In September 2021, India participated in the key summits of two quite different security groups with divergent agendas. First, between 16 and 17 September, India’s Defence and Foreign Ministers attended the 20th Anniversary Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), with Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressing the Head of Government plenary session virtually. India also contributed 200 troops to the SCO’s joint military exercise ‘Peace Mission-2021’ held between 13 and 25 September. Then on 24 September, Modi travelled to Washington D.C. to attend the first in-person Leaders’ Summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad). This came off the back of the successful ‘Malabar-21’ naval exercises, for which India sent two ships, which has become the de-facto mechanism for joint military exercises for the Quad members.
In both summits, discussions largely focused on the issue of the Taliban’s recent takeover in Afghanistan and the human security initiatives that each group aims to develop. Despite these ostensible areas of convergence, most geopolitical analysts view the two geopolitical groups as representing conflicting interests and agendas. Specifically, the SCO is often viewed as a vehicle for China, and to a lesser extent Russia, to augment and project their power by ensuring a cortege of friendly and stable states within Central Asia. Earlier predictions that the SCO would become an ‘autocratic alliance’ or an ‘anti-NATO bloc’ to counter the US interests has proven largely overblown. Instead, the SCO has been primarily focused on maintaining the regime security of its members by political-economic cooperation and a focus on combating the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. In practice, this has seen intelligence sharing, cooperation between member’s security organisations, and annual military exercises to gain valuable experience for their troops. However, it is believed by observers that this security cooperation is also being used to coordinate repression of domestic opposition and dissidents within many of the member states.
In contrast, the Quad is a semi-formal coalition between the major Indo-Pacific democracies that has formed over converging interests, namely, to protect the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and rule’s-based order generally. Comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, the Quad initially formed after the four countries successfully coordinated the response to the 2004 tsunami and began looking for other maritime security issues they could collaborate on to address. However, the Quad was discontinued in 2009, partly to assuage Chinese concerns that it was being actively contained and partly because each member had their reasons not to further commit at that stage. By November 2017, the geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific had changed and the four states found their interests increasingly converging, prompting them to restart their active engagement. Since then, the Quad has conducted multiple joint ministerial level dialogues and military-to-military engagements. There are multiple threats recognised by the Quad, including pandemic responses, terrorism, and organised crime. Yet the clear, but rarely directly acknowledged, common interest for all four states is their desire to resist China’s growing influence and assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific.
Thus, India’s regional multilateral participation has found itself in an apparent paradox. On one hand, it is an active member of one group that China clearly uses to create a favourable strategic environment for itself by securing the often-despotic regimes within Central Asia. On the other hand, India is a founding member of another group with the tacit goal of checking the expansion of China’s power and upholding the liberal world order. Whilst rare, it is not unheard of for a country to simultaneously participate in multiple organisations and forums that exist in tension with each other. However, India’s recent and continuing active involvement with both the SCO and the Quad is an interesting development for two key reasons.
Firstly, India’s traditional policy has been to avoid joining multilateral movements that appear aligned with any one superpower, preferring a policy of ‘non-alignment’ in order to preserve their strategic autonomy. India’s reticence in joining multilateral security organisations has gradually been dropped under the Modi government, leading to India joining both the SCO and relaunched Quad in 2017. Nonetheless, India clearly remains uncomfortable with fully committing to multilateral security groups, in part because it remains concerned aligning too closely with one power and potentially alienating regional partners such as Iran.
Secondly, India has several issues with members within each group that often ensures that it is not on the same page as its partners and could seriously impact its willingness to cooperate. India’s tense border standoffs with China and active rivalry with Pakistan throws a major spanner in the works for the SCO, making security cooperation between them awkward and tense at best. Whilst India harbours no animosity to the other states in the Quad, it has remained clearly sceptical of its partners’ commitment, especially Australia, concerned that they may prove to be fair-weather friends. These concerns have ensured that concrete consensus within the Quad was often elusive, as evidenced by the tendency for each state to issue separate summaries rather than agree to joint statements prior to 2021.
Nonetheless, India ostensibly seems committed to walking the fine line between the two groups, for the time being at least. There has been curiously little direct commentary on this dynamic from academics or pundits but several possible explanations for India’s membership. One likely explanation is that India is simply compartmentalising its interests, using the SCO for its multilateral security engagement with Asia whilst using the Quad to further its maritime interests in the Indo-Pacific. Alternatively, India’s simultaneous participation in the SCO and Quad could be an example of it hedging its bets. Indeed, by engaging both groups, India can ensure strategic autonomy and avoid becoming too closely enmeshed with one side in the emerging geopolitical rivalry.
