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China-India Brief #160

May 27, 2020 - June 09, 2020

China-India Brief #160BRIEF #160

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
May 27, 2020 - June 09, 2020


Guest Column

Unsafe Distancing: India and China Face Off Once Again 

By Rohan Mukherjee    


CIB160_1An Indian military view point in Ladakh near the China-India border.
Photo by Indi Tourists from Flickr 

On May 5, Indian media reported that Chinese and Indian soldiers had come to blows at Pangong lake in Ladakh in the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border between the two countries. Five days later, another brawl involving 150 soldiers was reported at Naku La in Sikkim in the LAC’s eastern sector. While differing perceptions of the LAC—which is neither delineated on agreed-upon maps nor demarcated on the ground—often result in patrols running into each other, fistfights and stone-pelting are rare occurrences.

By late May, reports emerged of a significant number of Chinese troops having set up camp at various points on the Indian side of the LAC in Ladakh. Although the numbers and nature of the intrusions remain hotly contested, it is clear that Chinese troops are now stationed on territory that was previously only patrolled by both sides. The situation has been complicated by conflicting information from within the respective civilian and military establishments in India, as well as Beijing’s relative silence on the matter.

Tough Talk 

China’s state-run Global Times, however, initially accused India of trying to capitalize on the COVID-19 pandemic and US-China tensions by luring firms away from China and taking “a tougher and even irrational attitude toward border relations.” The rhetoric then escalated to accuse India of deliberately instigating border conflicts and creating a situation that might “even exceed the sort of intensity of the Doklam standoff,” referring to the 73-day military standoff between Indian and Chinese troops on the Doklam plateau near their shared border with Bhutan in 2017.

It was only after US President Donald Trump publicly offered to mediate between the two countries on May 27 that the Global Times tempered its approach and China’s foreign ministry announced that the border area was “stable and under control,” and any issues could be bilaterally resolved “through dialogue and negotiations.” New Delhi, irked by Trump’s claim of a non-existent phone call with Prime Minister Modi, was quick to state that it was engaging with China bilaterally. Since then, troops, transport, and artillery have amassed on both sides of the LAC in Ladakh.

The Bilateral Context 

Although the situation is still in flux, analysing its potential causes helps reveal the underlying trajectory of India-China relations and the directions it might take in the future. Chinese motives are impossible to precisely discern at the best of times, but enough information exists to draw reasonable inferences about the present situation. The causes are multi-faceted and complex, and can be understood at three nested levels: the bilateral context of India-China relations, the local context along the LAC, and the immediate context of the geopolitics of the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the macro level, it is no secret that China has been steadily pulling ahead of India in military and economic terms. Approximately at parity at the end of Cold War, China’s military spending today is 3.7 times that of India’s and has grown almost twice as fast compared to India over the last decade. This growing gap suggests that Beijing has little to gain from negotiating over territory today that can be taken by force or the threat of force in future. As China’s relative power has grown, it has become more willing and able to challenge India’s regional interests, including along the LAC. 

The Local Context 

At the local level, India has increased its capabilities along the LAC over time, focusing on infrastructure in the form of roads, bridges, and tunnels. In 2005, in a reversal of decades-old policy, the government tasked its Border Roads Organisation (BRO) to build 61 roads totalling approximately 3400km along the LAC. Watching the BRO struggle with this mandate, in 2013 the government streamlined the organisation so that it could focus exclusively on strategic roads. In 2015, the BRO was moved from the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways to the Ministry of Defence, and given more financial resources.

These efforts produced the desired result. In January this year, the BRO announced the imminent completion of 11 new roads along the LAC, 9 more by next year, and the grand target of 61 roads by 2023. These roads increase India’s access to border areas and significantly reduce the time and effort for Indian troops and heavy equipment to reach the LAC. Not only do Indian patrols now risk coming into contact more frequently with Chinese patrols, India’s infrastructural developments erode the People’s Liberation Army’s traditional advantage in the local balance of power, triggering security concerns in Beijing. Indeed, the areas where Chinese troops have intruded are in the vicinity of a 255km road running parallel and close to the LAC that the BRO completed in mid-2019.

