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China-India Brief #187

August 11, 2021 - August 27, 2021

China-India Brief #187BRIEF #187

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
August 11, 2021 - August 27, 2021


Guest Column

Afghanistan: The Elephant versus the Dragon 
By Claude Rakisits      


CIB187_1Image credit: Flickr/Afghanistan Matters

Now that Kabul has fallen to the Taliban almost 20 years since they were ousted from power by a coalition of Western forces led by the US, there will be competition between regional powers to fill the vacuum created with the departure of the US. And the two leading contenders to be the major external actor in Afghanistan are India and China. Let’s examine these in turn.

Despite the fact that India has been the fifth largest aid donor to Afghanistan for the last 20 years, the bilateral relationship continues to be weighed down by historical baggage and security issues which will make it difficult for it to become the predominant external player in a Taliban-run Afghanistan. 

Since 2001, India has spent some $3 billion in assisting Afghanistan in development and civil reconstruction. It was involved in some big projects, such as financing and building the Parliament House, laying transmission lines in Kabul, as well as donating commuter buses to the country. Delhi also funded and helped rebuild the hydroelectric Salma Dam in western Herat province and built a 133-mile highway linking Afghanistan to Iran. In addition, it was involved in about 300 smaller projects, especially in the fields of rural development, health, education, and agriculture. Surprisingly, this commendable development assistance didn’t generate that much influence in Kabul. 

Importantly, India and Afghanistan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2011, which included military training for the Afghan security forces. And while that too produced little tangible influence in return, the Taliban would not have welcomed this agreement with the previous government. Needless to say, that agreement would now be considered null and void by the new Afghan leaders.

Turning to some of the historical baggage, the Taliban leaders would remember that India was not critical of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which led to death and destruction for ten years before the Mujahideen were able to oust the Russians from the country. Nor would they have forgotten that India supported the American-backed Northern Alliance—an eclectic grouping of warlords from the north and west of Afghanistan—in ousting the Taliban from power in 2001. 

However, a more immediate obstacle for India going forward in developing a working relationship with Afghanistan is the Taliban’s relationship with the various terrorist groups roaming the country. Indian civilian and military leaders would be seriously worried about what the return of the Taliban will mean for the security of India. And they have good reason to be worried. In 1999, India released a jailed Pakistani militant, Masood Azhar, and two others in return for the release of over 150 airline passengers held hostage on board a hijacked Indian Airline flight which landed in Kandahar. Azhar eventually made his way back to Pakistan and founded the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Kashmir-focused militant group which was responsible for a number of attacks against Indian security forces over the years. Indian security officials are worried that the Taliban may support the JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), another non-state actor focused on Kashmir which has a presence in Afghanistan, and thus complicate even further India’s security equation. However, a day after the Taliban took over Kabul, a spokesman reportedly stated that Kashmir was a “bilateral and internal matter”. Whether India will be reassured with that statement remains to be seen.

Until very recently, Indian leaders didn’t approach the Taliban because they considered them simply a tool of Pakistan. This was a mistake on two fronts. While the Taliban has had a close relationship with Pakistan for the last 25 years, it is certainly no puppet of Pakistan. This is why the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan by military means rather than through a peaceful and negotiated process was received with mixed feelings in Pakistan. The second reason is that this lack of past flexibility means that New Delhi must now do a lot catching up on the diplomatic front, compared to the US, Russia, Pakistan and China which have been engaged diplomatically with the Taliban for years, often secretly.

Turning to China, it may have a head start on India, but its relationship with the Taliban will be complicated and multilayered. 

Just like New Delhi, Beijing will be concerned about what a Taliban-run Afghanistan will mean for the security of China and in particular, its Xinjiang region which has a 75-kilometre border with Afghanistan. Xinjiang is home to the Muslim Uighurs who have become increasingly restive in the face of China’s human rights abuses against them. It fears Afghanistan could become a springboard for militant groups to launch terrorist attacks against China and its close ally, Pakistan, where Beijing has significant economic interests at stake. It is particularly concerned about two groups: the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).  

Although the Al Qaeda-linked ETIM, the principal Uighur group in Afghanistan, only has a limited presence in the country, China is worried that the Taliban victory will encourage ETIM to launch attacks against China. However, the high-level Taliban delegation which visited China last month was keen to reassure Foreign Minister Wang Yi. They reportedly said that the Taliban would "never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China".
 
Neutralising the TTP, which has over 6,000 fighters in Afghanistan, will be more difficult. The Taliban and the TTP have deep ideological and personal links which go back to even before the TTP was founded in 2007 in Pakistan. Chinese workers working on the $60 billion, 15-year China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project in Pakistan have been the victim of several TTP attacks over the years. When asked about the TTP, the Taliban spokesman has reiterated the usual official position, namely, that it would not allow Afghan territory to be used to attack other countries. Still, all TTP prisoners in Afghan jails were released as soon as Kabul fell to the Taliban.

