Share

China-India Brief #188

August 28, 2021 - September 14, 2021

China-India Brief #188BRIEF #188

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
August 28, 2021 - September 14, 2021


Guest Column

Initial Taliban moves fail to convince Afghanistan’s neighbours and near-neighbours 
By James M. Dorsey      


CIB188_4Image credit: US National Archives

The Taliban’s record in recent weeks on making good on promises to respect human and women’s rights as well as uphold freedom of the press is mixed at best. Afghanistan’s neighbours and near-neighbours are not holding their breath even if some are willing to give the Central Asian country’s new rulers the benefit of the doubt.

A litmus test of Taliban willingness to compromise may come sooner than later.

It’s most likely only a matter of time before China knocks on newly appointed Afghan acting interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani’s door demanding the extradition of Uighur fighters.

The Chinese demand would be challenging not only because of the Taliban’s consistent rejection, no matter the cost, of requests for the expulsion of militants who have helped them in their battles.

The Taliban already made that clear two decades ago when they accepted the risk of a US invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 by refusing for the umpteenth time to hand over Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. There is little in Taliban 2.0 that suggests that this has changed.

If Haneef Atamar, the foreign minister in the US-backed Afghan government of former president Ashraf Ghani, is to be believed, Uighurs, including one-time fighters in Syria, contributed significantly to the Taliban’s most recent battlefield successes in northern Afghanistan.

A demand to extradite Uighurs to China would also be challenging because Mr Haqqani himself, the Afghan official in charge of internal security, is a wanted man with a $5 million US bounty on his head. Moreover, the United Nations has sanctioned Mr Haqqani’s prime minister, Mullah Hasan Akhund, and several other members of the caretaker government.

“It’s hard to see a wanted man turning over someone who is wanted for similar reasons,” said a Western diplomat.

Moreover, honouring extradition requests could threaten unity within the Taliban’s ranks. "Taliban actions against foreign jihadist groups to appease neighbouring countries would be especially controversial, because there is quite a widespread sense of solidarity and comradeship with those who fought alongside the Taliban for so long," said Afghanistan scholar Antonio Giustozzi.

Unanswered is the question of whether China would go along with what seems to be an unspoken international consensus that it may be best not to seek extraditions if the Taliban keep their word and prevent militants from striking at targets beyond Afghanistan.

Counterterrorism experts and diplomats argue that if forced, the Taliban would quietly let foreign militants leave their country rather than hand them over. That would make it difficult to monitor these individuals.

China has in recent years successfully demanded the extradition of its Turkish Muslim citizens from countries like Egypt, Malaysia, and Thailand and has pressured many more to do so even though they were not suspected of being foreign fighters and/or members of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). The United Nations Security Council has designated TIP’s predecessor, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organisation.

There is little reason to assume that China would make Afghanistan, a refuge from Syria for Uighur fighters, the exception. 

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi made that clear when he hinted at possible extradition requests during talks in July in China with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a co-founder of the Taliban and the new government’s first deputy prime minister. Mr Wang demanded that the Taliban break relations with all militant groups and take resolute action against the TIP.

Moreover, the Taliban may have destroyed any chance of Chinese reliance on them by demonstrating early on that they and the international community may be speaking different languages even if they use the same words.

The Taliban made clear that their definition of inclusivity, a term the group and the international community, including China, Russia and India, appeared to agree on, was very different. The Taliban formed an overwhelming ethnic, all-male government that was anything but inclusive by the universally agreed meaning of the word.

Similarly, Mr Haqqani and his colleagues, including Qari Fasihuddin Badakhshani, the Afghan military’s new Taliban chief of staff, a Tajik and one of only three non-Pashtuns in the new 33-member government structure, is believed to have close ties to Uighur, Pakistani and other militants

As a result, they are likely to be equally reticent about entertaining Chinese-backed Pakistan requests for the transfer of members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), more commonly known as the Pakistani Taliban.

The TTP is a coalition of Pashtun Islamist groups with close ties to the Afghan Taliban that last year joined forces with several other militant Pakistani groups, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a violently anti-Shiite Sunni Muslim supremacist organization. 

Hazara Shiites, who account for 20 percent of the Afghan population were not included in the newly appointed Afghan government even though the Taliban made a point of last month protecting Shiite religious celebrations. Nonetheless, the Taliban’s notion of inclusivity has already troubled relations with Iran and could persuade the Islamic republic to covertly support resistance to the group’s rule.

