China-India Brief #191

Since the bloody Galwan clash in 2020, cycles of provocation and the heightening of insecurities on both sides have become routine in India-China relations. The mirroring of military maneuvers and increasing geopolitical and diplomatic jostling have done little to ease tensions.

For instance, China’s nationalist tabloid the Global Times, in a recent editorial on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Beijing and Thimphu on a three-step process towards settling their border dispute, declared that “China-Bhutan border negotiations can yield results without India’s intervention”. The accompanying cartoon showed a sulking elephant (India) standing alone as two gentlemen (presumably Bhutan and China) happily shook hands.

Noting that the agreement would pave the way for China and Bhutan to finally establish long overdue “diplomatic relations”, the editorial cautioned India against trying to derail the process by “again [putting] pressure on Bhutan and [infringing] on its sovereignty” and expressed its wish not “to see India continue with a regional hegemonic image in the international community”.

The Global Times’ extensive coverage also included another article on the China-Bhutan MoU which argued that the boundary talks would give India “less chances or excuses to make troubles over border areas”, adding that “[u]nsolved China-Bhutan boundary issues were used as an excuse by India to attack China during the Doklam standoff in 2017”.

Meanwhile, despite Chinese propaganda, India’s response to China’s agreement with Bhutan has been muted. India’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson did not respond to the question on whether Bhutan had kept India informed about the developments but said India had “noted” the agreement.

Imposing reputational costs on India

The China-Bhutan agreement comes four years after Indian and Chinese troops were locked in a 73-day confrontation at the Doklam tri-junction—when China tried to construct a road in an area claimed by Bhutan. India supported Bhutan and defended its own security interests vis-a-vis China by sending in its troops to confront Chinese units there, thus pushing the two nuclear-armed neighbours to the brink of war. When India and China did disengage from Doklam, it was seen globally as a diplomatic victory for India.

China’s public rhetoric back then, too, was acerbic. Senior Colonel Zhou Bo—an honorary fellow with the PLA Academy of Military Science—was quoted by Indian analysts as saying Doklam “was not even a tactical victory for India” because “the disputed border was not on China’s strategic radar”. But the Doklam standoff had “provided China with a lesson on reconsidering its security concerns”. Translation—China would expedite its infrastructure fortifications all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Beijing did subsequently construct model villages in Tibet, of which 200 have reportedly come up along the LAC with India, some along the border with India’s Arunachal Pradesh (which China claims entirely as Southern Tibet), and some in Bhutan and Nepal. Using Google Imagery, China watchers identified Chinese land reclamation attempts in Bhutan around 12 kilometres beyond the Tibet-Bhutan border. The remote area developed for “villages” were speculated to be “extensions of military cantonments” to be used in case of “escalation” and to strengthen Chinese territorial claims. The reverse slope occupied by China in the Doklam plateau was also confirmed to be fortified into a proper base and perhaps an artillery holding position too.

I have argued in an earlier article that Chinese provocations in India’s neighbourhood, coupled with building economic and infrastructure inroads, have been part of China’s attempt to impose reputational costs on India, aside from securing its own strategic and commercial interests in the Indian Ocean Region. These undercut India’s global aspirations. In turn, China believes providing asylum to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugee community are Indian attempts to impose reputational costs on China and mar its global image.

Blame games over deadlock, militaries “here to stay”

The latest round of military talks in October failed to deliver any breakthroughs. Even worse, both sides have blamed the other for the setbacks.

PLA Senior Colonel Long Shaohua, spokesperson for the Western Theatre Command, praised China’s sincerity of effort while blaming India for making “unreasonable and unrealistic demands, which added difficulties to the negotiations”. Reiterating that China would stand firm on “sovereignty” issues (contrary to the earlier Chinese phrasing of the conflict as a “territorial issue”), he warned India against “misjudging the situation” and urged it to “abide by the relevant agreements and consensus”. An article in the Global Times went one step further, stating that India “will not get the border the way it wants”.

