For nearly ten months, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army confronted each other at the Pangong Tso Lake along their nebulous Line of Actual Control (LAC). Yet, for now at least, the two nuclear-armed neighbours have reversed their intense military brinkmanship in the area and are said to have pulled their forces back.
Unlike the tense non-lethal faceoff between them at Doklam (Dong Lang) in 2017, each side accused the other of firing provocative or warning shots at Pangong at one stage. Also, unlike Pangong, Doklam was not a hot spot along the LAC. But, as in 2017, Sino-Indian military diplomacy, complemented by civilian efforts, produced an accord to “disengage” at Pangong. On 21 February 2021, “smooth” completion of the “synchronised” and “organised” disengagement was noted at the 10th round of corps commanders level meetings which began in mid-2020.
The Pangong crisis differed from the violent clash that took place in the Galwan Valley in June 2020. Ironically, that clash, which resulted in fatalities on both sides, occurred in the wake of an understanding to disengage. In contrast, the announcement of a “smooth” disengagement at Pangong may appear to presage new maturity in the Sino-Indian engagement which is still rocked by swirling differences over the Kashmir issue. But any such hope will depend on how both sides engage each other going forward.
Two types of ‘LAC’
The latest Sino-Indian crisis has concealed two types of ‘LAC’—the agreed but un-demarcated ‘Line of Actual Control’, and a ‘Line of Active Control’. During discussions which later produced the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement, China had at first insisted on using the term ‘Line of Active Control’; though both sides would eventually agree on using ‘Line of Actual Control’, as the referral point for peace in the border areas. However, the current situation has, in my view, turned into a contest for active control along the long-disputed boundary.
Under the concept of actual control, each side was expected to respect the other’s customary or known positions along the LAC pending a resolution of the boundary dispute. However, both parties often felt thwarted in enforcing their perceived rights in this regard. At Pangong, therefore, China and India secured vantage positions, and resorted to active military presence to hold them. But, under the disengagement accord, these positions are said to have been given up now. If so, what was the logic of the mutual withdrawals?
Surely, one side must have felt more vulnerable than the other due to their respective gains to establish active control. In the end, though, mutual anxiety about these gains prompted mutual withdrawals. A view in India is that its military gains at Pangong could have been used as bargaining chips in negotiations with China on other friction points. But the frequent tensions along the LAC have been treated as localised episodes requiring local solutions.
The shadow of Kashmir
Going forward, a key issue to be considered is the root cause of the latest tensions in the western sector which spans the China-India-Pakistan neighbourhood. In 1963, when China and Pakistan signed a “temporary” boundary agreement—which has neither been formalised nor scrapped—this neighbourhood acquired its triangular dimension. Moreover, the Kashmir issue, originally an India-Pakistan affair, has become the new root cause of Sino-Indian tensions, following Delhi’s creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL) in 2019.
Ladakh has long been the subject of a territory dispute between India and China. Though the territory was officially administered by India, it enjoyed a certain degree of freedom from Delhi due to it being part of the autonomous state of Jammu and Kashmir. This changed in 2019 when India’s central government scrapped the state’s autonomy and converted Ladakh into a federally-administered Union Territory (UTL). From Beijing’s standpoint, Delhi’s stratagem was to try and nullify the status of Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, as “an internationally-recognized disputed area”, thereby weakening China’s claims over them. Moreover, Delhi’s assertion that the UTL encompasses the Chinese-administered Aksai Chin turns the tables against Beijing, potentially strengthening India’s claim over this contested territory.
This frames the political context of the latest Sino-Indian crisis in the western sector. Overall, though, the evolving military situation will determine whether and, if so, how China and India will re-set their stakes in this triangular theatre. If the Sino-Indian disengagement at Pangong holds, followed by de-escalation and peace, the focus will shift to other friction points in this sector.
A Vital Strategic Cluster
Among the dense cluster of strategic sites along the LAC, Depsang is an area that is seen as particularly important. The Sino-Indian confrontation there predates the creation of the UTL. An airstrip, which India modernised in its efforts to play catch-up to China’s strategic military build-up along the LAC, is one of these sites. Others include India’s long arterial road along the LAC, the Siachen Glacier where the Indian Army dominates, and Shaksgam Valley which China holds.
