David Austin: There was a lot of media attention when a Pew Research Center study came out in late 2020 saying that 61 percent of citizens in 14 major economies held unfavourable views of China. And especially that public opinion of China in the United States was historically negative.
But what about public opinion inside China? How did Chinese citizens view these same 14 countries? That's exactly what our guests found out. Their survey, which also got a lot of media attention, revealed that the negative feelings are largely mutual. Particularly Chinese views of the US, which 77 percent responded was "very unfavourable" or "somewhat unfavourable".
The survey was authored by Songying Fang, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rice University, Adam Liu, Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy who are both with us now, and Xiaojun Li, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, who was unfortunately unable to join us.
David Austin: Whose idea was it to perform the survey?
Songying Fang: We are co-authors and friends at the same time for many years. So there are three authors of this short survey - myself, Adam, and there's another author, Xiaojun Li, who is a Professor at the University of British Columbia in Canada. So we kind of always talk about international politics and related matters. So, when the election, the US election was approaching, we were thinking about doing public opinion survey, taking advantage of the fact that there will be a "before and after election."
So we came to this idea that the Pew survey, which received really a lot of attention worldwide might be a good idea, to sort of, to some extent, ride on, but providing the other half of the picture.
David Austin: The Pew study showed that the view of China by Americans had really dropped significantly. What was your reaction when you first saw that Pew study?
Adam Liu: Well one of the things that I thought was that, you know, given the political climate around China's relationship [with western countries], I thought it was just natural that there would be some sort of deterioration of the perceptions of Americans'[views] vis-a-vis China. And in particular, I think since March or so in 2020, when the United States started to really bombard China for its lack of transparency in the handling of the COVID-19 crisis, I think, you know, gosh, this has got to be worse down the road and also given the media portrayal of what was going on in China, I mean, the American media portrayal [of what] was going on in China.
I think, you know, what we saw from the Pew survey was just a natural sort of a combination of all these factors combined.
Songying Fang: Yeah, I agree with that. I wasn't really surprised by what I was seeing. If you follow the news, if the result is different, you'll actually be surprised. You'll be surprised why the public has a totally different take on these things than what the media is reporting. So in that sense, I wasn't surprised at all.
At the same time I was thinking, I bet if you do a survey of the Chinese side, something similar, maybe occurring at the same time. So the hardening of positions at the public level probably is going to be happening simultaneously. What we didn't have a lot of expectation about is what the views are going to be like for the rest of the Western countries.
David Austin: Well then let's get straight to your study, the survey that you did, the headline is that, "The United States topped the list of 'Very Unfavourable'", with 47% saying they had a very unfavourable view of the United States. What was your first reaction when you got the results of the survey?
Songying Fang: On the one hand, I was not surprised, but I was surprised by people's reactions, though. Our article was shared on social media pretty widely, I mean, certainly more than our average typical academic publication. So in that sense, you know, we were pleasantly surprised, but the reactions were that people were surprised that the negative level was this high.
But if you were following Chinese social media, this should not come as a big surprise. So we were not terribly surprised, but the reactions were a lot [of surprise]. There was a lot of surprise and there were also people who commented that the negativity level is even higher than Japan, because the general understanding is that the Chinese public has more negative view about Japan because of historical legacies, than other Western countries.
So we were, or at least I was, surprised by the reactions, which was interesting for us. And it was a learning experience as well.
David Austin: And Adam, how about you?
Adam Liu: Yes. So I think the result of the survey itself wasn't as surprising, but we - I, myself - was pretty fond of looking at the comments and all the retweets [of] what people were saying about our survey results and as exactly as Prof. Fang just mentioned, one of the things that people bring up all the time is that "Good job, United States," the US even beat Japan in terms of you know, this negativity ranking. And some other kinds of some other comments also bring up issues like how come countries like Sweden, or some other countries that the Chinese government sort of criticized in the past didn't get such negative views.
So this means it goes against the sort of stereotype that Chinese public opinion is entirely shaped by the Chinese media. So there's actually tremendous variation in terms of Chinese views vis a vis other countries. And what, you know, what are the determinants of change of public opinion on these countries is still not entirely well known yet.
David Austin: You mentioned the media and media perceptions. Did it add anything substantive to that headline media story of US versus China, or did it just kind of amplify the overall story that, okay, these are the two big boys on the block that are going to be fighting for the foreseeable future?
Songying Fang: From our perspective, the story is fuller than just [the] US and China, because, unless you see the West as one block and as a unitary actor, [there's] the fact that there's a huge variation in Chinese perception of the West and some surprising findings. Like, Sweden has had trouble with China, two years ago I believe, so it received a lot of negative publicity in the Chinese social media, because of tourist issues or something like that. But they didn't come out especially bad compared with other countries such as Denmark and Holland.
So it was interesting, sort of learning for us to understand what the situation is in terms of public perceptions. So I think from the Chinese perspective, the idea of the West is not necessarily one big block and a unitary actor. From the reaction of the American readers, it seems that they were more interested in sort of how this reflects on US and China relationship.
