Share

China-India Brief #179

March 14, 2021 - March 24, 2021

China-India Brief #179BRIEF #179

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
March 14, 2021 - March 24, 2021


Guest Column

Contrasting Takeaways from the India-China Boundary Crisis
By Dhruva Jaishankar      


CIB179_2_900x500Image credit: Pixabay/Arun Dubey

There is a lot that is still not publicly known about what transpired along the disputed India-China border in eastern Ladakh over the past 18 months. What is clear is that the crisis led to the worst violence between forces of the world’s two most populous countries since 1967. The future implications are also far from certain. Perceptions about recent developments vary, not just between India and China, but also within both countries. Unfortunately, this suggests that differences between India and China are likely to remain, contributing further to what had already become a more competitive relationship.

The boundary between India and China has been unsettled since 1950, when the People’s Republic of China annexed Tibet. The western sector in Ladakh was always the least-clearly demarcated portion due to the complex geography and insufficient cartography inherited from the time of the British Raj and the Qing Empire. Even after their 1962 border war, India and China held different perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with significant areas over which their competing claims overlapped. Following a series of agreements beginning in the early 1990s, the countries effectively allowed for overlapping patrols in some of these areas while normalizing their relationship along other facets. But the prerequisite for these arrangements was that certain protocols would be adhered to by both sides that limited the use of deadly force and did not alter the territorial status quo.

Despite these series of agreements between 1993 and 2013, both China and India engaged in the building of road infrastructure in the border areas to improve their own mobilization and access. China gained a first-mover advantage, which forced India to play catch-up. These developments resulted in more frequent confrontations between patrols from both sides. Indian attempts at reinforcing a road to its northern-most base at Daulat Beg Oldi in the Depsang Plains was of particular strategic significance, as it consolidated Indian positions between Chinese forces to the east and areas disputed with Pakistan to the west.

In late 2019, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) inducted new armaments – including Type 15 lightweight tanks and the 155-millimeter vehicle-mounted howitzers – in their units in western Tibet. Then, in early 2020, the global coronavirus pandemic hit. As the PLA’s routine military exercises took place in the spring, Chinese forces rapidly mobilized along at least four points on the LAC – the Galwan River Valley, Hot Springs, Gogra, and Pangong Tso (lake) – and unilaterally attempted to define the Line of Actual Control on preferred Chinese terms. By April 2020, the size of their build-up was without recent precedent and these actions changed the status quo on the ground, most significantly on the north bank of Pangong Tso. The friction points added to earlier points of contestation to the north in Depsang and to the south in Demchok.

In early May 2020, Indian troops challenged the Chinese incursion at Pangong Tso; the resulting clash led to the hospitalization of several Indian soldiers and a continued Chinese forward presence. Negotiations followed and a disengagement plan was agreed to on June 6. But disagreements about the implementation of that plan in the Galwan Valley led to violence and on June 15 the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four (and possibly more) Chinese soldiers. An impasse followed in negotiations until late August, when Indian forces in a surprise operation seized heights on the southern bank of Pangong Tso, granting India a better negotiating position. At the same time, throughout 2020, India took steps to tighten scrutiny of incoming Chinese investment, ban specific Chinese-owned apps for mobile devices (such as TikTok and PUBG), and create additional screening for Chinese companies in Indian public procurement.

As both sides continued their stand-off over the winter – with about 50,000 troops on each side – a breakthrough was finally reached at the 9th round of military discussions in January 2021. A verifiable disengagement plan was agreed, and initiated at Pangong Tso, with phased disengagement to follow at other points. This is to be followed by de-escalation – the thinning out of troops on both sides – although that process is expected to take much longer.

Despite the beginnings of disengagement, the situation on the ground has not yet reverted to pre-April 2020 normalcy. Both militaries remain present, armed, and reinforced in the vicinity of Ladakh. Furthermore, there are still differing Chinese and Indian views about the road forward. Chinese officials have indicated a link between disengagement on the border and a return to normal economic and political relations. India has essentially signaled a different view in its official statements: that a return to normal economic relations is predicated upon disengagement, de-escalation, and peace and tranquility on the border, which was both the objective and basis for the agreements between 1993 and 2013.  Given that a return to even a modicum of trust on the border will take time, the lifting of Indian restrictions on Chinese investment, technology, and suppliers is unlikely to be swift or sweeping.

