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China-India Brief #196

January 12, 2022 - January 26, 2022

China-India Brief #196BRIEF #196

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
January 12, 2022 - January 26, 2022


Guest Column

Missile race spirals between China and India
By David Scott


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The last half of 2021 saw the missile race between China and India heat up, as both powers continued their competitive rise in the international system as rival techno-powers, watching and responding to each other. Their missile capabilities have advanced in speed and range, amidst new deployments and increased frequency of testing. A major concern for India according to Balasubraniam and Murugesan, is China’s “rising” missile capabilities that could be deployed against India from the South China Sea and from China’s Western Theatre Command.

Hypersonic capabilities

China twice tested hypersonic weapons in July/August 2021: a low-earth orbit rocket or Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), which carried a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) able to carry various types of ballistic and anti-ship missiles. The FOBS is difficult to stop because of its trajectory maneuverability, the HGV because of its speed. China’s breakthrough created further concerns in India. Lt General Prakash Menon argued that India should stay in this hypersonic “race”, Justin George warned that “India should be worried”, and the Hindustan Times considered it a “big threat not only for America but also for India”. In early September, India’s own ongoing hypersonic programme passed a threshold with the successful maiden test of a High-Speed Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV), using an indigenously developed scramjet propulsion system. China, though, pushed further ahead by announcing breakthroughs in using titanium alloy components for its hypersonic missiles at the end of December, which will enable it to ramp up production, as well announcing breakthroughs in infra-red homing technology.

Agni missiles

In late October 2021, India conducted its first user-trial of the Agni-5, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in full operational configuration by the military’s Strategic Forces Command. The key feature with the Agni-5 is its China-centric range. Whereas Agni-4 could only target Western China, Agni-5 with its 5,000 km range, now puts the whole of China, including its capital and eastern seaboard within range. In India, Major General Gagandeep Bakshi argued that China would be “rattled” by the test, which indeed was its purpose. China formally denounced the test at the UN Security Council, with Lan Jianxue considering it “provocative”.

In mid-December, India successfully tested the Agni-P missile. This new generation medium-range ballistic land missile can carry a nuclear warhead, and with a maximum range of up to 2000 km, is able to target Pakistan as well as Chinese positions in Tibet.

BrahMos missiles

The BrahMos medium-range supersonic cruise missile, with a range of 400-500 km, has become a key part of India’s inventory. In mid-October, India’s Attorney General Kottayan Venugopal told the Indian Supreme Court of the government’s intention to push ahead with the ambitious Char Dham road project, in order specifically to get the BrahMos Block III variant, designed for mountain warfare, up to the border facing China. Unsurprisingly, this news was immediately denounced in the Chinese state media by Zhang Changyue. This heated exchange had been preceded by China’s installation of long-range Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs) along the border in April 2021, as a post-Galwan “deterrent to India”. In early December, an air version of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile was successfully test fired from an Indian Sukhoi 30 MK-I supersonic fighter aircraft, and this was quickly reported in the Chinese state media. It is no coincidence that India had made a push to base Sukhoi fighters, able to carry BrahMos missiles, along the Himalayas, again facing China. Completing the armed forces’ growing use of BrahMos missiles, Rajnath Singh viewed successful testing of India’s sea-to-sea BrahMos advanced variant on 11 January 2022, from the newly commissioned INS Visakhapatnam.

With a renewed focus on the BrahMos technology, in late December the Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh laid the foundation stone of a new BrahMos missile production unit in Lucknow, aimed at producing 80-100 new generation BrahMos missiles annually. Such production is partly for India’s own use, but also partly for export. Sales of BrahMos missiles were concluded in January with the Philippine navy, and was described as “a deal that sends [a] message to China”. There was further momentum on BrahMos missile transfers to Vietnam in January—an issue long denounced in the Chinese state media (Ai Jun), but seen by Indian commentators (Sumit Sharma) as a way to tweak China’s tail in the South China Sea and distract Beijing’s strategic attention away from the Himalayas.