Whilst both the above explanations likely have some truth to them, India’s recent behaviour in both groups indicates that it sees them primarily as means for engaging in dialogue with key players in its neighbourhood rather than potential rival alignments. Indeed, India’s External Affairs Minister declared last year that he viewed the Quad as primarily a forum for the likeminded countries to discuss common foreign policies, with efforts to calculate its military potential being misguided. Similarly, for India the SCO has become something of a safe space for it to engage in dialogue with states that it would otherwise have trouble talking to directly. Most notably, India and China have used the SCO as an opportunity to conduct bilateral meetings on the sidelines to de-escalate the 2020-2021 Sino-Indian border crisis. Furthermore, the SCO has provided a useful channel of communication between the two states whilst they officially keep relations at a ‘low ebb’ during the ongoing border standoff.
However, with US-China relations remaining strained and China recently conducting aggressive posturing against the Taiwan ‘separatist’ government, it is unclear how long India will be able to keep its commitments to both the SCO and Quad compatible.
Dr. Stephen P. Westcott is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia.
The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.
News Reports
Bilateral relations
India, China army talks to defuse border tensions fail
Channel News Asia, October 11
Since February, both India and China have withdrawn troops from some face-off sites on the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso, Gogra and Galwan Valley, but they continue to maintain extra troops as part of a multi-tier deployment.
Large scale Chinese build-up along LAC continues to be in place: Army chief Gen Naravane
Wion, October 10
General Naravane declared that the Indian Army is keeping a close eye on the Chinese activities at the border while adding that, “if they are there to stay, we are there to stay too”.
India, China had brief face-off in Tawang last week: Reports
Yahoo News, October 8
The engagement reportedly lasted for a few hours before the issue was resolved at a local commander-level talk.
Chinese still deployed at 3 air bases facing Ladakh, building infra: IAF chief
The Indian Express, October 6
On the development of airfields by the PLAAF in the Tibet Autonomous Region, Chaudhari said although “hardened aircraft shelters are being built”, China's “capability to launch regular missions from high altitude airfields will remain a weak area for them”
Chinese ambassador calls for joint efforts to bring China-India ties back on track
Xinhua, September 30
Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Weidong has called for joint efforts to bring China-India relations back on track of healthy and stable development so as to benefit the two countries and their people.
News Reports
China and India in the Region
With eye on China, US thinks twice about sanctioning India for Russian missile system
South China Morning Post, October 7
US may have concluded that upsetting a friend in the Indo-Pacific was not worth the risk after controversial Aukus alliance and exit from Afghanistan.
US and India ‘like-minded’, will challenge China when it undermines interests: US Dy Secretary of State
India Today, October 7
Speaking at a session of the USIBC India Ideas Summit, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said, “We'll compete vigorously with China where we should, we will cooperate with China where it's in our interest to do so”.
Aggressiveness, coercive nature of China is frequent topic of discussion among Quad says Pentagon
The Hindu, October 1
India, the US and several other world powers have been talking about the need to ensure a free, open and thriving Indo-Pacific in the backdrop of China’s rising military manoeuvring in the region.
India counters China in Sri Lanka with $700 million port deal
Mint, October 1
An Indian company entered into a US$700 million deal on Thursday (September 30) to build a strategic deep-sea container terminal in Sri Lanka, officials said, in a move seen as countering China's rising influence in the region.
‘Australia, India don’t want to constrain China’: PM Morrison says Beijing can be Quad ‘partner’
The Print, September 30
Just a week after first in-person Quad summit, Australian PM Scott Morrison says Canberra not in ‘containment club’ when it comes to China since it has 'greatly benefited' from it.
News Reports
Trade and Economy
Government's Big Shift On Trade Amid China Row, Taliban Takeover
NDTV, October 11
India is racing to wrap up a clutch of quick-fire bilateral trade pacts by the end of March, officials said, as economic necessity spurs a shift from New Delhi's usual go-slow approach on trade deals.
India courts chip-makers with Taiwan and Quad on its side, as it takes on China
South China Morning Post, October 10
New Delhi is reportedly in talks with Taipei for a US$7.5 billion deal as part of a vision to become a new semiconductor manufacturing hub.
China-made electric vehicles should not be sold in India: Modi govt to Elon Musk
Wion, October 8
Union minister Nitin Gadkari claimed on Friday that Tesla has been told not to sell vehicles made in China in India and to instead make them here.
