Intro: Hello and welcome to the latest episode of the Foreseeable Podcast series. I'm Zubaidah Nazeer from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and host for today's conversation. South Korea is currently navigating a significant political crisis marked by the unfolding drama surrounding the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol.
A situation some former Presidents have faced, this upheaval raises questions about systemic issues within South Korean politics, and has significant implications for the nation's immediate future, particularly with a snap Presidential election in South Korea called for the 3rd of June. Korea watchers are anticipating policy shifts both domestically, constitutionally, and in foreign policy.
But stay till the end as we explore how South Korea is grappling with the ongoing trade war sparked by US President Donald Trump's Liberation Day tariffs in a time when it is facing a leadership vacuum of sorts, as the acting President takes helm before the elections in June. Here with me today is Yongwook Ryu, an Assistant Professor at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
He specialises in international relations with a focus on East Asia, including foreign policies of China, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN, as well as broad regional and global issues. He is a native of South Korea and speaks Korean. Japanese, and Mandarin. Welcome, Professor.
Yongwook Ryu: Okay, thank you for your invitation.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Perhaps I'd kick this off. Could you begin by providing our listeners with a brief summary of the recent political crisis in South Korea?
Yongwook Ryu: So, there were a whole lot of events that took place, but let me just give you the gist of these events. So, on 3rd of December last year, around 10:30pm at night, the former President now, Yoon, declared martial law in a televised speech, which surprised everybody. And in about less than 10 minutes, soldiers were seen entering the National Election Commission. Around 12:07am the next morning, soldiers were dispatched to the National Assembly, and around 1:00am, legislators managed to gather at the National Assembly to pass a motion to repeal the martial law.
And at 4:30am, President Yoon appeared in another televised speech, lifting martial law. So that's the whole lot of events that took place. And what ensued afterwards was a political contestation between the national assembly, controlled by the opposition party, as well as President Yoon.
So 14 December last year, the opposition parties managed to pass an impeachment motion with 204 votes in favour out of 300. So, in order to impeach the President in South Korea, you need a two-third majority in the Legislature, and the opposition managed to get over that two-third majority.
So, the impeachment motion was passed on 14 December, and we had a whole series of legal proceedings relating to the President's impeachment, which came to an end on 4th of April this month when the Constitutional court decided to uphold Yoon’s impeachment. And since then, Yoon's criminal proceedings have taken place and are currently underway now that he's stripped of his Presidential legal immunity.
So these criminal charges were brought against former President Yoon. But this is only related to President Yoon. There are actually a whole lot of impeachment cases that the opposition parties brought against the high-ranking officials under Yoon's administration. Just to name a few, the Defense Minister, the acting President, the Premier Han Duck-soo, the Minister of Law, the Minister of Interior and Safety, and several others in Yoon's administration were all impeached.
Now so far, the score at the constitutional court is that Yoon’s impeachment was upheld. The impeachment against all these other high-ranking officials were rejected by the constitutional court. So that's the whole series of events that took place in recent months.
Zubaidah Nazeer: So, you know, you've elaborated on quite a bit there and it's fascinating to see this drama unfold. I'm just going to quickly ask a very quick follow-up here. Is this the most dramatic of all the former Presidents' downfall or have there been others? How would you rank this one?
Yongwook Ryu: Yeah. You know, the political contestation and polarisation is nothing new in South Korean politics. I think the manifestation of this underlying contestation and polarisation has never been as clear and as dramatic as what we've seen in the last few months. Because Yoon’s declaration of martial law is something that no one really expected, including his own supporters.
And it was televised to everybody. So I would say the manifestation has been very dramatic, although the underlying cause has always been there and building up, boiling up, leading to the current saga of impeachment and martial law.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Could you elaborate on the primary causes and key events of this situation?
Yongwook Ryu: Right. Here, I think we can divide it into immediate causes and deeper causes. The immediate causes I think there are two issues here. One is Yoon's ruling party losing the legislative election in April last year, which gave a very handsome victory to the opposition party.
So the Legislature came under the control of the opposition party, which sought to use its control in the Legislature to block any major policy initiatives coming from the Yoon administration, as well as to impeach some of the key officials in Yoon's administration.
The other immediate cause has to do with in-house fighting within the Conservatives. So, before the legislative election in April last year, President Yoon appointed his number two guy to lead the ruling party. And this number two guy was the former Minister of Law, quite popular among the Conservatives when he took over the leadership of the ruling party.
But the moment that he took over the leadership of the ruling party, there was immediately a dispute between the President and this number two guy. So, the Conservatives went into this legislative election with a divided house, with much in-house fighting, and their fallout led to divided conservative votes and handed an easy victory to the opposition.
