Climate change has been a focal point for Sino-Indian relations since global climate governance started in the early 1990s when the international community under the United Nations negotiated the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and later its two protocols—the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the Paris Agreement in 2015.
Being two of the largest developing countries in the world, both China and India have been under persistent pressure from some of the other Parties (countries) to the UNFCCC to undertake mitigation obligations to reduce their increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the Conference of the Parties (COP) since 1995 when the first COP to the UNFCCC (COP-1) was held in Berlin, Germany.
Thanks to close Sino-Indian collaboration with other developing countries at the COPs, developing countries in general, and China and India in particular, were exempted from GHG mitigation obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (expired in 2020), which committed developed countries to undertake legally binding mitigation targets based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). CBDR arose from the fact that developed countries were historically responsible for the accumulation of GHG emissions stemming from the industrial revolutions of the mid-19th century.
However, due to both countries’ fast economic growth over the past three to four decades, China and India have already become the world’s largest and third largest GHG emitters respectively, which has significantly undermined both countries’ bargaining power against not only developed countries but also other developing countries, especially small island states that are most vulnerable to rising sea levels caused by global warming. Under such circumstances, China and India have sought to strengthen their negotiating positions at the UN climate negotiations by not only enhancing their bilateral coordination, but also forging two new negotiating blocs, namely BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) in 2009 and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) in 2012—a bloc of low- and middle-income countries, many of them with fossil fuel interests, including Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mali, Nicaragua, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Venezuela, besides China and India, the two initiators.
In spite of Sino-Indian bilateral and multilateral climate alliances mentioned above, the principle of CBDR and the differentiation between developed and developing countries were completely dismantled in the Paris Agreement reached at COP-21 in 2015. Under the new agreement, developing countries were now subject to the same requirements as developed countries in mitigating their GHG emissions in the form of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) as well as in accepting a legally binding transparency process.
Since the Paris Agreement entered into force in November 2016, the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC have engaged in negotiations to implement detailed workable guidelines. Negotiations have been conducted at four COPs so far—COP-22 in 2016 in Morocco, COP-23 in 2017 in Bonn, Germany, COP-24 in 2018 in Katowice, Poland, as well as COP-25 in 2019 in Madrid, Spain. During these negotiations, China and India have consistently supported each other’s positions vis-à-vis those of developed countries and some of the other developing countries. For instance, although developed countries often try to set transparency and reporting as priority issues on the negotiating agenda, this is commonly opposed by China, India, and other developing countries who argue for equal importance to be given to finance and adaptation. Moreover, both countries have continued to emphasize equity as a core principle for developed and developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. With regard to mitigation, China, India as well as other developing countries have long insisted that they should be granted flexibility in their mitigation efforts, while developed countries have sought common rules that will hold all equally accountable. Moreover, at COP-25, both China and India underscored the importance of pre-2020 implementation for developing countries’ enhanced action, and under the umbrella of the LMDCs, both countries called for a work programme to track progress and identify gaps in the pre-2020 implementation.
On financing, China and India share the position that developed countries should provide sufficient and regular financial support to developing countries to address climate change. For instance, at COP-23, China and India led the BASIC group to strongly oppose the developed countries’ unilateral creation of new criteria for funding under the Global Environment Facility (GEF), arguing that this practice had no legal foundation. At COP-25, in the negotiation over the eligibility for GEF support and related criteria, China and India jointly underscored the need for the eligibility of all developing countries.
To be sure, China and India have not always come to a consensus on climate change. Both countries have adopted different policies toward the goal of global net-zero emissions by 2050, that is, China has announced its goal of carbon neutrality by 2060 while India has refrained from setting such a goal. In spite of this divergence, China and India will continue to collaborate with each other at the UN climate negotiations, given the fact that both countries are very much aware that net-zero discussions at the global level are largely empty diplomatic talk, which will end up nowhere just like the failed Kyoto Protocol. Besides, both countries have a shared pragmatic goal in climate negotiations, that is, to continue to let developed countries do the heavy lifting as much as possible, mitigating their own emissions while providing financial support and technology transfers to developing countries to help the latter combat climate change. Against this backdrop, the currently troubled Sino-Indian bilateral relationship will not hinder both countries’ collaboration at the forthcoming COP-26 in November 2021 in Glasgow, as well as other future UN climate negotiations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
Wu Fuzuo is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Salford. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Fudan University, and was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University, University of Oxford, and Yale University. Her research focuses on China and India’s foreign policy, energy and climate policy/diplomacy, nonproliferation and export control policy, and global environmental governance. Her book, Energy and Climate Policies in China and India: A Two-Level Comparative Study was published by Cambridge University Press. Her articles have been published in Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Asian Survey, and Asian Perspective.