Chinese perceptions of Indian resolve have also likely changed since the 2017 Doklam standoff. At that time, in response to Chinese road-building in territory that was disputed by China and Bhutan, Indian troops took the PLA by surprise by crossing the international boundary and entering the Doklam plateau. It was only after a protracted negotiation that both sides agreed to withdraw (though China maintains a military presence very close to Doklam). From Beijing’s perspective, therefore, India is now both more capable and more willing to press its claims in Ladakh, where China controls the disputed Aksai Chin region, a mostly high-altitude desert larger in size than Taiwan. 

The Immediate Context 

But why act on these fears now, in the midst of a global pandemic? There are three potential answers to this question, all of which might be in play. First, the pandemic offers an opportunity to take action while India and its major strategic partners such as the United States and Japan are distracted. History, in this case, offers a precedent—in 1962, China picked the moment that the superpowers were caught in the grip of the Cuban Missile Crisis to invade India in response to a small number of Indian military outposts being set up north of the McMahon Line, in the eastern sector of what is today the LAC.

Second, China’s success at dealing with the pandemic compared to the West may have produced a sense of overconfidence in Beijing with regard to its ability to achieve strategic objectives during this window of opportunity. In this sense, China’s LAC adventures seem to be part of a larger pattern of behaviour that includes the increased harassment of Vietnamese and Indonesian fishing vessels in the South China Sea, military drills near Taiwan and intrusions into Taiwanese airspace, and the passing of a new national security law in Hong Kong. This pattern is not unlike China’s behaviour in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008—which hit the West particularly hard—when Beijing began to abandon the policy of “peaceful rise” for a more assertive approach toward all its neighbours, including the United States.

Finally, China’s behaviour may be driven by its leadership’s need to show strength to both domestic and international audiences. While the Chinese public and elites typically consider India to be of “secondary” strategic importance, it is possible that recent manoeuvres are driven by politics internal to the senior leadership of the CCP and PLA. President Xi Jinping in particular must project a strong internal image at a time when the world is deeply critical of China for its lack of transparency over the emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2. These circumstances also suggest that Beijing would want to demonstrate strength and resolve to its potential adversaries in order to deter any adventurism on their part at a time when China is diplomatically vulnerable. 

An Evolving Status Quo 

These factors all combine to create the perfect storm in the high Himalayas. A changing global balance of power makes China more willing to coerce India over their border dispute. A changing local balance of power makes India more of a threat to Chinese interests in Aksai Chin. A global pandemic creates a need and an opportunity for Chinese leaders to show rivals they mean business, and engenders the confidence that they can get away with it.

India and China are engaged in diplomatic and military talks to defuse the current crisis. However, its broader causes are likely to only grow more compelling with time. Similar incidents will flare up along the LAC in the near future. Both countries need to develop a more robust dialogue to reinstate the relative peace and tranquillity that prevailed along the LAC in the 1990s and 2000s.


Rohan Mukherjee is an assistant professor of political science at Yale-NUS College, Singapore.


Guest Column

India-China relations: Enduring legacy of Nalanda 

By Rup Narayan Das    


CIB160_2The ancient ruins of Nalanda University in Bihar, India.
Photo by Tushar Dayal from Flickr.

At a time when there is some disquiet in the relationship between India and China after COVID-19 outbreak and the confrontations at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it is propitious to revisit the hallowed Nalanda as the cultural and civilizational linkage between the two countries and their peoples, while both prepare to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relation. It is also appropriate in the context of the International Day for Monuments and Sites (on April 18), given that Nalanda has been declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 2016.

Nalanda, in the erstwhile Magadh empire, now in the eastern Indian state of Bihar, had flourished in the 6th and 7th centuries under the Gupta empire, as a centre of learning. It attracted scholars from different parts of the ancient world, including China, Korea and Central Asia. It is believed that Mahavira and Gautam Buddha had lived in Nalanda. The great Chinese scholar Xuanzang, also known as Hiuen Tsang, during his sojourn in India between 630 CE and 643 CE, visited Nalanda first in 637 CE and then again in 642 CE to study Buddhist scriptures and texts. He started his odyssey at the age of 26 in the seventh century and covered a distance of 8,333 miles from Chang-an to Rajagraha spending all together seventeen years on his journey before returning to China.  He was received at Nalanda with great honour and was accorded a seat near the chief monk. He paid his respects to the venerable Silabhadra who was very pleased to welcome him. Besides Buddhism, he also studied Sanskrit, logic and grammar. It is believed that he returned to China with 657 Buddhist texts and 150 relics. He bequeathed not only a rich heritage of Buddhist scholarship, but also the enduring legacy of civilizational connections between India and China.