China fears that the fallout of the Taliban’s sweep across Afghanistan could affect China beyond Afghanistan’s borders, perhaps no more so than in Pakistan, a major focus of the People’s Republic’s single largest Belt-and Road-related investment.

The killing in July of nine Chinese nationals in an attack on a bus transporting Chinese workers to the construction site of a dam in the northern mountains of Pakistan raised the spectre of Afghanistan-based religious militants jihadists targeting China. Until now, it was mainly Baloch nationalists who targeted the Chinese in Pakistan.

The attack occurred amid fears that the Taliban victory would bolster ultra-conservative religious sentiment in Pakistan where many celebrated the group’s success in the hope that it would boost chances for austere religious rule in the world’s second-most populous Muslim-majority state.

“Our jihadis will be emboldened. They will say that ‘if America can be beaten, what is the Pakistan army to stand in our way?’” said a senior Pakistani official.

Indicating concern in Beijing, China has delayed the signing of a framework agreement on industrial cooperation that would have accelerated the implementation of projects that are part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a crown jewel of the People’s Republic’s transportation, telecommunications and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid recently kept the Taliban’s relationship with the TTP ambiguous.

"The issue of the TTP is one that Pakistan will have to deal with, not Afghanistan. It is up to Pakistan, and Pakistani Islamic scholars and religious figures, not the Taliban, to decide on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their war and to formulate a strategy in response," Mr Mujahid said during an interview on a Pakistani television program. The spokesman stopped short of saying the Taliban would abide by a decision of the scholars.

Afghan sources suggest that the Taliban advised the TTP to restrict their fight to Pakistani soil and have offered to negotiate with the Pakistan government an amnesty and the return of the Pakistani militants to the South Asian nation.   

Uncertainty about where the Taliban may be taking Afghanistan has also cast a shadow over Indian hopes that the Iranian port of Chabahar would facilitate trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia and counterbalance the Chinese-supported Pakistani port of Gwadar.

Eager to maintain leverage in its relations with Pakistan as well as China, Taliban official Sher Mohammed Abbas Stanekzai chose his words carefully by stressing that economics should be at the centre of Afghan-Indian relations. “We give due importance to our political, economic and trade ties with India and we want these ties to continue. We are looking forward to working with India in this regard,” Mr Stanekzai said.

Mr. Stanekzai’s business-focused approach coupled with the pressure on Taliban to police militants on Afghan soil, some of whom have attacked India in the past, dovetails with Islamic scholars in the Deobandi alma mater in the Uttar Pradesh town of Deoband stressing the divide between themselves and their Afghan and Pakistani brethren. 

The Indian Deobandi posture created an opportunity that the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has yet to grasp to involve them in India’s backchannel and direct contacts with the Taliban. India invested US$3 billion over the last 20 years in building Afghan roads, girls' schools and health clinics. Mr. Stanekzai’s remarks indicate that the Taliban would like India to continue its investments in the country.

The Taliban as well as a significant number of Pakistani ultra-conservatives root their worldview in Deobandism, a strand of Islam that emerged in India in the mid-19th century to oppose British colonial rule by propagating an austere interpretation of the faith. Deobandism became prevalent among Pashtuns even if Deobandis in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India went their separate ways after the 1947 partition of the subcontinent.

Arshad Madani, the principal of the Darul Uloom Deoband, the original Deobandi madrassa established in 1886, recently welcomed a decision by India’s Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) to set up a training centre in Deoband.

“There is nothing wrong with what we teach, and we welcome the ATS staff to be a part of our classes whenever they like,” Mr. Madani said. A spokesman for the madrassa added that “we are a religious school, but we are also Indians. To doubt our integrity every time the Taliban spread terror is shameful.”

Mr. Madani’s posture should serve as an incentive for the Modi government to work with Indian Deobandis in the hope that the Taliban may be more willing to listen to religious figures with whom they share a history.

Mr. Madani has never had contact with the Taliban nor has he ever visited Afghanistan. “I'm weak and old,” says the 80-year-old cleric. “But if given the chance, I would go to Afghanistan.”


Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar and a Senior Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute.


