Intro: Hello, everyone.
What's more controversial than coal, harder to build than a dam, and suddenly, back on Southeast Asia's policy agenda? Nuclear.
For years, it was too politically sensitive. Too scary and too expensive. But now, demand from industry, data centres and urbanisation is making it necessary for governments to look again. Renewables can definitely help, but they have limits. So nuclear, especially Small Modular Reactors, is being reconsidered.
In Singapore, the issue is also moving from hypothetical debate to formal assessment. From 2027, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts will assess Singapore's nuclear infrastructure readiness. Though the government has emphasised that this is not a decision to adopt nuclear, but part of a rigorous three-phase assessment. So nuclear isn't just an engineering question. It's about trust, safety, public fear, and what happens when risk crosses borders.
My name is Yuhao Ba. I am an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Today's Policy Unpacked is about Nuclear in Southeast Asia: Power, Politics and Public Trust.
Joining us today are my two esteemed colleagues: Assistant Professor Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng. He is the Director of the Institute for Environment and Sustainability. His research sits at an important intersection of environment, health and development. And we're also joined by Professor Leong Ching. She is the Vice Provost for Student Life at NUS. Her research examines water policies, environmental behaviour, public sector reform, and policy communications.
Thank you so much for joining us.
Nuclear energy was once seen as politically difficult in many countries, but it is now reappearing in conversations about climate change, energy security and economic competitiveness.
So my first question to you guys is: why is nuclear back on the table, especially in Southeast Asia? I guess, Prof. Jie-Sheng, you can help us get started by helping us understand the energy policy context. Why are governments and researchers paying renewed attention to this issue now?
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: Sure. I guess there are quite a few reasons. Maybe we’ll start with the first one: there is now this strong push towards green energy transitions. So typically when we think about green energy transitions, we would think about renewables. You know, solar, hydro, wind power and so on. Those have been developing quite a bit in Southeast Asia. But we also realised that, there's some constraints towards how far we can take this, renewable energy, as you know.
Well, first thing is, they require a lot of land. [Secondly], there is this intermittency issue. Which means, the availability of renewable energy is dependent on the weather condition. If, for instance, in the nighttime, you wouldn't get solar. On a day where there's no wind, you wouldn't get wind energy. And so what that means is, to harness these traditional renewable energies, you will need to back them up with other technologies like batteries, and so on. So that's the constraints of renewable and green energies.
But then the good thing about nuclear energy is that it doesn't have both of these issues. A nuclear power plant compared to renewable energies does not take as much space, relatively speaking. And especially, you know, for the latest technologies in nuclear energy, there's the Small Modular Reactors that take even less space.
So for a lot of Southeast Asian cities, land constraints, especially in a country like Singapore, SMRs or nuclear energy suddenly becomes really attractive.
Second, they operate more like a traditional power plant in the sense that they are not dependent on the natural elements. So, you have a steady baseload of electricity that you can depend on. So in a way, that makes it a lot more attractive than the traditional renewable energies. So that's one issue, which is the need to push towards a green energy transition.
And the third reason is because nuclear compared to fossil fuel, it also has a much lower carbon footprint or lower carbon content. So in this sense, they resolve the land constraint issues. They don't have the intermittency issue and they fulfill the need for green transitions. So that's on the supply side.
On the demand side, we are also seeing exponentially growing demand for electricity. So in many parts of Southeast Asia which are still developing, many households still do not have reliable access to electricity. So that's on the residential side. But on the industrial side, there's also a lot of demand for electricity because of the fast growing industries like data centres or semiconductors. They consume huge amounts of electricity. So that means for economies, for countries that want to grow—they have no choice. They have to attract these industries and in turn, they have to build up infrastructure, electricity infrastructure, so that they can ensure that these industries can grow in their economies. So for both the supply and the demand side, there's a strong reason to look towards nuclear energy as the solution.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much, Prof. This is a very excellent analysis from both the demand side and the supply side.
And coming to you, Prof Ching, this is about the public in this conversation. So we know that for the public for the longest time, there has been this concern if nuclear is safe or not.