Guided missile destroyers

China commissioned two more 055 stealth guided missile destroyers (10,000 tons), the Dalian and the Anshan in April 2021 and November 2021—giving them four in total, with another further four due for completion. By then, India was attempting to keep up with the commissioning of its own stealth guided missile destroyer INS Visakhapatnam (7,400 tons) in November 2021, the first of its class, considered by Raja Menon as the warship that gives India “an advantage over China in the Indian Ocean”.

Submarine and missiles

During 2021, China commissioned its seventh Jin-class Type 094A reconfigured nuclear-powered ballistic submarine (SSBN), the Changzheng-18, in April. India’s second Arihant-class SSBN, INS Arighat, completed sea trials in March, its third SSBN codenamed S4 was launched in November 2021, with a fourth envisaged still later. China is already moving to production of more powerful Type 096 submarines, ahead of India’s next generation S5 project. However, in mid-December India announced that it had successfully tested its ultra-long range Supersonic Missile Assisted Release of Torpedo (SMART) anti-submarine missile system, a supersonic speed missile of around 600 km range, which is significantly longer than China’s Yu-8 anti-submarine missile.

MS-400 anti-aircraft missile systems

June 2021 witnessed China installing S-400 air defense missile system, purchased from Russia, and installed in Chinese border positions facing India in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. This was quickly seen by observers in India like Shishir Gupta as a counter to Indian aerial power along the border, and something that should force India to rethink its own aerial defense system. In December, the Indian Air Force started to deploy its own S-400 air defense missile system, purchased from Russia, in the Punjab region. According to government sources, India’s deployment was to counter “threats from both Pakistan and China”.

Broader features

Firstly, there is a cascading security dilemma, as China’s push for missile advancement vis-à-vis the US disadvantages India, which prompts India to initiate its own catching up with China. Secondly, there is a missile arms race between China and India, across the various armed services. Thirdly, this is feeding into specific local friction along the border as both sides continue to push against the other, in a tit-for-tat spiral. Finally, India’s own missile advances reflect a degree of internal balancing, as India seeks to build up its own strength towards China, particularly on the border (where China already has a missiles advantage from its position in Tibet) and in the Indian Ocean. India’s missile sales to the Philippines and Vietnam represent an additional element of external balancing towards China, regional balancing by India that is alongside but not dependent on strategic cooperation with the United States
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David Scott writes regularly on India and China foreign policy including India-China relations, is a Member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), and is also Associate Member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. He can be contacted at decb64_ZGF2aWRzY290dDM2NkBvdXRsb29rLmNvbQ==_decb64.


Guest Column

Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean Region
By Anita Inder Singh 


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Asia’s largest rivals, China and India, are upping their game in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visits to Kenya (6-7 January), the Maldives (7 January), and Sri Lanka (8-9 January), New Delhi’s recent extension of a line of credit to Bangladesh to buy more Indian arms, and its decision to develop the oil tank farm in the north-eastern Sri Lankan city of Trincomalee highlight Sino-Indian competition in the IOR, which stretches from Africa to Australia, as does the fact that both countries will develop the strategically vital Colombo Port

Geography gives India a strategic advantage in the IO, but that is insufficient to counter China’s growing influence in the region. India’s main strategic interest is its immediate IO neighbourhood in South Asia. 

Geographically China is not an IO power; its shores are in the Pacific, and its security priorities are East Asia and the Western Pacific. But its economic and military progress has empowered it to expand its influence from the Straits of Malacca to the east coast of Africa. China recognises India’s geographical edge in the IO but has warned that the ocean is not India’s backyard.

While claiming to protect its economic investments along the Silk Road, China has increased its military footprint in the IO. Indeed, its 2015 Defense White Paper stressed the link between strategy and economics by confirming “the new requirement of safeguarding national security and development interests”.