So these are the immediate causes that led to intensification of conflict between the Legislature and the Executive. Because the Legislature came under the opposition's control.
I think the deeper cause has to do with the intensification of political polarisation in South Korean politics between the Conservatives and the Progressives in recent years. And this in turn stems from conflicting political identities of these two major political groups, the Conservatives and the Progressives, each seeing the other as being an illegitimate political force in South Korea. This is also based on their differing understanding of key historical events that are crucial to the formation of modern post-independence, Korean national identity.
Let me just give you one example here. So, for example, you take the Korean War, which you can regard as a proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union, which took place on the Korean Peninsula between South Korea and North Korea. And on this key historical event, the historical understanding between the Conservatives and Progressives differ quite a bit.
So, Progressives look at the Korean War as a proxy war by great powers, and without US intervention, the two Koreas would've been unified. Of course, probably under the communist political system, but still South Korea and North Korea would've been unified had there not been external intervention. And this kind of historical perspective is based on their clinging attachment to ethnic Korean nationalism, based on shared blood and ethnicity.
The Conservatives take a very different historical interpretation. They look at the Korean War as being a North Korean communist military invasion, and the US came to rescue South Korean democracy and the system, and therefore, this feeds into their support for the alliance with the United States.
So since these two groups have very different interpretations of that key historic event, which go to the core of their political identities, they don't see each other eye to eye. They think that whatever the other is trying to do is weakening the quality and the future development of South Korea.
And, you know, of course they will clash across multiple political issues when they have these different historical perspectives.
Zubaidah Nazeer: And these opposite spectrums have been existing in such a tension over the years, really.
Yongwook Ryu: Yes. So, this tension has always been underneath the surface of South Korean politics.
You know, I mentioned that this was boiling up, leading up to the declaration of martial law. I'll give you concrete evidence for this. So, under the previous presidencies, there was some contestation and conflict between the Legislature and the Executive. When the former progressive President, Roh Moo-hyun, was in charge, there were four impeachment initiatives in the Legislature and one actual impeachment. And that impeachment was actually against that progressive President. When we had a Conservative President, Lee Myung-bak, there was only one impeachment initiative in the Legislature.
When Park Geun-hye was the President, there were two impeachment initiatives, one actual impeachment, which was against Madame Park, and that impeachment was successfully upheld at the Constitutional Court. And then in the last administration, the Progressive President, Moon Jae-in, there were six impeachment attempts against Moon's administrators, and one actual impeachment, which was brought against one judge.
Now, fast forward under President Yoon's presidency, we've had 29 impeachment initiatives made by the opposition party in the Legislature and 13 actual impeachment cases.
Now, this number is greater than the total number of impeachment initiatives and actual impeachment under the previous four administrations. So this, you know, this is all showing the political polarisation and contestation boiling up and actually spilling into actual actions during Yoon's presidency.
Zubaidah Nazeer: And this is an astounding number, but it also brings us to the next thing which I would like to get your perspective on. You know, when it comes to declaring martial law, what might have motivated President Yoon to take such a drastic and ultimately unsuccessful step?
Yongwook Ryu: From Yoon's perspective, he may have felt that he could not run his government properly with the opposition party threatening and initiating a series of impeachment against high-ranking officials in his administration, and blocking major policy initiatives including the annual budget.
Now, here, I think there's some constitutional issue that needs to be addressed in the future. So, in the current South Korean legal system, if a high-ranking official is impeached, he or she immediately stops functioning until the constitutional court makes a ruling. That means with a simple majority, which is all you need to impeach high-ranking officials other than the President himself, the opposition party that controls a simple majority in the Legislature can bring any high-ranking official in the Executive, impeach those officials, thereby stifling the functioning of administration, and this has to be addressed. But from President Yoon's perspective, he may have felt that he could not run his government properly.
In addition, he genuinely believed that without any concrete evidence that the elections in South Korea have been rigged by the collaborative effort between the opposition party; and this is the astounding part, the Chinese Communist Party. And he publicly mentioned this a couple of times. Foreign interference. So, it is a conspiracy theory that has been quite popular among the conservative supporters in recent years, but the Progressives were actually the first ones to start this conspiracy theory about a decade ago. So, what happened in South Korean politics is, whenever they lost the major elections, such as the President's election, the losing side came up with this conspiracy theory.
