Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Share

China-India Brief #198

February 09, 2022 - February 24, 2022
China-India Brief #198BRIEF #198

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
February 09, 2022 - February 24, 2022

Guest Column

Strategic Calculations: Indian and Chinese Responses to the Ukraine Crisis
By Vidya Nadkarni


CIB198_1

India’s commitment to strategic autonomy is being put to the test in the recent Ukrainian crisis, during which China has stood by Russia as Putin has compelled Western attention to Moscow’s demands for status and recognition as a Eurasian great power. There is a possibility that if US and Western military and economic resources are pulled into defusing a spiraling crisis in Europe, Washington’s attention to Asia will be deflected, allowing China to continue with a coercive strategy vis-à-vis Taiwan, an aggressive posture in the East and South China Seas, a carrot-and-stick approach to gain influence in Southeast Asia, and continued incursions along the undelineated India-China and Bhutan-China borders. Given this, India is caught in a bind between New Delhi’s long-standing “special and privileged” partnership with Russia and deepening ties with the United States. Washington’s concerns over a rising China, a “near-peer competitor”, are magnified in India, which is confronting assertive, concerted, and unrelenting Chinese pressure along their common border. Infiltration along the line of actual control (LAC) has resulted in an entrenched Chinese presence in disputed territory in the northwest region previously under Indian control. India needs a robust US presence in the Indo-Pacific region to safeguard its security interests against Beijing’s increasing influence in countries along the Indian Ocean littoral. China’s influence is manifest in its infrastructure projects under the expansive and opaque umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which include the construction of ports, roads, railroads, and power plants in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. 

The uncertain outcome of a protracted US-China global power transition that is underway puts into sharp focus the stakes for each country in the unfolding Ukraine imbroglio. China prospered from the US-sponsored liberal economic order after joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, becoming, over time, a global leader in trade and advanced technologies, an indispensable link in global supply chains, and the largest trading partner of countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Washington’s expectations of making China a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order have been belied as Beijing has selectively engaged and challenged that order. The 2007-08 global financial crisis temporarily knee-capped the United States, showcased Chinese economic resilience, and marked a turning point in Beijing’s international self-image. Abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s counsel of restraint, China used the 2008 Beijing Olympics as the curtain raiser on the country’s entry into the stratified league of global powers. Since then, President Xi Jinping’s China, even more self-assured and confident, has asserted its rightful place on the world stage. 

Against the backdrop of Chinese success in apparently subduing a pandemic that has challenged the political capacity of the United States and Europe, Xi declared that the “East is rising, and the West is declining”. These assertions have been tempered by the recognition that the United States represents the biggest roadblock to Chinese international ambitions. In threatening Ukraine, Russia’s intemperate defiance of the norm of sovereignty and of the European security order anchored in NATO has allowed Beijing, at minimal risk, to enjoy the multiple benefits of having Russia bear the cost of challenging the dominant hegemon and the extant international order. 

It is no surprise then that at the opening of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin stood shoulder-to-shoulder in a unified show of support. Both have shared grievances against the West. In addition to Trump-era economic sanctions against China that have not yet been fully lifted by President Biden, Xi is facing a US-led Western diplomatic boycott of the games over China’s human rights record in Xinjiang. US sanctions imposed on Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea are ongoing with the threat of even more biting Western sanctions on the energy and financial sectors were Putin to decide to invade Ukraine. 

The flow of events has further cemented a Sino-Russian partnership first inked in 1996 and formalized in the 2001 Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation. In the context of the US-China power transition, China has every interest in abetting Russia’s undermining of US hegemony while benefiting from public goods offered by the free trade regime that the US-led economic order supports, challenging global governance, particularly on human rights norms, and in the creation of alternative mechanisms, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRI, to promote Chinese economic influence around the world. 

