Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Share

China-India Brief #180

March 25, 2021 - April 15, 2021
China-India Brief #180BRIEF #180

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
March 25, 2021 - April 15, 2021

Guest Column

After Disengagement: four possible scenarios on the India-China border
By Kyle Gardner      


CIB180_1Image credit: Flickr/Asim Kumar Chaudhuri

Tensions may be cooling along the disputed Indian-China border as the frigid Himalayan winter begins to thaw. The unprecedented extension of troop deployments into the winter months pushed India to purchase winter equipment from the US and left both sides with the prospect of an elevated year-round troop presence on a scale not seen since 1962.

In February, following the ninth round of Corp Commander-level talks, Indian and Chinese troops disengaged at Pangong Lake in eastern Ladakh. The eleventh round of talks, held on April 9, appear to be inconclusive on disengagement at the other major friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). But even assuming complete disengagement and de-escalation occurs to both sides’ satisfaction, conflict will likely return.

It is conceivable that with time, the scope and scale of this past year’s standoff will become a historical anomaly. After all, prior to the deaths of Indian and Chinese soldiers in June 2020, the border had not witnessed a conflict-related fatality since 1975. For an undemarcated border covering more than two thousand miles of sparsely populated mountain terrain, that is itself an achievement.

But the events of this past year showcased the fragility of the status quo along the poorly defined LAC, and it is unlikely that either side will soon adopt a policy of “masterly inactivity.” Relative tranquility may return to the LAC in the short term and attention may shift elsewhere. The Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan, the Korean Peninsula’s demilitarized zone (DMZ), and the South China Sea can retake their places atop the list of Asia’s tensest border zones. But there’s a notable difference between India’s two disputed borders. Apart from the approach to the Siachen Glacier, the LOC is defined. The LAC is not. The LAC is more akin to the South China Sea than to the DMZ, at least with respect to competing boundary claims.

As Dhruva Jaishankar noted in the last China-India Brief, the future implications of what transpired this past year along the border remain unclear. Here are three of the likeliest long-term scenarios, and a less likely but welcomed fourth.

The first would be a return to the “summer cycle” of the past decade: winter eases in the harsh terrain of the high Himalayas; patrolling activities increase; incursions from either side occur as patrols overlap; and occasional small skirmishes break out. Prior to last June’s fatalities, episodes of rock throwing were not uncommon along the LAC, where the prohibition of firearms has generally been adhered to. This scenario is most akin to a return to the “status quo ante” that India has called for—if not in precise territorial control than at least in the practice of patrolling it.

A second long-term scenario, which could co-exist with the first, involves a shift in focus from the western sector to the eastern sector. The western sector of Ladakh and Aksai Chin was of significant strategic importance to China in 1962. The Aksai Chin connected restive Xinjiang and Tibet, both of which have now been drawn more closely into the Chinese state, politically and infrastructurally. The Aksai Chin is otherwise resource poor, arid, and has never been permanently inhabited. By contrast, the eastern sector is more complex. Centered on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, most of which China claims as South Tibet, the eastern sector is resource rich, ethnically and religiously diverse, and spans one of Asia’s largest river systems: the Brahmaputra (known in Tibet as the Yarlung Tsangpo). Home to Tawang, the largest Tibetan Buddhist monastery outside of Lhasa, the region figures prominently in the politics surrounding the Dalai Lama, the 85-year-old Tibetan spiritual leader who has lived in exile in India since 1959. And the growing water demands of both India and China make transboundary water sharing a growing source of tension. While there have been only minor indications to suggest growing Chinese assertiveness in the eastern sector at present, given the issues at stake in the region, longer-term tensions may increase.

A third scenario would involve the broader militarization of the LAC or the failure to ever fully disengage from the current standoff. While this has a considerable risk of leading to more frequent confrontations, it could, in the long term, also produce the counterintuitive situation of a more stable de facto border. Cumulative border infrastructure—whether roads, shelters, or simple markers—could do the work of establishing a more permanent imprint on either side of the border. In the long term, this imprint could reduce the likelihood of competing claim lines.

In the short term, however, adding any infrastructure is likely to raise tensions. Analysts have pointed to India’s completion of an all-weather road as one of the triggers for Chinese aggressions last year. Simply establishing a permanent presence in this historical “no-man’s land” has been a challenge for both sides and the more possession that can be established, the more concrete the border is likely to become.

But an outlay on materiel comparable to the LOC between India and Pakistan could exacerbate budget constraints for India’s military at a time when pandemic-related fiscal stimulus measures and a deep recession have increased pressure on already constrained defense spending. A shift in focus on land borders could also divert needed funding for India’s navy. As China continues to extend commercial investments in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Central Asia, India increasingly feels encircled.