What explains the interest of India and China in the IO?

Parts of the ocean comprise India’s maritime territory. Attempts by India and China to expand their influence in the IO highlight the strategic and economic importance of these international waters. Most Chinese and Indian trade and oil imports traverse the IO, so maritime security is a strategic and economic imperative. 

India’s development of the oil tank farm in Trincomalee is premised on the assumption of a 50 percent increase in its domestic oil consumption by 2030.Energy-hungry China buys nearly half its oil from the Middle East. Access to ports in the IOR is therefore among its economic and security priorities. China wants to ensure that the sea routes from Europe, Africa and the Middle East are not dominated by hostile powers including India and the US. So it has developed ports from Myanmar to Kenya. They include Chittagong in Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, and Mombasa and Lamu in Kenya. The Chinese-built Kipevu Oil Terminal at the Port of Mombasa is expected to be operational by April 2022. Added to these since 2017 is China’s first overseas base, in Djibouti. All these ports have enlarged China’s global influence and promoted its strategic interests, far away from the Pacific, in the IO. 

How India and China Project Power in the IO

Trade and investment are among the main instruments which India and China are using to enhance their clout in the IO area. Since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aligns its partners economically with China, India is concerned that all its littoral state neighbours, including friendly Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well as hostile Pakistan, which contests India’s claim to Kashmir, are on board.

China became the primary arms seller and investor in some IO countries long before the inauguration of the BRI in 2013. For example, it established itself as the main arms vendor to Sri Lanka during that country’s civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2009. Currently, it is also the top weapons retailer to several IO states, including Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan, China’s BRI has simultaneously pushed forward its trading and strategic interests. To project power in the IO, China has gained reliable access to naval facilities in key points around the area. In South Asia, all the countries in which China has gained ground have given it access to deep water ports.

New Delhi is also investing more in the IOR, especially in infrastructure. It has signed logistical pacts with Oman and France, strengthened maritime ties with Mauritius, Seychelles, Mozambique and Madagascar. In January 2022, China suggested the holding of a forum on the development of island countries in the IO to create consensus for common development. 

Both India and China have tried to show how their projects—for example, in the Maldives—benefit local communities. Meanwhile, in October 2020, Colombo asked Beijing for a $90 million aid grant, which was personally delivered by Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member Yang Jiechi. China lauded the “timely grant”, to be used for medical care, education and water supplies in Sri Lanka’s rural areas and “contribute to the well-being of [Sri Lankans] in a post-COVID era”.

If China needs to overcome a reputation for ensnaring countries in its ‘debt trap’, India needs to overcome a poor record of implementing projects in neighbouring countries, for example, the Teesta project in Bangladesh. Generally, India must strengthen its capacity to implement major infrastructure projects in littoral states and islands scattered around the IO.

China’s naval strength in the IO is greater than India’s. The People’s Liberation Army Navy can deploy more sea-based aircraft. China has moved submarines, destroyers, special operations forces and guided-missile frigates into the IO.

The Indian Navy has significantly increased its deployment of warships, submarines and other assets in the IOR, but the extent to which India can deploy advanced technologies will have a bearing on its status as major South Asian and IO power. India also needs to modernise its armed forces—especially its navy

China’s growing influence goes against the Indian vision of an IOR where security rests on the balance of power rather than dominance by any single country—whether that is the dominance of the US or China. This is an important reason why New Delhi has signed logistics agreements with the US, France and Australia to counter China’s naval presence beyond India’s immediate maritime neighbourhood. 

However, to counter China successfully in the rough seas of the IO, India’s arms sales, military strength and partnerships must be accompanied by more economic investment and trade with countries in the region. The economic slowcoach India faces tough competition in the IO not least because its defence spending—$72.9 billion in 2020—lags far behind that of China’s $252 billion. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, India’s economic decline was adversely affecting its ability to prioritise foreign policy goals in its South Asian regional and maritime spheres of influence.