So, the opposition, the Progressives, were the first ones to start this conspiracy theory about electoral fraud. Now, this has taken its hold among the Conservatives. Given Yoon's political power and influence was waning with the opposition stifling the functioning of his government. And based on this belief that the elections were rigged in South Korea, Yoon probably felt that emergency martial law was a necessary way to reverse his waning political fortunes to place the National Assembly under control and to investigate into the workings of the Central Election Commission. Now, the problem is that whatever the opposition did to the Executive, to the President, was legally permissible.
So all these impeachments against Yoon's high-ranking officials, were all legally permissible activities that the opposition could do within the Legislature, just like Yoon's exercise of feudal power. So, Yoon actually exercised a lot of feudal power during his presidency that's also legally permissible.
And of course, this is political polarisation and conflict between the Executive and the Legislature that I mentioned.
All this is within the bounds of normal politics. However, the reasons Yoon had in mind for justifying his emergency martial law have no place in law, and hence, Yoon's declaration of martial law violated the constitution and the law.
Right now, I think in hindsight, it's quite puzzling to me why Yoon had to opt for this extreme measure because Yoon's political situation would have improved significantly had he waited for maybe three or four extra months. The opposition party leader would've faced his own criminal cases.
There’s actually a number of criminal cases brought against the current opposition party leader. His number two guy, with whom Yoon fell out of cooperation, was losing his popularity among the Conservatives. And also in April this year, Yoon gets to appoint two judges on the constitutional court as part of his Presidential power.
So his political fortune would have improved significantly had he waited maybe three or four months.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Why do you think he didn't wait?
Yongwook Ryu: That's a difficult question to answer. I think the main reason is his wife, the First Lady, who has always been quite controversial ever since Yoon became President. Some people even think that it's she who's calling the shots behind the scenes.
And she was coming under a lot of political and legal pressure and therefore, Yoon, in order to protect his loved one, used this extreme measure to try to reverse his political fortune.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Okay. It's interesting to note that because you know, it's not just in Korean politics that we hear of those critics accusing the first ladies of meddling with the husbands’ political decisions.
Yongwook Ryu: Of course, you know, Yoon and his First Lady, they're in the same boat. So, whatever the First Lady did wrong, legally or politically, would have implicated President Yoon himself. So, you know, it's not saving his wife, it's actually saving himself as well.
Another tabloid story that I can tell you is, President Yoon is known for drinking habits. So, apparently, every dinner he drinks alcohol. And at what time was the martial law declared? 10:30pm. That's after dinner. So, this tabloid analysis is: Yoon drank at dinner that fateful evening, and he got emotional, worked up, and didn't think straight. He decided to go for this extreme measure as a one-stop solution to reverse everything.
His waning political influence, the legal and political problems involving him and his wife, and to deal with this conspiracy theory that was gaining popularity among the conservative supporters who are the core of his political power base.
So that's another tabloid analysis. I think what happened was, in my opinion, he didn't think straight, and he probably thought that in the wrong way, fundamentally, that he needed to do this in order to save the country from what he perceived to be increasing the opposition's influence in Korean politics.
And he perceived the opposition groups to be a den of criminals. And this is the exact phrase that he used in his justification speech for the martial law. And, and the way he saw the Korean politics moving is, it's getting closer to the communist groups, whether in North Korea or in China.
Now, I don't necessarily agree with Yoon's perspective, but this is how he probably perceived the Korean political situation. And therefore, the Korean martial law is his way of saving the country.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Very fascinating. There is a parallel between President Yoon's potential fate and that of his predecessors, Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak, who were also subject to legal proceedings. Could you discuss the significance of this pattern in South Korean political history?
Does it indicate a systemic issue within the Presidency or merely the broader political culture?
Yongwook Ryu: The Presidents that you just mentioned were all conservative Presidents. However, the progressive Presidents would have received similar legal consequences, maybe ending up in prison after they stepped down.
However, former progressive President Roh Moo-hyun committed suicide while facing criminal investigations after he stepped down from the Presidency, and another progressive President, Kim Dae-jung, died naturally before he faced criminal investigations. So, given that basically all South Korean Presidents would have faced or did face criminal investigations and proceedings after they stepped down from the office of Presidency, it's quite unfortunate, and reflects the immaturity of South Korean politics as well as the intense conflict of political identities between the Conservatives and Progressives.
So hence, whenever there is a power shift from one side to the other, whoever takes political power wants to use that political power to engage in political purge and crush the other group so that they can maintain their political power. So, this is a reflection of this underlying political contestation and polarisation of these two major political forces in South Korean politics, who see the other as being a very illegitimate political force in Korean politics.
Zubaidah Nazeer: It sounds like a zero-sum game almost, doesn't it? Where the other sees only one existing?