A fourth outcome is also possible. Given China’s military strength and the fearful proposition of India facing a two-front conflict with China-backed Pakistan, India has very limited military options. Alone, this asymmetry in capacity affords India relatively few options that are not basically reactive to Chinese movements. India does have diplomatic and commercial options, including the punitive economic measures India directed at Chinese direct investment and Chinese-owned mobile apps last year. But military options without broader international support are quite limited and could risk catastrophe between two nuclear-armed nations.

This power asymmetry offers China a diplomatic opportunity to generate international goodwill and dramatically improve relations with its giant South Asian neighbor. The PRC could agree to demarcate the border along the current de facto border zones, removing its claim to Arunachal Pradesh in exchange for India’s relinquishing of its claim to Aksai Chin. A gesture of that magnitude would be hard for India to ignore and would suggest to the international community that it is premature to dismiss China’s “peaceful rise.” As M. Taylor Fravel has shown, the PRC has not been averse to compromising on territorial claims. China and Bhutan recently concluded another round of talks on their own disputed border, with promises for a roadmap for accelerated resolution. A breakthrough with Bhutan, a close friend of India, might signal further willingness to compromise with India.

A diplomatic breakthrough is perhaps the least likely scenario given domestic pressures in both India and China and the posturing of two governments driven by nationalist rhetoric and the need to assert maximalist territorial claims. Though barren, uninhabited, and of limited strategic value to India, the inhospitable Aksai Chin now forms a part of India’s cartographic self-conception and will not be relinquished easily. But however implausible a diplomatic breakthrough might be, both sides should not lose sight of the long-term benefits of an equitable solution to one of the world’s major border disputes.

Dr. Kyle Gardner is a non-resident scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. His first book, The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846-1962, has just been released with Cambridge University Press.

Guest Column

Conflict Along the India-China Border: Can the Quad Make a Difference?
By Satoru Nagao      


CIB180_2Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Last year was a turning point for India-China relations. In the Galwan Valley of Ladakh in India, clashes between Chinese and Indian troops left twenty Indian and four Chinese soldiers dead and at least 76 Indian soldiers injured. These were the first fatalities along the border since 1975. Despite the majority of Chinese troops withdrawing from the Indian side in February 2021, the incident raised an important question for India: if India continues to cooperate with the US, Japan, and Australia as a member of the Quad security framework, will China increase military pressure toward it in response? And if so, should India distance itself from the Quad?

To answer that, two additional questions are relevant. If India stops its cooperation with the Quad, will China stop its incursions in the India-China border? And is the Quad beneficial for India?

Regarding the first question, when we check the number of incursions in the India-China border area and the number of Chinese activities around the Senkaku Islands in Japan, there is a similar pattern. And that pattern indicates an answer to this question. Along the India-China border, the number of China’s incursions was 213 in 2011. But after 2011, they increased to 426 in 2012, 411 in 2013, 460 in 2014, 428 in 2015, 296 in 2016, 473 in 2017, and 404 in 2018. And in 2019, the number increased drastically to 663. In the case of the Senkaku Islands, the number of Chinese vessels identified within the contiguous waters was only 12 in 2011. But after that, the number sharply increased to 428 in 2012, 819 in 2013, 729 in 2014, 707 in 2015, 752 in 2016, 696 in 2017, and 615 in 2018. And in 2019, there was an even greater jump to 1,097. Therefore, China’s activities along the India-China border show a similar pattern with China’s activities around the Senkaku Islands. In both areas, in 2012 and in 2019, China’s activities increased markedly (Figure 1). 

The Quad was active in 2007 but not between 2007 and 2017. If its cooperation was what influenced China’s assertive behaviour, then the figures should have indicated lower Chinese activity during the 2007–17 period. But that did not happen. This shows that Quad policy and China’s activities are not directly linked. Even if India were to stop its cooperation with the Quad now, it is unlikely that China would stop its incursions in the India-China border area.

Figure 1
Chinese Incursions  
Source: Compiled by author based on figures from Indian media sources and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
 
As to the related question of whether the Quad is beneficial to India, we can judge its merits from three perspectives: strategic, military, and political/economic.

First, the Quad is beneficial for India strategically because it has the potential to impose order in this region. The Quad member countries—India, Japan, Australia, and the US—are the four most influential powers in the Indo-Pacific region, with the exception of China and the ASEAN nations. In the past, Europe was the center of world politics. But the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly emerging as a far more influential region in world politics. Coalitions of influential powers in the Indo-Pacific such as the Quad are very important for creating order and stability, and India’s continued membership can play a part in that.

