Doubts have grown in South Korea in recent months about the reliability of the United States as an ally, following a series of US unilateral actions that suggest the US could sideline Seoul’s interests if it suits its own priorities.
From a redeployment of US Patriot missiles and weaponry based in South Korea to the Middle East in March to support the Iran war, to US President Donald Trump’s verbal threat in April to withdraw US troops from the Korean Peninsula and his forceful demand that Seoul “pays up” for US protection earlier in July 2025, the impression that many in South Korea are receiving is clear: US security guarantees may no longer be unconditional.
That has led many analysts to conclude, familiarly, that South Korea is getting closer to China as a result. It may appear so on the surface. Yes, President Lee Jae Myung may have emphasised pragmatic diplomacy and strategic autonomy. His outreach to Beijing, including reaffirming the “one-China” policy and calling 2026 a year of “restoration” in ties, suggests a thaw.
But this interpretation is inaccurate, because it reduces a complex foreign policy to a single US-China axis and misses the fact that Seoul has doubled down on the US-ROK alliance over the years when facing insecurity.
If anything, Seoul’s hedging strategy in preparing for a world where US security guarantees are not forthcoming lies not in bending towards China but in building up its military capabilities and expanding its defence partnerships beyond the US with countries in other parts of the world
For further reading, please visit The Straits Times here, where this article was first published in on 6 May 2026.