China-India Brief #77

Guest Column

Sino-Indian Nuclear Relations and the Security Dilemma

by Zhang Baohui

Amid a largely positive Sino-Indian relationship, the security dilemma between them remains a challenge. As realist international relations theory suggests, in an anarchic international system states choose to assume the worst when it comes to digesting other states’ strategic intentions. This pernicious behavior is the cause of the security dilemma, which drives two purely defensive minded states into strategic mistrust and arms race.

Sino-Indian relations are particularly susceptible to the effects of the security dilemma. After all, they fought a war fifty years ago and bitter memories of that war still linger. Even worse, they have not resolved their differences over the border issue. Periodically, their frontline troops engage each other in face-offs along the contested border.

Moreover, Sino-Indian relations are bothered by rising strategic mistrust. This is largely due to the logic of great power politics. As John Mearsheimer argues in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, powerful countries engage each other in contests over power, prestige, and primacy. As both China and India are rising powers, they cannot escape the tragedy of great power politics. Both see the other trying to undermine their national interests. For example, it is not uncommon to see many Indian security experts perceiving China harboring malign intentions towards India. It is often suggested that China has adopted a “string of pearls” strategy to encircle India. At the same time, some Chinese foreign and security experts believe that India is abetting the US and Japan to contain China’s rise.

In this context, Sino-Indian nuclear relationship constitutes a key issue that may either enhance the strategic stability between them or harm it. Up to now, this relationship has not been systematically examined, let alone managed by the two governments. It is time to bring the issue to the table.

Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability in the Sino-Indian Context

Both China and India are making concerted efforts to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals. Indeed, China is pursuing a full-blown nuclear modernization program that covers its land and sea-based strategic nuclear weapon systems. For example, it has changed its old single-warhead deployment pattern by arming its strategic nuclear missiles with multiple and independently guided warheads. The DF-5B solo-based strategic missile, which was revealed to the public in a September 2015 military parade, represents this new trend. China is also testing a new road-mobile strategic missile, the DF-41, that is also armed with multiple and independently-guided warheads. In the meantime, it is reported that China’s new generation strategic nuclear submarine, the Type -094 SSBN, is already conducting combat patrols.

India has also been pursuing an ambitious nuclear program. India’s Agni-IV and Agni-V intermediate-range missiles have been successfully tested in recent years. The latter has a range of at least 5,000 kilometers. Once deployed, India will start to have the ability to strike at China’s major coastal cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Moreover, India has been making progress with its sea-based nuclear platforms, including the Agni-VI submarine-launched nuclear missile.

The nuclear progresses made by China and India could stabilize their bilateral relations. As many have argued, the Cold War was a period of Long Peace built on mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mutually assured destruction forces states to act with maximum prudence toward other nuclear-armed states.

Sino-Indian relations can benefit from mutual nuclear deterrence. This is because of the inherent instability generated by their border conflicts. In fact, it has become routine to see face-offs between their militaries along the contested border. While both governments have made concerted efforts to manage their border conflicts, there is no guarantee that the next face-off will not touch off a dangerous spiral toward military conflicts. Often, states are driven to “stand firm” in scenarios of conflicts either because of domestic politics or because of obsessions with “deterrence reputations.”

Without nuclear mutual deterrence, border incidents are likely to trigger the escalation spiral, leading to military conflicts that nobody wants. With nuclear mutual deterrence, decision-makers on both sides are aware of the extremely nasty consequences if their countries go to war against each other. Therefore, nuclear mutual deterrence in theory generates pacifying effects on states’ behaviors during crisis situations, pushing them to try to reign in the escalatory dynamics of a crisis situation. The efforts by China and India to establish a credible nuclear deterrent can work for the benefits of both countries by instilling caution in both capitals.

The Security Dilemma and Sino-Indian Nuclear Arms Race

Unfortunately, mutual deterrence does not solve the security dilemma problem in great power relations. While nuclear deterrence motivates states to be more cautious during crises, the presence of nuclear threats from other states sharpens their sense of insecurity, thereby amplifying the security dilemma between them. The result could be increased strategic mistrust and nuclear arms racing.

This scenario could potentially drive China and India into an arms race. In fact, they are already engaging in a quiet arms race. For example, India’s nuclear modernization program, especially its pursuit of intermediate-range strike capabilities, is certainly geared toward China. This is not unreasonable on the part of India, as China has already deployed intercontinental nuclear capabilities. To achieve credible deterrence against China, India must establish the capabilities to strike at major Chinese coastal cities.