Another point I want to make is that - you mentioned media. I think if it's domestic politics, the public or ordinary people, they're able to relate news with their daily experiences. So a lot of times you will see that people are more critical or sceptical of media report about domestic affairs, because they have basis to compare their own circumstances with what's being reported.
But I think when it comes to reports about foreign countries, they don't necessarily have a lot of basis to compare with. So it's more likely that media is going to have a bigger influence on public perceptions of other countries. And that can be good and bad.
David Austin: That's really interesting. After you saw these results, did you look back at like recent media reports and try to make any correlations or links between specific news stories or specific reporting?
Adam Liu: No, we haven't done that sort of correlational study in terms of what kind of news is driving the results. But one of the things we just did and it's still an ongoing process, is that we did a follow up survey, We haven't really, you know, cleaned up the data and really systematically looked at the data yet.
So this was done roughly one week after Joe Biden took office. So basically this is the Biden presidency already. The number of, "I don't know," kind of answers really increased quite a bit for the second survey. We haven't really looked, again, we haven't really examined the data carefully yet, but let me give you just one example. For example, in the first wave, roughly 77% of the Chinese hold very unfavourable views of the United States and that figure so far, for the 900 plus respondents we got back is 68%. So this is roughly a 10% drop. So where did that 10% go? So in the first survey, you know, roughly 2% of the Chinese say, "I don't know how to evaluate the United States," but in the second wave, 10% of the Chinese respondents say, "I'm not sure as to how I should evaluate the United States at the moment." And I don't think that the Chinese media's portrayal of the United States has really changed dramatically. So again, this tells us a lot about how people actually form their opinion about other countries. That's something that we should really look into in future research.
Songying Fang: So I just want to add a little bit, so it, the combination of "Very unfavourable" and "Somewhat unfavourable", that's the 77%.
Adam Liu: Right, right, right.
Songying Fang: So, in our first survey, that's 47% is "Very unfavourable," but, "Somewhat unfavourable" was 30%. So combined was 77%.
David Austin: [For] the follow-up survey, are you asking the exact same questions as the first one?
Adam Liu: Yes, everything is identical.
David Austin: And then were there other questions on the survey, the first survey, besides the attention-getting unfavourable question. Were there any other questions or parts of the survey that you found interesting, or would like to share?
Adam Liu: Yes. So basically for example, we asked about "Do you think the United States has a huge impact on the Chinese economy? If you think so, what kind of impact negative positive? Who do you think is the biggest economy in the world?" And this one [is] sort of interesting. "Do you have confidence in the US president making the right decisions for the world?" So these are the questions. "Do you believe the American government respects the freedom of the American people?" And so on, so forth. So we have about a bunch of questions on those.
David Austin: Those are all really interesting. Can you share some results for any of those? I know you might still be sorting through the data, but can you, is there anything that you can share?
Adam Liu: Yeah. So for example, the last thing I just mentioned is that, you know, the more relevant to the discussion today is that "Compared to 10 years ago, how do you value the role of the United States and the world?" And roughly, and pretty consistently across the two waves, 70% of the Chinese believe that the United States is no longer that important in world politics, in the world.
And maybe just give you one other example. "Do you have confidence in the American president making the right decisions in world affairs?" For the first wave, the total number of people who say that they have "Absolutely no confidence" or "Relatively no confidence" is 74%. That's end of the Trump administration. But for the second wave, people who don't have confidence in the American president, which is the Biden administration, is 63%.
So we are seeing somewhat a change going on, but again, we're not drawing definitive conclusions on those questions yet.
David Austin: And what about the question about who has the bigger economy or which economy is the biggest in the world? What were some of those responses?
Adam Liu: That one is actually very interesting and surprised us because I think by all measures, the United States still has the largest economy in the world. That's a fact (except for using PPP as measurement). But, in the first wave, 52% [of] Chinese believe that China has the biggest economy in the world. And in the second wave again, 50, roughly 51% of Chinese believe that the Chinese economy is the biggest in the world. That's just the data.
David Austin: And Professor Fang, was there anything from the first wave of questions that you've also found interesting that you'd like to share?
Songying Fang: I just want to mention, previously, you asked if this result is a result of media influence, whether there is an evolution of, this percentage? We cannot compare with any study that we have done before, but in our first article, we did mention reports or surveys done by a think tank in 2019.
So assuming that we're both doing our sampling correctly there is some comparison. There's a jump of over 50% of "Somewhat/ Very unfavourable" views of the United States, within [a] short time, within a year.
David Austin: Professor Fang, I'm curious, since you're based there in Houston, Texas, do you have any personal views or any particular point of view or perspective that you can share from seeing these, but being based in the United States?