On January 31, Beijing joined Moscow in a procedural vote called by Russia in the UN Security Council opposing a discussion on the Ukraine crisis. China has publicly stated its support for Russia’s demand to stop NATO expansion to the East and to end Western interference in the internal affairs of other countries in a nod to Putin’s excoriation of the “colour revolutions”. But China’s embrace of Russia, in line with Beijing’s long-standing support of sovereignty, stopped short of endorsing an invasion of Ukraine. China’s economic interests would not be furthered either by the spike in oil and gas prices that would inevitably ensue in the wake of a war or by inviting secondary US sanctions. Clearly, China is in the driver’s seat in the Russia-China relationship.

Unlike China, which is allied with Russia and in a hostile relationship with the United States, India has an amicable partnership with Russia and a strategically significant nexus with the United States. The Ukraine crisis, therefore, has placed India in a particularly sticky situation. India is a pivotal state in the US-China power transition. India’s rivalry with China complicates Beijing’s aspiration for Asian hegemony. China’s challenge to US global hegemony has in turn created structural incentives for the United States to accommodate India’s rise. This conjunction of interests has manifested in burgeoning India-US security ties. India is an important member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) that includes Australia, Japan, and the United States. Among other initiatives, the Quad’s commitment to a “rules-based” order and calls for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific can be seen as a veiled challenge to China’s flouting of maritime rules of open navigation with expansive sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. In the face of repeated Chinese breaches of the LAC and China’s concerted efforts to project power in the Indian Ocean region, India cannot afford to alienate the United States. 

Russia is India’s largest supplier of arms and their multifaceted defence cooperation includes joint production of weapons systems. India is in the crosshairs of US sanctions, with the 2018 purchase of the Russian S-400 anti-missile system, with delivery of components having begun in December 2021. CAATSA or Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act was signed into law in 2017, with Russia as one of its targets. New Delhi has requested a waiver and this exception is supported by the co-chairs of the US Senate’s India caucus. India’s position in the Asian balance of power may help offset US frustration at New Delhi’s equivocal position on the Ukraine crisis and allow India, for now, to maintain its cordial relationships with two countries—the United States and Russia—that are fast moving into hostile terrain. Russia’s call for a procedural vote on the Ukraine discussion was surely designed to force China and India to declare their loyalties publicly. Vetoes are not allowed on procedural votes and so the move could not have derailed the discussion, which had the support of ten UNSC members. Unwilling to alienate either Russia or the United States, India abstained, but sought to temper its vote by calling for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Russia applauded India’s abstention and China’s opposition as a public relations victory. US State Department spokesperson Ned Price in a terse response stated that Washington’s relationship with India “stands on its own merits”. 

Chinese and Indian ties with Russia are framed by a global structural context that in the near- to medium-term is likely to strengthen the Sino-Russian alliance while making for a vexing Indo-Russian partnership. The nature of their relationship with the United States and with each other goes a long way in explaining India’s hedging and China’s circumscribed but open support of Russia in the Ukraine crisis.

Vidya Nadkarni, PhD, is a Professor in Political Science and International Relations at the University of San Diego.

Guest Column

The BRICS as a Barometer of the China-India Bilateral Relationship
By Andrew F. Cooper 


CIB198_3

There is no forum that receives such asymmetrical consideration as the BRICS. Largely overlooked in the West, the institutional dynamics around the BRICS are followed closely by its member countries (China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa). This concentrated focus is especially evident in China and India because the BRICS serves as a barometer of the state of the bilateral relationship. 

Their relationship in the BRICS reveals China and India as both partners and rivals. This mix is to be sure evident in other institutional settings. The difference however, is that in the BRICS, China and India share an institution, as opposed to having positions quite apart from each other. China’s privileged membership as a Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is distinctive from India’s lack of equivalent status. India has engaged in the Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia, while pulling back from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) where China is a core member.

Even in cases where India has joined institutions in which China has taken a prominent or indeed a leadership role, Indian participation at least at the diplomatic level has commonly been low-key such as in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or outright rejectionist as in the Belt and Road Initiative summits. 

