China-India Brief #157

Guest Column

India-China Water Issues

By Amit Ranjan    

Photo by Shibanigogoi from wikimedia commons

Growing populations coupled with accelerating climate change effects have widened the demand-supply gap of water in China and India. In China, the per capita water availability is estimated to be only about 2,100 cubic meters. To meet its increasing water demands, China introduced a strict water management policy in 2011 known as the “Three Red Lines” approach. Subsequently in 2012, the Chinese State Council issued a document titled Opinions of the State Council on Implementing the Strictest Water Resources Management System which further enhanced management measures and specified major targets for water conservation: “by capping annual water usage at 700 billion cubic meters for the overall economy by 2030, increasing irrigation efficiency, and protecting water quality”. To study the effectiveness of these policies, the World Resource Institute in 2018 used water withdrawal data from 2001, 2010 and 2015 and found that the rate of water withdrawals had slowed from 5.1 billion cubic meters per year between 2001 and 2010, to 1.6 billion cubic meters per year between 2010 and 2015. However, the result varied from one region to the other, and China remains a water-stressed country overall.

In 2019, China set an aim to reduce its water consumption to below 670 billion cubic meters by 2022, and 700 billion cubic meters by 2035. However, by 2030 when China’s population is expected to reach around 1.45 billion, water demand is estimated to surge to  818 billion cubic meters, while total supply will be only around 619 billion cubic meters. 

Likewise, per capita availability of water in India was 1,544 cubic meters in 2011 and is expected to decline to 1,486 cubic meters by 2021, and drop further to 1,341 cubic metres by 2025. By 2030,  it is estimated that India’s water demand will exceed the total supply in the country by about two times. 

With this decline in the domestic water availability, it is expected that the two thirsty powers—India and China—may start demanding a larger amount of water from their transboundary rivers. That situation may escalate their water-related tensions. It is estimated that India depends on China-originated rivers to satisfy about one-third of its water needs. 

India and China share around 3,488 square kilometres of border. Of the total border area, there are disputes over some of the water rich areas in the western and eastern sectors. For example, according to a 2010 task force report by the Indian think tank, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Study and Analyses, China’s claim to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is also motivated by the roughly 200 million cusecs of waters in the state. 

One of the major rivers India and China share is the Brahmaputra river or the Yarlung Tsangpo. It originates in Angsi glacier in the Tibet Autonomous Region in China. Contrary to popular perceptions in India, the Brahmaputra becomes mightier as it flows downstream in India. A large amount of water is added into river Brahmaputra by its Indian tributaries such as Dibang, Luhit, Subansiri, Manas, Sankosh, Teesta, etc. 

However, some of the activities in the upper riparian state affects the flow of waters in India. In December 2017, the waters of the Brahmaputra suddenly began turning black. At that time, the Indian media accused China of building underground tunnels in the upper stream to divert the Brahmaputra’s waters. The purpose of the diversion, as reported and discussed in the Indian media, was not just for the generation of hydropower from another dam, which is about 13 kilometers away from Tsangmo or Zangmu dam but, possibly also to transfer it to driest parts of the Taklamakan desert in China. 

In the western sector, China has been accused by India of interfering in the flows of the Sutlej river or Langquen Zangbo. In 2000, the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh was hit by flash floods, resulting in about a hundred deaths as well as the destruction of 200 kilometers of National Highway 22 and more than 50 bridges. A study by scientists of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) found that the flooding was caused by the sudden release of excess water accumulated upstream of the Sutlej basin, originating from Tibet. 

Subsequently in 2004, when seasonal landslides caused an artificial lake to form in the same upstream region of Tibet, there were fears of a similar disaster occurring in India again. A red alert was issued by the Himachal government, along with the deployment of armed and paramilitary forces, and work at the Nathpa Jhakri dam project was shut down. Fortunately, no flooding occurred that year. However, floods did occurr in 2005 in river Sutlej due to a breach in Parachoo lake formed in Tibet. In that flood, National Highway 22 was damaged at many places and 10 bridges and 11 ropeways were washed away. 

China has also been accused of building structures over the Sutlej river. In March 2006, the Indian media reported on the construction of one such structure—a small hydropower station—raising concerns that it would disrupt the flow of water into India. The Chinese foreign ministry defended the use of the hydropower plant, claiming that it was necessary to meet the electricity demands of the local population. More importantly, the ministry countered that China had always adhered to the basic principles of fair and reasonable development of transboundary rivers while building such hydro structures. 