So my question to you is: from the public perspective, does the climate change argument change people's understanding or concern about nuclear energy? In other words, Prof. Jie-Sheng mentioned that this is part of the clean energy transition. If we frame it this way, would nuclear [power] be more acceptable to the public?
Leong Ching: That's a really good question. And this ties up to your earlier question about why now? So all the questions and all the reasons that Jie-Sheng had given were always there. They have always been there. And in fact, many countries around the region had already earlier said that they were interested in nuclear, but so nothing really happened. So your question is really good. Like, why now? What has happened now?
So I think, of course, the technologies have developed in such a way that the cost-benefit analysis now kind of looks better, right? But also from a behaviourist point of view, you're thinking: why now? One of the things I think is really important is to look at the salience of incidents. So the salience of incidents has…I mean, sometimes it goes up and sometimes it goes down. And we think, well, salience does fade with time.
So I think given the time that has passed between the last incidents in Japan and now, I think governments may have sort of calculated to think that in terms of politics, people's minds may be more willing to accept now. So what you said earlier, it's like, is it the case that people suddenly feel that the climate is changing and things are getting so hot? [Do] I need nuclear now? The answer would be no, because it's extremely unlikely. It's one of the curses of all of us environmentalists and all the people who are pushing for green issues to have a bigger seat at the table.
One of our greatest difficulties is the low salience of environmental issues. We have long-term discounting bias. We think things are not going to happen so soon. So if you're thinking…If you're relying on the fact that people are suddenly awakening to the climate crisis and thinking, well, let's have nuclear powers and options, that's not what I think is going to happen. But what I think is happening now is that the last incident has sort of faded in salience, and maybe people are sort of really ready to think again.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much. Indeed, I think nuclear energy is not just about climate change. It's also about energy security and economic competitiveness, as well as the salience of environmental issues on the policy agenda.
So let's move on to our next question. Why is nuclear so politically sensitive, and how should policymakers navigate and understand what we often call public fear?
Prof. Jie-Sheng, perhaps you can help us get started again. Just from a policy and economics perspective, how should we study public acceptance in a way that takes these concerns systematically and seriously?
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: Right. So this is a very tough question. So, I think first, just speaking not so much as a researcher, but as a citizen, as an individual, the word ‘nuclear’ has always been scary. It always invokes something really powerful. Something massive, you know? So from an individual perspective, when we hear the word ‘nuclear’, no matter what context it is, it sounds scary. It sounds big.
So I think this is the first thing the governments need to pay attention to, which is: they need to take a closer look into citizens, individuals or regular folks…how do they think about nuclear? Not so much immediately framing it as: are you for or against it? I don't think that's going to be useful. It's much better to get a more nuanced understanding because there are so many different aspects to nuclear. And I don't think most people are totally for or totally against all aspects.
So, for instance, when we talk about nuclear, there's the cost part. There's the safety part. There's the waste management part and many others. So someone who believes or trusts the technology side of nuclear may not trust the management side. Meaning, maybe they do not trust that their government has the capacity to safely regulate. Or, someone that trusts the regulation part, maybe they only trust the operation part, but they are unsure whether the eventual waste management of it can be handled properly and safely over not just decades, but over centuries. So I think at the first instance, [in order] to try to understand the public's feelings or acceptance of nuclear energy, the government needs to take a more nuanced look at it.
Yuhao Ba: Thanks so much.
Ching, so from your perspective, or from your expertise… When people are afraid of or concerned about nuclear energy, should we understand that as a lack of information or a lack of trust, a reasonable response to uncertainty or some combinations of the three?
Leong Ching: So this is a really good question because it relates to my other piece of work, which is on recycled drinking water. So as you know, recycled drinking water has been very rarely successfully implemented. And a lot of times people think, well, it's an information deficit. That's a diagnosis, that people don't know the signs. They don't trust it. But actually, it's something else. It's something else that speaks to our aversion to new things, maybe. Or something psychological, or some sort of novelty penalty.