Despite the dubious reliability of these Taliban assurances, China is nevertheless eager to develop a working relationship with the Taliban. It demonstrated this by keeping its embassy open in Kabul while all the Western countries shut theirs and stating hours, after the Taliban took over, that it was ready to deepen "friendly and cooperative" relations with Afghanistan.

While Chinese FDI in Afghanistan in 2020 was only $4.4 million, which is less than three percent of its FDI in Pakistan, if security permits China would be very interested in investing in Afghanistan’s massive reserves of rare earths and minerals estimated at up to $3 trillion. Equally as economically enticing for China would be to connect Afghanistan to CPEC and its vast Belt and Road Initiative network, which could include Iran and Central Asia.

So, all in all, India’s negative historical baggage, its lack of influential presence on the ground, little previous diplomatic interaction with the Taliban, and a question mark on the Taliban’s links with various terrorist groups mean that New Delhi will have difficulties—at least initially—in building a constructive relationship with the Taliban regime. China, on the other hand, while also concerned about the security aspects of a future relationship, has played its cards more shrewdly, has a critically important relationship with neighbouring Pakistan, and has more to offer in economic terms.

Accordingly, and as it stands now, the dragon would seem better placed than the elephant in building a fruitful working relationship with a Taliban-run Afghanistan. But these are early days yet, so let’s wait and see what happens once the dust has settled
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Claude Rakisits is an Honorary Associate Professor in International Relations at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. His Twitter handle is @ClaudeRakisits.


Guest Column

India’s Renewed Interest in the Tibetan Question 
By Bipin Ghimire      


CIB187_2Image credit: pxfuel

The recent celebrations in China commemorating the centenary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party went almost unnoticed in New Delhi. However, the birthday of the Dalai Lama just five days later received heed directly from the top seat of Raisina Hills as India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly conveyed his greetings to the spiritual leader for the first time since 2015. India’s renewed attention to the issue of Tibet raised many eyebrows and has opened various avenues for discussion. What factors pressed India to give the Tibetan issue a new life suddenly, and what implications might it have on India-China relations and larger international politics? Is it a well-calculated move, or is India skating on thin ice? The answer to this conundrum depends on the vantage point one takes or the person one asks. 

Tibetan Factor in China-India Relations

Tibet has been a contentious issue between India and China since the 1950s when Mao’s communist army took control of the Tibetan administration despite the objections of the Potala Palace. The ‘peaceful liberation’, ‘invasion’ or ‘annexation’, whatever one may call it, was perceived by India as endangering its century-long cultural relations, economic interest and what Kanti Bajpai calls ‘quasi-diplomatic presence’ in Tibet. It also jeopardised India’s larger geopolitical aim of keeping Tibet as a buffer state between China and India. 

India’s granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan refugees in 1959, the emergence of armed rebellion in eastern Tibet in the late 1950s and the United States’ support to Tibetan Khampas through its policy of communist containment were all seen by the Chinese as part of a plot by the Indo-US alliance to cripple Beijing’s power in Tibet and to maintain Tibet as a buffer state. For the US however, exerting pressure on communist China was geopolitically necessary to prevent the domino effect of Communist expansion in South Asia. 

The accumulation of such antagonistic and fractured relations eventually led to the Sino-Indian war in 1962. Since then, Sino-Indian relations have been shaped by mutual suspicion, mistrust, and a zero-sum security rationality. The loss in the 1962 war, which India calls a Chinese ‘betrayal’ to Nehru’s idealistic ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ policy, continues to remain a psychological stain on the Indian military and civilian polity. India houses thousands of Tibetan refugees and provides them with freedom of movement and livelihood which has induced further suspicion in China about the Indian role in Tibetan politics. 

Xi, Modi and Tibet

Fast forward to 2013-14, the rise of China’s economic and political profile under Xi Jinping’s presidency and the landslide election victory of Narendra Modi raised expectations that bilateral relations would improve. However, despite growing trade interdependence and a series of confidence-building measures between the two militaries (in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012, 2013), border disputes between India and China continued, with lingering claims and counter-claims of territory in the Western and Eastern Himalayan sectors. Beijing’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh and New Delhi’s refusal to accept China’s control of Aksai Chin have remained major points of contention.

It was in this context that Modi invited Lobsang Sangay from the Central Tibetan Administration to attend the inauguration ceremony of his first term in office, legitimising the authority of the exiled Tibetan leadership and elevating Sangay’s status to that of an equal with other accompanying heads of states. The hosting of the Dalai Lama at Rashtrapati Bhawan by President Pranab Mukherjee in 2016 further infuriated China. 