Only in the BRICS do China and India share equitable status. China has pushed initiatives, for example, the expansion of the formative BRIC to include South Africa, a move that was formalized at the 2011 Sanya summit establishing the BRICS. Equally, India has pushed initiatives of their own, above all, the original idea to build a BRICS bank which came into the being as the New Development Bank (NDB) which was the pivotal agenda item at the 2012 New Delhi BRICS summit. 

Attention on the China-India bilateral relationship has been magnified, as the chairmanship of the BRICS has passed from India (2021) to China (2022). On the surface, the transition has been a smooth one, with the first BRICS Sherpas meeting under China’s chairmanship held virtually on January 18-19, 2022, amid gestures of appreciation for India’s performance in the previous year. 

Yet, tensions have been building up between China and India both because of specific differences relating to the agenda of the BRICS and due to the wider context of their bilateral relations. 

In the initial stages, the BRICS was held together by an effective club culture. The highest level of attention in communiqués were devoted to the cluster of issues where BRICS could express their traditional sense of grievance at being marginalized within the global institutional architecture and their shared sense of criticism about the West’s poor management of the global economy. Global financial issues receive a large amount of coverage in the summit declarations, above expressions of solidarity with the rest of the global South, environmental/climate change issues, and promotion of the G20 and trade. By way of contrast areas where BRICS was most divided, such as the reform of the UNSC, this received a minimal level of coverage in BRICS declarations.

Strains in the club culture became evident in the process of creating the NDB: with the necessity of contested trade-offs with some gains for India (including the consolidation of the principle of equality and receiving the first term of the presidency of the NDB) but also a reluctant going along with China’s insistence that it secure the location of the bank in Shanghai.

The far more serious test for the BRICS has come, however, in the geo-political context. Most notably, the Xiamen summit in September 2017 became caught up in the dramatic escalating tensions between India and China over Doklam, with the armed forces of the two countries facing off along the China-India boundary. 

To its credit, the BRICS was successful in limiting the damage of the Doklam standoff—notwithstanding media outlets in both countries stoking tensions. Indeed, a de-escalation was facilitated by meetings between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the informal BRICS meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit at Hamburg at the end of August 2017.

The main question for the BRICS is whether this type of crisis management can be repeated when necessary. For, as demonstrated by the physical clash between Chinese and Indian forces (which resulted in at least twenty fatalities) at Galwan in June 2020, further border clashes remain possible, as border tensions remain highly sensitive and volatile.

Still, despite the amplification of tensions between China and India, hanging together is a more likely scenario than breaking apart for the BRICS. For one thing, the successful expansion of the membership of the NDB takes the focus away from the China-India bilateral relationship. Originally, the issue of expanding the BRICS membership had been another source of bilateral tension. For expansion was widely viewed in India as a vehicle to increase China’s leverage at India’s expense, especially if it targeted Beijing-friendly countries like Pakistan. With the addition of Bangladesh to the NDB in September 2021, these concerns have eased somewhat though not completely dispelled. 

And, arguably more importantly, there is no sign of a downgrading of the BRICS by either China or India. There was considerable speculation in 2017 that Prime Minister Modi put pressure on China over Doklam by signalling that he would not attend the Xiamen summit—a highly visible protest gesture that would have been deeply embarrassing for the image and delivery of the BRICS. Fortunately, this worst-case scenario was in fact avoided. But, notwithstanding the smooth transition of the BRICS from India’s chairmanship in 2021 to China’s chairmanship in 2022, geo-political tensions between China and India obviously remain acute. While not preluding important forms of organizational continuity, it must be highlighted that in the context of the BRICS relationship, these tensions have been papered over.

As a barometer of the state of the bilateral relationship between China and India, therefore, the BRICS is highly salient. There is ample confirmation of the rivalry between these two countries. But the degree to which both China and India attach value to their partnership in BRICS is on display as well. If finding a balance will continue to be awkward, the privileging of club membership stands out as a counterweight to institutional disruption.

Andrew F. Cooper, PhD, is University Research Chair and Professor at the Department of Political Science, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo. He is also Associate Research Fellow at the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), in Bruges, Belgium. He is the author of The BRICS (Oxford: OUP, 2016).

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.