And so, what my research in recycled drinking water shows is, it’s exactly as Jie-Sheng said: that people are not pro or anti-specific things, but there are different reasons that you have to accept this. So for recycled drinking water, a lot of the research has been on what is the main variable between those who accept and those who reject. A lot of people think it's the 'yuck factor'—that, you know, it's a toilet to tap. And actually, it's not; it's something else. And this is something else is social conformity, that I found was true in recycled drinking water and I found later to be true in the acceptance of new vaccines, mRNA vaccines. And my research shows that the mere fact of other people accepting it increases the chances of you accepting it, with no additional information. So mere conformity alone is a significant factor. So it's really interesting.
I'm not sure to what extent this applies to nuclear power, but I did want to say it should make us at least skeptical of the role of information alone. Not that information isn't important, but if you're hoping that public education or giving information per se will be sort of the ‘big bullet’ that will change [people’s minds]... I think it's extremely unlikely. There's lots of other things that we need to do.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much. And I thank you both for mentioning the many aspects and the trade-offs at the macro level decision making when it comes to nuclear energy policy acceptance or perceptions.
And on that, I want to press Jie-Sheng a little bit more. So when we talk about these trade-offs, and then when we think about the public acceptance or concerns, should they be treated as a constraint or as some useful evidence for good policy design?
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: Yeah, that's a good point. So I think it's safe to say that for just about all policies, there will be trade-offs—either between different groups of people, or even within the same person, but they are winning some and losing some. So, a large part of my research is actually on cost-benefit analysis, right?
So, I guess the first thing is: we need to identify what are the cost parts and what the cost component or the benefits component at the individual level. So for instance, if my country adopts nuclear energy, maybe I can gain in terms of having cheaper electricity, more reliable electricity, and maybe even more jobs, better jobs. Because the country will be able to attract more investments, more industries and growth, and all that.
Now, the cost part would obviously be in terms of the environmental risk, and treating it as a radioactive risk. It's not a certainty but it's obviously some non-zero probability, right? So, this is the trade-off that individuals will need to make when they are deciding whether they are accepting— whether they are in support or against nuclear energy. And so in that sense, this is something that can only be discerned by policymakers. You know, if they conduct a full-fledged quantitative study, then we can better understand the trade-offs that individuals are making.
And then from there, we can then devise policies to see what is the best way to alleviate some of these trade-offs. We can better make sure that regular folks will also win when the country adopts nuclear energy.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much.
And then my last question is to both of you, actually—still on this political controversy, sensitivity, this topic. I think in the mass media, when we talk about public concern about nuclear energy, and now we hear this term ‘public fear’ a lot.
And I want to ask you two: is ‘public fear’ the right term or does making it a public concern sound irrational? So, perhaps we can start with Ching.
Leong Ching: Oh, that's so interesting, the word ‘irrational’, right? Because this is my work and the rationality component is such a…sometimes overestimated and sometimes underestimated. I'll explain.
I think it's rational to be afraid sometimes, and I think that's so important to understand. So, Fukushima is a great tragedy. Tens of thousands died from the tsunami. More than a thousand died from the evacuation efforts. But if you're thinking about the radiation…the radiation itself, nobody died [from it].
But this is the way the human mind works. And we are boundedly rational. We use heuristics, we use mental shortcuts to process information, including information about risks, fears and policy options that are open to governments.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much. Bounded rationality. Exactly, that is. And then also…
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: Can I pick up on that?
Yuhao Ba: Thank you. Yeah, please.
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: So, you know, Ching, I think you raised a very interesting point in that, although we talk so much about Fukushima, but no one actually perished from it. So do you think…This also links up to something Yuhao has mentioned earlier.
If we provide more information on the actual casualties of prominent nuclear incidents, do you think that would sway more people or reduce people's fear or increase people's acceptance of nuclear power?
Leong Ching: Yeah, that's the thing, right? We often think: how do we fix biases? How do we fix mistakes and errors in thinking? And we think often that the fix is to provide information as a corrective mechanism.