India’s official response didn’t hold back either, blaming the “unilateral attempts of [the] Chinese side to alter the status quo” and their “violation of the bilateral agreements” for the prolonged standoff. Arguing that India had “made constructive suggestions”, New Delhi accused the Chinese side for not bringing “any forward-looking proposals” to the table.

India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar at a media conclave recently said that a year after Galwan “there is still no credible explanation as to why they [China] chose to bring that size of forces to that sector of our border”. He also admitted that while progress was made “in a few areas”, “the larger problem remains which is a very sizeable Chinese force close to, if not at, the LAC”. Both Jaishankar and India’s Army Chief Gen. Naravane spoke of China’s increasing militarisation all along the LAC and its infrastructure build up, and cautioned that this would mean a more volatile and “active” border, though not as active as India’s border with Pakistan. He warned that it will be a difficult winter, “but if they are there to stay, we are there to stay too.”

While both sides disengaged from Pangong Tso in February 2021, the two armies still have 50,000 to 60,000 troops each on the ground and equipped with advanced weaponry. In June 2021, media outlets reported that China had “conducted over 100 drills this year close to the border”, including one with 1,000 troops in the Tibet Autonomous Region, to improve Chinese troops' combat capabilities in extreme weather conditions.

LAC now live, focus shifts east

India’s Eastern Army Commander Lt. Gen. Manoj Pande told the media on October 19, 2021 that while the situation remains tense in Ladakh, the PLA is scaling up its training exercises in the eastern sector, bringing in multiple military assets along the LAC and preparing for joint operations. There has been a rise of drills in in-depth areas. With patrolling ramped up, reports of face-offs in the eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh and elsewhere are increasing.

For example, Indian and Chinese troops faced off briefly at the LAC near Yangtse in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, ahead of the 13th round of military talks. The altercation lasted for a few hours, and India reportedly detained a few PLA soldiers. This incident comes just weeks after an incursion at Barahoti in Uttarakhand, in the middle sector, in August 2021 when PLA troops crossed over the LAC into Indian-held territory and remained there for a few hours before leaving.

As China ups the ante, the Indian army is ramping up deployment of high-tech platforms, with satellites, long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, and surveillance and reconnaissance systems being used to monitor and match Chinese deployments and activities. Gen. Pande also confirmed that the Indian Army's new mountain strike corps is fully operational, and the force is also looking at the integrated battle group (IBG) model to enhance operational efficiency.

India has in addition dismissed Chinese MFA remarks on objections to the Indian vice president’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, saying that “[o]bjecting to the visit of Indian leaders to a state of India does not stand to reason and understanding of [the] Indian people”.

With reports of the PLA “holding live fire-drill on Tibetan plateau and testing air defence equipment against possible Indian air raids, stepping up night drills and deploying more advanced weapon systems” as well as “building new winter-proof shelter for troops in the friction points”, it seems clear that Chinese military readiness will continue to be on display in the months ahead.

Amidst a protracted deadlock, troops on both sides look set to withstand a long winter. In the absence of a thaw in ties, the drumbeats of war seem to linger in the air.

Shruti Pandalai is an Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She works on India’s foreign and security policy including Information Warfare in India-China relations and sharp power contestation in the Indo-Pacific. Her twitter handle is @shrutipandalai.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

China passes law to strengthen border security amid ongoing tensions with India and terrorism fears
South China Morning Post, October 24

The law permits the use of blockades and “police apparatus and weapons” against those who cross its borders illegally.

Strategic Sela Tunnel for Tawang to be completed by mid-2022
The Times of India, October 21

The project will bolster all-weather connectivity and allow for swifter military deployments to the critical Tawang and Kameng regions of Arunachal Pradesh along the border with China.

Army strengthens fire power along LAC including Tawang
The Hindu, October 20

This includes upgraded L-70 air defence guns, M777 Ultra Light Howitzers, and automated and electronic fusion of Bofors and other artillery guns deployed along the LAC.