Yongwook Ryu: So, politics often comes down to a zero-sum game. And in the case of South Korea, even though it's a proper democratic country, in some sense, this zero-sum game nature of politics becomes more visible and more intense than in many other countries.
Zubaidah Nazeer: It is lively, I have to say. Okay, so now let's shift it a bit to take on a bit of a wider lens. What do you see as the most significant implications of these recent political troubles for South Korea's immediate future?
Yongwook Ryu: I think the single most important implication is the state of the Conservatives as a political group in South Korean politics. The Conservatives are in chambers right now and still cannot find a clear leader who can take them out of this current mess and unite the party and unite the political group. Now, it is still very much a divided house with some still supporting Yoon, while others seeking to distance themselves from Yoon.
Now, this has real consequences, because if the Conservatives remain divided, the upcoming Presidency election will become an easy victory for the opposition party. Then, the opposition gets to control the Legislature; it gets to control the Executive; and by controlling these two branches of government, it can actually exercise a great deal of influence over the judiciary.
Politics 101, right? The intro politics will tell you, for democracy to function properly, there's got to be functioning checks and balances on power. And if one party ends up dominating all three branches of government, I don't think it bodes well for the future political development of South Korean democracy.
Some other consequences related to what's going on today, namely Trump tariffs and the US-China conflict. At this critical time South Korea is in a leadership vacuum, which won't be resolved until the Presidential election later this year in June. And this could disadvantage Korea, although much depends on how the negotiations between US and other countries pan out in the next month or so.
Now, I think if I were Donald Trump looking at South Korean politics, I would be extremely puzzled because if you remember when Trump was the President for the first time, he wanted to talk to his South Korean counterpart, and back then Madame Park was impeached. So there was a leadership vacuum in South Korea when Trump became President for the first time.
Now, he returned to power, became President again and he wanted to talk to his South Korean counterpart, which, once again, the President was impeached. There was a leadership vacuum. So, he probably would go, ‘What's wrong with this country? Whenever I become the President and want to talk to my South Korean counterpart, there's no clear leader in South Korea.’
Zubaidah Nazeer: It's nice that you're linking back to Trump but pure coincidence as well, right. But perhaps right now, maybe we can get your thoughts on the likelihood of constitutional changes being pursued in the aftermath of this crisis. What specific aspects of the governmental structure might be targeted for reform?
Yongwook Ryu: There are two main aspects to the current constitution reform debate, and both relate to the structure of power. One is to change the current five-year, one-term presidency to four-year, two-term presidency with the possibility of re-election. And the other is to change the presidency system entirely to some sort of parliamentary system.
The former could strengthen the office of presidency, while the latter will definitely strengthen the Legislature. Now, there's a greater momentum for changing the Presidential system to parliamentary system at the moment, but the problem in my opinion is that the current constitutional reform debate is mainly driven by politicians who have very little chance to become President.
Zubaidah Nazeer: I see.
Yongwook Ryu: Therefore, they tend to favour changing the Presidential system to parliamentary system, given that Korean politics is almost always polarised and unstable, this could result in frequent change of political leaders, something that we see in Japanese politics. So, if you remember, before the late Prime Minister Abe lasted long in his Prime Minister position, almost every year there was a new Japanese Prime Minister. So, if South Korea becomes a parliamentary system with the current polarisation and instability of politics, we could see a very frequent change of leadership.
Now, this means that almost all major political heavyweights will have a chance to become a national leader. And no wonder, the ones who think that they cannot become President, tend to favour this parliamentary system. There's a chance for a political system. That's right. They have a chance to become national leaders.
So the current constitutional reform debate is a little problematic because the debate is driven by politicians who do not see very much chance to become President.
Now, when we talk about constitutional reform, you know, we should talk about the future benefits, right? And the future functioning of the government, rather than thinking about the individual benefits that could be generated for specific politicians. There are actually other constitutional issues, um, that I think deserve greater attention, which are swept under the carpet.
And and these are specific issues, so people don't pay attention to these. One such issue is the potential shift of the right to produce a national budget from the Ministry of Finance to the President's Office. This will give a lot of power to the President's Office to determine how much money that he can spend.
Now, this could lead to expansionary fiscal policy and greater government debts, which will reduce the future growth potential of South Korea and burden the current young and future generations. Another has to do with the impeachment process that I mentioned earlier. So, right now, a simple majority in the Legislature could impeach all high-ranking officials except the President, and they will cease to function immediately when this impeachment motion passes the National Assembly, until the Constitutional Court makes a ruling.