So, quite a lot of scholars feel that with behavioural public policy, our role is to point out these biases and to debias them. That’s not how it works though. Sometimes all the information in the world isn't going to fix things. For example, if it were true, a lot more countries would be drinking recycled water. It would be, right? Because information alone obviously isn't going to help because the science is known. The impacts are known. It's no secret. I mean, come to Singapore, you can look at all our factories, right? So information alone, I think, isn't going to help.
But I think information, if you embed it within a narrative that works as some kind of heuristic that's really quick thinking, that kind of frames [it in a way that] within seconds you can understand it…I think that information, if trusted, will then give you a way to legitimise new policies.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much, Ching and Jie-Sheng.
I guess involving information campaigns, information communication or policy communication as part of our overall package will enhance the legitimacy or public acceptance of nuclear energy.
Do you think other policy measures or mechanisms should be paired with information campaigns in this overall package?
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: Right, other measures. So let's talk about the information.
Yuhao Ba: Oh, sure.
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: So I think, something Ching said, that really resonated with me. Because I also conducted some work where we are looking into how salient the increase of water tariff is on people’s behaviour on water usage.
And we found that, you know…so I conducted this study in the counties of China. We found that counties that presented that information in a very succinct… not so wordy, you know, less than 500 words or so. Those counties had a much better effect in terms of translating the information or the implication of water tariff increase to households. So meaning households are better. They have the so-called desired response in terms of reducing their water usage. So I think I agree with Ching’s point, having some information embedded in a way that is easy for people to digest is much more useful than just dumping all the things. So it's factual and [easy to] digest that.
Back to the other question, which is your main question of other policy measures. So I think because the fear for nuclear power is there, and I don't think it's an irrational fear because the thing is, once an accident happens, it can be existential. Especially for a place like Singapore because the entire country is within the danger zone. So, I think at least for some places, it's definitely not irrational.
So I think one thing is, the government needs to definitely instill confidence in the people that they have the regulations, they have the technical capabilities of building and sustaining nuclear power and that we are not rushing into such a decision. So I guess that's the most basic thing that the government can do to at least assure citizens of that.
But beyond that, obviously, the government still needs to do a lot more to translate all these things that they have done or the factual information of nuclear energy to the people in a way that is easily digestible for them.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much. This is a very helpful distinction. Public fear is not necessarily irrational. And then the tricky thing is about the design of our information campaign strategies and to make it digestible and then relatively salient to the public. And then it might also reflect deeper questions about trust, accountability and fairness, and our institutional capacity.
So now let's move our question and conversation to the regional level. In Southeast Asia, there's another level and layer to this issue. Of course, nuclear risk may be governed nationally, but it may be perceived and/or reflected regionally.
So we know that countries are geographically connected and then deeply close to each other. If one country develops or deploys nuclear energy, neighbouring countries might feel exposed to the same risks, especially given that they do not necessarily receive the immediate or direct benefits from nuclear energy.
So, in your view, Jie-Sheng, perhaps we can start with you again. Could you explain why the cross-border dimension matters for nuclear energy in Southeast Asia?
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: I grew up in Marina Parade, East Coast. So, the place where I used to live is right across the sea. I can see Batam from my place every day. So that gives you a sense of how close we are. People that live in Woodlands, they will be able to see Johor every day. So our neighbours and Singapore, we are definitely seriously deliberating the possibility of building nuclear power plants.
The Indonesian government has already identified over 20 sites, potential sites for nuclear power plants, and Batam is one of them. And Johor, as we know, they are building a lot of data centres. And data centres consume a lot of electricity. So it wouldn't be a stretch of imagination to think that they might one day need to rely on nuclear power. And given the proximity, and similarly for Singapore…Given the proximity of these three countries, whatever happens within our own country will affect our neighbouring countries, because environmental risks simply do not respect national jurisdiction or borders. And we have seen quite a bit of this kind of environmental pollution, travelling cross-border. I mean, for the countries in this region, we are very familiar with haze, which sometimes comes from Indonesia. And I think two months ago, it came from Johor.