However, India’s quest for credible nuclear deterrence is forcing China to pursue missile defense capabilities to neutralize potential threats from Indian nuclear weapons. Since 2010, China has conducted several successful mid-course missile defense tests. Given the vast superiority of US nuclear capabilities, it is unlikely that Beijing believes that its nascent missile defense capabilities can neutralize a nuclear strike initiated by the United States. Most likely, China’s quest for mid-course missile defense capabilities is aimed at India’s limited nuclear capabilities.

It is highly possible that China’s advancement in missile defense will motivate India to further expand its offensive nuclear capabilities. If so, the future Sino-Indian nuclear relationship will resemble the current China-US nuclear relationship. A major driver of China’s recent nuclear modernization efforts has been its concerns for US missile defense. China has been seeking improved offensive capabilities to guarantee that its nuclear forces will be able to penetrate US missile defense in a worst-case scenario.

The future China-India nuclear relationship could be defined by the same offense-defense arms race. India’s quest for credible nuclear deterrence versus China motivates the latter to pursue defensive capabilities, which will in turn force India to expand its offensive capabilities.

Managing the Security Dilemma

If their nuclear relationship follows the above dynamics, the security dilemma between the two countries will certainly worsen. The nuclear shadow will force both parties to try to either stay ahead of the other side or at least maintain a balance with the other side.

Therefore, while nuclear mutual deterrence could potentially stabilize their border conflicts, it may also deepen the security dilemma between China and India. To avert this prospect, the two countries should start to engage each other in candid nuclear dialogues. Security officials and experts on both sides need to frankly talk about their respective concerns. As international relations theory suggests, strategic communications are vital for breaking down mistrust. In addition to confidence building, China and India should pursue greater mutual transparency. They may first establish relations between China’s Strategic Missile Forces and India’s Nuclear Command. Finally, they may pursue a nuclear framework that accepts mutual deterrence as the foundation of their strategic relationship. This kind of framework should dampen the dynamics of a senseless arms race between the two countries.

Unfortunately, the road to stable nuclear relationship between China and India will not be easy. This is because of the security dynamics between China and the United States. As mentioned earlier, China’s nuclear modernization program is driven by its concerns for US missile defense. As long as the US continues to expand its missile defense capabilities, China must expand its offensive capabilities, which will in turn put pressure on India’s nuclear program.

Nonetheless, China and India must be aware that they need to manage their nuclear relationships. If not, the security dilemma between them will certainly harm the broader relationship between the two countries. The two sides should start with confidence building efforts through candid dialogues about their legitimate security needs. Mutual transparency will also improve bilateral trust and dampen the security dilemma. Finally, the two countries should aim for a nuclear framework that is built on mutual deterrence but shuns an arms race.

Zhang Baohui is Professor of Political Science and Director of Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. He is the author of China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order (Routledge 2015).

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Guest Column

South Asia: A Region Divided

by Touqir Hussain

South Asia has changed and so has the way the world powers relate to it. It presents economic opportunities, strategic challenges and security threats like never before. China and the US and, to a lesser degree, Japan are now heavily invested in the region that was once an area of low priority for them.

For China, its $ 46 billion-China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) represents a critical platform for its ambitious One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative that can dramatically change the economic and strategic landscape of Eurasia. The US, through its own extraordinary new relationship with India, hopes to contain Chinese power and influence in the region, and beyond. Russia, trying to limit the Chinese and American presence, is wooing India on one hand and Iran on the other. A great new balance of power game and strategic and economic competition is on in the most nuclearized part of the world, with profound implications for global peace and prosperity.

While South Asia has never been so actively engaged with the outside world, ironically it remains a disengaged region internally. The weight of the past continues to oppress the present. The relationship between India and Pakistan and Pakistan and Afghanistan remain marred by lingering tensions rooted in religion, culture and identity, and conflicting versions of history and war.

The upshot is that even the outside powers’ engagement with the region tends to be divisive. Whether it is China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan or Washington’s enhanced engagement with India and Afghanistan, these have only hardened the differences between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The old and the new thus limit the prospects of cooperation and enhance the potential of conflict in South Asia that remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world and arguably a nuclear flash point. The region is defined by the security and political issues that divide the major states rather than by the common economic interests that unite them.

