Author/s
Mar 09, 2020

Americans eagerly followed the poll results from the "Super Tuesday" Democratic primaries, where 14 states allocated delegates that will decide which Democratic candidate will challenge President Donald Trump in the general election this November. American elections have historically focused on domestic issues close to voters' hearts, not foreign policy.

This election cycle appears no different, which is likely to reassure China's leadership but, undoubtedly, America-watchers in Beijing are closely following the candidates, seeking to deduce their positions and penchants. Their job this week just got easier.

Until Tuesday, the race had been close between the large field of Democratic candidates, with the two highest-profile candidates, former vice-president Joe Biden stumbling in early contests, and Bernie Sanders looking strong at the outset.

But with Michael Bloomberg announcing his candidacy and employing a radical strategy of skipping the first four primary contests in February and waiting until Super Tuesday where he would flood internet and traditional media markets with advertising, there was no certainty which candidate would come out on top on Wednesday morning.

Bloomberg, who reportedly spent about US$500 million on advertising in the 14 Super Tuesday states, failed to win a single one, capturing only the territory of American Samoa. Biden emerged from the crowded field, winning 10 of the 14 contests, including the delegate-rich states of Texas, North Carolina and Virginia.

Sanders can console himself with a win in California, but Biden won 25 per cent of the votes, giving him a decent share of that state’s delegates, further cementing his overall victory on Tuesday.

Biden is now the clear front runner in the nomination race, with Sanders his only viable political rival. With Bloomberg’s withdrawal, it is obvious to all that the Democratic nomination race is between the two. And with the Democratic establishment lining up behind Biden, it is increasingly likely that the November election contest will be Biden vs Trump.

This considerably simplifies the job of China’s America-watchers, since both Biden and Trump are devils they know.

It is a mistake, however, to presume that Beijing has a preference between the two, and delusional to accuse it of seeking to further the fortunes of one candidate over another.

Bloomberg has just proven that money can’t buy votes, and Russia’s efforts to influence American voters in the 2016 election cycle has raised awareness as well as the risk of foreign interference. Any effort Beijing may make to support one candidate over another is likely to backfire and produce a perverse outcome, as well as alienate the American public.

But is it possible for analysts in Beijing to determine whether one president could be better than another when it comes to protecting their interests?

After eight years as vice-president, Biden is a known entity to Beijing. But it would be a mistake to presume that a Biden presidency would carry on the China-friendly policies of the Obama administration. The Trump administration has moved the goalposts when it comes to China.

There is no question of returning to the Obama-era China policies of balancing cooperation and competition. The Trump administration has successfully made the case in Washington, embraced by both political parties, that China is a challenger and competitor that must be confronted and deterred from harming US interests.

Trump’s goal of achieving a more equitable economic relationship has been disruptive, and only partially successful thus far, but appreciated in many quarters because of its assertiveness and his unwillingness to back down or give in to Beijing’s intransigence.

Biden is a liberal internationalist who instinctively puts his faith in the international system and rules-based order that China so effectively challenged while he was in office. This makes it difficult for Biden to argue that engagement, dialogue and accommodation are more effective approaches to gain China’s cooperation.

Economic interdependence with China did not build trust or foster convergence on strategic issues and has even come to be seen as a liability. Since 2010, China has showed its willingness to use economic coercion against countries with which it had political or security issues, including the Philippines, South Korea and others.

Biden may gain the backing of major unions, which traditionally support the Democratic Party, but the union bosses are likely to tell him that they like Trump’s tariffs and commitment to bringing back manufacturing jobs to the US.

Besides a likely inability to walk back some of Trump’s confrontational policies which greatly frustrate Beijing, Biden’s liberal world view presents other potential challenges for China. The liberal world view is staunchly anti-authoritarian, teeing up the prospect of human rights tension with a China which has become even more oppressive since Biden left office.

Likewise, liberals place a premium on integration with the international order and reject spheres of influence, which puts a Biden presidency philosophically in conflict with aspects of President Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream. Biden is likely to find himself on the same path as Trump, confronting China in a competitive relationship where neither side sees value or benefit in accommodating the other.

If history holds, China is unlikely to be a factor in election politics. Key domestic issues, including the economy and immigration, are likely to be the focus of discussion, saving China from becoming a political punching bag ahead of the November elections.

That said, the world’s second-largest economy is an inescapable issue that the newly inaugurated president will need to address at the start of his term in January 2021, and neither candidate is going to go easy on Beijing.

This article was first published in the South China Morning Post on 7 March 2020.

(Photo credit: Phil Roeder)

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