Author/s
Jul 07, 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic has taken the world by storm, with more than 8 million infections and approximately 448,000 deaths recorded at the time of writing. This is due to the incoherent and uncoordinated responses to the outbreak of many international institutions around the world. In a similar vein, the pandemic has illustrated ASEAN's institutional weaknesses as Southeast Asia has been hit hard by the outbreak.

ASEAN's efforts against the pandemic have been highly fragmented to date, in terms of efficacy and responsiveness, which has undermined ASEAN's institutional criticality. Countries like Vietnam or Singapore have implemented rigorous quarantine and lockdown policies and contained the spread of the virus effectively, while other countries such as the Philippines or Indonesia downplayed the risk from COVID-19 and did not carry out stringent measures to put it under control. The policy divergence of ASEAN's members sheds light on the limited role of ASEAN-led institutions in combatting the virus. On the one hand, it proves that even without ASEAN's mechanisms, there were still states that managed to control the pandemic effectively, suggesting that ASEAN's mechanisms play a minimal role in their successful containment of the COVID-19. ASEAN also seems to be unable to provide viable solutions for those members that failed to combat the pandemic as mentioned above, which has substantially reduced its institutional centrality.

Failure to orchestrate members response

Additionally, ASEAN institutional weakness is shown by the ineffectiveness of its initiatives in fighting against COVID-19. ASEAN has been making painstaking efforts to combat the pandemic by establishing both intra and extra-regional ad-hoc agencies such as theASEAN-China Ad-Hoc Health Ministers Joint Task Force, the Special ASEAN Summit on the COVID-19, COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund, and the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on COVID-19. These mechanisms aim to facilitate senior discussions among regional actors on how to contain the pandemic’s spread and to reduce its negative impacts on the region. However, their practical implementations are still insignificant when the cooperation among member states is insubstantial, as illustrated by the polarisation of their COVID-19 policies and the high number of cases and deaths in the region.

In the most recent virtual 36th ASEAN Summit hosted by Vietnam, ASEAN leaders illustrated their commitment to implementing targeted policies to assure ASEAN’s central role in the battle against COVID-19. Nevertheless, ASEAN efficiency is still not ensured when it has yet been able to contain the spread of the pandemic in the region, evidenced by the daily increasing number of new cases. In this regard, the institutional capacity of ASEAN has been put under the question, which casts doubt on its role as a fulcrum of the regional web of institutions.

The escalation of the US-China rivalry

Next, ASEAN's role in reducing the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China is relatively weak. The already strained US-China relations have worsened following the outbreak of the COVID-19. Both sides have been relentlessly blaming each other for causing the spread of the pandemic. Moreover, the COVID-19 outbreak has once again stirred up tensions in the South China Sea (SCS). After having partially recovered from the pandemic, China has been more assertive,fortifying islands and increasing its military presence in the SCS. The US, in response, has expanded its naval presence and taken part in the diplomatic battle of diplomatic notes against China. Sitting in the regional driver's seat, ASEAN is expected to be proactive in brokering the relationship between the US and China, as they hold membership of ASEAN-led institutions, most notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN had actually held meetings with both the US and China to call for cooperation in response to the crisis. However, ASEAN has thus far been unable to play a brokerage role between the two great powers. There has been no step forwards in their relationship to date, meaning the US-China tensions will be far from being de-escalated.

The counter-effective non-interference

Furthermore, the principle of non-interference is also worth addressing to understand the inertia of ASEAN in responding to COVID-19 outbreak. Despite being arguably the albatross for ASEAN members, non-interference has been criticised by many scholars and policymakers as the main hindrance ASEAN faces in achieving its goals, for instance in the case of the Rohingya crisis. Although the principle has never been officially defined, it can be understood to refer to the action of preventing any ASEAN member states from intervening in others domestic affairs. In this respect, the level of institutionalisation of ASEAN members actions is lowered.

Responses to the current pandemic showcase a major disadvantage of the non-interference principle. As mentioned above, ASEAN members have been dealing with the virus in a divergent number of ways. In the midst of the outbreak, ASEAN, as the major regional organisation in Southeast Asia, should play a central role in coordinating its members actions, which may assist them in tackling the crisis more harmoniously and effectively. However, due to the principle of non-interference, ASEAN has failed to orchestrate its members actions towards the COVID-19 crisis, because it does not have the authority to implement intrusive policies to make sure all members are on the same page.

The COVID-19 outbreak has exposed ASEAN's institutional weaknesses in dealing with the crisis, which threatens its centrality. Nevertheless, looking on the bright side, this crisis is a good chance for ASEAN to address its institutional limitations at a grassroot level. Needless to say, ASEAN has to adopt effective institutional reforms and act more boldly to buttress its institutional power, if it seeks to maintain the centrality in the region.

Photo credit: razaklatif

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