News Reports

Bilateral relations

China tells India working on ‘early return’ of medical students
The Hindu, February 22

Chinese authorities have told Indian officials that they are working on an “early return” for the thousands of Indian medical students who have been waiting for two years to resume their studies.

"Very Difficult Phase": External Affairs Minister On India-China Ties
NDTV, February 20

On India-China ties, Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar said that India had agreements with China not to bring military forces to the border, but China violated those agreements.

Ladakh standoff: China blames India for border tension
Hindustan Times, February 14

“We hope the Indian-side will abide by our agreements, do not issue irresponsible remarks and uphold the peace and tranquillity along the border region with concrete actions,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin said on Monday (February 14).

Chinese troops entered Indian territory, drove away herders: local official 
The Indian Express, February 12

Chinese soldiers entered Indian territory on January 28 in Ladakh and stopped local people from grazing their herd in the area, a local official has alleged.

 

News Reports

China and India in the Region

Countering China: 13 nations including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam to participate with warships in largest-ever naval exercise Milan
India Today, February 23

The participation of countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar is significant in wake of Chinese navy’s growing influence and aggressive posturing in the Indian Ocean region.

Australia accuses China of 'act of intimidation' after laser aimed at aircraft
Channel News Asia, February 20

A P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft was illuminated on Thursday (February 17) while flying over Australia's northern approaches by a laser from a People's Liberation Army–Navy (PLA-N) vessel, according to Australia’s defence department.

Pakistan's acquisition of Chinese J-10C fighter jets significant for both sides: analysts
Global Times, February 20

"If confirmed, this could be the first time China has exported the J-10 series fighter and also the first time it has exported the WS-10 series engine," observers said.

‘If it walks like a duck, and talks like a duck ...’: India backs Australia on Chinese coercion
The Sydney Morning Herald, February 14

In response, China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told reporters in Beijing: “The label of ‘economic coercion’ cannot be pinned on China. All attempts to gang up with others to misrepresent facts and resort to malicious hype-up are bound to fail.”

India-China border feud discussed at Quad meet, Jaishankar says
The Straits Times, February 12

The dispute has "arisen" because China had failed to honour agreements, India's foreign minister S. Jaishankar said, adding that when a large country disregards written commitments, it becomes a "legitimate concern for the entire international community".

Quad is a tool to contain China: Foreign Ministry spokesperson
CGTN, February 11

"The so-called Quad mechanism is, in nature, a tool to contain and circle China, and preserve America's hegemony," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian on Friday (February 11).

India rejects references to Kashmir, CPEC in China-Pak joint statement
Hindustan Times, February 10

The joint statement had contained numerous references to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that passes via Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).


News Reports

Trade and Economy

India, UAE sign deal to boost trade to $100B by 2027
Associated Press, February 19

The UAE is India’s third-largest export destination after the United States and China with exports reaching nearly $16 billion for 2020-21.

In a first, France joins China to build $1.7 billion global infra projects
Business Standard, February 18

France has become the first country to join China to jointly build seven infrastructure projects worth over USD 1.7 billion in Africa, South East Asia and Eastern Europe, in a boost for Beijing in the face of its growing hostility with the US.

India set for stronger tech, media and telecom IPOs as China falters
Business Standard, February 18

Between 2018 and 2020, there were 15 TMT IPOs in India. Last year alone, 15 Indian TMT companies went public and raised a total proceeds of $4.8 billion, reveals data and analytics company GlobalData.

China slams New Delhi for ‘suppressing’ Chinese firms after tax raid on Huawei’s India office
South China Morning Post, February 17

Huawei confirmed on Wednesday (February 16) that India’s tax officials had visited the company’s local offices and spoke to employees. China is ‘deeply concerned’ about India’s ‘suppression of Chinese firms’, said Gao Feng, spokesperson for China’s commerce ministry.

India adds 54 more Chinese apps to ban list; Sea says it complies with laws
Reuters, February 15

India has blocked access to 54 mobile apps, mainly Chinese but also including Singapore-based Sea Ltd's "Free Fire" mobile game, over security concerns, government sources said on Tuesday (February 15).