The basic problem is that India and Pakistan have not decided what kind of relationship they want with each other. They cannot perceive each other except in negative terms. The same is true of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. All three have found similar solutions -- to weaken each other by arms races and by the use of proxies. That has created an enabling environment for forces of destabilization like insurgencies, terrorism, and local and transnational religious extremism. 

The countries of South Asia have to realize that extremism is a contagion and that threats and opportunities in the region have all become interlocked. Without stability in Afghanistan, there can be no stability in Pakistan. A stable Pakistan and “rising” India are interdependent. The forces of de-stabilization must be defeated. That would require cooperation among all the countries. Not just a common counter terrorism strategy but also normalization of relations among them, especially between India and Pakistan, are vital.

But the question is: how can they achieve normalization when Pakistan and India have conflicting perceptions? Kashmir lies at the heart of these differences. India has to realize that its massive military presence in Kashmir may have helped it to control the territory but has invalidated its claim to it. As for Pakistan, it has to understand that it has not been possible to solve the dispute by military means that have in fact have blown up in Pakistan’s face.

China seems to have correctly concluded that the socio-economic development of Pakistan and Afghanistan is critical to its stability and essential to the success of CPEC and OBOR and vice versa. But excluding India from CPEC makes New Delhi oppose it and go around Pakistan to try to weaken Islamabad. China needs to reassure New Delhi that it does not plan to use the project to isolate India. With India’s acceptance of CPEC, and possible inclusion at some stage, and Pakistan’s willingness to give India transit trade rights, South Asia canbecome an integrated market linked with Central Asia, with a great economic future for the two regions. But Pakistan will not give transit rights without overall normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. That is the main problem. And normalization needs both Chinese and American help.

America’s affirmation that it wants to help India become a great power has incited Indian ambitions and encouraged miscalculations. India is behaving the same way as Pakistan which, deluded by Washington’s hyperbole on being the most allied ally, concluded that it would be wooed by Washington regardless of its actions. Now Pakistan has found a similar friend in China. Pakistan has come a long way but continues to avoid making hard decisions, complacent in the belief that China is the answer to all its problems. And the Chinese are making little effort to tone down this overweening confidence.

The attitude of both China and the US, to the effect that conflicts in the region should be resolved by the parties themselves, has to change. The flaw in that view is that outsiders have also very much become parties to the disputes.Ultimately, for peace and prosperity to come to South Asia, geopolitical, regional, and bilateral relations have to be in sync. What is required is a paradigm shift in the domestic politics and the mindset of the countries of the region and in the approach of the external powers, both in their own relations and in relations with their allies in the region.  Unfortunately, that does not seem to be on the cards any time soon.

Touqir Hussain is a former Ambassador of Pakistan and Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister, teaches at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins University.

The views expressed in these articles are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

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News Reports

Bilateral relations

After NSG play, China minister fixes India date
The Economic Times, June 11
Chinese Home (Public Security) Minister Guo Shengkun will visit India soon in what is being viewed as a Confidence Building Measure -- after the Seoul NSG plenary -- to meet his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh to explore counter-terror cooperation against the growth and spread of Islamic State impacting the region including Xinjiang in Western China besides finding ways to choke funds for terror groups. Guo's visit is aimed as an effort to cool the temperature after India alleged that a single country (read China) blocked its entry into the coveted Nuclear Supplier's Group. Beijing's intransigence to Delhi's membership in the exclusive club had upset the Modi government. 

India blames China’s ‘obstructionist policy’ for thwarting its NSG dreams
The New Indian Express, July 2
India on Friday made it amply clear that China’s obstructionist approach had thwarted its bid to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a technology restraint regime comprising 48 countries, despite favourable indications from other member countries. The bruising New Delhi faced at the NSG was succeeded by the country’s entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on June 27th. However, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) singled out China for blocking its entry into the NSG. “....we have bilateral engagements with each of the 48 countries and on the basis of that I can say with complete certainty that at the end of the day there was only one country that raised procedural hurdles as a result of which the Nuclear Suppliers Group could not arrive in favour of India,” MEA Spokesperson Vikas Swarup said in a briefing here.

News Reports

China and India in the Regions

Int’l experts praise Chinese President Xi’s speech on CPC anniversary
Xinhua, July 4
International scholars and experts Monday spoke highly of Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent speech at an event marking the 95th founding anniversary of the Communist Party of China (CPC). On Friday, Xi, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, elaborated the Party's stances on how to enhance Marxism, advance national governance and promote China's peaceful development. China should adhere to and never stray from the leadership of the CPC and socialism with Chinese characteristics, he said. Sitaram Yechury, general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), said that "the CPC has stuck to socialism in the past several decades, which has not only alleviated the population of the unprecedented amount of poverty in history, but also turned China into the world's second-largest economy. That is an achievement of historic significance." He said Xi attributed the CPC's success over the past years to upholding Marxism as its guiding principle and enriching its content in real governance.