Guest Column

The overlooked triangle: China, India, and the EU 
By Daniel Balazs and Xue Gong      


CIB188_2Image credit: Flickr/European Parliament

China-India relations have witnessed a downturn in recent years, reaching their lowest point during the bloody Galwan skirmish in June 2020. The two rising Asian nations are emerging global players, hence the repercussions of their confrontation go further than their bilateral relationship: analysts have pointed out that the clash possibly pushed India toward greater strategic cooperation with Washington and the QUAD. Going beyond the often discussed China US India triangle, Sino Indian tensions have brought forth a new dynamic: the emergence of the China-EU-India triangle. As the EU wants to boost its profile as an Indo-Pacific player, it seeks to bolster ties with India, especially against the backdrop of deteriorating EU-China ties. The current trajectory of the China EU India strategic triangle suggests that parallel to a downward trend in EU-China relations, we could be seeing the advent of a golden era of EU-India ties. 

China-India relations have been going downhill for a while. The relationship has been faring relatively well on the shaky basis laid down at the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi visit, but tensions have been building up after 2012 on multiple fronts. First, India has been wary about China’s emerging profile in the Indian Ocean and burgeoning cooperation with regional countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Second, the two parties have different visions about regional connectivity. India has been one of the few states that distances itself from China’s Belt and Road Initiative—a grand enterprise aimed at connecting Africa, Asia, and Europe. Finally, the once dormant border dispute has increasingly become a source of tensions. The two sides engaged in bloodless standoffs in 2013, 2014 and 2015. In the summer of 2017, the two militaries stood eye-to-eye for 73 days on the Doklam Plateau, with the spectre of war lingering in the air. Tensions peaked last June when the two militaries clashed, claiming twenty Indian and four Chinese lives. 

Given that the two countries have large populations, booming economies and formidable militaries, their bilateral frictions trickle beyond their boundaries. In the wake of the Galwan clash, India reconsidered its strategic ties and moved to boost cooperation with major actors like the US, Japan, Australia—and a relatively new player in the equation, the EU. 

New Delhi’s timing was opportune for two reasons. First, the EU’s stance on China has been hardening. The EU uses a “multi-faceted approach” toward China by treating it as a rival, competitor, and partner. This slogan means that the EU is trying to cooperate with China in areas of mutual interest, such as climate change or the promotion of multilateralism. At the same time, it is putting pressure on China in areas of disagreement such as human rights and democracy. The EU’s sanctions, together with those of the United States, Britain, and Canada on Chinese officials for alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the ban on Xinjiang products such as cotton and tomatoes, were perceived in China as actions from hostile foreign forces defaming and curtailing China’s rise. In response, China imposed sanctions on European NGOs and individuals, including several members of the European Parliament. Overall, the EU-China relationship has been notoriously difficult to manage, and frictions manifested in the temporary halt in ratifying the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Second, the EU is in the process of establishing itself as full-fledged Indo-Pacific actor, as witnessed by the April adoption of the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. With its “strategy for cooperation”, the EU strives to promote a holistic agenda involving digital transformation, green initiatives and of course, security partnerships. Such an endeavour needs buy-in from regional states, among whom, India plays a key role. 

Against this backdrop, India’s outreach was more than welcome in the EU. This May, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in a summit with the EU in a unique format, where not only the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission were present but also all the 27 leaders of the EU Member States. This setup has a symbolic meaning that signals the high value EU leaders attach to their relationship with India. The participants of the summit proposed multiple areas of enhanced cooperation between Brussels and New Delhi, such as connectivity, trade as well as security and defence cooperation. In other words, the EU and India laid down the foundation of comprehensive joint ambitions for years to come. 

The picture we see folding out is an EU tilt toward New Delhi. Such a development has key repercussions for all the actors involved. As far as Brussels is concerned, this trend puts the EU’s approach to rivalries into a new context. The EU has been reluctant to pick sides in the China-US rivalry, but in the China-India context, it appears that it is no longer equidistant between the two Asian giants. Brussels could win a close friendship with New Delhi and bolster its Indo Pacific profile, but it might come at a price of drifting further away from Beijing. 

An EU tilt toward India puts China into an unenviable position. The EU is a valuable partner, given its significant trade clout and 400 million strong market. Further frictions between Brussels and Beijing could deepen the extant schism between the two parties. At the same time, India might become more intransigent in the China-India relationship if major players take its side. 

India has a lot to gain from a close friendship with the EU, such as an important trade partner, a companion in connectivity projects and the further diversification of strategic partnerships. Nevertheless, the EU’s friendship will not come without expectations, such as improvement of the human rights situation and more ambitious climate commitments from New Delhi. 