Moreover, arrogance, red tape and piecemeal payments are bad ways of dealing with neighbours like Sri Lanka, which are saddled with debt and desperately in need of money to pay for imports while fighting the pandemic—especially when they are simultaneously approaching China for funds. In such situations, by dispensing largesse India could gain politically against China.

All told, Beijing’s mix of economics, strategy and building of a world-class navy throws down the gauntlet before India because China is already a major player—second only to the US—in the enduring Great Game in the IOR. That is the hard fact ‘aspiring’ India has to face about its Chinese competitor in the Indian Ocean
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Anita Inder Singh is a Founding Professor of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in New Delhi.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

China’s PLA accused of abducting Indian teen in Arunachal Pradesh
Al Jazeera, January 20

A parliamentarian from India’s ruling party has accused China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of abducting a teenager from the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.

PM Modi takes jibe at China's debt-trap diplomacy
Deccan Herald, January 20

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Thursday (January 20) tacitly took a jibe at China’s predatory lending practices, underlining that India’s support to development projects in other countries was always based on needs and priorities as well as respect for the sovereignty of the recipient nations.

Chinese bridge at Pangong Tso nears completion, show satellite images
India Today, January 19

New satellite images of an under-construction bridge connecting the north and south banks of the Pangong Tso lake suggest that the speed of construction peaked during the winter.

Beijing Winter Olympics: No boycott, but no high-level political representation from India
Wion, January 15

India has previously made it clear that it will not be joining calls to boycott the Olympics in the neighboring country.

Latest China-India military talks show positive sign as both sides agree on efforts to maintain stability
Global Times, January 13

Compared with the 13th round of military meeting three months ago, which ended in tension, the friendly atmosphere this time is a good sign, even if differences remain and no concrete breakthroughs were made, Chinese experts said on Thursday (January 13).

 

News Reports

China and India in the Region

China to hold its Central Asian meet ahead of India’s summit
The Times of India, January 25

Ahead of the first India-Central Asia summit, China will virtually host its own summit with the five central Asian countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—on Tuesday (January 25) to commemorate the 30th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic ties between the two sides.

Sri Lanka hopeful of obtaining further Indian aid of USD 1.5 billion: Foreign Minister
The Economic Times, January 24

The island nation's government is rejecting the option of going for an economic bailout package from the IMF. The Cabinet is also divided on the issue of approaching the US-based global financial institution.

Iran, China and Russia hold naval drills in north Indian Ocean
Reuters, January 21

Iran, China and Russia held their third joint naval drills in the northern Indian Ocean on Friday (January 21).

New chapter in ties as Indian foreign secy meets Germany navy chief, warship ‘Bayern’ visits
The Print, January 20

With Germany identifying India as one of the key partners in its Indo-Pacific policy, a German frigate entered Indian waters for a port call in Mumbai, in a major signal to China.

China won't 'bully' neighbours over South China Sea, foreign minister says
Reuters, January 17

China will not use its strength to "bully" its smaller neighbours including the Philippines, its foreign minister said on Monday, as he highlighted the importance of settling disputes in the South China Sea peacefully.

China steps up construction along disputed Bhutan border, satellite images show
Channel News Asia, January 12

China has accelerated settlement-building along its disputed border with Bhutan, with more than 200 structures, including two-storey buildings, under construction in six locations.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

India takes on China, Vietnam in electronics manufacturing; eyes $300 billion in local production by FY26
The Times of India, January 25

India's counter-attack on China and Vietnam in manufacturing of electronics is set to get additional fire-power.

Modi says India is committed to reforms, calls for global effort on cryptocurrencies
The Straits Times, January 18

Prime Minister Narendra Modi sought to woo investors by promising that the fastest-growing economy in the world was committed to reforms, and called for a collective global effort to deal with the problems posed by cryptocurrencies.