Today Nalanda is remembered as a continuum of the civilizational linkage between India and China, and Xuanzang has become an icon of their relationship. This article elucidates how the historical site with all its remnants nourishes the civilizational interface between India and China and how the top leadership of the two countries incorporates this enduring legacy as facets of soft power.

During the 1950s, Bhikku Jagdish Kashyap, the founding director of the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, broached the idea to commemorate the legacy of Xuanzang at Nalanda, with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Construction of the Xuanzang Memorial Hall was initiated in January 1957 and completed in 1984. The Chinese government provided assistance in the form of an endowment, and contributed some relics of Xuanzang, along with some Chinese Buddhist texts. Plans were initiated for the renovation of the memorial in 2001, and a team of experts from China and India in 2005 put forward some recommendations for the renovation works and use of creative artwork designs. These suggestions were incorporated, and the memorial was jointly inaugurated by dignitaries from both China and India on February 12, 2007.

Yet another initiative to resurrect Nalanda was taken in March 2006 when the former President of India Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, while addressing the Bihar Legislative Assembly, proposed the idea of reviving the university. Almost simultaneously, the Singapore government put forward the “Nalanda Proposal” to India, which sought the re-establishment of a university like Nalanda which would once again be the focal point of Asia.

Over the years, the leaders of China and India have invoked Nalanda and the contributions of Buddhist seers and scholars like Xuanzang to the relationship between the two societies. The cultural and civilizational linkages between China and India have received much traction under the present government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Modi in his engagement with China has often referred to the historical legacy of Buddhism. The Chinese leadership has responded to such gestures positively. Ahead of President Xi’s visit to Gujarat in September 2014, Modi posted various slides depicting Gujarat’s rich Buddhist heritage, including the excavation at Vadnagar—his hometown—on his Twitter account. “Ashokan Edict in Junagadh shows Samrat Ashok’s reverence towards Buddhism & focuses on social & moral precepts,” said one tweet, while another said, “the place where I was born, Vadnagar too has a rich Buddhist influence including a Monastery.” He also observed that, “Well known Chinese traveller Xuanzang (Hiuen Tsang) noted the presence of Buddhist monasteries, monks in parts of Guj[arat].”

Xi reciprocated the gesture in equal measure when he received Modi in his hometown of Xi’an in May 2015, where Xuanzang spent his twilight years. Receiving Modi, Xi said, “You received me very warmly in your hometown. I am very glad to receive you in my home town.” This was the first time that the Chinese leader has received a foreign leader in Xi’an.

Re-invoking the spiritual and civilizational linkage between the two countries, Modi during his visit to China in May 2015, presented Xi with gifts, including replicas of Buddhist relics excavated from a 3rd–4th century CE stupa at Dev-ni-Mori, as well as archaeological drawings of the excavation at Vadnagar, which Xuanzang had visited around 641 CE. Modi also visited the Giant Wild Goose Pagoda where Xuazang worked for years to translate the sutras that he brought to China from India.

Excavations carried out by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) have unearthed structures resembling a Buddhist monastery in Vadnagar. In his writings, Xuanzang had recorded that in ten monasteries in Vadnagar, there were more than 1000 monks of the Sammitiya School, suggesting that the region was an important centre of Buddhist learning in western India during the period. In ancient times, Vadnagar was situated at a strategic location where two major ancient trade routes crossed each other. One connected central India to Sindh and the further northwest while the other was from the port town on the Gujarat coast to Rajasthan and north India. Therefore, it could have been a city of great opportunities while these routes remained vibrant.

A significant outcome of Modi’s visit to China in May 2015 was the decision on joint production of films depicting cultural ties between the two countries. During Modi’s visit to China in a press briefing in Beijing it was announced that the China Film Corporation and Eros International together with India would co-produce films. The first film was on Xuanzang. It is a historical adventure movie based on Xuanzang’s seventeen-year overland journey to India during the Tang dynasty. The film is directed by Huo Jianqi and produced by the famous Chinese film director Wong Kar-wai. It stars recognizable actors from both China and India—Huang Xiaoming, Kent Tong, Purba Rgyal and Tan Kai. The film was released in China and India on April 29, 2016 with distribution in China by the China Film Group Corporation. It was selected as the Chinese entry for the best Foreign Language Film at the 89th Academy Awards, but it was not nominated. It was, however, screened at the 2nd Annual Asian World Film Festival on October 31, 2016.