Moreover, China’s South-to-North Water Diversion Project (also known as South-North Water Transfer Project) (SNWDP/SNWTP) or Nanshuibeidiao also concerns India. India’s main worry is from the third line in this project, known as the Great Western Line, which is sub-divided into two—the Western and Greater Western Routes. 

The idea of the Greater Western Route was first conceived in 1950s and was proposed again in the 1990s by Guo Kai, a retired Chinese army general and prominent water engineer. Later, in 2006, the idea found support from another Chinese engineer, Li Ling. In his work Tibet Water Will Save China, Li Ling envisaged a plan to divert waters from six rivers flowing in Tibet through canals and tunnels across Qinghai Tibetan plateau. Li’s plan did not initially find support from the Chinese establishment at the time because of the huge difference between its cost and expected benefits. In more recent years however, it has begun to gain traction among a number of Chinese scholars and hydrologists. According to a report in the Global Times, in July 2017, around 20 scholars met outside Urumqi in Northwest China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and discussed the feasibility of diverting waters from the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to Xinjiang’s lowland plains. 

To address their water-related issues, India and China have signed a number of Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs). In 2002, China agreed to provide hydrological information onmajor transboundary rivers to India. India pays around S$200,000 every year to get data from Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia hydrological stations for the Brahmaputra river and from a station at Tsada for the Sutlej river. Unlike India, Bangladesh does not have to pay anything to get the same hydrological data from China, which it has been receiving since 2002. 

In 2010, India and China signed an MoU to facilitate the provision of hydrological information pertaining to the Sutlej River in flood season. In 2013, the two sides signed another MoU to set up an expert-level mechanism to exchange hydrological data during the flood-seasons and manage emergency situations. In 2015, during the visit by then Indian Vice-President, Hamid Ansari, to Beijing, the MoU on the Sutlej river was renewed for another five years. 

Despite having MoUs and other such mechanisms in place, the sharing of water-related information remains largely dependent on the state of the India-China bilateral relationship. These mechanisms work well, as long as the relationship is cordial. For example, during the 73-day military stand-off at Doklam in 2017, China stopped sharing water-related information with India. The Chinese government said that the interruption was due to technical upgrading works in the water-measuring stations in the upper riparian and had nothing to do with the military stand-off. This explanation is unlikely to have convinced many in India, particularly since China continued to make the same hydrological data available to Bangladesh. 

Later, as tensions between India and China eased, the sharing of water-related information resumed. The two countries also entered into another MoU on hydrological data information in June 2018. Under this MoU, China agreed to provide hydrological data in flood season from 15 May to 15 October every year. China also agreed to  provide hydrological data if the water level exceeds a mutually agreed level. Consequently, in October 2018, timely information was provided by China when a barrier lake was formed in the upper riparian due to landslides in the upper stream of the Brahmaputra river. That information gave the Indian government the opportunity to make the necessary preparations and avert a potential disaster in Arunachal Pradesh. 

To conclude, to manage the imminent challenge, water issues have to be shielded from India-China political differences.

Dr. Amit Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore. His research interests include water disputes, South Asian politics (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), India’s regional policy and India’s internal security. His papers, review essays, and book reviews have been widely published in journals, including Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, Asian Ethnicity, BIISS journal, Economic & Political Weekly, India Quarterly, Indian Journal of Public Administration, Studies in Indian Politics, Social Change, South Asia Research, The Roundtable: The Journal of Commonwealth Studies and Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. He has also contributed commentaries, opinion editorials and reviews in newspapers and websites.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

China "Deeply Concerned" As India Cancels Orders For COVID-19 Test Kits
NDTV, April 28

Several Indian states have complained that the kits had an accuracy rate of only 5.4%. The government on Monday (April 27) had said not a single rupee will be lost to Chinese firms who provided faulty COVID-19 test kits to India as the orders have been cancelled and the payments not made.

India’s new bridge in Himalayas could potentially reignite China border dispute
South China Morning Post, April 24

The new bridge, which can bear 40 tons of weight, was built in Arunachal Pradesh in India’s remote northeast, a region claimed by China. Relations are already strained after China accused India of blocking its companies by tightening laws for foreign investment.