Second, the Quad has the potential to deter Chinese aggression in the India-China border area. For example, Quad participation can strengthen India’s defence capability around the India-China border. After the Galwan Valley incident, India and China increased their troop presence and continued to face off during a harsh winter season in the 5,000m-high mountains. The US exported not only winter combat coats to India, but it also sold military equipment, including C-17 and C-130 transport planes, AH-64 attack helicopters, M777 airlift-capable ultra-light howitzers with precision guided ammunitions, and Ch-47 transport helicopters that can operate at high altitudes like those in the India-China border. The US also exported P-8 anti-submarine patrol planes that are useful to check China’s activities in the India-China border because of their good radar. Along with this equipment, infrastructure projects also enhanced India’s defense capability. Since 2014, Japan has invested in infrastructure projects in Northeast India. Despite the projects being outside of the border areas like Arunachal Pradesh, road construction projects connect India’s mainland to the border area and allow Indian troops to enter it more easily. Japan could do more to help Indian connectivity in the future. 

Moreover, China now faces increasing pressure from the Quad’s growing military capabilities, and therefore its military must face east as much as it has to face west. Currently India, the US, Japan, and Australia are all planning to possess 1,000-2,000 km long-range strike capabilities such as cruise missiles or new long-range bombs for their fighter jets. In the last quarter of 2020, India conducted a slew of missile tests, such as the extended-range BrahMos missile, the Shaurya missile, the Nirbhay missile, and the HSTDV (which is a supersonic vehicle system for missiles with scramjet engines). If India deployed these missiles, it could attack strategic roads, tunnels, bridges, or airports in mountainous Tibet. Japan and Australia also plan to possess joint-strike missiles (JSM), joint air-to-surface standoff missiles (JASSM), and long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM). Japan plans to extend its domestic development of anti-ship missiles with a range of 1,000-2,000 km. If all the Quad countries possessed such long-range strike capabilities, China would be preoccupied with defending multiple fronts and could be discouraged from launching aggressive actions.

Third, India receives political and economic support from other Quad members. By making public statements opposing China’s acts of aggression, the other Quad members draw global attention to what is happening along the India-China border, increasing international support and legitimacy for India’s position. In March 2021, the Quad leaders held a summit for the first time, during which they agreed to set up working groups looking at areas of cooperation including vaccine production, climate change, and critical emerging technology. This indicates that the Quad is expanding its scope and that it has the potential for real strategic cooperation. 

Overall, the Quad is beneficial for India, and its membership in the alliance will not worsen the problem along the India-China border. In fact, further tensions along the border will only lead to an even greater institutionalization of defence capabilities among the Quad members.

Dr. Satoru NAGAO is a Fellow (Non-Resident) at Hudson Institute, based in Tokyo, Japan. His primary research area is US-Japan-India security cooperation. Dr. Nagao has authored numerous books and articles on security issues, and he also contributes to the column, “Age of Japan-India ‘Alliance’” at Nikkei Business, the journal of one of Japan’s leading newspapers.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.


News Reports

Bilateral relations

India-China border tensions remain high despite force pullbacks: US Intel
Business Standard, April 14

US intelligence community told Congress that Beijing seeks to use coordinated, whole-of-government tools to demonstrate its growing strength.

China changes stance, wants de-escalation before disengagement in Ladakh. India disagrees
The Print, April 13

De-escalation before disengagement could give China an advantage as it can move troops back much faster than India due to its better infrastructure.

No joint statement from latest China-India military talks indicates challenges in full disengagement: experts
Global Times, April 11

While China and India are still in communication on both military and diplomatic levels, the absence of any joint statements are signs that solving the remaining issues will be challenging for both sides.

China a ‘challenging neighbour’ for India: S Jaishankar
Livemint, March 26

He also described as "sensible" the recent agreement between the military commanders of India and Pakistan to adhere to a 2003 ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir.


News Reports

China and India in the Region

India protests U.S. Navy's transit through its exclusive economic zone
Reuters, April 10

The USS John Paul Jones “asserted navigational rights and freedoms,” inside India’s EEZ in line with international law by sailing about 130 nautical miles (241 km) west of India’s Lakshadweep islands, the U.S. Seventh Fleet said in a statement.

US lays strategy to counter China, strengthen ties with India, allies
The Times of India, April 9

The “Strategic Competition Act of 2021” seeks to boost America’s ability to out-compete China, endorses the Quad, and calls for deepening bilateral and regional partnerships, including with India.

Bangladesh looks to BRI to boost development
China Daily, April 6

A slew of China-backed infrastructure projects that are lined up or nearing completion are propping up Bangladesh's ambitious plans to transform from a least-developed country to a developing nation by 2026 and benefit others in the region.

India 'fully supports' WHO call for China to share comprehensive data on COVID origin
Livemint, April 2

India on Thursday (April 1) said that it fully supports the World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom's expectation that future collaborative studies will include more timely and comprehensive data sharing but raised concerns over China's delaying tactics and lack of access to “complete, original data and samples”.