In the meantime, China continued to tighten its grip in the border region resulting in five standoffs since Xi came to power in 2013. On the other hand, India proceeded carefully in Modi’s second term by telling its officials to avoid programmes planned by the Central Tibetan Administration and to skip public interactions with Tibetan leaders. However, India’s conciliatory posture towards China did not last long as the territorial dispute between these powers reached its boiling point in 2020 in the Galwan valley.

Anti-China sentiments in India spiked after the violent clashes in 2020, not least due to the loss of Indian lives along the border—a first since 1975. Faced with pressure to respond, New Delhi undertook a slew of new policy directions—from implementing restrictions on Chinese companies, to expanding security cooperation with like-minded partners, and aggressively conducting missile tests—all aimed at demonstrating India’s willingness and ability to stand up to China. Against this backdrop, the Dalai Lama’s birthday presented another opportunity for India to pressure China by putting the spotlight on Tibet.      

Connotation and Implication of India’s Recent Moves on Tibet

Drawing attention to Tibet has several implications. First, it sends a symbolic message to Beijing to the effect that India is not happy with Chinese incursions into India’s first concentric circle of influence, i.e. its immediate neighbourhood—symbolic because India is well aware that the issue of Tibet does not hold much significance in reality as almost every country has accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Second, India also appears to be signalling to China that, if needed, it is willing to “touch upon matters that Beijing might consider sensitive” and will keep the Tibetan question alive so long as China continues to disregard India’s sensitivities and concerns regarding Kashmir and its border with China. Third, New Delhi’s harder line on Tibet may be suggesting that India is not willing to meet Chinese expectations on the Tibetan questions without a significant quid pro quo on the border, India’s primacy in its immediate neighbourhood, shared Asian leadership, or Chinese support for India’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council
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Bipin Ghimire is a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of International Relation, South Asian University in New Delhi, India. He can be reached at decb64_YmlwaW5naGltaXJlMTRAZ21haWwuY29t_decb64 and @BipinGhi.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

Joint PLA drill in Tibet sends strong warning to India, say analysts
South China Morning Post, August 26

A recent joint operation drill in which the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet deployed more than 10 combat units to seize a battlefield from their “enemy” on a peak in the Himalayas was designed to send a warning to India, experts said.

External affairs minister Jaishankar slams China for terror stand at UNSC
Business Standard, August 20

In a swipe at China, India told the UN Security Council on Thursday (August 19) that countries should not place “blocks and holds” without any reason on requests to designate terrorists.

In veiled reference to Pak, China, PM Modi lists 2 challenges facing India
Hindustan Times, August 15

PM Modi spoke about the dual challenges of terrorism and expansionism--a veiled reference to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and China‘s expansionist policy in Ladakh.

China most distrusted nation, says survey of Indian youth
The Times of India, August 15

COVID-19 pandemic, terrorism, cyber-security and the Ladakh stand-off with China are the top foreign policy concerns of the Indian youth, shows a new survey.

 

News Reports

China and India in the Region

Indian Navy to take part in sea phase of Exercise Malabar 2021 from August 26 – 29
India Today, August 26

The Indian Navy will be participating in the sea phase of Exercise Malabar 2021 from August 26 – 29, 2021, along with the US Navy (USN), Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

As India watches Afghanistan nervously, upheaval could reshape US ties and shift its approach to China stand-off
South China Morning Post, August 24

As India adapts to changing dynamics on its western front, it may need to reconsider US ties and de-escalate border tensions with China.

India And Philippines Conduct Naval Drills In South China Sea
NDTV, August 24

India on Monday (August 23) carried out a naval exercise with the Philippines in the South China Sea, in the region that has been witnessing growing Chinese military expansionism..

India and Vietnam conduct naval exercise in South China Sea, ahead of the Quad's ‘Malabar’ off Guam
The Times of India, August 18

India and Vietnam conducted a naval exercise in the contested South China Sea on August 18, as part of the ongoing deployment of Indian warships to the region.

India revives Indian Ocean security bloc with an eye on China’s growing influence
South China Morning Post, August 17

The group was formed in 2011 and revived in November last year. It is now poised to bring Bangladesh, Seychelles and Mauritius into the fold.

Pakistan's foreign minister blames Afghanistan and India for suicide attack on Chinese workers
CNN, August 13

An Indian official told Reuters that the allegations were baseless.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

China's two-week port closure to have a mixed impact on India's trade
Business Standard, August 27

India has been facing acute shortage of containers since November 2020 leading to ocean freight rates having zoomed 5-7 times within a span of 8-9 months.

India Urges Its Automakers to Cut Reliance on Imports From China
Bloomberg, August 26

Thinktank Niti Aayog warns of being too dependent on neighbor.