If these trends persist, we could be witnessing transformative changes in the international system. With the EU entering the game, the Indo-Pacific is about to host a fledgling strategic actor that brings its own digital, inclusive, and green agenda to the area. With the new role however, comes new responsibilities. If Brussels tilts further toward New Delhi and away from Beijing, the Sino-Indian rift could become more pronounced—a bad combination for two neighbouring great powers sharing a disputed border. The negative implications of this trend could be countered by looking for areas of agreement and cooperation between all three parties. Common efforts toward tackling climate change are a prime suspect in this regard. Regardless of the directions of their next steps, the actors must tread carefully. In the intricate web of Indo-Pacific strategic affairs, bilateral actions can go beyond the relationship and shape the behaviour of third players
.


Dr. Daniel Balazs is a recent PhD graduate of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), in Singapore. Dr. Xue Gong is an Assistant Professor and Deputy Coordinator of the International Political Economy Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), in Singapore.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

China changes Western Theatre Commander again
India Today, September 8

This is the fourth time that the Chinese President, who is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), changed the top General since the India-China standoff in Ladakh last year.

China-India border: PLA troops, jets, artillery ‘send warning shot with Tibet drill’
South China Morning Post, September 8

Chinese fighter jets dropped missiles, troops brought down drones and ground force howitzers made precision strikes during a high-altitude drill by the Tibet Military District intended as a warning to India, according to military observers.

Galwan took India-China ties in different direction: EAM
The Times of India, September 7

The Galwan clash last year took the Sino-Indian bilateral ties in a completely different direction, foreign minister S. Jaishankar said on Monday (September 6).

India wants solution to border dispute with China through dialogue, won't allow unilateral action on LAC: Defence Minister
The Economic Times, August 30

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on Monday (August 30) that India wants a solution to the border dispute with China through dialogue and asserted that the government would never allow the sanctity of borders to be violated.

 

News Reports

China and India in the Region

India, Australia Deepen Defense, Trade Ties Amid China Tensions
BloombergQuint, September 11

India invited Australia to jointly develop and produce defense equipment and the two nations plan to expand cooperation in military information and logistics, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh told reporters on Saturday (September 11).

Chinese FM Wang Yi starts tour in Southeast Asia to boost ties
Global Times, September 10

Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi commenced week-long official tour in four neighboring countries on Friday (September 10) with the first stop in Vietnam.

Sri Lanka looks to bolster India defence ties amid China threat
The Economic Times, September 6

According to new strategy paper drafted under Sri Lanka's new high commissioner Milinda Moragoda, the island nation is looking to bolster defence and security ties with India amid growing concerns of China's footprint in the region.

US, India okay to cede Kabul to China-Pakistan if terrorism is canned
The Times of India, September 5

The US and India are reconciled to ceding their influence in Afghanistan to China, Pakistan and so long as the territory is not used to foster terrorism.

India, Singapore conduct major naval exercise near South China Sea
The Times of India, September 4

The SIMBEX exercise took place on the southern fringes of the South China Sea from September 2 to 4.

China Opens Rail Line With Access to Indian Ocean via Myanmar
The Irrawaddy, August 30

A new rail line providing China with access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar was opened on August 25 on the Chinese side of the border.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

BRICS to get China digital push
China Daily, September 7

China will work with its partners to push for the implementation of Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025, to reinforce intra-platform cooperation, and seize opportunities in emerging fields like digital and green technologies for more growth potential.

Trade between China, India continues to grow, despite cold bilateral ties
Global Times, September 7

Trade between the two countries continues to rise, with the trade from January to August growing 51.9 percent on a yearly basis, according to data released by China's customs on Tuesday (September 7).

Multiplying crackdowns haven't stopped cash pouring into China
The Straits Times, September 4

For all the short-term pain and disruption, there is a belief that President Xi Jinping's campaign for "common prosperity" could help China sustain longer-term expansion.

India becomes third largest startup ecosystem in the world
The Times of India, September 3

Over the last year, India has added three unicorns every month taking the total count to 51.

India fast-tracks trade deals as COVID-19 upends economy
The Straits Times, September 2

Fuelled by the coronavirus pandemic that has upended the economy and concerns of being shut out from global markets, India is fast-tracking negotiations with the the United Arab Emirates, Britain, Australia, Canada and the European Union, said a top official.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

China and India send coal prices soaring amid green-energy push
Nikkei Asia, September 13

The price of thermal coal used to generate electricity is nearing a record high as surging demand in China and India collides with a reluctance to invest in new capacity in a world heading for decarbonization.