Now, I think how this should be changed should be that an impeachment process can still take place in the Legislature, but the impeached official can remain in his or her office to carry out his or her administrative functions until the constitutional court upholds the impeachment by the National Assembly.
Zubaidah Nazeer: I see. Well, a Snap presidential election has been called for June 3rd. In light of this recent political climate, we've just been talking so much about what are some of the key dynamics and potential policy shifts you anticipate?
Yongwook Ryu: Korean politics are always short on substance and policy discussion especially during the election campaign. So, you know, we will see various efforts by both political groups to demonise and de-legitimise the other with political and legal accusations.
And at the same time, various efforts to mobilise their own support base to turn up and vote on election day. Putting this politicking aside, I think there are actually a number of important policy issues in the current upcoming presidential election for domestic, social, and economic issues.
There are issues relating to economic growth, housing market, pension reform and medical reform, all of which are very key for the future President and government to tackle. None of these issues are easy to resolve, and require deft political handling and require serious political discussion and debate.
For foreign policy, the overriding issue will be how to position Korea between the US and China. The Conservatives and majority of the Korean public support a closer relationship with the United States, but Trump's heavy-handed approach to Korea might weaken the public support among the Koreans for a stronger relationship with the United States.
The Progressives tend to favour a more balanced approach between the US and China and improvement of relations with North Korea. With regards to the US-China conflict, the Progressives might have friction with the United States. On the North Korea issue, there is room for cooperation between a potential progressive government in South Korea and the Trump administration as Trump also seeks to improve his relations with North Korea.
Zubaidah Nazeer: And so, extending this a bit more, you know, what about the social and economic impact to South Korea, if any?
Yongwook Ryu: Sure. There, I think there will be significant social and economic impact of the upcoming President's election.
So if the Progressives retake political power, then they will promote their progressive agenda. This could actually affect the housing market. This could affect the pension system and medical reforms, and so forth. If the Conservatives somehow pull a surprising victory in the upcoming President's election, then that new conservative President will probably continue most of Yoon's policy agenda during his term.
So we have to wait and see. However, in my opinion, I think some of the structural issues that South Korea faces go beyond a particular administration. This actually calls for, in some sense, a rewriting of the social contract between the government and the public. This also requires some serious thinking as to how to distribute wealth across different social groups in South Korea.
So, let's take the pension issue. South Korea used to have a voluntary pension system. So, people who are willing to contribute to the pension system, they could do so voluntarily. I don't remember the exact number, something like below 10%, in return, for something like 25%.
So, of course they contribute little, but they get a lot more. Now, it's a compulsory system whereby the distribution of this pension is unequal. So basically, if you're a young person who's now mandated to contribute to the pension system, you contribute more, but you will get less; while the earlier ones, the older generations who entered into the pension system on a voluntary basis, they contributed little, but they end up getting a lot more.
Now, this is a redistribution issue. Of course, if you are on the beneficiary side, in other words, part of the older generation, you don't want to reform the pension system. If you're a younger generation, you don't want the pension system. You actually want to get rid of this mandatory nature of the pension system. A leader needs to somehow reconcile this conflicting interest between different generations, and that calls for deft, political handling and leadership. So far, we've not had that sort of leadership. And I doubt if we will have any major politician who will be willing to risk his personal political capital to ameliorate and intermediate these different political interests. Because no matter what sort of solution you come up with, it will upset somebody.
Zubaidah Nazeer: What impact do you think the former president and his followers will have on the upcoming election?
Yongwook Ryu: If the former President Yoon were to have some impact on the upcoming President election, he could, but whatever impact that he might have will be negative under all circumstances. So, the best he can do to help the conservative political chances is to remain quiet and stay out of politics and focus on his criminal proceedings because his attempt to influence politics will only create further in-house division among the Conservatives, which will hand over the political reins to the opposition party quite easily.
Whether he can remain quiet and stay out of politics remains to be seen, because we've already had some signs that his supporters want to form a new political party and put out a Presidential candidate who has been very close to President Yoon, and with either explicit or implicit approval by former President Yoon, as I mentioned, this will lead to further in-house division among the Conservatives. Then, the opposition party will win that Presidential election quite easily. Who's it going to be?
Zubaidah Nazeer: That's the question.
Yongwook Ryu: That's right. That's a million-dollar question.
So far, the opposition party leader, Lee Jae-myung seems to have an upper hand. But, as I mentioned earlier, he also faces his own criminal proceedings. And it might happen that before the June 3rd President's election, the Supreme Court in South Korea might make a ruling on one of Lee Jae-myung's criminal cases.