India to reinvigorate ties with African nations
The New York Times, July 6
India's prime minister hopes his visit this week to four African nations, some not visited by an Indian leader in more than three decades, will reinvigorate cooperation in energy, trade and investment. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Mozambique on Thursday followed by South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya. Brushing aside suggestions that India is trying to compete with China in Africa, an Indian External Affairs Ministry official, Amar Sinha, said several agreements are expected to be signed with each of the four countries during Modi's visit. Sreeram Chaulia, the dean of the Jindal School of International Affairs, said there was no competition between India and China in terms of influence in Africa.

China promises to help Sri Lanka become a shipping hub
The New York Times, July 8
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Friday his country will align its maritime silk road project with Sri Lanka’s development plans to enable the island nation to become a shipping hub in the Indian Ocean. Wang’s comments came after meeting Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, starting a two-day visit. It is a sign of Sri Lanka’s new government’s increasing receptiveness to Chinese projects having previously suspended some to investigate corruption and possible environmental hazards. “We’ll take the building of the maritime silk road as a priority to better align our development strategy including your five-year development plan so that we can come up with a comprehensive blue print for future cooperation, so that we can help Sri Lanka build itself into a shipping center in the Indian Ocean,” Wang said.

U.S. asks China to follow India on SCS dispute resolution
The Hindu, July 8
The United States has asked China to learn from India’s handling of its maritime disputes with its neighbours, ahead of a key ruling by an international arbitral tribunal on rival claims over the strategic South China Sea (SCS). China has taken a position of non-acceptance and non-participation on the jurisdiction by the International Court of Arbitration in a case the Philippines has brought against China’s claims to nearly all of the SCS, Abraham Denmark, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for East Asia, told lawmakers at a Congressional hearing. “In 2014, the Permanent Court of Arbitration — the same court that will issue a ruling on the South China Sea next week — ruled against India in favour of Bangladesh in a three-decade-old maritime dispute,” he said.

South China Sea: Court rules in favour of Philippines over China
CNN, June 12
An international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines in a maritime dispute Tuesday, concluding China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to the bulk of the South China Sea. Chinese President Xi Jinping rejected the decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is likely to have lasting implications for the resource-rich hot spot, which sees $5 trillion worth of shipborne trade pass through each year. "China will never accept any claim or action based on those awards," Xi said. China had boycotted the proceedings.

South China Sea: India, US say ‘accept ruling’ while Pakistan backs China
The Times of India, June 12
India on Tuesday urged all parties involved in the South China Sea dispute to show utmost respect for the UN-backed tribunal's ruling. A UN-backed international tribunal on Tuesday struck down China's claims of "historical rights" in the strategic South China Sea, prompting Chinese President Xi Jinping to reject its ruling and asserting that Beijing will not accept the verdict "under any circumstances".  India believes that States should resolve disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability, it further said.

Trade and Economy

India leads China in pharmaceutical exports in 2015
The Times of India, July 5
India maintained its supremacy over China in pharmaceutical exports in 2015 with a growth of 7.55 per cent to $12.54 billion, the commerce ministry said. "India's pharmaceutical exports continued its lead over China in 2015 ... India maintains its supremacy over China in pharmaceuticals," the ministry said in a statement. While India's pharma exports grew from $11.66 billion to $12.54 billion in 2015, recording a growth of 7.55 per cent, China's exports rose by 5.3 per cent to $6.94 billion, it added. "India moved ahead of China in all important markets such as the US, Africa and the European Union," it added.

Survey: Indian firms best, China worst on transparency
The New York Times, July 11
India has the most transparent companies while Chinese firms are the most opaque, according to a global watchdog's survey released Monday that assesses the efforts of companies in emerging markets to fight corruption. Transparency International said the report's findings were "pathetic" and highlighted the urgent need for big multinational companies to do more to fight corruption. The report covered 100 companies in 15 emerging-market countries that also included Brazil, Mexico and Russia. The overall score slipped since the last Transparency In Corporate Reporting survey in 2013, falling a fraction to 3.4 out of 10, with three quarters of companies scoring less than half.