Meanwhile, Chinese analyses of the disengagement process continue to suffer from some shortcomings. Because it is impossible for Chinese commentators to publicly accept the role of China as aggressor, they have suggested that Indian concerns about a Biden administration or its domestic challenges forced it to withdraw from its points of advantage. There is no evidence to suggest such a cause and effect. This inability– at least publicly – to examine the reasons for the deterioration in China-India ties suggest that many lessons from this episode may go unlearned.

While the fact that China and India have agreed to, and have begun to implement, a disengagement plan, is obviously welcome news, the 2020-21 border crisis will have long-term effects for relations between the two countries. In India, it has negatively affected public opinion, which already expressed a critical view of China. Trust built up over two decades on the management of the border has evaporated. India has made it clear that there will be implications for the larger relationship, including economic ties. Meanwhile, Chinese analysts and commentators appear not to have appreciated the effects of Beijing’s build-up, and continue to lay the blame at New Delhi’s doorstep. Despite superficial attempts at reverting to normalcy, these consequences suggest a longer-term chill in relations between the world’s two most populous countries.


Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director of Observer Research Foundation (ORF) America in Washington, D.C.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

Next round of India-China talks looks positive on Gogra-Hot Springs
Hindustan Times, March 22

The 11th round of India-China military dialogue to be held this month is expected to record forward movement in disengagement of armies in the Gogra-Hot Springs area of East Ladakh.

China eases visa rules for Indians who take its COVID-19 vaccine, but India has no Chinese jab
India Today, March 17

Following other Chinese missions, the Chinese embassy in India on Monday said it will “facilitate” travel for Indians who have been inoculated with Chinese COVID-19 vaccines. However, no 'Made in China' vaccine is available in India so far.

India Building Critical Road Along Border With China in Ladakh: Home Ministry
The Wire, March 16

The home ministry, which oversees the border infrastructure, told a parliamentary panel that the government had spent a total of Rs 2,156.09 crore in fiscal 2019-20 on border projects.

Connectivity achieved on 59 roads along India-China border — Rajnath Singh in Rajya Sabha
The Print, March 15

Singh said 10 border roads are targeted to be completed by this month while work on seven roads is expected to be over by March 2022 and another two by 2023.

News Reports

China and India in the Region

Sri Lanka signs three-year $1.5 billion currency swap deal with China
Business Standard, March 23

The deal is aims to promote trade and investment between the two countries..

Missiles, vaccines and China bring the Philippines and India closer
South China Morning Post, March 22

Manila this month signed a deal to buy the world’s fastest cruise missile from New Delhi, while it could also secure up to 38 million doses of COVID-19 inoculations made in India.

Biden administration signals India is an important partner in tackling China
CNBC, March 22

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh over the weekend on his first foreign trip in the role as the two sides concluded talks on defense cooperation.

India, Pak, China to participate in SCO joint anti-terrorism exercise this year
India Today, March 22

India, Pakistan, China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will hold a joint anti-terrorism exercise this year, the eight-member bloc said.

Vaccine tensions loom in Asia as China and India trade free shots for influence
The Guardian, March 21

India and China have given away vaccine for diplomatic reasons. Now there’s pressure to save supply for their own people.

News Reports

Trade and Economy

Adopting protectionist measures to counter China threat a 'self-defeating' strategy: Report
The Economic Times, March 23

The report by the Pune International Centre (PIC) argues for certain restrictions to be put in place like limiting state-controlled Chinese companies from taking a controlling stake in sensitive infra assets in India, staying clear of Chinese technological standards and blocking surveillance of Indian people and entities by Chinese entities.

In the pandemic, India’s middle class shrinks and poverty spreads while China sees smaller changes
Pew Research Center, March 18

While India plunged into a deep recession in 2020, China was able to forestall a contraction.

India’s imports from China at $58.71 billion post Galwan, says government
The Times of India, March 17

China remains on top of the list of countries where India imported goods during January to December of 2020.

China delivers on threats to rein in internet economy
Reuters, March 18

Beijing is making good on its threats to clamp down on the sprawling “platform economy”, with President Xi Jinping weighing in on the need to rein in behemoths that play a dominant role in the country’s consumer sector.

