Two political observers from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy – Visiting Senior Research Fellow Drew Thompson and Assistant Professor Lu Xi – weigh in on the outcome of the January 2024 elections, with views on what challenges the new president will likely face and how they expect the United States-China relationship to change.View from Drew Thompson
On 13 January, Taiwan’s people went to the polls to elect their president and legislature for the eighth time since the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the advent of direct elections. The election process was free, fair, and efficient, with the incumbent Vice President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) winning the election, gaining a million more votes than his challengers, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-Yi of the Kuomintang (KMT), and the rising populist former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The KMT gained a one-seat majority over the DPP in the Legislative Yuan, giving them the presidency of the Legislative Yuan, while the TPP secured eight seats, making them a critical caucus to pass any legislation. The election and its outcome highlight the maturity and centrality of Taiwan’s democracy to its governance.
The election represents a status quo outcome, where all three political parties achieved their political objectives to retain an element of political power. President-elect Lai has pledged to continue President Tsai Ing-wen’s policies and approaches, increasing investments in Taiwan’s defense and domestic social programs, working closely with the United States (US) and Taiwan’s other diplomatic and economic partners, and keeping the door open to communications with Beijing. President-elect Lai is expected to emulate President Tsai’s cross-Strait approach which sought to avoid antagonising Beijing, while preserving Taiwan’s autonomy and
de facto independence without making overt moves towards
de jure independence, something which Lai has already claimed is unnecessary. Lai clearly has no intention of acceding to Beijing’s political demand that he acknowledges China’s one China principle or the so-called 1992 Consensus, but he recognises that provoking Beijing brings him no benefit either, so he is expected to support the current political status quo.
Relations with the US
Likewise, Washington seeks to preserve the cross-strait status quo and it is prepared to work constructively with any democratically elected government in Taipei in pursuit of its interests. Washington views Taiwan as more than just a subset of US-China relations. Taiwan is the US’ 9th largest trading partner, a key part of its supply chains, a trusted global diplomatic partner providing training and development assistance to third countries, and it is a thriving democracy with shared values. President Tsai has worked very closely with US counterparts, regularly hosting government and non-government visitors, meeting regularly with the
de facto US ambassador to Taiwan to ensure robust, open lines of communication between Washington and Taipei that built trust and avoided surprises. As a result, President Tsai provided eight years of stability in the US-Taiwan relationship, even as the relationship between the US and China took dramatic swings during her tenure. The expectation is for President Lai to do the same.
The DPP’s choice of Hsiao Bi-Khim as Vice President on his ticket was shrewd, not only because of her popularity among Taiwan voters. Hsiao’s longstanding personal relationships with Washington political and foreign policy elites and her expertise on national security matters make her an asset to Lai and the next DPP administration. She developed strong personal ties on Capitol Hill during her time as representative to Washington, no doubt leveraging her shared experience as a former elected legislator which will help ensure Taiwan continues to receive attention and support from Congress. Hsiao is not just the top DPP America-hand but her connections within the DPP cut across its cliques, evidenced by her close working relationships with the DPP’s first President, Chen Shui-bian, Tsai, and now Lai, who undoubtedly already sees her tremendous ability and worth.
Managing China, and the road ahead
Managing China will be more challenging for President-elect Lai. He has pledged to keep channels open to Beijing, which in turn refuses to engage unless he concedes to Beijing’s sovereignty claim over the island. No mainstream politician or party can accept Beijing’s demands, nor do they have any incentive to accommodate Beijing which offers nothing tangible in return except its own satisfaction. Beijing’s formula for unification
– One Country, Two Systems
– is rejected by all of Taiwan’s political parties, underscoring how low Beijing’s credibility is. Its pledge to allow Taiwan to maintain its own political system and autonomy is not convincing, particularly after China abrogated the Basic Law and Sino-British treaty that guaranteed Hong Kong autonomy for 50 years. Since Xi Jinping came to power, Beijing has used economic, political, or military coercion against many countries that it has political differences with. Taiwan is subjected to all three simultaneously, which is unlikely to change, so long as Xi Jinping remains in power and Taiwan continues to seek to preserve its autonomy.
View from Assistant Professor Lu Xi
In the recent Taiwan presidential election, cross-strait issues were overshadowed by domestic issues, indicating that the Taiwanese people have reached a basic consensus on Taiwan's political nature. The basis of this consensus lies in the "Four Commitments" proposed by outgoing president Tsai Ing-wen, who had essentially advocated for a de facto two-state theory that does not overtly violate the Constitution of the Republic of China. Any president is expected to adhere to this consensus within Taiwanese society, thus the election results will not fundamentally alter the established direction of letting the two states exist politically apart, between the two sides of the strait.
As for Taiwan's position in the context of US-China relations, it is clear that under the social consensus of the "Four Commitments", Taiwan's autonomy has been significantly strengthened. In this election, the Kuomintang (KMT) barely received any votes from young people, or those under 40 years old, indicating that the pro-China faction represented by the "1992 Consensus" has been completely abandoned by the times.
On the other hand, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) attempted to attack Ko Wen-je's flexible cross-strait policy using old tactics, but still could not prevent him from winning a large number of votes from young people. This indicates that young people are not concerned about whether Ko Wen-je will cross their bottom line on cross-strait and US-China issues. Therefore, Taiwan's pro-US stance after the election will not change, and there will be no substantial internal forces challenging this.
The only question is how to flexibly handle relations with mainland China while maintaining a reasonable distance.
The fundamental challenge for the new president in managing relations with China and the US lies not within Taiwan, but with China. If the Chinese economy continues to decline and the internal high-pressure rule persists, there will inevitably be dissatisfaction towards Xi Jinping. Leaders of authoritarian regimes often provoke highly controversial events to gauge potential dissenters for easier suppression. The greatest risk of a Taiwan Strait conflict stems from this.
US-Taiwan relations
On the American side, uncertainty mainly arises from the US presidential election. If former president Donald Trump, who has indicated his bid for this year’s elections, returns to office, there is uncertainty over whether US military and economic policies globally will undergo reversals similar to those seen during his previous term.
What’s next
Regardless of who is elected in Taiwan, they will likely follow the current path set by Tsai Ing-wen. However, Tsai Ing-wen's approach is not acceptable to mainland China. Therefore, the issue does not solely lie with newly elected president William Lai's personal capabilities but rather with mainland China's adherence to an unrealistic cross-strait policy, which has led to the current diplomatic impasse between Taiwan and China.
President-elect William Lai faces several challenges: his past political stance may lead to him being less resolute than Tsai Ing-wen in resisting pressure against the voices of independence. The Democratic Progressive Party's loss in the Legislative Yuan may constrain Lai in handling cross-strait relations. Lai himself is known for being stubborn and ideologically driven, raising questions over whether he will demonstrate enough flexibility at critical moments.
Examining what has happened in the past could provide some clues as to what can happen in the future. In the past few years, military exercises and aircraft intrusions around Taiwan have become routine. Unless there is a sudden and rapid economic collapse in China in the coming months, there are unlikely to be any surprising actions. The most probable scenario is that China will take sterner action in its economic and trade relations with Taiwan, potentially cutting it off from the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Apart from this, the cross-strait relationship will likely remain in its current deadlock. Taiwan is also unlikely to engage in excessive provocative behaviour.