The United States has the world's largest overseas military presence with an undisclosed number of overseas bases. Today, China is seen as the biggest competitor to the US, even though it has only one overseas base in Djibouti in comparison to US, Britain, France or even Russia. China's maritime ambitions have triggered various policy responses out of which the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) has surfaced from time to time as a strategic bulwark to curtail Chinese ambitions.
The first virtual Quad leaders' summit held on March 12, 2021 demonstrates the four partners – US, India, Australia and Japan are heavily invested in the outcomes of advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific. As more militarisation of the Indian Ocean Region occurs, the call for the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (ZoP) becomes feebler. What does this mean for stability in the Indian Ocean?
The ZoP Proposal and challenges for its realisation
The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was a proposal introduced to the United Nations by the littoral states of Sri Lanka and Tanzania at the 26th United Nations General Assembly in 1971, spearheaded by then-Ceylonese Prime Minister Sirimao Bandaranaike. The concept of ZoP was also adopted as soft law through the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) to maintain peace and stability in the region.
This was in the context of the Cold War, during which smaller states in the Indian Ocean were following an international policy of non-alignment and support for decolonization. Then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi played a crucial role in supporting the ZoP and calling for major powers to remove their military presence from the region. Unfortunately, these efforts underwent serious challenges as militarisation of the Chagos Archipelago and Diego Garcia ensued.
The call for a ZoP resurfaced in 2015 when India demonstrated renewed interest by pitching this concept during the 2015 Galle Dialogue in Sri Lanka. In addition, at the Jakarta Concord 2017, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) also recalled the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) for Indian Ocean stability. The IORA provides a voice for smaller nations to promote their maritime interests and to resist militarisation of the oceans, but the challenges to its realization remain omnipresent.
A reality check for India?
Firstly, China would actively reject the proposal since it potentially limits China's ambitions in the Indian Ocean, as Beijing seeks to develop blue water capability, increase naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, develop its base in Djibouti and invest continuously in the Belt and Road Initiative. Secondly, there is competition of major powers to defend strategic islands which are located near important maritime chokepoints. These include the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Cocos Keeling Island and La Réunion which fall under the jurisdiction of India, Australia and France respectively.
Thirdly, the ZoP is also inimical to India's own power projection. As India does not possess military capabilities to counter China's assertions in the IOR, the ZoP provides a mechanism to circumscribe China in the short term. Divergently, in the long term if India supports the ZoP, it also circumscribes other powers especially the Quad nations which are now highly strategic to India's own maritime interests. Delhi's choices are therefore limited by strategic reciprocity as it may in the future use the US Diego Garcia base and defend its offshore interests. (Not to forget that in the past, India had also attempted to add the Mauritian Island of Agalega to its offshore assets).
Finally, other ad-hoc partnerships have emerged which are not as visible as the Quad. This includes China, Russia, South Africa, Iran and Pakistan. Examples are the 2019 Exercise Marine Security Belt in the Gulf of Oman by China, Russia and Iran and Exercise Mosi with Russia, China and South Africa.
Since 2007, the Pakistan Navy had also conducted the Aman Naval Exercises which in 2021 garnered more attention than ever with Russia's participation, during which Russia showcased the Black Sea Fleet's Admiral Grigorovich frigate, Dmitry Rogachev patrol ship, SB-739 rescue tug, a helicopter, and both marine corps unit and mine clearance unit. Pakistan is therefore strongly signaling India which is generally perceived as a net security provider, which cautions India to enhance its role as a member of the Quad and lessen interest in the ZoP.
Can small states advance the ZoP?
The ZoP therefore becomes a proposal for small states, who are wary of the major powers, to champion. Sri Lanka for example, has already commenced providing a normative leadership to facilitate the creation of a code of conduct for the Indian Ocean Region premised on the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.
The Centre for the Law of the Sea in Colombo began this process by calling for inputs from 21 members of the IORA on the draft proposal. The Code essentially calls for a rules-based order for maritime governance, providing a set of guidelines on measures to repress piracy, protective measures for ships, measures to repress armed robbery against ships and detailed guidelines for information sharing and coordination on piracy incidents.
The code also encourages states to incorporate national legislation to interdict and prosecute offences including money laundering, illegal arms and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering, crude oil theft, human trafficking, human smuggling, maritime pollution, IUU fishing, illegal dumping of toxic waste, maritime terrorism and hostage taking, and vandalisation of offshore oil infrastructures.
These maritime security issues are common to many IOR states. Although a similar initiative, The Djibouti guidelines, already exist, it has geographical limits, which makes the IOR Code of Conduct unique on its own. The potential lies in the Code promoting norms for maritime governance for a rules based order in the Indian Ocean Region.
Furthermore, the future of the Indian Ocean is a multipolar one as both the BRI and Quad have already commenced their activities. For example : developing nations in the Indian Ocean Region receive development assistance from major powers such as China, Japan, Australia, European Union and also the United States while in negotiation for security related partnerships.
For instance, the United States continue to negotiate defence agreements and partnerships in the region which includes: Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with Sri Lanka and Maldives and both ACSA and General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Bangladesh.
These countries also receive significant amount of investments from China as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore small nations must seek strategic autonomy as foreign policy objectives with more clarity in separation of economic and security interests moving forward.
(Photo credit: U.S. Pacific Fleet)