China’s Changan Automobile could enter India
Business Standard, July 11
Changan Automobile, China’s 4th largest carmaker may be eyeing an entry into the Indian car market. Executives from the brand reportedly visited the states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu to explore the possibility of tying up with a local partner to set up a production facility. The move is believed to have been motivated by stagnating sales in the Chinese domestic market and stiff competition from global brands.

Chinese construction major keen on India’s highway projects
The Economic Times, July 12
A major Chinese construction corporation has expressed keen interest in India's highway development projects, the government on Tuesday disclosed. The disclosure by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways came after a high-level delegation from the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited (CRCC) met officials from the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) here. According to the ministry, NHAI Chairman Raghav Chandra appraised the CRCC delegation about the various projects lined up with the state-run roadways developer like the upgradation of two-lane highways and various other special expressways. Further, the state-run enterprise informed them about other connectivity projects for construction of by-passes and ring roads around major cities which will contribute to the "Smart Cities Projects". 

Energy and Environment

Nigeria unveils energy infrastructure deals with China
Financial Times, June 30
Nigeria says it has signed provisional agreements worth $80bn with Chinese companies to upgrade its oil and gas infrastructure, in a sign of Beijing’s willingness to bolster Africa’s largest economy as it grapples with its worst economic crisis in decades. The memorandums of understanding cover all aspects of Nigeria’s energy sector, from rehabilitating decaying refineries and building new pipelines to developing the neglected gas and power sectors, the country’s state oil company NNPC said in a statement. The agreements were reached during a visit this week to Beijing by Emmanuel Ibe Kachikwu, Nigeria’s oil minister. NNPC said 38 Chinese companies were involved in the agreements, including Sinopec, an oil group, and Norinco, a weapons maker.

India is cutting oil deals worldwide
Bloomberg, July 8
In May, shortly before he spoke to Congress in Washington, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to Tehran to sign a deal with the leaders of Iran and Afghanistan to develop a port on the Gulf of Oman, with India providing $500 million in financing. “Iran has prioritized expanding relations with those states that stood by its side when it was under sanctions,” Tehran-based political analyst Mostafa Khoshcheshm said on Iranian state television in May. India, though pressured to buy less oil from Iran, stayed close to the country during the sanctions. The prime minister is looking north, too. India’s largest oil company, state-owned Oil & Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC), completed a $1.3 billion purchase of 15 percent of Vankor, one of the biggest Russian oil fields to go into production in the past 25 years. 

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Analyses and Commentaries

Delhi’s NSG bid upset by rules, not Beijing
Global Times, June 28
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had a plenary meeting in Seoul last week, and all members participated in a special conference on Thursday evening about the accession of non-participants of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into the NSG. At least 10 countries, including China, have opposed their bid. India is not a signatory to the NPT, but is the most active applicant to join the NSG. Before the Seoul meeting, the Indian media played up the prospects of its bid. Some even claim that among the 48 members of the NSG, 47 have given it a green light, except China. Since its foundation in 1975, all NSG members shall be NPT signatories. This has become the primary principle of the organization. Now India wants to be the first exception to join the NSG without signing the NPT. It is morally legitimate for China and other members to upset India's proposal in defense of principles.

The real reason China won’t let India join NSG
Forbes, June 30
China had a clear and loud message for New Delhi in the recent Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) meeting – there’s no place for India here. That came as a big disappointment to Indian observers who had hoped that China would support India’s bid to join this elite group. There’s an official and an unofficial reason for China’s position on this matter. The official reason is that New Delhi is not a signatory of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

A Himalayan balancing act
The Hindu, July 1
The great Himalayan Divide between India and China was in evidence last week following the Chinese refusal to support India's case for entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. While non-entry into the Group is not the end of the world, for India lives to fight another day, of concern is what the Chinese stance implies for the bilateral relationship between the two Asian giants. This is a relationship that has been assiduously tended over the years since the mid-seventies when ambassadorial relations between the two countries were restored at the initiative of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Despite the humiliation suffered in 1962, she famously opined that “we cannot march to Peking” and that normalisation of relations constituted the triumph of maturity over the futility of alienation.