So in this sense, because of our close proximity, whatever happens in our country, in one country, when there's an environmental impact, it will tend to travel outside. So that's why citizens of these three countries would rightfully be concerned not just about what their national government or what their city governments are doing, but what their neighbours are doing as well.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much. And especially those parallel examples and other issues. And if I may ask a follow up question. So you mentioned that people would definitely perceive the adoption of nuclear energy in other countries, especially in neighbouring countries.
Do you think that would make nuclear energy feel more normal, more acceptable, or could it make people even feel more exposed or vulnerable?
Tan-Soo Jie-Sheng: Yeah, that's a good question. That's something I would definitely like to do more research on. But just thinking it through as a thought experiment…so think of it this way.
Let's say your neighbour adopts nuclear energy. So whatever happens to them, you will have to, you know, sort of deal with the consequences as well. But at the same time, whatever gains that they get, they get to keep it. So in this sense, a rational thing for me to do is basically, well, they’ve already taken the plunge. I might as well go along with the flow and adopt it. But rather than this scenario of us ‘racing to the bottom’, I think probably a better response would be, maybe it needs to be a regional decision and a regional collaboration so that to ensure that no one will have to unfairly incur the consequence of each other's actions.
So I think it actually is…because, you know, a lot of these transboundary environmental issues are best managed collectively. So for instance, back to the haze. So, Singapore had tried. We actually introduced the Transboundary Haze Act in Singapore's parliament, I think, in 2014. But obviously that didn't have much weight because we did it unilaterally, without our neighbours signing off on it. But in the case of nuclear power, I think that's a strong case because we are all starting from a blank slate. There is a strong case for closer regional collaboration.
Yuhao Ba: Thanks so much. Hopefully we will not end up ‘racing to the bottom’, especially with strong regional cooperation and collaboration.
Ching, on the same topic, so we understand that this cross-border concern or issue is real. And Jie-Sheng also mentioned about this unilateral legislation or legislative action in Singapore on haze.
And when it comes to communication, may I ask: how should the government communicate to their neighbouring governments and their public on this issue of nuclear energy?
Leong Ching: Well, the general characteristic of environmental problems, such as the ones that you describe, is a global commons. So, the nature of a common-pool resource means that all of us are in the same boat. That is the key thing. I mean, it's not just communication, it's not a reframe. It's not razzmatazz. It is really the truth, right? We all sink or swim together.
So I think once that fact becomes sort of top on the agenda, then the incentives are aligned. I mean, it's slightly different from transboundary haze because it's extremely asymmetrical. We are price-takers. Like, that’s it, right? But for nuclear, I think, if an incident happens, we're all in it together. And of course, Jie-Sheng is partly right to say that the gains are private, but the cost could be community-wide and regional.
But actually, I think because we are so close-knit, gains would sort of have positive spillover effects as well. I mean, that's a function of policymaking, but in terms of the type of good that we're talking about, nuclear power ought to be conceived of as a global commons, or at least a regional commons. And then all the governance principles follow.
Yuhao Ba: Thank you so much for the very engaging and insightful conversation on this very timely, important topic.
So for our audience, three takeaways from today's conversation.
First, nuclear in Southeast Asia is not simply a technology debate. It is a question about governance, regulation, transparency, safety cultures and emergency preparedness as well as waste management. They matter a lot, as much as the reactor itself.
Second, public concern is not simply irrational fear. It often reflects deeper questions about trust, accountability, and whether institutions are prepared to manage long-term risks. Communication matters as well, but it has to be backed by credible governance.
Third, nuclear risk does not stop at borders. In a region as interconnected as Southeast Asia, regional cooperation will be essential—not only on safety standards, but also on information sharing, emergency response and public confidence.
So the real question is not simply “nuclear: yes or not?” It is whether countries can build the institutions, trust, and regional confidence needed before building up all the reactors.
Thank you so much for watching. We'll see you in our next episode.