Songying Fang: I think that it's very important to study public opinion in both countries. And a lot of times we think that, because of [the] Chinese political system, that public opinion doesn't matter. But anybody who studies China politics knows that, at least since the internet age, Chinese internet users are very active online and express their point of views.
And the government reacts to that. So that's the first point that we want to make about Chinese public opinion and public opinion in general.
The second point is - so think about a leader's incentive. In today's world, if a leader says something publicly, they're potentially having two audiences, domestic audiences and international audiences. And it's very difficult for leaders to try to speak to just one audience, but at the same time, depending on what their domestic needs are, sometimes they do speak in certain ways to address their domestic audiences, but it will be heard by other countries as well and [they] make inferences based on that. So there is a problem for leaders of two audiences in today's world, whenever they speak publicly. Now, between those two, sometimes you want to send sort of more of a conciliatory message to your international audiences, but domestically, you need a, perhaps more hard-line, message. So they are not perfectly aligned. The question here is then: when faced with these choices, what do leaders focus on?
We tend to think that, for leaders, they have to survive domestically first, before they implement any of their international agenda or national interest policies. So in that sense, again, public opinion is very important because leaders are going to first and foremost satisfy their domestic public opinion to stay in power.
David Austin: Do you think that the Western world is ignoring Chinese public opinion, to a certain degree?
Songying Fang: I think that's probably a fair assessment. There hasn't been sufficient analysis of Chinese public opinion, I think, in part because of this perception that Chinese public opinion doesn't matter in China's foreign policy. But I think that, you know, going back to my argument earlier, as Chinese leaders, there's a question of whether or not you want to respond to public sentiment, at least those in public forum.
And it seems like on the issues such as trade, where there is no conflict between what government wants to do, which is more trade relations with other countries, and the public perception that international trade has improved their economic circumstances, it's easy to do, it's a low cost issue where the government can respond to [the] public.
Adam Liu: I think Prof. Fang is entirely correct in saying that I think there's a very entrenched perception, even among some of the academics in the West, that Chinese public opinion doesn't matter. But we do have quite a few scholarly research on this question that shows that Chinese public opinion matters, and it matters hugely - the Chinese leadership monitor what the Chinese people are thinking of themselves as well as other countries. So I'm not really into the sort of scholarly literature on this, but I think you are right, David, in saying that there's still a lack of research and lack of taking Chinese public opinion seriously among many academics in the West.
David Austin: What questions do you still have? What would you still want to know? If budget was not an issue and you could continue doing this research just based on your curiosity, what would be the next big questions you would want to find out?
Songying Fang: I would say probably just follow public opinion, much like Pew has been doing. One of the rationales that Chinese public opinion has not been taken as seriously as those public opinion in the United States and the West in general is because the idea that the state media has a dominant influence on public opinion.
But as our research suggests, they're not perfect correspondents. And the government is constrained in the following sense, that if there's a very negative perception toward a certain country or on certain issues, the government, if it tries really hard to make a totally different argument, the public would not buy it.
So the government is constrained. So because of its dominant presence in the media, it does have a lot of power, but it doesn't mean that they have the unlimited ability to shape public opinion, which often is the perception in the West.
David Austin: Yeah, that's very interesting point. Because the second survey has shown that at least to a certain degree, the Chinese public sentiment is a little less sure of their opinion of the United States right now after the election and the Biden administration taking place. Do you think there's an opportunity for the Biden administration to improve the United States' image with the Chinese people?
Songying Fang: I have no question about that. It's very interesting, just within two months, that level of uncertainty went from 2% to 10%. So the public, find it useful to, at least, withhold their judgment even, at the new beginning. So that really suggests that the public is thinking, they're not unthinking, checking boxes, when they respond to our questions. Now, we did design our questions to be so simple and straightforward much like Pew survey did.
That's how you can get less ambiguous and more truthful response from the public. So that's one good sign for us, both for the purposes of the substantive question you ask, and for the purpose of knowing that our respondents actually think and answer our questions. The second point I want to make is that the Chinese perception of the US was very favourable. It started from a very favourable position in 2019, and before.
There are 300,000 Chinese students studying in the US. There are a lot of tourists. There are just numerous connections at [the] public level. So it started from a very positive note. So the question is: this one year change, does it have a staying power or [is this] something that can be reverted?
David Austin: Is there anything else that each of you wanted to mention before we go, anything that you wished that I'd asked you?
Songying Fang: One of the reasons that the study of public perceptions are very important fundamentally - say suppose the US and China, they go about their separate spheres. They, close down toward each other. Individuals' lives may be affected a little bit. But when you think about climate change, think about pandemic, these sorts of issues, where countries cannot deal with [these] individually. This is when public opinion and people's willingness to look at others, publics in other countries, its people, similar to them, become important, because there are issues that require cooperation as opposed to, you know, "I can live my life without you", that straightforwardly. Yeah.
David Austin:Very good. Well, I think that's a good place to leave it right there
Songying Fang: Thank you. Thank you very much for the interview.
(Photo credit: 褚天成)