Now, if the Supreme Court finds him guilty of crime, then he cannot run for presidency. Therefore, whatever the Supreme Court decides, this will also be politically controversial. No matter how the Supreme Court decides. The Supreme Court might actually decide to send the case back to the lower court, in which case it's not a final verdict, but it's some sort of political statement that, okay, the opposition leader may have some legal issues.
And then there's the ball in the political court. How the people vote in the upcoming present election will decide the fate of South Korea’s future in the next few years. So right now, the clear candidate with the most chance is the opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung. The Conservatives are all struggling to mobilise their own political base. They're struggling to bring various conservative politicians together to form a united front against the opposition leader.
Zubaidah Nazeer: And to be fair, I mean it is how many, whatever, how many weeks left until this, you know? So, between now, which is, at this time of recording, the end of April to June 3rd, there's still more than a month away and anything can happen, I'm sure, given all this activity and drama in Korean politics at the moment, right?
Yongwook Ryu: There's a saying in Korean politics, "A day in Korean politics is like a year in one's life." So, we still have more than a month to go before the Presidential election. So, a lot of things could happen.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Okay. I'm just going to move down to another equally interesting and exciting topic: the US trade tariffs?
Given South Korea's reliance on exports, how would the US tariffs — despite this 90 day pause — and any prolonged global trade war, overshadow, or even affect the recent political turmoil?
Yongwook Ryu: You know, this has occupied everyone's attention in recent days. In general, tariffs have a dampening effect on global trade, and therefore all exporting economies like South Korea would be adversely affected.
However, what matters the most is relative. In other words, how much tariffs you get compared to your potential competitors. Hence, if South Korea gets, let's say 10% of tariffs while China gets 50%, then that could be good for South Korean exporters. Thus, we must pay attention to the specifics and details.
And right now, the Korean delegation will be visiting Washington this week to hold consultation with the US side to see what their concerns are. And South Korea will relay their own concerns to the US side, but given the election in South Korea, I doubt the current acting government can conclude this negotiation with the United States.
So we have to wait and see.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Okay. And, and to just pick up on that point at the time of this recording, of course you know, we are talking about an impending visit. So by the time this is actually being released, there could be varying outcomes, right?
Yongwook Ryu: A bigger concern about Trump's tariffs to me is actually not so much about the tariffs, per se, but what the tariffs represent.
The tariffs represent the fundamental shift in the US approach to global trade and the multilateral order that it had built up in the aftermath of the Second World War. The US under Trump, rightly or wrongly, since the current global economic order disadvantages the United States, especially US manufacturing, and this has implications for national security for the United States as well as domestic inequalities in the US, which Trump seeks to change.
And it is this change, withdrawal from the global economic order, multilateral order, that is a huge concern to South Korea. And frankly, all Asian economies. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong has publicly spoken about this, and I completely agree with his way of looking at the current situation.
It's the US withdrawing from the global multilateral economic order. That is a big concern for Asian economies that are mainly exporting economies rather than the tariffs per se. Now, what is the solution? One solution could be to move closer to China. And I know that, and, you know, some Asian economies are contemplating this option, hoping that China would uphold a multilateral trading system and rules.
However, for both national security and economic reasons, I think that this is a very bad national policy choice. Although one could seek limited cooperation with China in some areas,
To me, a better solution is to go for low-hanging fruits that countries ignored in the past because all they had to do was to go with these two great powers in their economic relationships. And these low-hanging fruits are cooperation with other Asian countries. So, for example, enhanced cooperation between Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the major Northeast Asian economies, on the one hand, and Southeast Asian and South Asian economies, where there are natural economic complementarities. Another low-hanging fruit is Europe and Asia cooperation, where once again, both sides can form complementary economic partnerships for mutual benefits.
Zubaidah Nazeer: It'll be interesting to look at how the shift happens. And also at LKYSPP, we do have political scientists who are also examining the shifts between countries from, say, China to US or US to China. But Prof, your point about the fact that the national security element is also worth thinking about is another different aspect to look at it, because I think, as you have said before, that the economics is one thing, but there's also this other element.
Yongwook Ryu: Sure. I think if you take a purely economic perspective on what's going on right now, in terms of Trump tariffs, in terms of US-China, I think, you know, you will reach a very wrong conclusion. I think what fundamentally drives US policies, whether it be in the economic or trade or in national security, and so on and forth.
It's all political agenda, national security concerns, the inequalities in the USA, between the gigantic tech firms or financial institutions, and manufacturing, right? So basically, the Wall Street versus the main street. Sometimes I look at what's going on in global affairs in the last few years and I think that these major great powers have all made fundamental strategic blunders.