The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.
News Reports
Bilateral relations
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India Today, May 24
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Mint, May 20
“The issue of me is how do I manage the relationship if the basis of the relationship has been violated" by China, Jaishankar said.
China's ambassador to India condoles loss of lives due to cyclone
Xinhua, May 20
China's ambassador to India Sun Weidong Wednesday (May 19) expressed condolences on the loss of lives in India due to the Cyclone Tauktae that has wreaked havoc on India's western coast.
Disengagement not de-escalation: Army Chief says India to maintain troop levels along China border
The Indian Express, May 20
And till that happens, he added, India will continue to maintain an enhanced troop presence along the length of the border with China.
Chinese Army returns to exercise areas near eastern Ladakh; Indian troops keep close watch
India Today, May 18
In a significant development, the Chinese Army troops have been deployed heavily near the Ladakh front in their training areas from where they had transgressed into Indian areas last year.
News Reports
China and India in the Region
FM: China ready to facilitate talks among Afghan parties
China Daily, May 19
Foreign Minister Wang Yi held separate discussions with the Afghan foreign minister and the national security adviser to the Afghan president on Monday night (May 17), as Beijing stepped up its efforts to advance the peace and reconciliation process in the nation.
China not happy with arms supply, but Russia-India friendship unshakeable: Carnegie Moscow head
The Print, May 17
Dmitri Trenin says Russia can’t be dictated to by another country, adds that real test for India from Moscow’s perspective is how it tackles S-400 deal issue with US.
Beijing denies meddling as Bangladesh slams envoy’s ‘aggressive’ warning not to join Quad
South China Morning Post, May 12
Bangladeshi Foreign Minister A. K. Abdul Momen calls comments regrettable and says Dhaka will decide its own foreign policy.
US, UK, Germany clash with China at UN over treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang
India Today, May 13
The United States, Germany and Britain clashed with China at the United Nations on Wednesday over the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, angering Beijing by hosting a virtual event that China had lobbied UN member states to stay away from.
News Reports
Trade and Economy
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CNBC, May 24
The COVID-19 resurgence in some parts of Asia could lead to a change in fortunes for China, according to Zhang Zhiwei, chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management.
India can help change global supply chains: Foreign minister Jaishankar
Hindustan Times, May 20
Foreign minister S Jaishankar said that India can strengthen and de-risk the global economy through more effective partnership, like the supply chain resilience initiative with Japan and Australia.
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Business Times, May 19
The Global Trade Update by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on Wednesday said that in Q1 2021, the value of global trade in goods and services grew by about 4 per cent quarter-over-quarter and by about 10 per cent year-over-year.
China Supports Vaccine Patent Waiver Plan Proposed By India, South Africa
NDTV, May 18
India and South Africa called for TRIPS waiver of certain intellectual property provisions of COVID-19 vaccines in a communication to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October last year.
India launches probe against China, Thailand and Vietnam
Financial Express, May 17
India’s commerce ministry has initiated an anti-dumping investigation against the import of solar cells from China, Thailand and Vietnam.
India’s COVID-19 drug makers see Chinese raw material prices soar
South China Morning Post, May 14
Ingredients for drugs like ivermectin have risen by 200 to 300 per cent, while products needed to make paracetamol and antibiotics are up 30 to 40 per cent, according to industry sources.
News Reports
Energy and Environment
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Channel News Asia, May 22
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Chinese vaccines can protect against mutated variants in India: China CDC
Global Times, May 20
Current Chinese COVID-19 vaccines can offer protection against the mutated variants found in India, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) said on Thursday (May 20).
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Channel News Asia, May 18
At least 21 people were dead and 96 were missing on Tuesday (May 18) after a monster cyclone slammed into western India, compounding the misery for millions of others who are enduring a devastating COVID-19 surge.