China opens green channel for clearing cargo aircraft carrying medical supplies to India
Deccan Herald, April 24

China has opened a “green channel” for granting approval for cargo aircraft carrying medical supplies to India, as New Delhi decided to keep procuring from the communist country test kits and ventilators as well as protective gears required for doctors and nurses taking care of the Covid-19 patients.

Indian Ambassador stresses China-India cooperation in COVID-19 fight
China.org.cn, April 16

Addressing an online press conference on Tuesday (April 14), Misri said the immediate priority in the bilateral cooperation lies in the procurement of much-needed medical supplies from China for frontline healthcare workers fighting the outbreak in India.

China dispatches 650 000 medical kits to India to fight COVID-19 Indian envoy
The Week, April 16

China on Thursday (April 16) dispatched 650,000 coronavirus medical kits to India to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic, Indian Ambassador to Beijing Vikram Misri said.  Over two million test kits being procured from China will be sent to India in the next 15 days, he said.

Australia rejects Chinese 'economic coercion' threat amid planned coronavirus probe
Reuters, April 27

Australia made a ‘principled call’ for an independent review of the Covid-19 outbreak first detected in the Chinese city of Wuhan, foreign minister says. In newspaper interview, Chinese ambassador Cheng Jingye had said: ‘Maybe the ordinary people will say ‘Why should we drink Australian wine? Eat Australian beef?’’

Beijing’s aggressive South China Sea push amid pandemic worries India, US
The Times of India, April 26

Under cover of the coronavirus pandemic, China has ramped up its aggressive expansionism both in the South China Sea as well as the Indian Ocean Region.  

India-Pakistan rivalry continues amid efforts at regional unity in fighting coronavirus
The Straits Times, April 22

There has been an uptick in activity along the Line of Control, the de facto border which cuts across Jammu and Kashmir, with both sides accusing each other of ceasefire violations, including troops firing guns and mortar shells along the border.

India readying rapid response teams for Bangladesh, Bhutan, SL and Afghanistan
The Times of India, April 22

India is readying separate rapid response teams for dispatching to friendly neighbouring countries in spirit of its commitment to help them deal with the coronavirus pandemic, official sources said.

China sends more medical aid to Sri Lanka amid COVID-19 pandemic
Xinhua, April 18

A fresh batch of medical aid donated by China arrived at the Bandaranaike International Airport on Friday evening (April 17), as the government of China and its people stood firmly with Sri Lanka in the country's battle against the COVID-19 pandemic.

India sending Hydroxychloroquine to 55 countries, will not procure PPES from China
India Today, April 17

India is in the process of supplying anti-malarial drug hydroxychloroquine to 55 coronavirus-hit countries as grants as well as on commercial basis, sources said.

US supports firms weighing India as alternative to China
The Economic Times, April 29

Representatives of several US-based companies have been advised to propose to the Indian govt to offer incentives that would facilitate proliferation of US businesses in India.

India, China among top three military spenders in 2019: SIPRI report
The Hindu, April 27

The global military expenditure rose to $1917 billion in 2019 with India and China emerging among the top three spenders, according to a report by a Swedish think tank, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

India plans to fast track Chinese investments after policy change: Sources
Channel New Asia, April 25

India plans to fast track the review of some investment proposals from neighbouring countries such as China following concerns new screening rules could hit plans of companies and investors.

China strengthens grip on India's smartphone market, Xiaomi undisputed leader
Business Today, April 24

Chinese smartphone makers strengthened their hold on the Indian market, with Vivo overtaking Samsung to become the second-largest brand behind Xiaomi, which remained the leader in the first quarter of 2020.

Red carpet for firms looking to ditch China
The Economic Times, April 23

The Prime Minister’s Office, Niti Aayog and the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade are firming up a plan to offer incentives to attract companies looking to shift manufacturing activities out of China.

China fumes over India's FDI move to block takeover of companies; calls it WTO violation
Business Today, April 20

China wants India to revise relevant “discriminatory practices” and foster an “open, fair and equitable” business environment; calls India's move violation of WTO's principle of non-discrimination.

Indian refiners export diesel to China as Beijing recovers from Covid-19
Business Standard, April 23

Indian refiners have started exporting commodities like diesel, a large share of which is going to China, where economy is on a recovery path.  