Today, Nalanda has re-established itself as a place of higher learning, with a new modern campus situated within walking distance of the excavated ruins of the ancient university. Just like its ancient counterpart, modern Nalanda University is connecting students of different cultures, languages and religions, establishing itself as a centre for inter-civilizational dialogue. The university is in a position to promote the pedagogical traditions and teachings of Xuanzang. More importantly, it could re-establish inter-Asian linkages that would benefit future generations of Chinese and Indians.

(This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the International Academic Conference on Historical Monuments and Modern Society organised by the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History, College of Liberal Arts, Shanghai University, on December 1-2, 2018.)


Rup Narayan Das is a Senior Fellow of the Indian Council of Social Science Research at the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi. He was previously a Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi on deputation from the Lok Sabha Secretariat of Indian Parliament.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

China begins evacuation of its nationals from India
The Economic Times, June 8

The evacuation began as several Indian cities have lifted lockdowns with the opening of restaurants, shopping malls and places of worship while curbs continue in severely hit regions.

India and China agree to peacefully resolve border dispute, New Delhi says
CNN, June 7

India and China have agreed to peacefully resolve a simmering border dispute between the world's two most populous nations, officials in New Delhi said.

India builds emergency airstrip in Kashmir amid Ladakh border tension with China
India Today, June 3

The National Highway Association of India has started the construction of an emergency landing airstrip next to the newly constructed national highway near south Kashmir’s Bijbehara. The move comes amid soaring border tensions between India and China in Ladakh.

PLA holds high altitude exercise as China-India border tensions continue
South China Morning Post, June 3

The recent drill in Tibet included drones and explosives to put troops to test in extreme, complicated situations. Exercise follows border clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Himalayas.

PLA expands high-altitude arsenal to address border threat
Global Times, May 31

Since the Doklam standoff with India in 2017, the Chinese military has expanded its arsenal with weapons like the Type 15 tank, Z-20 helicopter and GJ-2 drone that should give China the advantage in high-altitude conflicts should they arise, Chinese analysts said on Sunday (May 31).

Chinese troops wanted to enter deeper into the Indian side, but India thwarted it
India Today, May 30

In the first week of May, when the Chinese Army was marching through the Galwan River towards India, its intention was to go deeper into the Indian Territory and pitch their tents there.

“Dragon and Elephant dancing together” only right choice for China and India: Chinese envoy
Xinhua, May 28

The realization of "Dragon and Elephant dancing together" is the only right choice for China and India, which serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Weidong has said.

News Reports

China and India in the Region

As India, China talk to resolve border stand-off, analysts question when Delhi will speak to Nepal
The Kathmandu Post, June 8

India and China on Saturday held talks to resolve the month-long border stand-off in eastern Ladakh, with both sides agreeing to peacefully resolve the situation. Nepal, meanwhile, has been asking India to sit for talks since November, with New Delhi most recently saying that it’ll sit for talks once the Covid-19 pandemic is over.

India and Australia sign military pact as China tensions rise
Nikkei Asian Review, June 4

India and Australia on Thursday signed a deal that will strengthen their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and is sure to draw China's attention.

Trump, Modi discuss India-China border standoff and WHO reforms over telephone chat
The Print, June 2

US President Donald Trump also conveyed to PM Narendra Modi his ‘desire to expand the ambit’ of the G7 beyond the existing membership, to include India.

Pompeo slams China for taking advantage of a tactical situation
Livemint, June 2

The comments came as the India-China border face-off in the Ladakh region entered its fourth week, with more talks slated at two levels —between military commanders and between diplomats.

Britain wants US to form a 10-nation 5G alliance to cut reliance on China’s Huawei
South China Morning Post, May 29

Britain is proposing a “D10” club of democratic partners that would include the G7 nations, Australia, South Korea and India.

News Reports

Trade and Economy

Indian app highlights backlash against Chinese business
Channel News Asia, June 2

India's top trending free app on Google's mobile app store, with more than 5 million downloads since late May, is called "Remove China Apps" and does exactly what it says on the label.

RCEP countries woo India back to drawing board with ‘flexible package’
The Hindu Business Line, June 1

India has been offered the option of deferring commitments related to opening up its market by RCEP countries. This means, India would not have to make any commitment on this crucial issue at the time of signing the agreement, according to a diplomat from a member country.