India fourth largest forex holder in world, exceeds Russia
Business Times, March 15

India pulled ahead as Russian holdings declined at a faster rate in recent weeks as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) continues to hoard dollars to cushion the economy against any sudden outflows.

News Reports

Energy and Environment

India carrying out uranium exploration in Arunachal Pradesh
Hindustan Times, March 20

Uranium exploration has been taken up in Arunachal Pradesh by the Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research, a senior official has said.

China's share of new wind power tops 90% of region's total in 2020
Nikkei Asia, March 18

Asia-Pacific leads world as Beijing pushes to meet zero carbon goal.

22 of world’s 30 most polluted cities in India, Delhi tops capitals list, says report
The Print, March 16

Prepared by Swiss organisation IQAir, the report shows that Delhi's air quality improved by approximately 15% from 2019 to 2020, but is the world's 10th most polluted city.

World's three biggest coal users - US, China, India - get ready to burn even more
The Straits Times, March 16

The world's three biggest consumers of coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel, are getting ready to boost usage so much that it'll almost be as if the pandemic-induced drop in emissions never happened.

Flights cancelled as Beijing chokes in worst standstorm in a decade
Channel News Asia, March 15

The Chinese capital Beijing was shrouded in thick brown dust on Monday (March 15) as a result of heavy winds blowing in from the Gobi desert and parts of northwestern China, in what the meteorological agency has called the biggest sandstorm in a decade.

Analyses

India must be smart in supporting Myanmar, if Quad won’t measure up
The Print, March 23

By Lt General Prakash Menon, Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore, and former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat

Gaining overland access to Indian Ocean through Myanmar is crucial for China’s geostrategic designs. Which means India can’t protest against coup too loudly.

What the Quad misses about India is that it wants to follow China
Nikkei Asia, March 21

By Rupa Subramanya, Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

The one thing most Indians agree on is Beijing-style authoritarianism.

Is China too big to tame? No easy answers to Quad’s central challenge
Channel News Asia, March 18

By Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State University

Countries must confront the dilemma at the heart of the Quad: How to engage China positively while countering its assertive moves.

India, by pivoting to Quad, will ruin its industrial chain
Global Times, March 18

By Dai Yonghong, Director, Institute of Bay of Bengal Studies, Shenzhen University

After a year of confrontation, it is clear that cooperation is the only possible way for India to eke out consistent economic growths.

China’s Neighbors Are Stronger Than We Think
Foreign Policy, March 18

By Salvatore Babones, Associate Professor, University of Sydney

All across the Indo-Pacific arc, countries are beefing up their defenses.

What’s behind India’s generous vaccine diplomacy?
Channel News Asia, March 15

By Shashi Tharoor, former UN under-secretary-general, former Indian Minister of State for External Affairs and Minister of State for Human Resource Development, and is an MP for the Indian National Congress

At a time when most richer countries are criticized for hoarding vaccine doses, India stands out for having sent 33 million to poorer countries, with millions more in the pipeline.

Books and Journals

International Politics

Modi’s India and Japan: nested strategic partnerships 
International Politics, February 2021


By Rajesh Basrur, Senior Fellow, South Asia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, Leverhulme Doctoral Fellow, King’s College London. 

The three pillars of India’s foreign policy strategy under an overarching preference for ‘strategic autonomy’ are security, economic development, and status. Japan plays a significant part with respect to all three. We employ an analytical framework that assesses how Narendra Modi, in line with a trend set in motion by his predecessors, has attempted to build the India–Japan partnership through a set of nested strategic partnerships: bilateral (India–Japan), trilateral (India–Japan–United States) and quadrilateral (India–Japan–United States–Australia). We examine the extent to which Modi has contributed to the strengthening of each of these partnerships with respect to institutionalisation, security, economic interaction and status. Our findings show the degree of continuity or change wrought by Modi in each case and the reasons for this. We conclude that Modi’s transformative impact has been limited, though he has been able to take two of the three strategic partnerships forward to a significant extent.

 


 

 lky-cag-logo

 

Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

 

Have any feedback or comment? Email us at decb64_Y2FnQG51cy5lZHUuc2c=_decb64
Subscribe

JAISHANKAR, Dhruva

JAISHANKAR, Dhruva