In signal to China, U.S. raised India ties during Alaska talks
The Hindu, March 26

The reference to India was not favourably received by China and is being seen as reflecting how U.S.-India relations, only two months into the new administration, are developing robustly.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

At 13%, Economist Intelligence Unit Pegs India's Growth In 2021 Higher Than IMF
NDTV, April 13

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) pegged India's economic growth for the year 2021 at 13 per cent, higher than the growth forecast by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

China’s Growth Set to Drive World Economy in Post-Pandemic Years
Bloomberg, April 6

China will contribute more than one-fifth of the total increase in the world’s gross domestic product in the five years through 2026.

India freezes bank accounts of China's ByteDance in tax case, company mounts challenge-sources
Reuters, March 30

Indian authorities have blocked bank accounts of ByteDance in the country for alleged tax evasion.

News Reports

Energy and Environment

China's plans for Himalayan super dam stoke fears in India
Channel News Asia, April 11

China is planning a mega dam in Tibet able to produce triple the electricity generated by the Three Gorges - the world's largest power station - stoking fears among environmentalists and in neighbouring India.

US climate plan puts pressure on China, India
The Straits Times, April 10

An ambitious pledge to cut greenhouse-gas emissions under consideration by the US gives President Joe Biden more leverage when he hosts leaders for a climate change summit later this month - presenting a particular challenge to China's Xi Jinping.

India, Indonesia benefit as China's ban on Australian coal reshapes trade flows
Reuters, April 8

India and Indonesia have emerged as key beneficiaries of a Chinese ban on Australia’s coal exports which is expected to further shift global trade in the fuel used for power generation and steelmaking this year.

China reveals co-operation with EU on green investment standards
Financial Times, April 7

China’s central bank has revealed that it is co-operating with the European Union to converge green investment taxonomies across the two markets.


Analyses

India and the great power triangle of Russia, China and US
The Indian Express, April 13

By C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

Delhi has successfully managed the changing dynamics between the great powers, and is now in an even better position to do so thanks to the size of the Indian economy.

How India-China investment tension affects India's economy
China Daily, April 6

By Ahyoung Choi, Brive Consulting Market Analyst

It would be wise for India to remain open to foreign investment, not just to the United States, Japan and the members of the European Union as it is now, but also toward China.

The Quad has a plan and it’s not all about China
Channel NewsAsia, April 6

By Shruti Pandalai, Fellow, The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Countries of the Quad are moving forward in concrete cooperation that benefits the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. That is a positive direction it should continue with capacity building at its core.

Coping with changes
China Daily, April 6

By Lin Minwang, Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University.

The changing situation in the areas surrounding China spells both crises and opportunities for China.

India should not seek closer ties with US at expense of relationship with China
Global Times, April 1

By Long Xingchun, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University; and President of the Chengdu Institute of World Affairs

New Delhi has made major mistakes in its strategic judgment of Beijing, perceiving that the latter has the intention of threatening it. If India continues with this misunderstanding, it will spend a lot of economic resources on confrontation with China, which will hinder its own rise.

Putting Sino-Indian ties back on track
China Daily, March 26

By Swaran Singh, Professor and Chairman, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Recent Sino-Indian military disengagements on the border have raised hopes of India returning to its quintessential equilibrium in foreign policy. Most aptly, this "return" to equilibrium is expected to be reflected in Chinese leader's much anticipated visit to India later this year to attend the BRICS summit.

 

Books and Journals

The Rise of India and ChinaThe Rise of India and China: Social, Economic and Environmental Impacts 
Routledge, October 2020

By Kala S Sridhar, Professor at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, India; and Li Jingfeng, Assistant Researcher at the Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), and Director of the Regional and Strategic Research Office of SASS 

This book offers a comparative analysis of the rise of India and China and their decisive economic and social roles in a global context. It presents a cumulative picture of the socio-economic challenges as well as the opportunities for growth and inclusive development before India and China.

The volume analyses the performance of the two countries based on economic and human development indicators. It highlights the key achievements of the two countries in governance and financial growth, and the potential for further economic development. Drawing on government data and empirical research, the book examines India and China’s relative growth in trade, investments, renewable energy technologies, urbanisation, and employment and their policies on agriculture, land use, public health, and rural-urban inequality. Further, it discusses the shared challenges of inequality, poverty, gender disparity, and environment degradation which both countries face and contrasts their policy priorities and governance mechanisms.

Comprehensive and insightful, this book will be of great interest for researchers and scholars of development studies, economics, international relations, comparative politics, sociology, public policy, and Asian studies. It will also be useful for think tanks, policy makers, and general readers interested in the India–China relationship.

 lky-cag-logo

Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Have any feedback or comment? Email us at decb64_Y2FnQG51cy5lZHUuc2c=_decb64
Subscribe

GARDNER, Kyle

GARDNER, Kyle

NAGAO, Satoru

NAGAO, Satoru