David Austin: After a tense and controversial election period, Joe Biden is now set to become the next president of the United States. We asked Assistant Professor Yongwook Ryu to give us his perspective on the past four years under the Trump administration, as well as on what the Biden administration has in store for China and the rest of Asia.
David Austin: What's your assessment of how things changed during the Trump administration in the past four years?
Yongwook Ryu: Right. So, I think you know the past four years of Trump administration have been really interesting from an academic standpoint.
Trump, when he came into office, emphasised in a very explicit and blunt manner, the importance of achieving national interest, and he made no qualms about every country in this world working for their own national interests without worrying about the interest of others. And Trump himself said this is a moral political act to do, and he has remained true to his words.
When it came to Asia policy, he took a very hard line towards China, which received a lot of support both in the USA and in the region, but also at the same time, he exerted a lot of pressure on traditional allies of the USA and pro-US countries in the region, something that many countries in this part of the world are not very happy with. So I think that has been the single most consistent US policy under Trump.
When Biden comes in - and we already know that President-elect Biden has chosen Anthony Blinken as the next Secretary of State, and also Jake Sullivan as the national security advisor and these two folks are traditional multilateralists - I expect the next Biden administration to emphasise on traditional US foreign policy in Asia. So, working with allies of the USA, pro-US countries, and at the same time, unlike [the] Trump administration which adopted a sort of 'all the way pressure' attitude towards China, the Biden administration will most likely adopt a differentiated form of engagement with China.
On certain issues such as climate change where the USA needs cooperation from China, Biden will seek cooperation from China. On other issues the Biden administration will continue a hard-line pressure attitude towards China. Now, how are they going to strike a balance between cooperation on certain issues on the one hand, and decoupling or pressure or containment on some other issues? It's going to be an interesting issue to watch out for.
David Austin: Now Trump's four years of taking a harder stance against China — how effective do you think that has been? Has he gotten any good results out of that strategy?
Yongwook Ryu: So far, the concrete results have not yet come out. Although, I think Trump's China policy has received bipartisan support in the USA. So that's why a lot of people expect that the Biden administration will continue Trump's China policy.
And in fact, the US policy towards China has been in the making since the Obama administration. The Obama administration toyed with the idea of G2, so power sharing and then governing the world along with China, and at the same time there was concern in Washington DC. Therefore, the Obama administration also adopted a pivot to Asia. It was a mixture of re-engagement and containment towards China. When it came to Trump, the US policy switched completely towards containment, away from engagement.
It took a while for the Chinese government to figure out what Trump was up to. It took the Chinese government almost a year and a half to understand that Trump is all about containment and little about engagement, and then the real pressure exerted on China began in 2019.
So even after the trade deal, the US government continued to pressure China, and the Chinese government felt that pressure. And based on my personal interactions with Chinese academics and think tankers, they were joking quietly that their best Christmas wish for 2020 is 'anyone but Trump' for the next presidency in the USA.
So I think the pressure was being felt in Beijing, and for example Huawei has already given up its mobile phone business, pretty much, and then it's cut out of the supply of 5G equipment from many of pro-US countries So yeah, I think the pressure has been felt, although the USA went into the election year before the actual concrete outcome of pressure against Beijing has not been produced. But I think if this pressure, attitude, or policy continues, then yes, I think there'll be a lot of effects.
David Austin: What is the best outcome that the United States could hope for as far as containing China, or what policies would they like China to change the most? And is this more South China Sea related or military-related? What do you see as far as outcomes go?
Yongwook Ryu: Yeah, I think it's the entire package, right? So the best outcome that the USA, along with many US allies and pro-US countries in the region are hoping to see from China is a change of Chinese philosophy, policy priorities as well as foreign behaviour in this part of the world.
Under Xi Jinping, the Communist Party of China has moved away from the traditional Chinese foreign policy of, let me use a Chinese phrase here, '韬光养晦 (tao guang yang hui)', meaning 'hide your capabilities and bide your time', to more of doing things wherever they can, exerting Chinese influence and serving Chinese national interest.
And we've seen this in the East China Sea, over the territory disputes with Japan, over Taiwan, in the South China Sea, over the Spratly and Paracel disputes. We've also seen a rather different kind of Chinese governing philosophy exhibited in the cases of Uighurs in Xinjiang, in the suppression of demonstrations in Hong Kong and in inner Mongolia, where different kinds of education policy was adopted. All of this is designed, from the Chinese Communist Party's perspective, to strengthen national unity. The effect has been that it's been dividing national unity within China. So I think the United States wants to see a change of Chinese governance philosophy, policy priorities and actual foreign behaviour in Asia.
David Austin: Okay. Now, from what I've seen in the way that so much of the Chinese policy has been driven by Xi Jinping himself, it doesn't seem like that would be likely for him to change course, or am I wrong?
Yongwook Ryu: No, I think you are right. We know that you know even after [the] COVID saga in China, Xi Jinping's hold of power has not really declined. There was a moment when people thought that maybe Xi Jinping's grip on power was weakening especially when Li Keqiang, the Chinese premier, made certain public remarks which seem to challenge Xi Jinping's public speeches. So, for example, Li Keqiang said about 40% of Chinese ordinary people make less than 1000 renminbi per month, and this goes against Xi Jinping's idea and promotion of '小康社会 (xiao kang she hui)', 'modest strong society', where most Chinese make around 10,000 USD per year. So Li Keqiang's remarks seemed to challenge Xi Jinping's public statement.