India drone import ban as good as blocks China’s DJI
Taipei Times, February 11

India has banned the import of drones, a move that effectively blocks an emerging market for China’s SZ DJI Technology Co, the world’s top drone maker, and encourages a nascent local industry to increase production.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

Asian refiners eager to resume Iranian oil imports as high prices bite
Reuters, February 18

Iran has kept some exports flowing despite sanctions as intermediaries find ways to disguise the origins of the imports and China, Iran's biggest customer, has been a big destination.

China’s solar exports rose 60 per cent to US$28 billion last year, made light of COVID-19 pandemic and US tariffs
South China Morning Post, February 17

China’s export of solar photovoltaic (PV) products increased by about 60 per cent to US$28.4 billion dollars last year, the country’s ministry of industry and information technology said on Tuesday (February 15).

India and Australia to collaborate on solar manufacturing, deployment via letter of intent
PV Tech, February 16

Australia and India have agreed to collaborate on solar manufacturing and deployment, aiming to reduce the cost of solar PV, battery energy storage systems (BESS) and new clean technologies in both countries.

Russia And China Ink Huge Oil Deals As Ukraine Tensions Soar
Oilprice.com, February 14

Moscow’s state-owned oil giant, Rosneft, has signed a US$80 billion 10-year deal to supply the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with 100 million metric tonnes of oil.


Analyses

China’s Ukraine Crisis
Foreign Affairs, February 21

By Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Bonny Lin, Director, China Power Project, and Senior Fellow, Asian Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Given the rising antagonism between India and China, a Chinese-backed invasion of Ukraine would certainly push New Delhi even further away from Moscow and toward Australia, Japan, and the United States.

US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy takes a middle ground on China. But it’s not all bad news for India
The Print, February 21

By Tara Kartha, Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

The document's tempered tone indicates a new reality: China is a power to contend with, and nobody else is likely to take up cudgels against it.

ASEAN Summit: Should India grab this new opportunity to challenge China?
Money Control, February 18 

By Ranjit Bhushan, Former Nehru Fellow, Jamia Millia University

The member countries aren’t comfortable with the association chair Cambodia’s friendship with China. India could provide a nicer alternative.

Arms sales: A new vector of Sino-Indian competition in the Indo-Pacific
ThinkChina, February 16

By Yogesh Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies

It is a signal to Beijing that if China continues to arm India’s adversaries and influence its neighbours, New Delhi now has both the willingness and means to arm and enable its nemesis in Southeast Asia.

China’s stance on Ukraine: preventing NATO from interfering in the Indo-Pacific
Elcano Royal Institute, February 8

By Andrés Ortega Klein, Senior Research Fellow, Elcano Royal Institute

China’s stance on the crisis between Russia and Ukraine has two main goals: to gauge the US reaction to a possible crisis between Beijing and Taiwan; and to prevent NATO as such from meddling in the Indo-Pacific.

 

Books and Journals

AsianAffairs_163x233The China–Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: A Tale of Two Regional Security Complexes
Asian Affairs, February 2022

By Jonathan Fulton, Assistant Professor of Political Science, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, UAE; and Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council. 

The China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) has been described as a potentially disruptive alignment. This article analyses the impact of the CSP in two regional security complexes (RSCs): the Persian Gulf and South Asia. It finds that of the two RSCs, the China-Iran CSP has a greater likelihood of affecting the strategic landscape of the South Asian RSC as China seeks to contain India's power and influence. In the Persian Gulf, China's economically-motivated regional presence is supported by the maintenance of the status quo, and as a result the CSP is not likely to adversely affect that RSC.

 lky-cag-logo

Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Have any feedback or comment?
Contact our editor: Byron Chong (research associate), email: decb64_Ynlyb24uY2hvbmdAbnVzLmVkdS5zZw==_decb64 
Subscribe

NADKARNI, Vidya

NADKARNI, Vidya

COOPER, Andrew F.

COOPER, Andrew F.