What should Southeast Asian states do in a Taiwan conflict?

The Centre on Asia and Globalisation held the 4th Counterpoint Southeast Asia public webinar on 30 September 2022. Three Southeast Asian analysts were invited to debate and examine the question, "What should Southeast Asian states do in a future Taiwan conflict?"

Chong Ja Ian, an Associate Professor at the National University of Singapore, explained that Singaporean views about Taiwan’s security were mixed. He noted that while they are generally focused on Singapore’s narrow economic interests, there seems to be little appreciation for the risks and potential implications from a cross-Strait conflict. While Singapore’s preference might be to “not take sides,” it may be impossible to avoid entanglement in the face of increased pressure from both the US and China in the event of a conflict.

The risks to Singapore extend beyond the binary question of whether to continue to enable US forces to utilise military infrastructure on the island, or to accommodate China by curtailing US military operations and access. He further observes that China’s close cultural ties to Singapore’s majority ethnic-Chinese population could tempt China to mobilise ethno-nationalism which would undermine racial harmony and social stability in the island state.

Ratih Kabinawa, a PhD student at the University of Western Australia, meanwhile observed that Indonesia’s interests in Taiwan and at home would be severely impacted in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. She argued that the personal safety of almost 250,000 Indonesian citizens currently residing in Taiwan would be the primary concern of the government. Jakarta might even have to look to or work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to support evacuation efforts.

In addition, Ms. Kabinawa argued that Indonesia’s military needs to develop the capability to control its own territorial waters and airspace, enabling it to deny access to a belligerent. Notably, even though Indonesia and China do not have formal competing claims in the South China Sea (SCS), Indonesia is concerned about China’s encroachment into its EEZ in the North Natuna Sea. Lastly, she assesses that Indonesia’s preference for neutrality could limit its ability to protect its interests, including impacting the ability to evacuate its citizens and ensure the Straits of Malacca remains an open waterway.

Ivy Kwek, Fellow for China at the International Crisis Group, asserted that Malaysia’s core interest in the event of a cross-Strait conflict is maintaining open sea lanes in the SCS and ensuring the free-flow of commerce. This underscored the tremendous regional economic impact that a cross-Strait conflict would entail. She also observes the political ramifications for SCS claimant states should China use force against Taiwan; it would indicate Beijing’s willingness to aggressively assert its claims against SCS claimants.

Ms. Kwek proposed that Malaysia both works with ASEAN and takes proactive steps to prevent a conflict from breaking out over Taiwan. ASEAN could also attempt to reclaim its centrality by acting as a go-between for the US and China. She makes concrete recommendations that Malaysia begins planning for a Taiwan contingency, engage in multilateral military exercises, and begin talks with Taiwan to plan for contingencies including non-combatant evacuations.

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