China tops forecasts with 8.1% growth in 2021 but headwinds loom
Reuters, January 17

China’s economy rebounded in 2021 with its best growth in a decade, helped by robust exports, but there are signs that momentum is slowing on weakening consumption and a property downturn, pointing to the need for more policy support.

India’s trade with China crosses $125 billion, imports near $100 billion
The Hindu, January 15

India’s trade with China in 2021 crossed $125 billion with imports from China nearing a record $100 billion, underlining continued demand for a range of Chinese goods, particularly machinery.

Chinese investors' concerns linger though India revises policy
Global Times, January 12

Chinese industry representatives and experts said their concerns about the deteriorating business climate in India remain strong, despite reported New Delhi moves to ease curbs on foreign direct investment (FDI).

Modi’s PLI scheme to help Indian economy beat China; India to grow faster than emerging markets: World Bank
Financial Express, January 12

The World Bank said it has upgraded its expectations for India’s growth to 8.7% in FY 2022-23 “to reflect an improving investment outlook with private investment, particularly manufacturing, benefiting from the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme, and increases in infrastructure investment”.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

Beijing warns of heavy air pollution during Winter Olympics
Channel News Asia, January 24

Beijing warned Monday (January 24) that heavy air pollution is likely during the Winter Olympics, but said emergency plans were in place to ensure the Games are not disrupted by smog.

No China involvement is India’s caveat for buying power from Nepali plants
Kathmandu Post, January 20

The southern neighbour has but one concern about buying electricity—who is helping develop projects in Nepal.

China remains as reliant as ever on fossil fuels
The Straits Times, January 19

Last year, the share of coal and gas in China’s power generation was stuck at 71 per cent, the same as 2020.


Analyses

An ambitious India miscalculates Central Asia
Global Times, January 24

By Yan Jin, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Cooperation to promote peace, stability and development in Central Asia is welcome, but moves to create confrontation and stir up turmoil will definitely not be accepted by countries in the region.

India seeks to escape an Asian future led by China
Foreign Policy, January 23

By C. Raja Mohan, Visiting Research Professor, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

A flurry of trade talks herald an economic realignment toward the West.

Debate: India faces jointmanship from China and Pakistan, not two fronts
The Wire, January 20 

By David Devadas, author of The Story of Kashmir (2019) and The Generation of Rage in Kashmir (2018)

India's rulers have remained complacent even as Pakistan is heading towards becoming a satellite of China. While Vajpayee sought to unite the subcontinent, polarising divisions have become the order of the day even within the country.

Why India’s influence over South Asia will continue to weaken
Think China, January 20

By Guo Bingyun, Associate Professor, Sichuan International Studies University

India has long held dominance over South Asia, but recent developments show that the situation may be changing.

No progress in China-India military talks
Observer Research Foundation, January 16

By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST), Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

A 14th round of military talks ended with a joint statement but no real progress.

 

Books and Journals

International Relations_cover_163x243Hegemonic stability in the Indo-Pacific: US-India relations and induced balancing
International Relations, December 2021


By Jan Hornat, Head of the Department of North American Studies, Institute of International Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 

The United States has improved relations with no other country during the Trump administration as much as it advanced its relationship with India. US-India relations have arguably marked their historical high points since Trump entered office and India seems to be overcoming its suspicion of closer cooperation with the US. Given these developments, this article aims to theorize the relationship through the hegemonic stability theory and explain US strategy toward India. We first demonstrate why India is accepting the hegemonic standing of the US in the Indo-Pacific and then – since balance of power politics are still a staple of policymakers’ approach to stability in the Indo-Pacific – we introduce the notion of induced balancing to show what approach the United States has adopted to empower India to expand its balancing capacity vis-à-vis China. The last section of the article empirically maps the various incentives that Washington offers to New Delhi in order to situate it in the desired position of a proxy China-balancer.


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SCOTT, David

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INDER SINGH, Anita

INDER SINGH, Anita