Speak frankly with China
The Indian Express, July 5
As it comes to terms with China’s unambiguous opposition to India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Delhi must brace for an extended period of structural tension with Beijing. Managing this tension and limiting the political fallout from it constitutes the single most important external challenge for India. After the Seoul plenary of the NSG, Delhi signalled its displeasure at Beijing’s procedural tactics to block the consideration of Indian membership. At the same time, Delhi emphasised its commitment to continued engagement with Beijing. Adopting a measured tone towards Beijing in a TV interview last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted the complex nature of India’s bilateral relationship with China and underlined the importance of accommodating each other’s interests, concerns and priorities.

China, India eye ‘Asian Century’ as Brexit rattles old order
South China Morning Post, July 11
Britain’s vote to leave the European Union and simmering discontent in other Western countries are seen as hastening the arrival of an “Asian Century”, analysts say, led by the rise of China and India. By 2050, Asia will account for over half the world’s gross domestic product, almost double that of 2011, according to the Asian Development Bank, with 3 billion newly affluent citizens. Brexit has summoned the spectre of a domino-like departure of other members of the EU, pounded by the migrant and euro crises, as well as a fragmenting Britain, should Scotland vote for independence. A resurgent Russia, which is angered by EU and US-imposed sanctions and has friendly ties with China and India, has hailed the Brexit vote as it looks for cracks to exploit.

Beyond claims, South China Sea is battleground for US, Chinese exceptionalism
The Wire, July 12
In a few hours, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague releases its verdict on the South China Sea dispute, China will likely thumb its nose at a verdict “unilaterally” pursued by the Philippines. The Philippines may have a territorial dispute with Beijing, but it is only a small player in the struggle for Asian influence between China and the United States that the South China Sea dispute has now escalated. Among the volley of claims and counter-claims that will be parried between Beijing and Washington in the coming days, one in particular from China will stand out: that the United States has no legitimacy to intervene in a maritime conflict when it has not itself ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

China’s reaction to arbitration depends on provocation
Global Times, July 12
The award of the South China Sea arbitration will be issued at 5 pm Beijing time Tuesday. The US and Japan have claimed that relevant countries, including China, should comply with the arbitration result. They stand in sharp confrontation with China, which has announced that the award would be "nothing but a piece of paper." Whether the arbitration will lead to a severe geopolitical crisis has come under the global spotlight.  The Western media is analyzing how China will respond to the award. Bloomberg posited three scenarios from Beijing, from benign to moderately aggressive or  aggressive. It considers that China establishing an South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) would be moderately aggressive and towing away the Philippine warship grounded at Ren'ai Reef and construction on Huangyan Island as aggressive. 

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Books and Journals

Understanding Indian Policy Dilemmas in the Indo-Pacific through an India-US-China Maritime Triangle Lens
Maritime Affairs, May 2016
Between the American rebalance strategy and Chinese Maritime Silk Road initiative, India is increasingly pressed to formulate a maritime strategy that ideally meets Indian economic and strategic objectives. This is generating major policy dilemmas for India stemming from the attraction of economic integration led by China on the one hand, versus the attraction of strategic integration offered by the United States on the other hand. This paper, by Deepa M. Ollapally, suggests that between these binary options, there are both opportunities and challenges for India, calling for fine-grained policymaking. The notional concept of an India–US–China maritime triangle is useful in sifting through the choices before India to meet its ambitions of development as well as retain and improve its strategic influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

What is Different about Urbanization in Rich and Poor Countries? Cities in Brazil, China, India and the United States
Journal of Urban Economics, 2016
Are the well-known facts about urbanization in the United States also true for the developing world? Juan Pablo Chauvin, Edward Glaeser, Yueran Ma and Kristina Tobio compare American metropolitan areas with analogous geographic units in Brazil, China and India. Both Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law seem to hold as well in Brazil as in the U.S., but China and India look quite different. In Brazil and China, the implications of the spatial equilibrium hypothesis, the central organizing idea of urban economics, are not rejected. The India data, however, repeatedly rejects tests inspired by the spatial equilibrium assumption. One hypothesis is that spatial equilibrium only emerges with economic development, as markets replace social relationships and as human capital spreads more widely. In all four countries there is strong evidence of agglomeration economies and human capital externalities. The correlation between density and earnings is stronger in both China and India than in the U.S., strongest in China. In India the gap between urban and rural wages is huge, but the correlation between city size and earnings is more modest. The cross-sectional relationship between area-level skills and both earnings and area-level growth are also stronger in the developing world than in the U.S. The forces that drive urban success seem similar in the rich and poor world, even if limited migration and difficult housing markets make it harder for a spatial equilibrium to develop.

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