You look at Russia's invasion of Ukraine; Putin initially thought that he could have this war over maybe within two weeks. He's still fighting this war, Until today, so much so that he is fighting this war until today, and things have not gone very well for Putin. So much so that he had to go all the way to Pyongyang, asking one of the poorest economies in the world for ammunition and bullets as well. So, this is a strategic blunder on the part of Putin overestimating his own capabilities, Russia's own military capabilities.
You look at China under Xi Jinping, when he became President, he thought that he could challenge US authority and influence, in Asia and beyond. He thought that Chinese capabilities were so much up to that standard where whatever pressure US renders to China, the Chinese economy could probably withstand that.
You look at the Chinese economy today. It's actually in a very, very bad shape. Unemployment rate is high. The ordinary people's lives are worsening. So that's a strategic blunder made by Xi Jinping. I think Trump may be making his own strategic blunder, overestimating the US capabilities.
The position that the USA finds itself in today is much weaker than what the USA was in, in the 1950s and sixties. Therefore, if Trump decides to pick a fight with everybody while trying to realise his political ambitions. I don't think this will succeed. I think what the Trump government should do is to narrow its focus while seeking to expand its collaboration with like-minded countries and US allies around the world.
Zubaidah Nazeer: So, you know, this brings to mind what you said about how if Trump is going to pick a fight with everyone, and then you will see shifting alliances where maybe alliances were not expected really closely before, like that famous picture of the Foreign Ministers of China, South Korea, and Japan really coming together to talk about how to tackle these tariffs. So, what could be a good thing or bad thing about that?
Yongwook Ryu: You know, not only the tri-lateral foreign ministers meeting between China, South Korea, and Japan, but also the Europeans were trying to improve their relations with China because of Trump tariffs.
However, we've not yet seen concrete outcomes. I think here there are structural limitations. So even though on the surface it may appear that US allies and partners are seeking to improve relationships with China because of Trump tariffs, however, they also have their own national security concerns, economic concerns, vis-a-vis China.
So that's going to limit how far they're going to get close to China. I think if you look at Trump 1.0, when Trump still put pressure on all US allies and partners around the world. And yet they tolerated Trump's pressure and wanted to work with the Trump administration during that time for one reason: which is that Trump was willing to stand up against China.
And therefore, I think the same thing might repeat, even though they are not happy with Trump’s tariffs and Trump's heavy-handed approach to US allies and partners. But because Trump is willing to exert pressure on Beijing, in the end, they might still begrudgingly seek to cooperate with the United States.
Of course, having said that, there are certain areas where all countries can still achieve some cooperation in order to improve their economic situation.
Zubaidah Nazeer: How do you see the current political situation potentially influencing its foreign policy, particularly in its relationship between the US and China?
Yongwook Ryu: Let me share with you an intriguing statement which was inserted by the opposition parties in the first impeachment motion against Yoon.
The statement criticised Yoon's foreign policy, which had nothing to do with the impeachment case. So it was that particular foreign policy statement, which didn't have to go in the impeachment motion, but the opposition parties decided to insert it. So let me read it out verbatim.
"The Yoon administration has neglected geopolitical balance under the pretext of value diplomacy. Has antagonised North Korea, China and Russia, has insisted on a bizarre Japan-centred foreign policy and has appointed people with pro-Japanese ties to key government posts, thereby inviting isolation of South Korea in Northeast Asia, triggering war crisis, neglecting national security and the duty to protect the people."
Now, if I did not tell you that this statement came from South Korea, probably people would've thought that this came from North Korea. If this reflects the opposition party's genuine foreign policy preference, which I think it does, because this did not have to go into the impeachment motion, but they decided to put it in there.
And if the opposition takes political power, then we receive a major shift in foreign policy of South Korea under a new progressive party. Then we will see Seoul moving closer to Beijing, trying to distance itself away from Washington. They call it a balanced foreign policy between the US and China.
Whereas Yoon's foreign policy has emphasised stronger relationships with the United States across the board, not only in security, but also in trade. Now, one specific outcome of this is the Taiwan issue. The United States has been pushing very hard on its Asian allies to do more, to deter potential Chinese military aggression against Taiwan, and both Japan and South Korea on the conservative government were happy to improve their security cooperation with the United States in order to deter potential Chinese military aggression against Taiwan.
If we have a progressive government in South Korea after the June Presidential elections, they will try to stay out of the Taiwan situation because they think that this will be good for South Korea's own interest. I have a slightly different perspective on this. I think if something happens in the Taiwan Strait, there's no way the Korean Peninsula will remain unaffected. Whatever happens in the Taiwan Strait will have implications for the Korean Peninsula.