China bans import of pigs, wild boar from India because of African swine fever
Hindustan Times, May 28

China, the biggest consumer of pork in the world, has banned the import of pigs and wild boars from India to prevent the spread of the African swine fever (ASF), Chinese customs and agricultural ministry have announced.

India’s trade with South Asia less than 4% of global trade; China’s up by 546%
Hindustan Times, May 28

India’s trade with countries in South Asia has remained less than 4% of its global trade since the late 1980s while China has increased its exports to the region by 546%, from $8 billion in 2005 to $52 billion in 2018, according to a new study.

No India-China border trade through Lipulekh Pass this year due to COVID-19
The New Indian Express, May 27

The development comes at a time when tension is high between the Chinese and Indian troops in Eastern Ladakh and efforts are also on to defuse the tension.

News Reports

Energy and Environment

India’s Biggest Asset Sale to Attract China-Wary Oil Majors
Bloomberg Quint, June 7

The growing disquiet over China could see oil investors headed to India, said a top executive at a refiner that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has put up for sale.

India Now Has More Virus Deaths Than China Where Pandemic Started
NDTV, May 29

The South Asian nation's death count hit 4,695 on Thursday, climbing past the 4,638 fatalities from Covid-19 in China. The nation of 1.3 billion people now has the highest number of fatalities in Asia, excluding Iran, despite the largest lockdown in the world.

India invites bid for One Sun One World One Grid to take on China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Livemint, May 28

India has moved ahead with threading-the-needle for an ambitious global electricity grid, with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government on Tuesday calling for bids to roll-out the “One Sun One World One Grid" (OSOWOG) plan.

China, India soak up oil from floating storage as demand recovers
Reuters, May 28

The volume of crude stored on ships in Asia has come off the peaks seen earlier this month on a recovery in demand in China and India, trade sources and analysts said.

Analyses

Delhi must build power-balancing alliance, or come to honourable accommodation with China
The Indian Express, June 6

By Arun Prakash, Retired Chief of Naval Staff

For reasons of national security as well as self-respect, India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to respond in kind.

India’s Appeasement Policy Toward China Unravels
Project Syndicate, June 5

By Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies, Center for Policy Research in New Delhi; and Fellow, Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin

Last month’s swift and well-coordinated incursions by People’s Liberation Army troops into the icy borderlands of India’s Ladakh region were likely the product of months of preparation. The aggression—and the fact that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi didn't see it coming—shows just how miserably his China policy has failed.

India must be wary of extreme anti-China sentiment spreading to sci-tech areas
Global Times, June 4

By Long Xingchun, Senior Research Fellow of the Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University and President of the Chengdu Institute of World Affairs

The trending app in India called "Remove China Apps" has been pulled from the Google Play Store two weeks after its launch, said its developer on Wednesday. The developing story shows that extreme anti-China sentiment is surging again in the South Asian nation alongside recent border tensions.

India and China's border skirmishes bring giants closer to clash
Nikkei Asian Review, June 3

By James Crabtree, Associate Professor in Practice, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore

Xi Jinping is growing aggressive, but Narendra Modi should not overreact.

In time-tested ties between India and Nepal, China must not be a factor
Money Control, June 1

By Tara Kartha, Former Director, National Security Council Secretariat

Nepal has been a loyal friend for decades, and Indian diplomacy needs to use tact rather than the overly big boss approach.

China’s revisionism: From Hong Kong to India’s borders
ORF, May 30

By Harsh V. Pant, Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Make no mistake—China under Xi’s leadership is one of the most assertive and aggressive powers the world has encountered in a long time.

Books and Journals

China-India Relations: Geo-political Competition, Economic Cooperation, Cultural Exchange and Business Ties
Springer (2020)

By Young-Chan Kim, Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Business and Economics at the University of Greenwich, London

This book examines India-China relations throughout history as well as in the context of current business cooperation and competition. It also explores geo-political and societal factors, such as religion or class models, that influence and shape bilateral relations, and provides thorough analyses and comparisons of networks between the two countries. The book will appeal to researchers and graduate students interested in India-China relations as well as Chinese and Indian business ties.


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MUKHERJEE, Rohan

MUKHERJEE, Rohan

Rup Narayan Das

Rup Narayan Das