Climate change: China should pledge absolute carbon emissions cap until 2025, advisory body headed by vice-premier says
South China Morning Post, September 10

Influential policy research body chaired by Vice-Premier Han Zheng calls on China to improve carbon pricing and create a renewables-based energy system.

Revamped US-India Strategic Clean Energy Partnership launched
Mint, September 10

"The meeting also reviewed the progress on the India-US civil nuclear energy cooperation," petroleum and natural gas ministry said in a late Thursday (September 9) night statement.

China leads as new global offshore wind projects dip slightly in 2020
Reuters, September 9

Global installations of new offshore wind farms fell only slightly in 2020, reaching the second highest tally since a record in 2019 despite the coronavirus pandemic, with China installing the most, an industry report said on Thursday (September 9).

China's Sinopec plans to spend US$4.6b on hydrogen energy by 2025
The Business Times, August 31

Asia's biggest oil refiner said on Monday (August 30) it plans to become China's largest company to produce hydrogen for use as a transportation fuel, targeting annual capacity of 200,000 tonnes of hydrogen refuelling by 2025.


Analyses

China should be vigilant of India becoming de facto ‘sixth eye’
Global Times, September 13

By Lin Minwang, Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University

The recent 2+2 dialogue between India and Australia represents an important step in constructing an "Asian NATO" by the US, Japan, India and Australia.

BRICS could improve China, India ties
China Daily, September 8

By Swaran Singh, Professor and Chairman, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

The 13th BRICS summit aims to achieve deliverables across three main pillars: economy and finance; politics and security; and cultural and people-to-people relations.

Pakistan and China are preparing for a Taliban govt they don’t trust. So should India
The Print, September 8 

By Shyam Saran, former Indian foreign secretary, currently Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research (CPR)

Pakistan’s interest in an influential role for the Haqqani group in a Taliban government is on account of its anti-Indian agenda. India must be prepared.

After Afghanistan setback, can Modi's visit bridge trust deficit between India, US?
Global Times, September 7

By Qian Feng, Director, Research Department, National Strategy Institute, Tsinghua University

Despite highlighting diplomatic independence, New Delhi is leaning heavily toward Washington.

How Beijing’s New Maritime Rules in the South China Sea Will Affect India and Others
The Wire, September 4

By Manoj Joshi, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

In a classic manoeuvre of what is called “lawfare”, China announced a new set of maritime regulations last week that require ships carrying certain types of cargo to provide detailed information to the Chinese authorities when transiting through Chinese “territorial waters”.

The strategic signal of an Indian presence in the South China Sea
Observer Research Foundation, September 2

By Harsh V. Pant, Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

India has wider stakes in South China Sea as nearly 55% of India’s trade with the Indo-Pacific region passes through these waters.

Hope for China-India border dispute: turn off the megaphones, sensibly reduce forces, maintain calm in Tibet
South China Morning Post, August 28

By Kanti Bajpai, Director, Centre on Asia and Globalisation and Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Both sides can move along talks by ceasing publicly aired diplomacy; thinning their forces; and ensuring Tibet, or Arunachal Pradesh, does not become a flashpoint.

 

Books and Journals

The_Long_Game_Vijay_GokhaleThe Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India
Penguin Books (2021)


By Vijay Gokhale, former Indian foreign secretary 

India’s relations with the People’s Republic of China have captured the popular imagination ever since the 1950s but have rarely merited a detailed understanding of the issues. Individual episodes tend to arouse lively debate, which often dissipates without a deeper exploration of the factors that shaped the outcomes. This book explores the dynamics of negotiation between the two countries, from the early years after Independence until the current times, through the prism of six historical and recent events in the India-China relationship. The purpose is to identify the strategy, tactics and tools that China employs in its diplomatic negotiations with India, and the learnings for India from its past dealings with China that may prove helpful in future negotiations with the country.


 lky-cag-logo

Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Have any feedback or comment?
Contact our editor: Byron Chong (research associate), email: decb64_Ynlyb24uY2hvbmdAbnVzLmVkdS5zZw==_decb64 
Subscribe

DORSEY, James M.

DORSEY, James M.

BALAZS, Daniel

BALAZS, Daniel

GONG, Xue

GONG, Xue