The salience of this cluster is heightened by the proximity of the Karakoram Highway and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Gilgit-Baltistan and which India deems as its domain. Gaining attention, therefore, is a statement by Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe during his visit to Pakistan on 1 December 2020. He is reported to have said that China wanted to “push the mil-to-mil relationship to a higher level, so as to jointly cope with various risks and challenges…and safeguard the regional peace and stability”.
There is nothing new about the close China-Pakistan military cooperation which has always been a concern for India. But the timing of General Wei Fenghe’s visit to Islamabad, at the height of the Sino-Indian crisis at Pangong, has been noticed in Indian strategic circles. Crucial was his idea that Beijing and Islamabad should “jointly cope with” the challenges in safeguarding regional peace. By “regional”, he likely meant the contested China-India-Pakistan areas in Jammu and Kashmir.
The strategic cluster around Depsang has become a sensitive arena for China. An emerging Indian view of the crisis of 2020 is that the Chinese push in the Galwan-Pangong area was actually a feint. The real strategic targets, going back to 2013, were the Depsang plains and the Indian facilities including the airfield in the area. This view seems bolstered by the fact that the disengagement has occurred in Pangong while a similar agreement for Depsang has not been achieved. However, if the goodwill generated by disengagement at Pangong holds, Beijing and Delhi may be able to re-set their stakes on Depsang and other friction points in UTL/Aksai Chin. As things stand, it is still too early to call. Much will depend on how the situation along the border and the bilateral relationship between the two Asian giants develop in the coming months.
Mr. P. S. Suryanarayana is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is the author of Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China-India Synergy (2016), and his latest book is titled The Elusive Tipping Point: China-India Ties for a New Order (World Scientific, 2021).
The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.
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Books and Journals
The Road from Galwan: The Future of India-China Relations
Carnegie India, March 2021
By Vijay Gokhale, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie India; and Former Foreign Secretary of India. .
On June 15, 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a brawl that left twenty Indian soldiers dead while causing an unspecified number of Chinese casualties. The clash is a part of a broader border standoff along the Galwan River between the two forces on the Line of Actual Control that is yet to be resolved. The Indian strategic community is broadly in agreement that this border dispute marks an implacable decline in India-China ties. They argue that the very basis of relations that emerged after former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 has been shaken, if not destroyed. Yet, how did the two countries manage to reach this nadir in ties, and furthermore, what does the Galwan clash signify for the future of Sino-Indian relations?
This paper argues that, long before the present border dispute occurred, Sino-Indian relations had been steadily declining due to rampant misperceptions of the other side, contributing to a lack of trust. The most fundamental misperception between the two countries is the inability to comprehend each other’s international ambitions, yielding the fear that their foreign policies are targeted against the other. This paper traces the impact and development of these misperceptions on Sino-Indian ties through three different phases before considering the future of the relationship after the Galwan dispute.
Explaining the asymmetry in the Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry
Australian journal of international affairs, February 2021
By Manjeet S. Pardesi, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Asia Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington.
China views India as an asymmetric (‘lesser’) rival that has the ability to obstruct China’s grand strategic goals. China’s long-term goals are domination in East Asia followed by Asia-wide domination, and finally global pre-eminence. The asymmetric dimension of their rivalry is rooted in the ego-relevancy cognitive bias in the Chinese elites’ perceptions of Indian history and statehood. Consequently, China does not consider India as a ‘peer’. This perceptual dimension pre-dates their material power asymmetry. Nevertheless, China perceives India as an ‘imperial’ rival that interferes in China’s Tibet. Furthermore, India’s ‘hegemonic’ ambitions in Southern Asia pose a challenge for China at the pan-Asian level, and may even undermine Chinese domination in East Asia. Thus understood, there are three implications for the Sino-Indian rivalry. First, the positional and territorial dimensions of their rivalry are now intertwined and will be difficult to resolve. Second, this is not just a dyadic rivalry as it will interact with their relations with the United States, Japan, and Pakistan, thereby creating new uncertainties. Finally, the military undertones of this rivalry are spilling over into other regional countries. This rivalry will intensify if India pursues internal or external balancing, or if India charts a distinct path to politico-economic modernisation.
Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
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