But we know that throughout 2020, we've seen Xi Jinping strengthening his grip on power, we see Li Keqiang not taking much public limelight when he gives speeches. Although, I do think that there's a bit of a power struggle going on within the Communist Party, but it's fair to say that Xi Jinping is still firmly in charge, and that fact is probably not going to change anytime soon.
David Austin: The school has had some forums already about the US elections and what that means for Asia, and just reading some of the comments and questions posed by listeners, I think a lot of people are really interested in the possibility for military engagement in Asia. What do you think about that - how likely do you think it is, where are the hotspots and should people be concerned?
Yongwook Ryu: Yeah, I think people should be more concerned now than before. In general, the probability of military conflict is low to begin with, but I would say that the likelihood of military conflict in this part of the world now and in the next few years is certainly higher than what has been in the past decade or so.
And here I see two of the most dangerous flash points. One is the Korean Peninsula and the other one is Taiwan. So I'm not going to say the South China Sea, although we do see tensions, I don't think that's where the US and China will most likely clash.
The reason that I say the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are the most dangerous flash points are the following. In the case of the Korean peninsula, which has always been the subject of historically great power conflict, whenever there was a hegemon in Asia, that hegemon has always controlled the Korean Peninsula.
When Japan was militarily powerful, it occupied the Korean Peninsula; Before then, China was the most powerful hegemon in the region, China de facto ruled the Korean Peninsula. And during the Cold War when the power was divided between the US and the Soviet Union, the Korean Peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel.
And now, because power is more or less contested between USA and China, we see that great power politics and influence taking place on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea depends on China, South Korea is an ally of the USA, but there are also domestic politics within South Korea with conservatives favouring USA, certain quote-unquote liberal and progressive political forces wanting to balance between US and China. So as the US-China power rivalry intensifies, we will see a miniature of that great power politics taking place on the Korean Peninsula.
Taiwan, for obvious reasons. During President Trump's tenure, the USA has given a lot of support — political and diplomatic — to Taiwan and the Tsai Ing-wen government in Taiwan obviously wants to promote independence for Taiwan. So, both Trump adopting this anti-China or 'all the way pressure' policy towards China and then Tsai Ing-wen favouring independence, came together. It was an opportune moment for the Taiwanese government to take some political chances and go for this independence path, which is something that the Communist Party of China just cannot accept.
So we've seen a lot of tensions because of this, and neither CCP in the mainland nor Tsai's government in Taiwan are willing to make any sort of compromise, so they've been holding their grounds. And at the same time, Xi Jinping has publicly stated that he's going to unite Taiwan. Therefore, his personal reputation is on the line, so that's why I think Taiwan is also dangerous.
David Austin: What is the US-Indo-Pacific strategy and how is that working now, and what do you see as far as going forward?
Yongwook Ryu: The US foreign policy towards Asia, if you had to use one phrase, would be "free and open Indo-Pacific". In short, FOIP. This FOIP idea initially emerged from Japan, I don't know whether you knew this. The former prime minister of Japan was the first one who proposed this free and open Indo-Pacific. His initial policy idea was to connect the two oceans: the Asian Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and the two continents, Asia and Africa.
His main policy goal was to connect these two continents and oceans for greater trade interactions and exchanges. USA took the FOIP idea and then basically turned it into pretty much a China policy. So whenever nowadays you hear FOIP, people think about the US containment policy towards China, but the initial starting point was not that.
I think that the principles of FOIP will continue, and that undergirds US policy towards Asia, which is open, inclusive, based on international law and rules. If China deviates from these principles, then the USA will put pressure on China, along with Asian allies and pro-US countries. If China accepts these rules, then I think that's what everybody wants to see in the future.
David Austin: Now you mentioned the Korean Peninsula, and Trump famously met with Kim Jong-un here in Singapore. During his four years what changed between US and North Korean relationships and I guess North Korea's relationship with the world?
Yongwook Ryu: You might be surprised to hear this: I think Kim Jong-un is disappointed to see Trump go. Something that North Korea has always wanted to achieve is to have direct access to the US President, which is what Trump was willing to give to Kim Jong-un. That's why there were summit meetings between the two leaders in Singapore, in Hanoi and also at Panmunjom.
None of these summit meetings actually produced concrete results, and that's why we've not seen much progress on peace processes on the Korean Peninsula as well as the denuclearisation issue.
I think Biden will go back to the Obama administration's policy towards North Korea, which is to join forces with Japan and South Korea and put pressure on Pyongyang collectively. Now, this is something that North Korea does not like, but it's also something that the current South Korean government would not like to see. So my expectation is that we will see more conflict and tensions between USA and North Korea, as well as between the USA and the current South Korean government which prefers a more conciliatory engagement policy towards North Korea.
David Austin: Now, at least it seems in the major media North Korea has been fairly quiet during the US elections.