China doubled crude oil storage inflows during coronavirus demand hit: Russell
Reuters, April 20

Rather than cutting back on imports, China pushed crude oil into storage tanks at almost double the rate in the first quarter of this year than it did in the same period in 2019 as the new coronavirus hit domestic consumption.

India seeks to woo renewable energy firms shifting from China, plans manufacturing hubs at ports
Hindustan Times, April 18

The Centre has asked state governments and port authorities to identify land for creating new hubs for manufacturing renewable energy equipment as part of India’s efforts to attract firms shifting base from China amid the Covid-19 pandemic.

Epidemic accelerates shift toward clean fuels
China Daily, April 16

“China is likely to become more determined to develop renewable energy as part of its efforts to reduce energy imports from a longer-term perspective,” according to an analyst with BNEF.

China Tightens Grip Over The South China Sea: Should India Worry?
Eurasia Review, April 27

By Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow and Head of the Maritime Policy Initiative at ORF

To many in New Delhi, it is clear that China’s firming grip over disputed territories in the South China Sea portends greater power projection in the Eastern Indian Ocean.

China, India need common front to confront COVID-19
Global Times, April 26

By Liu Zongyi, Secretary-General of the Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies

he pandemic will indeed change many things, but for the international political and economic landscape, it will be more of a catalyst, accelerating or revealing political and economic processes that already existed but are not so apparent.

India fires a salvo at China
Observer Research Foundation, April 22

By Harsh V. Pant, Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

For India the problem lies that trade with China has often been viewed as a positive in a relationship which is increasingly devoid of any positive sentiment.

In the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis, India could emerge as the power behind the global growth engine
South China Morning Post, April 22

By Rajiv Kumar, Vice-Chairman of NITI Aayog and Independent Director on the Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India; and Kowthamraj V. Sangappillai, Young Professional at NITI Aayog, Alistore Scholar from the European Commission's EM+ programme

The Covid-19 pandemic has sparked a backlash against globalisation, which ignores its huge contribution to global GDP and poverty reduction. While China, with its dynamic supply chain, labour pool and support systems for manufacturing, powered global growth after the 2008 financial crisis, India could do the same for services.

China-India cooperation imperative for COVID-19 fight
Global Times, April 18

By Qian Feng, Senior Fellow at the Taihe Institute, and Director of the research department of the National Strategy Institute of Tsinghua University.

The two countries have a lot of room for cooperation in overcoming COVID-19, including the production of medical supplies, sharing experience in combating epidemics, and developing vaccines. Let's anticipate to foresee a further strengthened cooperation in these fields.

Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations
Routledge UK, March 2020

Edited by Kanti Bajpai, Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies and Director of CAG; Selina Ho, Assistant Professor and Chair of the Master in International Affairs Programme at LKYSPP; and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Associate Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University.

The Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations is a project of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP). The volume aims to provide readers with a much-needed understanding of the important and complex relationship between India and China. Reflecting the consequential and multifaceted nature of the bilateral relationship, it brings together thirty-five original contributions by a wide range of experts in the field.

Authors include: Tarun Khanna, Rudolph G. Wagner, Tansen Sen, Hu Xiaowen, Pallavi Aiyar, Simon Shen, Debasish Roy Chowdhury, Zhang Feng, Ian Hall, M. Taylor Fravel, Rishika Chauhan, Fang Tien-sze, Sebastian Biba, Yogesh Joshi, Anit Mukherjee,  Oriana Skylar Mastro, Arzan Tarapore,  David Brewster, Lora Saalman, Pradeep Taneja, Lin Minwang,  Jabin T. Jacob, Ye Min, Gu Jing, Neil Renwick, Jeff M. Smith, Vidya Nadkarni, Marie Izuyama, Andrew Small, Constantino Xavier, Sheryn Lee, Nicolas Blarel, Wu Fuzuo, Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Nicola Leveringhaus, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Julie Michelle Klinger, Courtney J. Fung, Lydia Powell, and Huang Yanzhong.

The chapters show that China–India relations are more far-reaching and complicated than ever and marked by both conflict and cooperation. Following an introduction by the Editors, the handbook is divided into seven parts based on thematic and chronological principles:

• Historical overviews
• Culture and strategic culture: constructing the other
• Core bilateral conflicts
• Military relations
• Economy and development
• Relations with third parties
• China, India, and global order

The handbook is particularly relevant for scholars in International Relations, Asian Security, and China–India relations.