India, Australia to include e-commerce in final free trade pact
Business Standard, October 3
The two countries have agreed to have an interim or early harvest trade agreement by Christmas and final free trade agreement or Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) by the end of 2022.
News Reports
Energy and Environment
Reliance’s new energy thrust to help make India self-reliant in green goals
Money Control, October 11
The acquisitions of Norwegian company REC Solar Holdings and India’s Sterling & Wilson Solar, exceeding $1 billion, will bring in-house capabilities for meeting Reliance’s target of 100 GW of solar energy capacity at Jamnagar by 2030.
India is on the brink of an energy crisis, as coal reserves hit critical lows
Fortune, October 9
India’s Central Electricity Authority (CEA) warned that coal reserves at over half of the country’s power plants could burn out in three days or less as a post-pandemic surge in manufacturing spiked demand for power and caught power producers off guard.
China digs in on coal, oil gains as energy crisis deepens
Reuters, October 8
China ordered miners in Inner Mongolia to ramp up coal production and oil prices jumped on Friday (October 12) as a record surge in the cost of gas revived demand for the most polluting fossil fuels to keep factories open and homes heated.
Indonesia, India below average in plastics management ranking
Nikkei Asia, October 5
Asia lags behind Europe in managing the life cycle of plastics—from production to waste—with Indonesia and India scoring below average in a report on 25 countries worldwide, released Tuesday (October 5).
India snags cheap Australian coal sitting at Chinese ports
Mint, October 2
India is buying Australian coal that’s been stranded inside China for months, according to people who have made the purchases, spotlighting how geopolitics is complicating Beijing’s battle against an energy supply crisis.
Analyses
A ‘Taiwan flashpoint’ in the Indo-Pacific
The Hindu, October 11
By Shyam Saran, former Indian ambassador to Myanmar, Indonesia and Nepal and High Commissioner to Mauritius
In pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy, India needs to be mindful of the China-US equations in the region.
What China wants from Afghanistan: stability and security
South China Morning Post, October 11
By Liu Zongyi, Associate Research Fellow, Institute for International Strategic Studies and Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, Secretary General of China and South Asia Cooperation Research Center, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS)
China is less interested in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth or its potential as part of the Belt and Road Initiative than in its security, especially in the regions bordering Xinjiang.
China’s Arunachal ‘Incursion’: Why India Should Look at the Bigger Picture
The Quint, October 10
By Manoj Joshi, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
Some reports suggest that there is a great deal of pressure on the White House, particularly from the business community, for a softer approach to China. Such developments will obviously impact New Delhi’s posture.
China-Taiwan ties are in dire straits after Beijing's repeated air intrusions but India's studied silence is surprising
Firstpost, October 6
By Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor in Chinese Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
It’s surprising that New Delhi and Taipei have not come together and worked to address ‘common challenges’.
India's Taliban Problem
Project Syndicate, October 5
By Shashi Tharoor, former UN under-secretary-general and former Indian Minister of State for External Affairs and Minister of State for Human Resource Development, MP for the Indian National Congress
The Taliban’s victory over the United States in Afghanistan will not only greatly embolden their fellow jihadists, but also shake up the region’s geopolitics. In particular, an Afghanistan-Pakistan-China axis involving policy coordination would represent a major risk for India.
Books and Journals
The Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the International Order
World Scientific (2021)
By Moritz Rudolf, Postdoctoral Associate, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School
This book showcases how the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been utilizing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to reshape the global order. Dissecting China's increasingly assertive international behaviour, the book demonstrates how the PRC projects its self-perception onto the international order. The book outlines five aspects of China's international role projection, which the PRC applies selectively, depending on its target audience: (1) The bearer of traditional Chinese culture; (2) The humiliated nation; (3) The socialist state with Chinese characteristics; (4) The developing state and promoter of international development; (5) The authoritarian globalization optimist.
Drawing on an in-depth analysis of hundreds of primary BRI documents, the book offers a comprehensive overview of China's most crucial foreign policy agenda item. It demonstrates how, through the BRI, the PRC has introduced mechanisms to the international level, which reflect its domestic policy-making mode. In addition, the PRC has institutionalized the initiative by establishing China-centered BRI networks across a wide range of policy areas. Within those emerging China-centered BRI networks, the PRC systematically increases its international discursive power, for example, by inserting Chinese vocabulary into UN resolutions or by promoting Beijing's approaches vis-à-vis “the rule of law” across a range of developing states. This book also further discusses the implications of the BRI for the international legal order.
Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
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