Yongwook Ryu: Surprisingly quiet
David Austin: Yes, surprisingly quiet. So what do you think Kim Jong-un is planning to do now that his friend Trump looks like he may not be the President?
Yongwook Ryu: Bromance is over right for them, right? So it's hard to know what's really going on in North Korea. Earlier this year, when COVID was rampant, Kim Jong-un disappeared from the public limelight for a few months, and then somebody who looked like Kim Jong-un appeared, and then there are all these folks who analyse these video footages to see whether the person who appears as Kim Jong-un is in fact Kim Jong-un. So they look at the ear size, they look at teeth, and then the different facial features.
We know that Kim Jong-un's health has not been very well, and he has delegated some of his authority to other people, including his sister. So his sister seems to be in charge of policies towards South Korea and towards the United States, although Kim Jong-un will still make the final decision. But he has not been seen in public for some time. I think North Korea will wait and see first how USA will react to North Korea. They will also wait and see how USA will react to China, and then they will try to do their traditional foreign policy.
My expectation is that North Korea will probably go back to the old brinkmanship policy if no goodwill gesture comes out of Washington DC under the Biden administration, then they will try to send out a signal to the USA that, if you don't do what we want you to do, then we will fire missiles over the sea of Japan and test satellites and so on and so forth as a way to provoke the USA, bring the USA to the negotiating table and then send out a message to the USA.
David Austin: When it comes to foreign policy, what are the things that you're waiting to see will or will not happen?
Yongwook Ryu: Right. So I'm waiting to first hear President-elect Biden make a foreign policy statement, and then within that statement, we will get a good sense of what the Biden administration will do in terms of its Asia policy. So, what Biden will say about China in terms of the level of engagement and containment.
As I said earlier, what form will this differentiated degree of engagement with China be exactly? Where will they cooperate and where will they fight against Beijing? And based on that I think a lot of countries in this part of the world will take their policy towards China. Under Trump, it was fairly clear: either with USA Trump or against. And certain countries such as India, which had its own conflict with China, and Vietnam which also has its own conflict with China all sided with the USA. They actually enjoyed strong US support against China.
Now I think these countries are in in some difficulty because they showed their cards towards Beijing, and if USA under Biden relaxes its pressure policy towards Beijing, then they are going to be in a difficult situation. So they will also wait and see what Biden will say about China. I think a lot of countries in this part of the world want to see the continuation of the new US position on the South China Sea, which came out under the Trump administration, [and] which is a logical extension of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling.
The new South China Sea policy under Trump was the fully-blown extension of the 2016 legal ruling on the South China Sea. The previous US administrations implicitly agreed with the full implications of the legal ruling, but they never explicitly stated those things. Trump did, and I think many regional countries want to see Biden or the administration continuing that statement, and I think that will happen. So that's going to be a positive.
Taiwan - I think, the other day, I was chatting with some Taiwanese officials and they're also a bit concerned - because in some sense they put all their eggs in one basket, hoping that the USA will continue to provide strong political support for Taiwan. Now if the Biden administration changes the tone and degree of this political support towards Taiwan, then it's going to be a very difficult situation.
I think they are quietly hoping that Biden will continue to support Taiwan, and by looking at the people who are going to play a crucial role in the new Biden administration in terms of foreign policy, I think there still will be strong diplomatic and political support for Taiwan, and that's going to make the US-China relationship quite difficult.
But we also know that the USA gives greater importance and priority to the relationship with China rather than to Taiwan. So everybody is watching how [the US-China] relationship will pan out right in the near future, and then based on that, they will adjust their positions.
David Austin: Do you think that the way that Beijing has cracked down on Hong Kong and sort of signalled an end to the one country two systems will give more support to Taiwan from America? Would that make them more likely to try and help and support Taiwan?
Yongwook Ryu: Yeah, absolutely. I think whichever administration we have in the USA, the domestic public opinion in the USA on the issue of China has decisively shifted towards a more negative attitude. Taiwan now can play with US domestic politics, both public opinion and Congressmen and women, to provide more support for Taiwan in the future, and of course that has to do with Hong Kong, it has to do with Chinese policy on Uighurs in Xinjiang and other parts of China. So yes, I think that provides favourable conditions for Taiwan's positive relationship with the USA going forward.
David Austin: Is there anything else that you would like to address, to say?
Yongwook Ryu: I think one thing that I want to emphasise, and this is something that I think the new Biden administration, especially policy makers, really need to pay attention to. The Trump administration has received a lot of criticism both explicit and implicit around the world, and everybody knows this.
In Asia, Trump put pressure on Japan, South Korea and other pro-US countries in this part of the world. Despite that fact, which is something that many regional countries are not happy with, despite that fact a lot of regional countries still supported Trump, and the only reason is because Trump's consistent and persistent pressure towards Beijing.
This is something that the Biden administrators must not forget. The most ideal situation for Asian countries is that the Biden administration continues to put pressure on Beijing, and at the same time tries to do this along with Asian allies and pro-US countries. So, back to multilateralism but the policy agenda towards China is still being maintained.
David Austin: All right, well thank you very much.
Photo credit: US State Department