China opposes Indian leader's visit to disputed border area
CGTN, October 13

China said on Wednesday (October 13) that it firmly opposes Indian vice president's visit to the disputed region of ‘Arunachal Pradesh’, urging India to refrain from moves that complicate boundary issues and bring China-India relations back on the right track and steady development.

Wang Yi: AUKUS pact will surely cause risk of nuclear proliferation
CGTN, October 22

Wang Yi tells British counterpart Liz Truss that the alliance with the US and Australia could ‘trigger an arms race and provoke confrontation’.

China backs ‘no first use’ nuclear policy, calls on nations to cut warhead stockpile
South China Morning Post, October 22

In the “Position Paper on China and United Nations Cooperation” issued by the foreign ministry on Friday, China declared it had a history of initiating the no first use (NFU) principle, and said nuclear-weapon states should abandon pre-emptive deterrence policies.

China Has Been Aggressor Along Himalayan Border, Says US Diplomat
NDTV, October 21

China, the US diplomat said, seeks to become the most powerful military, economic, and political actor in the Indo Pacific.

China did not test hypersonic nuclear missile, foreign ministry says
South China Morning Post, October 18

China tested a space vehicle for possible reuse, not a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile as reported by the Financial Times, ministry says.

MoU on China-Bhutan boundary talks 'breaks deadlock caused by India, paves way for diplomatic ties'
Global Times, October 15

China and Bhutan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a Three-Step Roadmap to help speed up boundary talks that have been heavily delayed, during a virtual meeting held on Thursday (October 14).

China outlines strategy to meet economic challenges, from power crisis to Evergrande woes
South China Morning Post, October 26

Chinese state media have released a 10 point article outlining how the government is managing economic risks.

Trade with China up 49%, Shringla red-flags deficit
The Times of India, October 22

With a deficit at $47 billion in the first nine months of this year, it is the largest deficit India has with any country.

UBS says India's equity valuations are unattractive, double upgrades China
The Economic Times, October 21

The foreign brokerage assigned an ‘underweight’ to India while double upgrading the rating for China equities to 'overweight'.

China's Q3 economic growth slows to 4.9%, misses expectations
Reuters, October 18

China’s economy grew slower than expected in the third quarter, official data showed on Monday (October 18), as power outages and supply bottlenecks hurt factories while sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks weighed on consumption.

China’s energy crisis to help Indian chemical, steel firms
Mint, October 18

Indian chemical and steel manufacturers would witness growth because of a reduction in supply by Chinese counterparts, according to industry analysts.

As power shortages in China ease, India is still grappling with supply bottlenecks
Global Times, October 25

While China has taken measures to resolve its power shortage, with the effects gradually emerging, its neighbor, India, which faces the same problem, remains in trouble.

Reliance Industries  set  to  take on Chinese solar PV makers
Mint, October 15

After stitching four clean energy deals and a partnership, Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) now sees its solar photovoltaic (PV) jigsaw complete.

COP15: biodiversity summit in China ends with UN hailing ‘renewed optimism’
South China Morning Post, October 15

Conference yielded a joint pledge to reverse loss of animal and plant species by 2030, and a US$230 million donation by China to a biodiversity fund.

China launches first solar exploration satellite
Xinhua, October 14

China sent its first solar exploration satellite into space from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in north China's Shanxi Province on Thursday (October 14).

As India Scrambles To Dig Up More Coal, A Warning By Top Energy Agency
NDTV, October 13

The energy agency report strongly calls on nations to decarbonise the energy sector rapidly to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius over average temperatures about 150 years ago.

How to make the Quad truly quadrilateral
Nikkei Asia, October 22

By Husanjot Chahal and Ngor Luong, Research Analysts, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University

Japan, India and Australia must learn to share technology with each other.