And similarly, whatever happens on the Korean Peninsula, we'll also have implications in the Taiwan Strait. That's why whichever political party takes political power in South Korea must take the Taiwan issue very seriously. But I don't think that's the perspective held by the progressive politicians.
Zubaidah Nazeer: Let's shift from US and China and take a look at another country. Would there be major changes with the relations to North Korea? Who would Pyongyang like to see win the election?
Yongwook Ryu: It's clear. North Korea would like to see a progressive political party to be in charge in South Korea because the progressive political party has always been the one seeking to promote inter-Korean dialogue cooperation. But what will happen vis-à-vis North Korea first depends on the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine War. As you mentioned earlier, North Korea has been directly involved in that military conflict, not only in terms of supply of military equipment, but also the dispatch of extra North Korean soldiers to fight on behalf of Russia.
And hence, without seeing resolution to that conflict, I don't think that there could be any major changes and movement on the Korean Peninsula. Beyond that, if we have a progressive government in South Korea, North Korea is likely to expect more inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, which the progressive government would be quite happy to promote.
Trump might also show interest in talking with Kim Jong-un to work something out with the North Korean leader. Now, this is the repeat of what we had during Trump 1.0 when we had Trump, Kim Jong-un and a progressive government in South Korea under Moon Jae-in. And if a progressive party takes political power again in June, then we have the repeat situation of Trump, Kim Jong-Un, and another progressive government in South Korea.
This is a little strange constellation of political groups that do not actually see each other eye to eye in terms of political values. But for the purpose of improving the relations between the US and North Korea this actually works pretty well. So, we might see some interesting dynamics happening on the Korean Peninsula if a progressive government comes into power in June in South Korea.
Zubaidah Nazeer: So, what now? Where do you expect the state of things to go now? What should the government do to stabilise the situation?
Yongwook Ryu: The two immediate things that I've already mentioned that we should watch out for are the outcome of the presidential election in early June and the trade negotiation with the Trump administration.
If the new President, whichever political party he comes from, engages in petty politics and political purge, as so often witnessed in the past, then there won't be any political stabilisation in South Korea. We will only see the more of the continuation of political polarisation and conflict, which will stifle the progress on substantive policy issues such as medical reform, pension reform, the constitution reform, and so on and so forth.
If the trade negotiations with the USA go well, this could provide, in my opinion, a lot of economic opportunities to South Korea. But if the negotiations fall out, then it could end up weakening the US-ROK Alliance relationship.
I think both the US and South Korea should take the current trouble involving the tariffs as an opportunity to reassess the state of the Alliance relationship in its comprehensiveness. So not only the trade imbalances, but also the security issues, the political issues, the future vision and goals of this alliance and try to build and strengthen the alliance relationship rather than view it as a tit-for-tat relative sum game.
If you look at it as a tit-for-tat and relative sum game, then there cannot be a mutual winning outcome. Whoever achieves something, then the other side will see it as losing.
Zubaidah Nazeer: So that's really a very nice and insightful take on everything. And so, to end our conversation today, which has been completely insightful and so interesting, what is the takeaway someone listening to this should take from this, and why does politics in Korea matter?
Yongwook Ryu: You know, I think most people, when it comes to Korea, they think about K-Pop, K-dramas, all these cultural products and Korea as being a relatively advanced, tech-based society.
Now all that is true, and all these are rather positive images of South Korea. Of course, life is not always completely positive. There is a darker side to Korea, which is Korean politics. And I've already explained how deep this political polarisation and conflicting political identities of two major political forces in South Korea are, and they produce negative outcomes in Korean politics.
We live in an interdependent world. Therefore, what happens in one part of the world will definitely affect the region where you live in. So, what happens in the Korean Peninsula will have implications for other issues in the region, including Taiwan, South China Sea, and Southeast Asia as a whole.
And therefore, you know, we live in Singapore, but what happens in the Korean Peninsula will certainly affect the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, South China Sea, and Singapore as a whole. And therefore, we should pay attention to these major political developments and security issues in other parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula.
Zubaidah Nazeer: And really thank you for over this last hour giving us a sense of how fascinating politics in Korea is, and the impact and the significance. And as you see, I really enjoyed listening to this. And I hope the others who are interested in listening to conversations like this will continue to tune into us, to Foreseeable podcast wherever you get the podcasts.
Thank you so much, Prof.
Yongwook Ryu: Thank you so much.