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CNBC, May 13
Among the 100 cities most at risk, 99 of them are in Asia — with 37 in China and 43 in India.
Analyses
India embracing West doesn’t serve Asian unity
Global Times, May 24
By Long Xingchun, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University, and President, Chengdu Institute of World Affairs
The strategy of "divide and rule" was used by Britain to rule India. Now the same old tactics are being used again by the US and Europe.
The new Great Game
The Indian Express, May 21
By Ameya Pratap Singh, reading for a DPhil (PhD) in Area Studies at the University of Oxford
US withdrawal from Afghanistan could push China to the centre stage, which would have implications for India.
India Draws a Line in the 5G Sand
Foreign Policy, May 18
By Harsh V. Pant, Director of Research, Observer Research Foundation, and Aarshi Tirkey, Junior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation.
After last summer’s clashes with China, New Delhi may finally be ready to leave ambiguity behind—and side with the West.
Beijing, Dhaka and the Quad: How China’s new diplomatic swagger is hitting India’s neighbours
The Indian Express, May 18
By C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
As Beijing becomes ever more assertive in South Asia, the costs of relying on China are likely to become more apparent.
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Nikkei Asia, May 12
By Brahma Chellaney, Geostrategist and author of nine books, including “Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan”.
Beijing's Ladakh aggression is driving New Delhi ever closer to Washington.
The right angle of the Quadrilateral
East Asia Forum, May 12
By Mason Richey, Associate Professor, Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS), Seoul
The obvious problem is that the Quad’s grand design — strengthening the ‘rules-based order’ of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) — is underdetermined with respect to matching means to ends.
Books and Journals
More than Meets the Eye: Understanding Perceptions of China Beyond the Favorable-Unfavorable Dichotomy
Studies in Comparative International Development (2021) 56:68–86
By Li Xiaojun, Wang Gungwu Visiting Fellow at ISEAS, Singapore, and Associate Professor of Political Science at University of British Columbia
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. This article takes a deeper dive into a series of surveys conducted in Canada that covered a wide range of topics, from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of “favorable versus unfavorable,” especially as one moves from overall impressions to more specific policy issues. Second, misperceptions of China are widespread and may be difficult to overcome, especially among those who already view China negatively. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanding global footprint, failure to account for these features in public opinion about China may lead to misguided policies.
How Pakistan and China Negotiate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 2021)
By Katharine Adeney, Professor of Politics, Director, Asia
Research Institute, University of Nottingham, and Filippo Boni, Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, The Open University.
Since being officially launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most watched set of projects under the aegis of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having already injected around $25 billion into Pakistan, the CPEC not only has been dubbed the “flagship project” of the BRI, but it also holds a central role in Beijing’s global ambitions.
While much has been said about the geopolitical implications of the CPEC, including for both India and the United States, less attention has been devoted to providing in-depth insights into the me chanics of how the BRI is unfolding on the ground in Pakistan. How do China and Pakistan negoti ate the terms of CPEC deals? To what extent has Islamabad managed to exert agency in its dealings with Beijing? How does China adapt to the contexts it operates in? By now, the CPEC has been subject to much media, academic, and policy scrutiny, but these questions have not been answered.
The power asymmetry between the two partners—coupled with the impression that the BRI rep resents a unidirectional Chinese endeavor, not just in Pakistan but also globally—has contributed to the erroneous representation that Beijing is merely imposing the CPEC on its all-weather partners in Islamabad. On the contrary, this study highlights China’s adaptive strategies in dealing with a host of Pakistani actors (including political parties, local communities, and the military) against the back drop of Pakistan’s evolving political landscape and change in leadership following the country’s 2018 elections.
In filling this gap, this paper foregrounds the importance of adopting a relational approach to study ing how the BRI unfolds on the ground. This entails looking at how Pakistan and China have negotiated the CPEC’s energy, infrastructure, and industrial cooperation projects. The analysis is based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the two authors during three rounds of fieldwork in 2015, 2018, and 2020–2021 triangulated with a host of official reports, statements, and newspaper articles.
Examining the domestic contours of the CPEC shows that Pakistani actors have wielded agency in important ways throughout the process, while Chinese actors at times have accommodated key Pakistani demands.
Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
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