Is New Delhi finally calling out Beijing for its bad behaviour?
Money Control, October 20

By Jabin T. Jacob, Associate Professor, Shiv Nadar University

A major change in tone and tenor in New Delhi’s response to China’s activities across India’s borders is evident, especially if one compares the latest Ministry of External Affairs statement with one from just a year ago.

Economic decoupling to self-strengthening, how India can rise to China challenge
The Times of India, October 16

By Shivshankar Menon, Visiting Professor, Ashoka University; former NSA and Foreign Secretary of India

The China challenge is likely to be the most significant issue in India’s external security policies in the coming decade.

The Quad, AUKUS, and India’s Dilemmas
Council on Foreign Relations, October 13 

By Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Associate Professor, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University

The partnership India has forged with the United States, Australia, and Japan appears to be gaining momentum, but some challenges remain.

Tensions with US, Japan won’t distract China from border issue with India
Global Times, October 13

By Long Xingchun, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University; and President, Chengdu Institute of World Affairs

If India wants to take advantage of a third-party factor to make unreasonable demands, the protracted border standoff will bring no good to India's long-term development.

China’s missile silos and the Sino-Indian nuclear competition
War on the Rocks, October 13

By Debak Das, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University

How will India react to Beijing’s new missile silos?

China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2021

By Deep Pal, PhD candidate, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington 

The Carnegie Endowment project “China’s Impact on Strategic Regions” comes at a time when states across several regions of the globe are experiencing China’s increased involvement in their polities, economies, and societies, and the consequences that such engagement brings with it. Over the last decade, China has developed a greater variety of interests and more connections than ever with countries, including in parts of Europe and South Asia. With these new channels of influence, it has developed expectations of exceptional consideration for its interests and is willing to exercise pressure in its pursuit for special treatment. 

This paper builds on the research carried out through focus groups, extensive interviews, and detailed archival analysis and media mapping in four South Asian states—Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka—to learn from their rapidly evolving relationships with China, as well as explore the impact of Chinese influence cross-nationally and comparatively. All four countries have distinctive vulnerabilities. In some, state institutions are brittle. In others, civil society provides an inadequate check on the actions and powers of the state. Elsewhere, elites are prone to capture, including by external actors, such as China and its proxies. The study attempts to make sense of deepening Chinese activism by framing it in terms of the impact it has on the vulnerabilities in these states. 

The paper aims to understand how China leverages specific vulnerabilities in these four states for its interests; how these vulnerabilities can be remedied; and how the states can share and learn from each other’s experiences to strengthen their individual and collective hand. Ultimately, the paper hopes to offer policy recommendations that aid the countries in discouraging unproductive Chinese actions and influences, while engendering the kind of engagement that is in their interest. The recommendations are also directed toward the United States and its strategic partners to help strengthen these states’ independence of action, bargaining power, and development.

Research Handbook on the Belt and Road Initiative
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021

Edited by Joseph Chinyong Liow, Tan Kah Kee Chair Professor of Comparative and International Politics, College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University; Hong Liu, Tan Lark Sye Chair Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs and Director, Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, Nanyang Technological University; Gong Xue, Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University 

This timely Research Handbook investigates the radically transformative impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), addressing key questions regarding its economic, political and strategic consequences: What does the Chinese government hope to achieve with the BRI? How have recipient states responded? And what are its potential opportunities and risks?

Bringing together prominent international scholars and analysts, this Research Handbook arrives at a critical time in the infrastructural development of the BRI, shedding light on its influence in the future of global politics and economics. Chapters unpack the role of the BRI in Chinese foreign policy, placing infrastructural development at the centre of regional affairs, great power dynamics and economic and investment trends. Employing geopolitical and diplomatic modes of investigation, it offers critical and holistic views of the progress and challenges of the BRI’s implementation and its implications on the world stage.

Providing an innovative global viewpoint on the BRI, this Research Handbook offers cutting-edge perspectives for scholars and students of political science, particularly those investigating the latest developments in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Its practical insights and broad empirical analysis will also benefit policymakers and think tank analysts working in the field.