India pips US to rank second in list of most attractive manufacturing hub globally; China first
The Indian Express, August 24

China remains at number one position, the consultant said in its 2021 Global Manufacturing Risk Index, which assessed the most advantageous locations for global manufacturing among 47 countries in Europe, the Americas and Asia-Pacific (APAC).

Chinese firms eye India's infrastructure plan
Global Times, August 24

Experts said that India could make good use of the advantages of Chinese companies for its infrastructure drive, but it should improve its business environment first.

Indian startups raise $16.9 billion VC funding in 2021, next only to China
The Economic Times, August 20

An analysis of GlobalData's financial deals database reveals that a total of 828 VC funding deals were announced in India during January-July 2021 while the total disclosed funding value of these deals stood at $16.9 billion.

India Aims to Spend $1.4 Trillion Building Infrastructure
Bloomberg, August 15

The investments will be made in India’s logistics sector to help integrate the country’s varied modes of transport.

India will fast track trade deals with six nations: Commerce Secretary
Business Standard, August 11

India will fast-track free trade agreements (FTAs) with at least six nations—including the UAE, the UK, Australia, Canada, and the EU—over the next few months, in line with its revamped foreign trade strategy, Commerce and Industry Secretary B. V. R. Subrahmanyam said.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

China aims to use space-based solar energy station to harvest sun’s rays to help meet power needs
South China Morning Post, August 17

China plans to put a 1 megawatt solar energy station in space by 2030 capable of harvesting energy from the sun and beaming it to Earth.

India, UK plan world bank for green energy
Mint, August 17

India and the UK have expressed willingness to explore the possibility of establishing a world bank for Green Energy which could materialise the proposal for $100 billion climate finance pledged by the developed countries.

Modi pledges massive green hydrogen 'quantum leap' to Indian energy independence
Recharge, August 16

Modi says India is to become a ‘global hub’ for renewable hydrogen that can ease reliance on imported fossil fuels.

At 100GW, India now fourth in solar, wind energy capacity
The Times of India, August 14

The milestone comes five years after PM Modi announced his plan in 2015 for India to achieve 175GW renewable energy capacity by 2022.

China cranks up carbon-intensive projects as climate crisis grows, research shows
The Straits Times, August 13

China announced scores of new carbon-intensive coal and steel projects in the first half of 2021, just days after a key UN report urged immediate global action to curb use of fossil fuels and prevent runaway climate change.


Analyses

On Kabul, India need not hurry. Let Russia, China, Iran see Pakistan’s control of Taliban
The Print, August 25

By Shyam Saran, Former Foreign Secretary; Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research

One doubts that Pakistan will be able to manage Afghanistan’s polity and society any more than it can in Pakistan itself. China will then have to think about stepping in.

China Losing Pakistan, Calls America and India ‘Enemies’
Newsweek, August 24 

By Gordon G. Chang, author of ‘The Coming Collapse of China’

As China makes gains in Afghanistan, the regime is suffering severe setbacks in neighboring Pakistan, where resentment against Chinese interests is widespread.

Rare earth trillions lure China to Afghanistan's new Great Game
Nikkei Asia, August 21

By James Stravridis, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO; and former Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

Beijing will be the first major power to recognize the new regime.

India eyes bigger influence in Indian Ocean through Colombo Security Conclave
Global Times, August 19

By Liu Zongyi, Secretary-General, Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; Visiting Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China; and Distinguished Fellow, Chinese (Kunming) Academy of South Asian and Southeast Asian studies

Small countries in the Indian Ocean should keep a clear head and be alert to India's ambitions.

China and India’s move towards candid messaging
The New Indian Express, August 12

By N. Sathiya Moorthy, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation-Chennai Initiative

American Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to India signals the possibility of a permanent course-change in our nation’s policy towards China, if not Pakistan.

 

Books and Journals

PacificFocus169x247India's RCEP Dilemma with China: Beyond the Legal Texts
Pacific Focus, Vol. 36, no.1 (2021)


By Wang Chao, Research Professor, Zhejiang University; and Vinay Sharma, Research Fellow, Zhejiang University 

The ASEAN-inaugurated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was eventually concluded on 15 November 2020 after 8 years of tough negotiations. India was counted as an important member of the RCEP, but it chose to back out when other members were finalizing the RCEP legal text. This article critically analyzes the relevant legal provisions leading to India's withdrawal from this significant mega trade deal, the reasons behind India's refusal of those provisions, the possibility of isolationism India might face, and geopolitical changes in Sino–India relations post stand-off on the Galwan Valley as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. It argues that unbalanced economic relations, India's self-reliant ideology, as well as China's growing hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region are among the principle factors for India to back out from the RCEP. However, the door to participate in the future remains open for India.


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RAKISITS, Claude

RAKISITS, Claude

GHIMIRE, Bipin

GHIMIRE, Bipin