Summary:
- Southeast Asian governments are using outdated factory-style tax rules and holidays to attract AI data centres, but these projects import most of their hardware, book profits overseas, create few jobs, and consume huge amounts of local power and water.
- Rather than await an ASEAN deal, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia should audit what data centres actually pay and shift tax deductions from imported servers to local power and water upgrades, and share national revenue with host regions like Johor and Batam.
- Under Singapore’s 2027 ASEAN chairmanship, governments could require operators to pay upfront for new power and water infrastructure – a move that also benefits Singapore, whose cloud hub relies on stable neighbouring utilities.
Southeast Asian governments spent years offering incentives to attract artificial intelligence data centres. Now some are asking whether the boom is worth the cost, even as neighbours race to undercut them. In July, Malaysia’s Treasury chief Johan Mahmood Merican admitted the country “perhaps overdid the red carpet for data centres”. After projects seeking tax breaks reached nine per cent of Thai GDP in value, Bangkok moved to hold 166 projects in September to set stricter rules on local returns. Even as Malaysia and Thailand tighten approvals, Indonesia is pitching Batam’s special economic zones with tax holidays of up to 20 years to capture the spillover.
Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok fear becoming what a Malaysian MP in October called “merely a place where people rent space”. Under China’s “East Data, West Computing” drive, cloud giants built server farms in western cities like Ulanqab for cheap power, but paid taxes back at their eastern headquarters, and one local official warned of becoming “landlords of server rooms”. Ulanqab is a remote inland city with little to sell beyond cheap power. Malaysia’s Johor and Indonesia’s Batam sit next to land-scarce Singapore, where cloud networks need nearby land and power to keep data delays low. Southeast Asian governments hold prime digital real estate, yet still price it using an outdated factory model.
Not Built Like a Factory
That model trades tax breaks today for factory jobs and local profit taxes tomorrow, and it fails when applied to data centres. A factory puts machines and workers under one roof. Most data-centre capacity in Malaysia and Indonesia is “colocation”, where a developer provides the land, building and power, and cloud firms rent the halls for their own servers. In its US listing prospectus, Singapore-based landlord DayOne Data Centers reported US$394.7 million in Malaysian revenue in 2025 and just US$0.9 million in cash income tax. DayOne is not evading tax. Corporate tax applies to profit, not revenue, and tax write-offs for building new halls in Johor offset most of its taxable profit.
The landlord’s tax should rise once building slows, but a bigger problem lies in how governments reward the tech firms that fill those halls. IT equipment makes up two-thirds to four-fifths of an AI data centre’s upfront cost, and as the regional research office AMRO notes, most of that hardware is imported. Malaysia and Indonesia still reward projects based on total capital spending rather than local construction. Malaysia’s flagship scheme gives qualifying projects up to ten years of tax deductions on capital outlays, and Batam waives import taxes on hardware, so both governments subsidise imported chips and servers that go obsolete within a few years.
Even after those write-offs expire, a server hall does not pay corporate tax like a manufacturing plant. A factory exports physical goods and books profit locally, whereas cloud firms can store data in Malaysia and report sales in another country, leaving only a thin local service fee to tax. When a Malaysian MP asked in October how to tax firms that store data locally and book sales abroad, Trade Minister Johari Abdul Ghani replied that for now the main thing Malaysia can charge them is “the maximum price of the power”. Asked earlier how much revenue the government had given up in incentives, Johari gave no figure. He lacked investment details for facilities currently operating and said he was “interested to know these details” himself.
Gaps in the Fine Print
Recent efforts to tighten the rules leave two big gaps. Malaysia’s data-centre task force now requires approved projects to meet 30 per cent local content, but has not said whether that covers the whole project, including servers, or only the building, which developers can clear by buying local cement and cables. Malaysia’s federal tax system also leaves out the state governments that supply land and water. Corporate income taxes go to the federal government and power bills go to the national utility, leaving Johor, the biggest host state, to rely on annual land tax and a one-off fee for converting farmland. When a lawmaker asked in April how much 65 approved centres had paid in conversion fees, Johor’s government explained the formula without saying how much it had collected, even as operating sites drew 22.39 million litres of water a day.
Supporters of the boom reply that rent and power bills are reward enough. AMRO estimates that 70 per cent of a data centre’s running costs stay in Malaysia through leases and utilities. That is real money, but most of it goes to private landlords or pays for fuel and generation costs, not into public budgets. The state power company makes only a five to 10 per cent margin on that power, Johari says, even as data centres are projected to consume 40 per cent of Johor’s electricity by 2035. The 27 projects cleared by the task force carry an estimated investment of RM226 billion yet are forecast to create only 4,053 jobs.
What draws tech giants to Johor and Batam is fast power next to Singapore, not tax giveaways. Carnegie Endowment modelling of US sites shows that a one-year delay in getting power and permits costs investors more than a doubling of electricity prices, and about 60 per cent more than losing typical state tax breaks. Although that modelling is drawn from a different market, the ranking of these factors plausibly carries over, as Europe faces multi-year grid queues and slow permitting, and abundant energy in the Middle East comes with acute security risks. Johor and Batam, by contrast, are still signing large power deals next to Singapore’s subsea cable hub.
Making the Bill Count
Southeast Asian governments will keep competing for capital, and none will let ASEAN set their tax rates. Still, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand can fix their own incentives at home. When Malaysia brings a data-centre bill to Cabinet next year, it should start by auditing the 57 centres already running, so MPs can see what past tax breaks bought before extending the current scheme beyond 2027. Tax deductions can then shift from chips and servers to power lines, water treatment and engineering staff. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta also need to share national tax and power revenue with Johor and Batam.
If cloud profits stay out of reach, host governments should at least make these halls pay the full cost of their power and water. Tax holidays cost a finance ministry nothing upfront, so neighbours keep undercutting one another on tax breaks, whereas power plants and water pipes require real cash and scarce physical capacity. In Thailand,
rules approved in July will make large data-centre operators post deposits for
every megawatt of electricity they reserve, and Malaysia now
bills operators for unused reserved power and requires investors to
fund grid upgrades. Indonesia faces the same physical limits, as
Batam’s authority warned that utilities must come first as server loads surge. As 2027 ASEAN chair, Singapore has reason to back a common regional floor on such charges, since its own cloud hub depends on neighbours with reliable grids. Few other regions offer both available power and geopolitical stability to host
American and Chinese tech giants, so Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia can insist operators pay upfront for new power plants and water pipes. Once they do, a project turned away in Johor will not find a cheaper utility deal across the strait in Batam.
The views and opinions expressed in this post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP).