectural governments in transferring central grants through the administrative hierarchy in China, the largest developing economy in the world.
This study will adopt a qualitative field research method. Two counties in Fujian and Hubei Provinces will be chosen for evaluating the role of intermediate governments. We will adopt a least similar case study method. It means that these two counties in Fujian and Hubei Provinces will receive central transfers, namely the transfer for public sector salary increase and the social security and employment subsidy. However, the targeted counties (one in Fujian and the other in Hubei) will be distinct in economic development (measured by GDP per capita), government revenue per capita, public employment size, and the number of recipients of MLSA.
The reason for choosing these two field sites is not only due to various amounts of central transfers received by two counties in Fujian and Hubei respectively. Perhaps more importantly, two provinces adopt distinct approaches towards intergovernmental fiscal management within their provinces. Local governments have different fiscal capacities and set different political and policy priorities. Therefore, we can observe the distinct forms of intergovernmental interactions in local China and generate some policy and theoretical implications. The PI has drawn on field research in Fujian and Hubei publishing academic papers (for example, Gong and Wu 2012; Wu 2014).